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the archivist at the University of Michigan-Flint, Dave Larzelere from the Flint Journal 
Archive, and Jeff Taylor from the Perry Archives, who have been extraordinarily helpful 
and supportive over the years.  During my long sojourn in the archives, I spent many 
months getting to know Olive Beasley, Aileen Butler, Paul Cabell, Woody Etherly, John 
Hightower, Edgar Holt, and other Flint activists who tried to build a more equitable 
region.  They deserve a special acknowledgement for providing me with information and 
inspiration.  Thanks also to Ananthakrishnan Aiyer, Dave Doherty, Ernest Holman, Jason 
Kosnoski, Albert Price, Dayne Walling, David White, and members of the Black 
Teacher‘s Caucus, who love Flint in spite of its faults and taught me a great deal about 
the texture of life in the Vehicle City.   
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asking tough questions, pointing out errors in argumentation and syntax, and providing a 
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politics really matter.  I could not have asked for a better advisor than Matthew Lassiter.  
For over seven years now, Matt has supported me in ways that I cannot even begin to 
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The city of Flint salutes you, 
to General Motors, we raise our voice in song. 
The city of Flint salutes you, 
to General Motors, the hand of friendship strong. 
 
The city of Flint salutes you, 
for the goal you‘ve reached today. 
We are proud to be your neighbor, 
and we‘re glad that you came to stay. 





We Northerners tend to look down on the South from a moral valley; not a mountain top.  In many ways the 
North is no better off than the South; its system of ghettoization and segregation is just as deplorable as 
Dixie‘s, and just as harsh and inhumane.   
—Whitney M. Young, Jr., Executive Director, National Urban League, ca. 1965
2 
 
On November 23, 1954, a celebration erupted in the industrial city of Flint, Michigan.  At 
precisely 10:10 on that crisp fall morning, workers cheered, factory whistles screeched, 
and ―aerial bombs‖ exploded in the sky as a sparkling sports coupe rolled off the final 
assembly line at a General Motors Corporation (GM) plant just south of the city.  The 
gold-plated, gold-trimmed Chevrolet Bel Aire was GM‘s 50 millionth car produced in the 
United States, and hundreds of journalists, automobile executives, and civic leaders 
gathered at the company‘s Van Slyke Road assembly plant to bear witness to history.  As 
workers put the final touches on the coupe, plant supervisors shut down the assembly line 
and summoned all present to hear speeches by GM President Harlow Curtice and 
                                                 
1
 A 1958 film commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of GM‘s founding features this song.  See Among 
Our Souvenirs (General Motors Corporation, 1958).    
2
 This undated remark is quoted in ―A Flint Paradox,‖ Circle (May 1965), Urban League of Flint Papers, 
box 1, folder 8, Genesee Historical Collections Center, University of Michigan-Flint, Flint, Michigan 
(hereinafter cited as GHCC). 
2 
 
Chevrolet General Manager T. H. Keating.  In an address broadcast by closed-circuit 
television to GM plants across the country, Curtice identified the golden vehicle as a 
symbol of industrial accomplishment unmatched in world history.  ―That car is the 50 
millionth car produced by General Motors in the United States since 1908,‖ Curtice 
proclaimed.  ―Fifty million cars are more cars than any other country or any combination 
of other countries has ever produced.  They represent a production feat that surpasses 
anything ever achieved by any other industrial organization.‖
3
  Like many of the revelers 
who had amassed to observe this historic event, Curtice viewed November 23 as a day to 
celebrate GM‘s corporate progress, the triumphs of American capitalism and democracy, 
and the seemingly boundless consumer prosperity generated by the post-World War II 
economic boom.  The Vehicle City of Flint and its nearly 200,000 residents were ready 
for a party.     
 
 
Figure I.1.  GM‘s 50 millionth car, a Flint-made Chevrolet Bel Aire sports coupe, 1954.  
Courtesy of http://www.55classicchevy.com/1955-chevrolet-50-millionth-car.html.  
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 ―50 Millionth GM Auto Touches Off Big Celebration,‖ Flint Journal, November 23, 1954; ―Curtice 
Praises Employees of GM,‖ Flint Journal, November 23, 1954. 
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Flint was a fitting place to celebrate GM‘s ―Golden Carnival,‖ the largest and 
most keenly anticipated bash in the city‘s hundred-year municipal history.  In 1908, Flint 
industrialist William Crapo Durant founded General Motors.  By 1954, metropolitan 
Flint—with nearly eighty thousand local workers on the corporation‘s payroll—was 
home to the greatest concentration of GM factories and employees anywhere in the 
world.  During the weeks leading up to November 23, Curtice, Flint Mayor George 
Algoe, Flint Journal newspaper editor Michael Gorman, and other civic leaders had 
meticulously planned the festivities.  In order to minimize traffic gridlock, corporate 
officials paid for free citywide bus service throughout the day.  For his part, Buick 
General Manager Ivan Wiles sponsored complimentary babysitting services, which 
allowed thousands of new parents to participate fully in the event.  To mark the occasion, 
nearly 150,000 people flocked to downtown Flint for a parade, music, dancing, and 
speeches.  Following his address at the Van Slyke Road plant in suburban Flint 
Township, Curtice and other special guests boarded cars and buses bound for Saginaw 
Street in the heart of Flint‘s central business district.  Joining Curtice and other honored 
guests for the parade were three hundred top GM executives, many of whom had arrived 
earlier in the day from Detroit courtesy of a privately chartered golden train.  Once they 
arrived downtown, observers received commemorative golden feathers distributed by 
representatives from the Flint Chamber of Commerce.  With feathers tucked in their 
fedoras, pillboxes, and ball caps, parade watchers enjoyed ―a spectacle of magnificent 
color and beauty,‖ complete with fireworks, bands, and eight thousand golden balloons 
floating overhead.
4
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 ―Symbolic Auto Touches Off Big Celebration Here,‖ Flint Journal, November 23, 1954. 
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  The Golden Carnival commenced within minutes of the Bel Aire‘s completion.  
Upon reaching downtown, Curtice and his guests made their way to a parade review 
stand in front of the luxurious Durant Hotel.  A ―three-bomb salute‖ greeted the Curtice 
caravan as it approached the hotel, followed shortly thereafter by ten additional ―bomb 
blasts‖ that opened the parade.  The highlight of the Golden Carnival, of course, was the 
new Bel Aire sports coupe, which sat atop the final float.  Still, the hour-long event 
featured a variety of entertaining performances and spectacles designed to captivate just 
about anyone.  Among the main attractions were nine marching bands from local high 
schools and colleges; five shiny white convertibles that previewed GM‘s 1955 line of 
automobiles; a display sponsored by the United Automobile Workers (UAW), Flint‘s 
largest labor union; a special float dedicated to ―Mr. and Mrs. USA,‖ which carried a 
young white family representing GM‘s loyal consumers; and performances by the ―high 
stepping Dreyer sisters, national baton twirling champions.‖
5
  Heralded by journalists for 
its scrupulous planning and military-like precision, the Golden Carnival was one of the 
most carefully orchestrated, lavish celebrations of mass production and consumption in 
American civic history.  Indeed, one of the day‘s only unscripted moments occurred 
when an errant metal baton tossed by a Michigan State College twirler struck an overhead 
power line, raining red-hot sparks over a section of the parade route.
6
  When asked by a 
Flint Journal reporter to comment on the event, L. A. Clark, a Flint resident for more 
than eighty years, stated, ―I‘ve seen everything that‘s happened in Flint but nothing half 
as big as this.  It was 500 per cent better than anything I‘ve seen before.‖
7
   
                                                 
5
 ―Spectacle Is Climaxed by 50 Millionth Car,‖ Flint Journal, November 23, 1954. 
6
 Flint Journal, November 23, 1954.   
7
 ―Brilliant Parade Tells General Motors Story,‖ Flint Journal, November 23, 1954; ―Windows, Trees and 
Roofs Crowded along Carnival‘s Line of March, Flint Journal, November 23, 1954. 
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The corporate and municipal officials who planned the Golden Carnival hoped 
that it would demonstrate the solidarity that connected Flint and General Motors, 
autoworkers and their employers, and loyal consumers with their trusted GM products.  
In order to strengthen those bonds, GM factory managers hosted open houses in all of 
their plants nationwide on November 23, providing citizens with unprecedented access to 
the company‘s industrial facilities.  Following the parade in Flint, over 100,000 people 
dispersed to visit the nine GM complexes scattered throughout Genesee County.  Because 
the Flint Board of Education cancelled school for the day, thousands of children 
accompanied their parents to the factories.  Once inside the plants, children witnessed 
firsthand the marvels of modern automobile production, learned about the work 
environments of loved ones, and, perhaps, even caught a glimpse of their own future 
workplaces.  Curtice and other corporate and civic dignitaries continued their celebration 
at the Industrial Mutual Association (IMA) auditorium just northeast of downtown, where 
GM hosted a Golden Carnival luncheon for three thousand invited guests.  At the IMA 
gathering, Curtice announced a $3 million gift from GM to fund the city‘s new cultural 
center.  According to Curtice, a longtime Flint resident, GM‘s gift to the city was an 
expression of the corporation‘s desire to be a ―good citizen of our plant communities and 
to assume the duties and responsibilities that good citizenship imposes.‖
8
  Mayor Algoe 
bragged that Flint was the ―envy of all other industrial cities in the United States.‖  In the 
opinion of F. A. Bower, Buick‘s retired chief engineer, ―The GM carnival was the 
greatest day in the history of Flint.‖  ―With Mr. Curtice at the head,‖ Bower predicted, 
―both the corporation and the city of Flint are assured of great prosperity.‖
9
  To Bower 
                                                 
8
 ―Curtice Announces $3,000,000 Flint Cultural Center Grant,‖ Flint Journal, November 23, 1954. 
9
 ―Consensus in Flint: Golden Carnival Great,‖ Flint Journal, November 25, 1954. 
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and Algoe, the Golden Carnival seemed to mark the permanent triumph of industrial 
progress, consumer prosperity, and social opportunity in the Vehicle City.  With its 
extraordinarily high wages, low unemployment, internationally renowned public schools, 
and high rates of home ownership, Flint was truly a remarkable sight on that golden 
November day.      
The Golden Carnival was a festival of both truth and fiction.  Although the 
splendor of the day made it difficult to detect, the 1954 extravaganza concealed just as 
much as it revealed about the texture of daily life in Flint, the relationship between the 
city and General Motors, and the corporation‘s commitment to prosperity and opportunity 
in its hometown.  In their stories about the tribute, reporters from the Flint Journal 
saluted Flint‘s civic progress and the corporate triumphs of General Motors.  On that 
same day, however, the newspaper‘s classified section featured Jim Crow advertisements 
from local citizens seeking white nannies, ―Colored‖ tenants, and white homebuyers.  
Furthermore, when Harlow Curtice and his colleagues made their trek from the nearly all-
white suburb of Flint Township to the Golden Carnival parade in downtown Flint, they 
traveled along Saginaw Street, the Vehicle City‘s most persistent racial fault line.  As the 
float carrying the golden Bel Aire rolled north towards downtown, it passed by several 
all-white neighborhoods just west of Saginaw that carefully excluded African Americans.  
On the east side of the street, by contrast, sat Floral Park, one of only two areas in city 
where black citizens could obtain housing in 1954.  Once they arrived downtown, Curtice 
and other GM executives viewed the parade from the grounds of the Durant Hotel, a 
whites-only establishment.  After the parade, Curtice attended a whites-only luncheon at 
the IMA auditorium, where he announced GM‘s $3 million gift to the city.  The donation 
7 
 
funded a cultural center adjacent to the all-white Woodlawn Park district, a neighborhood 
that black people could visit, but only during the daytime.  Beneath the glare of the 
Golden Carnival, Flint was among the most segregated cities in the United States; and the 
municipal officials and corporate executives who presided over the day‘s amusements 
were largely to blame for those conditions. 
Flint was also a city teetering on the brink of disaster.  During the decade 
preceding the Golden Carnival, tens of thousands of white taxpayers moved away from 
the city in search of newer and better housing in the racially segregated suburbs of 
Genesee County.  Their departures caused major tax and service gaps in the increasingly 
black metropolis.  Over the same period, GM and other local employers implemented a 
suburban investment strategy in Genesee County that redirected jobs, taxes, and capital 
from the city to the suburbs.  The state-of-the-art Chevrolet assembly plant that birthed 
GM‘s 50 millionth vehicle was located not in Flint but in suburban Flint Township, five 
miles southwest of the city‘s downtown business district.  Though few contemporaries 
noted the irony in GM‘s decision to feature a suburban plant in its celebration of Flint‘s 
place in industrial history, the significance of the company‘s capital decentralization 
campaign cannot be overstated.  Ultimately, the suburban migrations of white 
homeowners and businesses severely undermined the vitality of Flint‘s booming postwar 
economy.    
Tragically, F. A. Bower‘s predictions of stability and prosperity for the Vehicle 
City turned out to be false.  By 1974, only two decades after the Golden Carnival, the 
popular mood in Flint had shifted markedly.  During the oil shortages and inflationary 
crisis of the 1970s, American automakers saw their sales decline precipitously.  With its 
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lineup consisting almost entirely of large, heavy, energy inefficient cars and trucks, GM 
suffered devastating losses during the oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1979.  In January 1974, 
with over thirty thousand Flint residents out of work, the Vehicle City‘s unemployment 
rate stood at 15.1 percent, the highest in the nation.
10
  Although GM had regained a 
substantial portion of its market share by 1978, the sales slumps and economic downturns 
of the 1970s and early 1980s marked the end of the postwar boom and the onset of a new 
era of mass deindustrialization in Genesee County.  During the 1980s, Flint autoworkers 
suffered through a seemingly unending series of layoffs and plant closures that cut GM‘s 
employment in the region in half.  Between 1955 and 1987, the company eliminated 
thirty-four thousand jobs in the Flint area.
11
     
The lean years had only just begun, though.  The high-tech and Wall Street booms 
of the 1990s did little to stem the loss of jobs from the Vehicle City.  During the 1990s, 
                                                 
10
 Flint Journal, October 8, 1974.  See also, Bryan D. Jones and Lynn W. Bachelor, The Sustaining Hand: 
Community Leadership and Corporate Power (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986); Ronald 
Edsforth, Class Conflict and Cultural Consensus: The Making of a Mass Consumer Society in Flint, 
Michigan (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987), esp. 191-228; James D. Ananich, Neil O. 
Leighton, and Charles T. Webber, Economic Impact of Plant Closings in Flint, Michigan (Flint: Regents of 
the University of Michigan, 1989); Steven P. Dandaneau, A Town Abandoned: Flint, Michigan, Confronts 
Deindustrialization (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); and Theodore J. Gilman, No 
Miracles Here: Fighting Urban Decline in Japan and the United States (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2001).    
11
 On organized labor and the economic retrenchment of the 1970s and 1980s, see William Serrin, The 
Company and the Union: The ―Civilized Relationship‖ of the General Motors Corporation and the United 
Automobile Workers (New York: Random House, 1973); Dudley W. Buffa, Union Power and American 
Democracy: The UAW and the Democratic Party, 1935-1972 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1984); Robert Reich and John Donahue, New Deals: The Chrysler Revival and the American System (New 
York: Times Books, 1985); Harry Katz, Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the U.S. Automobile 
Industry (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1985); Mike Davis, Prisoners of the 
American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the US Working Class (London: Verso, 1986); 
Kim Moody, An Injury to All: The Decline of American Unionism (London: Verso, 1988), 95-126; Barbara 
Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class (New York: Pantheon, 1989); Robert 
Zieger, American Workers, American Unions, 1920-1985 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1995), 201-211; Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of 
American Labor (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 439-445; Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit? 
Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), esp. 192-
223; Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New 
York: Free Press, 2001), esp. 121-143; and Jefferson Cowie, ―‗Vigorously Left, Right, and Center‘: The 
Crosscurrents of Working-Class America in the 1970s,‖ in Beth Bailey and David Farber, eds., America in 
the 70s (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 75-106.   
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GM‘s share of the automobile market continued to decline.  In 1997, following the 
closure of the city‘s massive Buick City complex, Flint‘s largest industrial facility, GM‘s 
workforce in Genesee County dipped to thirty-three thousand.  By 2002, that number had 
slipped even further to fifteen thousand.  Unable to halt the outward flow of taxpayers 
and jobs, Flint‘s political leaders faced a deficit of over $40 million at century‘s end and 
the looming prospect of state receivership.  For many residents of the Vehicle City, the 
decline of the American automobile industry and Flint‘s emergence as the unemployment 
capital of the United States signaled the end of the once cordial relationship between 
General Motors and its parent city.  ―The new Flint paradigm should be that GM is a 
global corporation and it shouldn‘t give a hoot about Flint,‖ asserted Bill Donahue of the 
Billy Durant Automotive Commission.  By the close of the twentieth century, Flint—a 
city with more unemployed persons than autoworkers—was the ―Vehicle City‖ only in 
name.
12
   
The case study of metropolitan Flint that follows analyzes the interlocking 
histories of Jim Crow, mass suburbanization, and industrial decline.  ―Demolition Means 
Progress‖ explores the political, economic, social, and cultural developments of the mid-
twentieth century that transformed Flint from a segregated industrial powerhouse into a 
hypersegregated Rust Belt metropolis.  For much of the twentieth century, observers from 
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around the world looked to the partnership between Flint, the UAW, and GM as a 
microcosm of the American Dream of progress, prosperity, and democracy.  Buoyed by 
the post-World War II expansion of the automobile industry and the unprecedented 
collective bargaining agreements won by UAW members, the Flint of the 1940s and 
1950s was, for some workers, an ―arsenal of democracy‖—a city that delivered economic 
security, consumer abundance, and civic opportunity.  Today, by contrast, Flint is 
internationally renowned for its shuttered automobile factories, crime, high 
unemployment rates, racial segregation, and shrinking population.  After more than four 
decades of plant closures, population loss, and economic divestment, Flint has become a 
powerful symbol of the Rust Belt‘s decay and the downward economic mobility of 
working-class and poor Americans.  For some, the deindustrialization of Flint and other 
cities have come to represent the end of the New Deal ―social contract‖ and the death of 
the American Dream.  In truth, however, the Vehicle City‘s long history of racial 
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The Mythology of Northern Racial Innocence  
―Demolition Means Progress‖ examines the grassroots and structural barriers to racial 
equality and economic opportunity in metropolitan Flint from the Great Depression to the 
present.  Between the 1930s and the mid-1950s, racial segregation increased markedly in 
many of the schools and neighborhoods of Genesee County.  Restrictive housing 
covenants, neighborhood violence, ―racial steering,‖ and other private forms of racism 
and discrimination played an important role in maintaining Jim Crow in Flint and its 
growing suburbs.  Yet deliberate government policies also sustained segregation in the 
Flint region.  Corporate and elected officials maintained the color line in this spatially 
decentralized yet rigidly divided metropolis by imposing segregationist housing, urban 
development, and educational programs.  A combination of grassroots racism, federal 
growth initiatives, and local public policies intensified urban poverty and racial 
segregation and inscribed those inequities spatially on Flint‘s metropolitan landscape.  A 
set of complex ideological and policy bonds connected Jim Crow schools, Jim Crow 
neighborhoods, Jim Crow workplaces, and Jim Crow development practices.  The 
persistent segregation at the heart of Flint‘s story challenges historians to abandon false 
dichotomies between the North and South.  Given the pivotal role of the local 
government in maintaining racial inequality, the term de facto segregation best represents 
an ideological articulation of northern racial exceptionalism rather than a neutral 
descriptor of the region‘s color lines.
14
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During the past quarter-century, ―new‖ urban and suburban historians such as 
Arnold R. Hirsch, Kenneth T. Jackson, Thomas J. Sugrue, and Robert O. Self, have 
rewritten the history of postwar ghetto formation.  These scholars and others have 
conclusively demonstrated that planners, federal officials, local politicians, members of 
the private housing industry, and ordinary white homeowners deliberately segregated 
citizens by race.  In addition, they have undermined notions of northern and western 
racial exceptionalism by exploring the extraordinary depths of grassroots white racism 
and the government-aided ―resegregation‖ of metropolitan spaces.
15
  Despite such 
seminal contributions, however, researchers have not yet fully explored the role of 
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municipal public policies in maintaining racial segregation; nor have they jettisoned the 
language of ―de facto segregation‖ that upholds the mythology of northern (and western) 
racial innocence.  In fact, many historians of northern and western cities continue to reify 
false regional dichotomies, namely by privileging non-statist, grassroots forms of racial 
discrimination over policy-driven segregation, and by employing the language of de facto 
segregation to describe a largely privatized, ―northern version‖ of Jim Crow that simply 
did not exist.  The framework of de facto segregation—with its narrow emphasis on 
private forms of racism and the ―crabgrass-roots politics‖ of white homeowners—has 
allowed many historians to underestimate the central role of municipal planners, city 
commissioners, and other government officials in creating policies that maintained 
segregation.  Only a few scholars have endeavored to explain with any precision how 
suburban and municipal governments, regardless of region, worked to uphold the color 
line.  This dissertation constitutes one such effort.
16
   
The notion of de facto segregation is a sacred and enduring myth in American 
society.  The term first entered the political lexicon during the 1950s debates over school 
desegregation in the North and West.  In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 1954 
Brown v. Board of Education decision, legal experts, political observers, and 
policymakers from a wide variety of ideological persuasions—including many activists 
committed to toppling Jim Crow—began using the terms ―de jure‖ and ―de facto‖ to 
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denote distinctions between government-mandated racial segregation in the South and the 
private, extra-governmental ―discrimination‖ that reputedly prevailed in the rest of the 
nation.
17
  Adopting the same language as their historical subjects, many researchers have 
since employed the de jure category to characterize the statutory forms of segregation 
that existed in the Jim Crow South, reserving the de facto label for the ostensibly private, 
market-based, non-statist acts that resulted in segregation ―in fact‖ in the North and West.  
The de jure-de facto distinction, which has always held that segregation in the North and 
West derived from the housing choices of individual citizens and/or discrimination in the 
private real estate market, masks the government interventions that maintained the color 
line in Flint and other cities across the nation.  The de facto framework allowed 
municipal legislators, urban planners, school board members, suburban officials, and 
federal housing administrators in these communities to deny responsibility for the public 
policies that upheld racial divisions.  Still, virtually every instance of allegedly de facto 
segregation in Flint‘s schools and neighborhoods stemmed from state-sponsored 
education, housing, and urban development policies.  The persistent vocabulary of 
―choice‖ that underlies most declarations of northern exceptionalism fails to describe the 
spatial and racial configurations that emerged in metropolitan Flint as a direct result of 
postwar public policies.  Rather, the language of de facto segregation was part of a 
broader discourse of power on northern racial innocence that allowed both ordinary 
whites and elected officials to resist the moral, legal, and political demands of the civil 
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rights movement.  While it is clear that the form and structure of Jim Crow has varied 
widely over time and across space in the United States, it is also true that postwar 
housing, education, and development programs produced a state-sponsored, public 
policy-driven pattern of Jim Crow in Genesee County and other communities nationwide.  
Flint‘s story is, then, a national story.
18
 
The concept of de facto segregation has always hinged upon a series of 
displacements.  During the postwar struggles over open housing and school desegregation 
in the North, defenders of the segregated status quo routinely employed the language of 
northern innocence to reassign and deflect blame for the color line.  In Flint and other 
industrial cities, many whites insisted that segregation reflected personal preference 
unlike in the South, where the state required Jim Crow.  Similarly, when civil rights 
activists in the Vehicle City challenged school segregation, members of the Flint Board 
of Education claimed that ―racial imbalances‖ in their facilities were attributable solely to 
housing patterns.  However, Flint‘s civic and political leaders also denied responsibility 
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for residential segregation, asserting that the color line derived from the private 
inclinations of white and black renters and homebuyers.  Beyond the regional 
displacement, then, there was also a public-private dimension to the discourse on de facto 
segregation.  Those who argued that segregation in the North was de facto credited 
racially imbalanced schools and neighborhoods to private, non-governmental forces in 
the real estate, housing, and development industries.  State actors and government 
policies, according to this formulation, were not responsible for the North‘s stark patterns 
of segregation.   
The de facto framework has relegated important municipal policymakers to the 
historiographical margins of urban and suburban studies.  That urban and suburban 
historians have almost completely ignored the practices of school boards in the North is 
perhaps the starkest manifestation of how the myth of northern racial exceptionalism has 
thwarted scholarly inquiry.  Only a handful of monographs in the new urban and 
suburban studies literatures have explored school segregation within the broader fabric of 
northern Jim Crow.  Assuming that segregation in the ―neighborhood schools‖ of the 
North stemmed primarily from residential arrangements, scholars of metropolitan history 
have tended to privilege housing over education in studies of the North‘s postwar color 
lines.  The story of community education in Flint begs for a different wisdom, however.  
While it is undeniable that segregated housing influenced school demographics in Flint 
and elsewhere, it is equally clear that local education authorities often played a decisive 
role both in maintaining segregation and in naturalizing the fleeting, racially constructed 
borders of ―neighborhood school‖ districts.  Although metropolitan history scholars have 
written very little about schools, they were crucial to the construction of the color line in 
17 
 
postwar Flint.  Indeed, in Flint and other ―school-centered‖ communities, racially 
gerrymandered schools were the essential building blocks for the broader public sphere.  
―Demolition Means Progress‖ aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
cultural beliefs, structural forces, and public policies that sustained urban racial and 




Flint and the Nation 
This dissertation attempts to forge a metropolitan synthesis out of the theoretical and 
conceptual gaps that have divided scholars of urban and suburban history.  By employing 
a metropolitan perspective and looking carefully at public policies, this account 
incorporates the methodological approaches of suburban historians.  However, 
―Demolition Means Progress‖ is also a community-level case study.  Many suburban 
historians have eschewed the case study approach, choosing instead to focus on federal 
policies and the growth of suburbs in the nation at large.  These historians have argued 
persuasively that New Deal and postwar federal housing and development policies helped 
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to solidify residential segregation in cities and suburbs throughout the nation.  Often, 
though, this approach has reduced municipal actors to passive bystanders in a federally 
orchestrated saga.  In Flint and other cities, local actors, municipal public policies, and 
place-specific conditions played an important role in shaping the structure of the color 
line, the implementation of federal policies, and the pace and trajectory of suburban 
development.
20
   
This case study of Flint and Genesee County revises standard scholarly 
interpretations of federal housing and development policies.  Unlike most histories of 
New Deal and postwar housing programs, which maintain that the national government 
reflexively privileged segregated suburbs over integrated urban areas, Flint‘s story 
demonstrates that federal housing administrators initially favored all-white urban 
neighborhoods over underdeveloped, hardscrabble suburbs.
21
  The mortgage insurance 
policies of the Home Owners‘ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) forced elected officials in the suburbs to develop urban-style 
utilities, services, and zoning codes in order to qualify for federally subsidized 
mortgages.  During the 1930s and 1940s, while out-county officials worked to modernize 
their governments and build urbanized infrastructures, local lenders issued thousands of 
FHA-insured mortgages for homes in all-white neighborhoods inside of Flint.  Because 
only a few of Flint‘s suburbs possessed the physical and legal accoutrements necessary to 
meet the federal government‘s rigorous standards, FHA administrators ―redlined‖ most 
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areas of the out-county.  After World War II, however, growth-minded suburban officials 
worked feverishly to make their communities more appealing to federal underwriters, real 
estate investors, and residents.  In the 1940s and 1950s, city, village, and township 
governments in the out-county implemented new land use plans, built new schools and 
roads, and funded major utility service improvements.  By the close of the 1950s, the 
FHA had acknowledged these efforts by abandoning its suburban redlining policies, a 
decision that led to an unprecedented development boom in Flint‘s segregated suburbs.   
The urbanization of governments and services in the out-county spawned a new 
spirit of political independence among white suburbanites.  Mindful of the sacrifices they 
had made to improve living standards and property values, suburban officials and 
taxpayers vociferously opposed metropolitan government, annexation, and other urban 
growth initiatives.  During the 1950s and 1960s, suburbanites chose to incorporate their 
communities rather than face the prospect of annexation.  Regional disputes over land 
use, city boundaries, and municipal incorporation contributed to intense political 
fragmentation in Genesee County, which in turn left the city of Flint isolated from its 
neighbors and without room to expand.  Ultimately, then, federal housing initiatives 
played a more important structural role in maintaining metropolitan inequalities than 
scholars have previously imagined.  To be sure, federal and local housing policies 
subsidized segregation in the Flint area by rewarding white homebuyers over their black 
counterparts.  Equally important, though, those same policies intensified city-suburban 
racial and economic chasms by motivating and empowering governments in all-white 
suburban areas to erect political barriers around themselves.                            
20 
 
In American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland, Robert Self 
effectively fuses the most compelling elements of urban and suburban studies into a new 
metropolitan synthesis.  Notably, he argues that local struggles over the spatial and 
political reorganization of Oakland produced both ―a black power politics of community 
defense and empowerment and a neopopulist conservative homeowner politics among 
whites.‖  The narratives of black power and suburban secession, Self maintains, ―demand 
to be told as one.‖  Although this approach is compelling, the Flint case points to the 
limitations of both structural determinism and the black power-white secession 
dichotomy.  Throughout the nation, the postwar decentralization of the metropolis 
produced intense conflicts over race, space, and power.  However, local conditions and 
local actors decisively influenced the sort of politics that emerged from those disputes.  In 
the company town of Flint, General Motors executives, often operating beneath the radar, 
actively shaped the agenda of the pro-growth suburban development coalition while 
severely undermining the political leverage of civil rights activists.
22
   
Intense battles over race, space, and taxes were common in postwar Genesee 
County, but they never produced the hardened ideological movements that sprang from 
metropolitan Oakland.  To be specific, the seeds of black power did not take root in the 
Vehicle City.  In Flint, liberal and moderate civil rights organizations such as the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Urban 
League led the fights for school desegregation, open housing, and workplace equity.  
With few exceptions, civil rights and neighborhood activists worked within established 
political channels—indeed, often from inside of GM‘s pro-growth coalition—to secure 
equality for black citizens.  During the 1950s and 1960s, to cite one important example, 
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community activists in Flint‘s North End ghetto endorsed calls for ―slum clearance‖ and 
worked from within the GM-dominated alliance for urban renewal and freeway 
construction to obtain better housing for African Americans.  Although a version of 
Self‘s racially exclusive ―industrial garden‖ also existed in Genesee County, the black 
freedom struggles in Flint and Oakland followed divergent paths.  On the other side of 
the color line, Self‘s teleological model of mass suburbanization and tax revolts cannot 
account for the pro-tax politics that took root in many areas of suburban Flint after World 
War II.  Taxes played only a minimal role in driving the suburban migrations of 
homeowners and businesses in Genesee County.  Once they arrived in the out-county, 
white homeowners often supported tax increases in order to fund new roads and schools, 
better sewer systems, and municipal water systems.  By the late 1970s, many suburban 
homeowners in Genesee County had joined the tax revolt that flourished in California.  
However, the anti-tax sentiment of the 1970s represented a sharp break from the past.  
Indeed, the movement for suburban secession in Genesee County grew out of a pro-tax, 
pro-development, and always anti-integrationist suburban political culture.
23
     
 
Beyond the Rust Belt Synthesis  
The histories of racial exclusion, suburban development, and industrial decline are 
intimately connected.  Too often, however, scholars of the Rust Belt have narrated these 
developments separately.  Flint was only one among hundreds of American cities that 
experienced mass deindustrialization during the second half of the twentieth century.  
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During the 1970s and 1980s, as layoffs and plant closures multiplied in the nation‘s 
northern and midwestern manufacturing sectors, a new discourse on corporate 
abandonment and the formation of the Rust Belt emerged among liberal journalists, 
artists, activists, and academics.  In scores of books, articles, and cultural products, 
proponents of what could be called the Rust Belt Synthesis identified the 1970s and 
1980s as a crucial turning point in American history.  In 1982, at the behest of a group of 
trade union and community activists concerned about plant closures and unemployment, 
scholars Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison authored The Deindustrialization of 
America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic 
Industry, perhaps the most detailed and widely read statement of the Rust Belt Synthesis.  
For Bluestone, Harrison, and a number of other academics and social commentators, 
economic crises in the ―sunset‖ industries of the urban North came about in the 1970s 
because of foreign competition, declining profit margins, and economic stagnation.  
According to the various iterations of this model, corporations such as General Motors 
responded to increased foreign competition, rising energy costs, trade union militancy, 
and the economic recessions of the 1970s by closing plants in the Rust Belt and shifting 
capital and resources southward to the low-wage Sunbelt and points overseas.  The 
capital migrations of the 1970s, many have argued, allowed corporate executives, at least 
for a time, to recoup the profit margins that they had enjoyed during the postwar 
economic boom.  According to UAW President Douglas Fraser, GM‘s Rust Belt to 
Sunbelt capital shifts in the 1970s were elements of a broader ―southern strategy‖ 
designed to increase corporate profits by depressing wages and crippling the labor 
movement.
24
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The works produced by Bluestone, Harrison, Staughton Lynd and other public 
intellectuals have informed much of the discourse on the Rust Belt‘s industrial decline.  
Yet the most powerful and influential articulations of the Rust Belt Synthesis have sprung 
from the cultural arena, where artists—filmmakers in particular—have introduced the 
issue of deindustrialization to huge popular audiences.  Between the 1970s and the 1990s, 
Slap Shot, Breaking Away, Blue Collar, American Dream, and a host of other films won 
critical acclaim for their powerful, ironic, and often humorous portrayals of the Rust 
Belt‘s industrial collapse.  In 1989, Flint activist Michael Moore released Roger and Me, 
a blockbuster documentary film that brought the Vehicle City‘s story of 
deindustrialization to an international audience.  As with other articulations of the Rust 
Belt Synthesis, the narrative of Roger and Me hinges on the Reagan Era as the key 
temporal pivot between the prosperous postwar period—in which workers and executives 
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Proponents of the Rust Belt Synthesis have told many important truths about 
Flint‘s recent industrial history.  As Moore‘s film powerfully demonstrates, the capitalist 
revanchism of the 1970s and 1980s devastated the industrial economies of Flint and other 
Rust Belt cities.  Moreover, Douglas Fraser was correct in arguing that executives from 
General Motors and other corporations shifted hundreds of thousands of jobs and millions 
of dollars in capital from the Rust Belt to the Sunbelt during the second half of the 
twentieth century.
26
  Nevertheless, the Rust Belt decline narrative errs on several 
analytical levels.  In particular, this dissertation offers an earlier periodization for the 
emergence of Flint‘s Rust Belt crisis.  In doing so, it builds upon the recent works of 
Sugrue, Jefferson Cowie, Self, and other scholars of deindustrialization and postwar 
urban change.  As Sugrue argues in The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality 
in Postwar Detroit, ―The rusting of the Rust Belt began neither with the much-touted 
stagflation and oil crisis of the 1970s, nor with the rise of global economic competition 
and the influx of car or steel imports.  It began, unheralded, in the 1950s.‖  With its 
narrow temporal emphasis on the 1970s and 1980s, the Rust Belt Synthesis obscures the 
important postwar capital migrations that generated the first signs of economic crisis in 
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Flint and other northern industrial metropolises.  Furthermore, by framing urban plant 
closures and layoffs as the epiphenomenal outcomes of global economic restructuring 
and international market forces, proponents of the Rust Belt model have diverted 
attention away from the particular municipal contexts in which deindustrialization 
occurred.  Yet municipal politics played a decisive role in driving the spatial 
reorganization of capital and work in metropolitan Flint.  Moreover, the decline of 
manufacturing in the Vehicle City was not inevitable.
27
   
Beyond its temporal inadequacies and analytical limitations, the Rust Belt 
declension narrative often depends upon a severely distorted view of postwar American 
culture.  Many chroniclers of the Rust Belt have argued that Flint‘s declining fortunes 
stemmed directly from the ―hypermobility‖ of capital during the 1970s and 1980s.  Late 
twentieth-century plant closures and layoffs, according to this popular model, marked a 
fundamental historical pivot that distinguished the prosperous postwar boom years from 
the bleak, postindustrial future of the twenty-first century.  In making such claims, the 
architects of the Rust Belt Synthesis often celebrate a postwar past that never existed for 
African Americans.  With few exceptions, proponents of the Rust Belt model subscribe to 
a framework of urban decline that revolves too closely around the experiences of the 
white working class.  For tens of thousands of white autoworkers in Genesee County, the 
twenty-five years following World War II were, in many ways, a golden era of job 
security, consumer affluence, and social progress.  To many of these white workers, the 
1970s seemed to mark the end of a prosperous epoch in American history.  Yet for 
African Americans in Flint, the postwar decades were an era of limits and intense social 
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contestation marked by widespread employment discrimination and rigid racial 
segregation.
28
   
 
The Metropolitan Vantage Point 
It is impossible to understand the origins of America‘s urban crisis without examining the 
complex, contentious, and often policy-driven relationships between cities and suburbs.  
Urban historians have argued convincingly for a new postwar periodization for the 
emergence of the Rust Belt and the roots of urban ―hypersegregation.‖  Furthermore, they 
have made a compelling case that ordinary urban whites played a major role in defending 
the postwar color line.  However, city-centered historians have often neglected to employ 
the spatial and policy frameworks necessary to grasp the metropolitan scope of the urban 
crisis.  Simply stated, suburbs—and the public policies that helped them to grow—are 
largely absent from the new urban studies literature.  Scholars of postwar urban history 
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tend to view the metropolis from the bottom-up and the inside-out, focusing on grassroots 
racial conflicts inside central cities and the flight of whites and capital that ensued in the 
wake of those battles.  This spatial orientation has played a decisive role in shaping the 
trajectory of the now familiar urban declension narrative.  Because urban historians have 
viewed metropolitan cityscapes through a geographically circumscribed lens, too often 
they have reduced the roots of urban-industrial crises to the analogous narratives of white 
flight and corporate abandonment.  Although historians of urban America and proponents 
of the Rust Belt Synthesis have often disagreed about the chronology of those crises, 
researchers on both sides of the temporal divide tend to agree on the metaphor of 
abandonment.  In American Babylon, Self formulates a powerful critique of this model.  
According to Self, ―The metaphor of flight, though accurate in many respects, shifts 
focus away from the complicated political production of suburban communities in place.‖  
―Telling urban and suburban histories together,‖ he added, ―moves us beyond 
generalizations like ‗white flight‘ . . . to the specific context in which each was 
embedded.‖  By incorporating a broader spatial view and looking carefully at postwar 
metropolitan development, ―Demolition Means Progress‖ seeks to push past the 
conceptual limitations of the white flight and corporate abandonment paradigms.
29
   
Over the past forty years, journalists, social commentators, and academic writers 
have often referred to the postwar decades as an ―age of white flight,‖ an era in which 
whites from across the socioeconomic spectrum abandoned increasingly integrated 
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central cities for the racial exclusivity of suburbia.
30
  On the surface, the striking postwar 
demographic shifts that created black majorities in Flint and scores of other American 
cities seem to bolster the explanatory power of white flight.  Between 1950 and 2005, the 
number of whites living in Flint dropped precipitously, from 149,100 to 43,942, while the 
city‘s African-American population increased steadily from 13,906 to 62,433.
31
  The 
overwhelming majority of white departures from Flint followed the city-to-suburb 
trajectory.  As in other cities, whites in Flint‘s racially transitional neighborhoods often 
responded to integration by opting to sell or rent their homes to African Americans.  In a 
recent study of the Flint Park neighborhood, to cite one example, Thomas Henthorn 
demonstrated that even whites with strong attachments to their homes, churches, and 
schools ultimately chose to move when black neighbors arrived.
32
   
It is indisputable that white flight helped to drive the suburbanization of the 
United States.  Still, this term cannot fully explain the multiplicity of forces that drove 
white departures from central cities.  Tens of thousands of whites fled Flint when racial 
integration arrived in their neighborhoods.  However, tens of thousands more departed 
the Vehicle City long before the first signs of neighborhood transition had appeared.  The 
allure of home ownership and the pastoral ideal, increasing job growth in the suburbs, 
real and imagined fears of urban crime, the quest for better schools, and, crucially, local 
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and federal subsidies for suburbanization, all existed alongside—and at times 
reinforced—racial avoidance as factors driving white suburban migrations.  As well, 
urban renewal and freeway construction programs solidified the color line in Flint and 
other cities by simultaneously compacting black ghettoes and subsidizing the departures 
of white city dwellers.  By focusing primarily on the private inclinations and fears of 
individual citizens, the discourse on white flight obscures the broader array of housing 
and metropolitan development policies that enabled the growth of segregated suburbs and 
all-black ghettoes.
33
   
 Closely related to the white flight model, the narrative of corporate abandonment 
also conceals a great deal about the geographic reorganization of power in metropolitan 
areas.  With its overemphasis on regional dichotomies and its inattention to local 
investment patterns, the Rust Belt decline-Sunbelt growth binary masks the postwar 
suburbanization of capital that re-shaped metropolitan economies and city-suburb power 
relations throughout the United States.  The suburbanization of industry intensified urban 
economic crises not only in ―sunset‖ cities such as Flint, but also in Sunbelt metropolises 
such as Oakland, Charlotte, Miami, Los Angeles, and Memphis.  By the dawn of the 
1960s, the centrifugal migrations of businesses and taxpayers had created the first 
obvious signs of decay on Flint‘s urban-industrial landscape.  However, even during the 
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worst of the 1970s and 1980s economic crises, many—though not all—of Flint‘s suburbs 
remained economically vibrant.  By incorporating a broader spatial view and looking 
carefully at postwar suburban development, this dissertation challenges the usefulness of 
the Rust Belt-Sunbelt dichotomy.
34
   
Most urban history scholars have avoided the simplicity of regional development 
models and have readily acknowledged the importance of city-suburban divides.  
However, they too have framed capital migrations through the lens of corporate 
abandonment.  Specifically, urban historians have tended to categorize all outward capital 
migrations—regardless of how far away companies moved—as examples of corporate 
divestment from central cities.  City-to-suburb capital moves, many historians have 
charged, created ―spatial mismatches‖ between deindustrializing majority-black cities 
and all-white job centers in the suburbs.  At first blush, this seems to have occurred in 
Flint.  In the 1940s and 1950s, GM officials and other members of the city‘s pro-growth 
coalition invested heavily in new suburban developments.  During this period, GM 
executives built several new plants outside of Flint and shifted millions of dollars in 
manufacturing capital from the city to its segregated suburbs.  By 1960, many of the 
city‘s automobile industry suppliers, retailers, and small business owners had followed 
suit.  However, these outward capital migrations were not simply acts of secession from 
the city.  Rather, GM‘s postwar capital moves in Genesee County were part of a larger 
(and ultimately unsuccessful) metropolitan growth agenda to expand the city‘s 
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boundaries through regional government and annexation.  Building upon Self‘s metaphor 
of the industrial garden, this dissertation argues that single causal frameworks cannot 
fully explain either white homeowners‘ decisions to leave the city or the spatial calculus 
that drove corporate growth strategies.
35
                                               
__________ 
 
This two-part case study consists of twelve chronologically and thematically arranged 
chapters focusing on the residential color line, school segregation, employment 
discrimination, suburban development, urban renewal, and deindustrialization.  Part I, 
―Race and Space in a Company Town,‖ explores the geographic and political structure of 
racial and economic inequalities in the Flint metropolitan region.  The dissertation begins 
with a discussion of the 1908 founding of GM, the growth of the automobile industry, 
and Flint‘s rise as an industrial metropolis.  During the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, the city‘s rapid population growth spawned severe infrastructural crises, housing 
shortages, and public health calamities.  The first three chapters of this study explore 
local and federal responses to the city‘s growth in the areas of housing and education and 
the racial, spatial, and economic considerations that drove city leaders‘ pro-growth 
development agendas.  Chapter 1 addresses home construction efforts during the interwar 
era, the growth of racially restrictive housing covenants, the civic culture of Jim Crow in 
Flint, and the birth of federal redlining initiatives.  The chapter closes with an extended 
analysis of how the Home Owners‘ Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing 
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Administration formalized the practices of redlining in Genesee County.  Chapter 2 
investigates the origins and early development of ―neighborhood schools‖ and 
―community education‖ in Flint.  During the Great Depression, corporate executives and 
Flint‘s political leaders struggled to maintain labor peace, civic harmony, and economic 
growth.  In response to the turmoil of the 1930s, local manufacturer Charles Stewart Mott 
agreed to fund a citywide experiment in community education that helped to harden the 
city‘s color line.  Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the structures of segregation and 
discrimination in Flint‘s neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces.  These chapters 
illustrate how local and federal policymakers, corporate officials, and private citizens 
worked to formalize Jim Crow inside of the city limits.    
―Demolition Means Progress‖ begins by focusing on developments within the 
city.  In Chapters 5 and 6, however, the setting shifts to suburban Genesee County.  These 
sections address how corporate growth strategies, federal housing and defense initiatives, 
and local public policies drove the spatial reorganization of capital and labor in postwar 
Flint.  As well, they document how local elected officials in the out-county responded to 
grassroots and federal demands to urbanize suburban governments and services.  Viewing 
the city and the suburbs as part of a single metropolitan entity, corporate executives and 
most members of the urban political establishment endorsed the suburban migrations of 
white homeowners and businesses.  Flint‘s city commissioners hoped to expand the 
Vehicle City‘s boundaries and tax base through annexation and regional government.  By 
the close of the 1950s, however, dissenters on both sides of the color line had emerged to 
challenge the spatial politics of Flint‘s pro-growth coalition.  Chapter 6, which analyzes 
the rise of suburban political consciousness in the 1950s, represents a turning point in this 
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narrative.  In 1958, civic and corporate leaders unveiled New Flint, a plan for regional 
government in Genesee County.  Despite GM‘s open endorsement of the proposal, 
suburban legislators and white homeowners revolted in opposition.  Ultimately, suburban 
political activism helped to deliver a deathblow to New Flint and other Sunbelt-style 
metropolitan growth proposals supported by the city‘s corporate and political 
establishments.                                
  Suburban homeowners were not alone in objecting to the machinations of the 
city‘s pro-growth leadership.  Part II of this dissertation, ―Civil Rights, Suburban Revolts, 
and the Roots of the Rust Belt,‖ opens by addressing the struggles over civil rights in 
Genesee County.  Chapters 7 and 8 analyze the local battles over open housing and 
school desegregation that exploded in the 1960s and 1970s.  Although black activists won 
many important victories over Jim Crow during this period, policymakers, civic leaders, 
and ordinary white homeowners throughout the county consistently invoked the concept 
of de facto segregation to resist demands for desegregation.  By the close of the civil 
rights era, African Americans in the city had still not triumphed in their quest to topple 
Jim Crow.  Part of the difficulty, as Chapters 9 through 11 illustrate, stemmed from the 
fact that most white citizens and government officials in Genesee County remained 
steadfast in their commitment to defending the color line.   
This dissertation takes its title from the struggles over urban renewal that unfolded 
during the long postwar era.  Following the defeat of the New Flint plan, municipal 
officials, corporate executives, and downtown boosters sought desperately to create space 
in the city for new economic development.  During the 1940s and 1950s, members of the 
city‘s pro-growth coalition had helped to build a more decentralized and segregated 
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metropolis.  By the 1960s and 1970s, however, those same civic leaders were trying to 
replicate suburban growth in the city by tearing down ―blighted‖ and ―obsolescent‖ 
neighborhoods.  Their efforts centered on razing the Floral Park and St. John Street 
ghettoes.  Demolition, many city builders claimed, was a sign of progress.  Chapter 9 
reveals how the city‘s urban renewal and freeway construction programs—in spite of 
widespread black support for neighborhood clearance—ultimately hardened the color line 
and created a new political economy of Jim Crow and industrial decline.  Chapter 10 
turns to the struggles over race and residence that unfolded in Flint‘s racially transitional 
neighborhoods during the 1960s and 1970s.  By 1968, a momentous year for civil rights 
legislation, black citizens could claim protection from local, state, and federal fair 
housing laws.  Nonetheless, elected officials and private citizens continued to uphold 
segregation through a combination of public policies and extralegal measures.  Paying 
close attention to the post-1968 continuation of redlining and the enduring racial and 
spatial calculus that informed site location decisions for subsidized housing 
developments, this chapter argues that government-sponsored segregation outlasted the 
civil rights reforms of the 1960s.    
 Chapter 11 explores suburban defenses of racial and class privilege during the 
1960s and 1970s.  By the close of the 1960s, African Americans had desegregated many 
neighborhoods inside of the city, even piercing through the color line in Beecher and 
several other inner-ring suburbs.  However, whites successfully defended segregation in 
the remainder of Genesee County.  This chapter traces disputes over race, class, and land 
use in the out-county and explains how suburban governments used zoning, municipal 
incorporation, and other means to defend the racial and economic homogeneity of their 
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communities.  The defense of the color line outside of the city was part of a wider 
campaign for suburban independence from Flint that unfolded during the 1960s and 
1970s.  In response to the threat of annexation and the specter of regional government, 
suburban taxpayers and policymakers moved to incorporate their communities.  The 
incorporation of Flint‘s suburbs—which in many ways was the culmination of the FHA‘s 
original suburban development strategy—left the city‘s political leaders and residents in 
precarious economic positions.    
 ―Demolition Means Progress‖ ends with the devastating plant closures and job 
losses of the late twentieth century.  Between 1970 and 2000, GM executives 
implemented a major restructuring program in Genesee County.  By century‘s end, 
layoffs and plant closures had reduced GM‘s local workforce to approximately fifteen 
thousand.  The combined effects of corporate reorganizations, mass suburbanization, and 
capital divestment left the shrinking city and thousands of its unemployed residents on 
the edge of bankruptcy.  To some observers, GM‘s decision to close plants and divest 
from Flint seemed to mark an apocalyptic moment in the city‘s history.  Predictions that 
the city would become a ghost town turned out to be untrue, however.  Despite the 
economic setbacks of the 1980s and 1990s, Flint‘s civic leaders continued in their efforts 
to revitalize and repopulate the city.  Over the past two decades, civic boosters have 
waged an ambitious campaign to lure new developments and homeowners to the city.  As 
in the postwar era, however, these efforts to renew the city have failed to deliver 
economic opportunities, spatial fairness, and racial equity to the post-Vehicle City and its 
growing black majority.                            
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The story of Flint‘s still-evolving urban crisis is not a simple tale of how white 
flight and corporate abandonment caused one city‘s fall from a mythical era of prosperity 
and opportunity; nor is it a saga defined solely by the persistence of racial inequalities in 
modern American life.  Rather, Flint‘s complex history of decline and renewal suggests 
elements of both continuity and change.  The postwar decentralization of white 
homeowners and industry created economic turmoil in cities such as Flint and produced a 
fundamental shift in metropolitan power relations across the United States.  Throughout 
the era of mass suburbanization, however, race served as a constant barrier to equal 
opportunity and first-class citizenship for African Americans.   
Racial segregation in the North was neither innocent nor exceptional.  The 
ossified patterns of Jim Crow that Flint activists confronted during the 1960s and 1970s 
had their roots in federal and local government policies that first took shape during the 
New Deal and postwar eras.  State-sponsored barriers to racial equality, economic equity, 
and spatial justice emerged powerfully in the Flint region following World War II, 
thereby creating the three defining features of the Rust Belt: deindustrialization, urban 
sprawl, and rigid racial segregation.  In Flint and Genesee County, municipal and federal 
housing, education, and development policies cultivated uneven consumer abundance, 
suburban overdevelopment, capital decentralization, and white racial privilege at the 
expense of civil rights and social equity.  As in every other metropolitan area, municipal 
actors and local public policies played a major role in guiding the trajectory of Flint‘s 
postwar development and shaping the final resolution of conflicts over race and space.  
Nevertheless, Flint‘s history is in no way peculiar.  Indeed, the story that follows is as 
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American as the golden Chevrolet Bel Aire sports coupe that rolled through the 
segregated streets of Flint on November 23, 1954.  
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The Ghetto and the Master Builder 
    
 
In 1945, as Michigan‘s defense plants whirled and the United States inched toward 
victory in World War II, Carl Crow, the official historian of the Buick division of 
General Motors Corporation, penned a remarkable tribute to his employer and its 
hometown.  Describing the close familial relationship between the city of Flint and 
Buick, GM‘s original automobile line, Crow wrote:  
Buick is Flint and Flint is Buick.  It is not far-fetched to say that the 
relationship between the city and the industry has been like that of a self-
sacrificing father and a successful son.  The people of Flint dug deep into 
the toes of their financial socks to bring the puny Buick enterprise to this 
community.  They coddled and nurtured it through infancy and 
adolescence, and when it grew Flint also grew and was rewarded with 
security and prosperity.
1
   
 
Like so many of Flint‘s legendary civic boosters, Crow believed that the Vehicle City, 
with all of its industrial might, was a microcosm of the American Dream of progress, 
prosperity, and opportunity. 
By the time that Harper and Brothers publishing company released Crow‘s The 
City of Flint Grows Up, Flint and the nation as a whole sat on the cusp of the longest era 
of economic expansion and consumer prosperity in world history.  Intoxicated by the 
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frenzy of optimism that began at war‘s end, Crow reflected warmly upon Flint‘s place in 
the nation:  
The history of the interesting and dynamic city of Flint has been worth the 
recording because it is more than the chronicle of an individual city.  It 
epitomizes the history of America, an impoverished little nation of 
farmers, fishermen, and trappers which conquered the wilderness and 
became great because such a large proportion of its citizens were like the 
men who made Flint a great industrial city.   
 
―America is a thousand Flints,‖ Crow concluded, because this small midwestern city 
exemplified the growth, prosperity, and freedom that made the United States a beacon of 
hope for the wider world.
2
 
 Crow was not alone in celebrating Flint‘s accomplishments.  Not long after Crow 
hailed Flint‘s industrial and civic progress, Robert H. Plummer described the city in 
equally glowing terms.  During a 1953 speech to the Flint Optimist Club, Plummer, a 
guidance counselor from Flint Junior College, urged his audience to embrace GM‘s 
industrial progress and the many special virtues that made Flint a desirable place to live 
and work.  ―If you seek a fair city, look around you,‖ he asserted.  ―Flint is the town of 
seven wonders.‖  According to Plummer, the city‘s churches, schools, parks, and 
hospitals, along with its centralized geographic location near Detroit, constituted five of 
Flint‘s seven wonders.  Flint‘s reputation for ―Yankee Industry‖ and its ―men of vision‖ 
were Plummer‘s final two wonders.  In Plummer‘s estimation, hard work and 
extraordinary leadership helped to transform Flint into one of the ―leading vehicle cities 
in the world‖—a Fordist mecca where workers could ―produce an automobile in 90 
minutes from the time the frame goes on the assembly line until the car is driven off 
under its own power.‖  When Plummer cheered Flint‘s men of vision, ―those who built 
                                                 
2
 Crow, The City of Flint Grows Up, 205. 
40 
 
industry with foresight, persistence, and long-range planning,‖ Optimist Club members 
no doubt understood that he was speaking of the pioneers of General Motors—men such 
as William Durant, Charles Stewart Mott, and other local industrialists who helped to 
make Flint the world‘s second city of automobiles.
3
 
The town of seven wonders is located seventy miles northwest of Detroit, in the 
heart of the nation‘s midwestern manufacturing belt.  Once a sleepy mid-Michigan 
hamlet devoted to lumber and carriage production, Flint rose to industrial prominence 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century.  In 1908, the city became the 
manufacturing headquarters of the General Motors Corporation.  On September 16 of that 
year, William ―Billy‖ Crapo Durant, a Flint-based carriage maker and stock market 
speculator, founded General Motors as a holding company for automobile manufacturers.  
Within two weeks of the incorporation, he had purchased Flint‘s Buick Motor Company, 
GM‘s first automobile division.  By 1910, the freewheeling Durant had acquired the 
Olds, Cadillac, and Oakland automobile companies.  Sales in the American automobile 
industry exploded in the twenty years following GM‘s incorporation, bringing windfall 
profits to Durant, Mott, and other local industrialists.  Between 1908 and 1919, GM 
produced its first million cars for consumers.  By 1929, that number had grown to ten 
million, and GM, with its aggressive corporate acquisition strategy, was well on its way 
toward becoming the world‘s largest industrial corporation.  As GM grew, so too did the 
Vehicle City.  For dating back to 1905, Durant had recognized that Flint would play a 
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major role in GM‘s corporate ascent.  ―Flint is in the center of the automobile industry,‖ 
he boasted, ―a progressive city, good people, with conditions for manufacturing ideal.‖
4
   
Very few Americans had even heard of Flint prior to the founding of General 
Motors.  By the mid-1950s, however, the city had become virtually synonymous with 
automobile production.  The growth of the city stemmed almost exclusively from the 
corporate triumphs of GM.  In a 1955 report on Flint‘s economy, surveyors from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago needed only one word to describe the city‘s economic 
structure: ―The Flint economy, probably to a greater extent than that of any other city of 
comparable size, can be described in a single word.  That word is automobiles.‖
5
  In Flint, 
the car was king; and GM was the only game in town. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, GM executives and Flint‘s civic and 
political leaders worked to build an industrial garden of modern factories and attractive 
residential neighborhoods inside the city.
6
  Between 1900 and 1955, GM‘s local 
workforce grew at a frenetic pace as local executives opened new manufacturing and 
assembly facilities within the city.  On the city‘s near north side—to the west of the gritty 
St. John Street neighborhood, the Flint River, and the Chesapeake and Ohio rail lines—
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sat GM‘s massive complex of Buick manufacturing and assembly plants.  With an 
employee roll that reached 27,400 in 1955, ―The Buick‖ was Flint‘s largest employer and 
virtually a city unto itself.  Flint was also home to two major industrial facilities operated 
by GM‘s AC Spark Plug division.  At the southwestern edge of the Buick complex, on 
the corner of Harriet Street and Industrial Avenue, was GM‘s original AC Spark Plug 
plant.  In 1940, AC officials opened a second Flint plant on the city‘s east side.  By the 
mid-1950s, AC employed nearly twenty thousand workers who manufactured spark 
plugs, oil filters, and other automobile replacement parts at the two facilities.  On Flint‘s 
west side, in a valley surrounding the Flint River, visitors at mid-century could find GM‘s 
Fisher Body 2 plant and a large complex of Chevrolet manufacturing plants known 
affectionately as ―Chevy in the Hole.‖  Nearly twenty thousand workers at Chevy in the 
Hole manufactured and assembled GM‘s top selling line of cars and trucks during the 
postwar era.  Just to the north and west of Chevy in the Hole, on the corner of Third and 
Chevrolet Avenues, stood the General Motors Institute of Technology (GMI), an elite 
division of the company dedicated to training automobile engineers, plant managers, and 
corporate executives.  Flint‘s fifth major industrial facility was the Fisher Body 1 plant, 
located on the city‘s far south side.  By 1955, eight thousand workers at Fisher Body 1 
manufactured automobile bodies for the north side Buick plants.  An industrial marvel, 
Flint was home to more GM workers than any other city in the world.       
As America‘s national obsession with automobiles took root in the early decades 
of the twentieth century, Flint and GM grew at breakneck speed, attracting tens of 
thousands of migrants to work in the city‘s smoke-belching factories.  Between the turn 
of the century and the beginning of the Great Depression, Flint gained international 
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acclaim as GM‘s primary production center and the world‘s second largest manufacturer 
of cars, surpassed only by Detroit.  ―It is to the automobile,‖ claimed the New York Times 
Magazine in 1937, ―what Pittsburgh is to steel, what Akron is to rubber.‖
7
  The city‘s 
rapid growth mirrored GM‘s rise to prominence.  In 1900, only 13,103 people lived in 
Flint.  By 1930, the Vehicle City‘s population had risen to 156,492.
8
   
Over 80 percent of the city‘s residents in 1930 were native-born whites.  Nearly 
two-thirds of these individuals—most of whom were Protestants—were originally from 
Michigan, while an additional 12 percent had migrated to the city from the nearby states 
of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.  Approximately 12 percent of Flint‘s residents 
in 1930 were born in the South, most from the states of Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, 
and Tennessee.  Foreign-born residents accounted for just 14.2 percent of the city‘s 
overall population.  Among these immigrants, the largest portion hailed from English 
speaking sections of Canada, England, Scotland, and Germany.  Unlike Detroit, where 
―new immigrants‖—many of them Catholic—from Poland, Russia, Italy, Romania, and 
Greece comprised a third of the population, Flint‘s community of southern and eastern 
Europeans accounted for only 16 percent of the immigrant total.  Only a small fraction of 
the city‘s total population—approximately 1 percent—were of either Hispanic or Asian 
descent.  For their part, Negroes comprised just 3.6 percent of the Vehicle City‘s 
relatively homogeneous population.
9
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To boosters such as Carl Crow and Robert Plummer, Flint seemed to be the 
geographic embodiment of the American Dream—a city where hard work, ―men of 
vision,‖ and human ingenuity made middle-class dreams and consumer prosperity 
attainable for all.  Hoping to secure a piece of that dream, tens of thousands of migrants 
from big cities, small towns, and rural areas throughout the United States and the world 
packed their belongings and headed to Flint during the first half of the twentieth century.  
Most of these migrants knew exactly how they wanted to make a living.  But where 
would they all live?   
Housing the city‘s growing population of workers presented Flint‘s corporate and 
civic leaders with major challenges during the decades preceding World War II.  In the 
1910s and 1920s, GM executives and local real estate developers worked to resolve 
Flint‘s housing crisis by building new neighborhoods and modern homes for migrant 
workers.  Through racially restrictive deed covenants and other means, developers 
ensured that those new homes and neighborhoods were available only to white buyers, 
however.  As with whites-only schools, parks, and workplaces, segregated neighborhoods 
fit comfortably within Flint‘s broader civic culture of Jim Crow.  For the first half of the 
twentieth century, restrictive housing covenants, discriminatory real estate practices, 
white violence, and other private forces converged to enforce rigid racial segregation in 
metropolitan areas such as Flint.
10
   
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, federal and local policymakers began 
playing a more active role in shaping the racial contours of Flint‘s residential housing 
market.  New Deal home appraisal and mortgage insurance policies subsidized racially 
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restricted housing, excluded African Americans from the federally insured home 
purchasing market, and helped to codify residential segregation in Flint and other 
metropolitan areas throughout the United States.  Beginning in the 1930s, Washington-
based administrators from the Home Owners‘ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) created national standards that shaped the ways in which 
local bankers, insurers, real estate brokers, and municipal policymakers weighed 
mortgage risks and measured neighborhood stability.  Yet those same federal 
administrators willingly ceded a great deal of authority to local realtors, builders, 
municipal legislators, planners, lenders, and others on the ground who conducted housing 
surveys, created mortgage risk maps, and determined site locations for new housing 
developments.  By the time Carl Crow wrote his tribute to GM and Flint, private housing 
discrimination, federal housing initiatives, and municipal public policies had combined to 
reinforce existing patterns of residential Jim Crow in Flint.  The racial and spatial logic 
embedded within those policies remained in place throughout the postwar decades, an era 
in which Flint‘s civic and industrial leaders worked yet again to solve Flint‘s housing 
crisis.                          
 
Mapping Race, Space, and Value in Interwar Flint 
During the early twentieth century, international observers routinely heralded Flint‘s rise 
as a modern industrial metropolis.  Hoping to recruit new workers to the Vehicle City, 
Billy Durant and other civic leaders promoted Flint as a ―progressive‖ city where workers 
could earn high wages, buy new homes, and raise their families in wholesome 
midwestern surroundings.  Yet beneath the glossy sheen of its Jazz Age image, Flint was 
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a gritty, unhealthy, and densely packed city that already teetered on the brink of urban 
crisis.  As in Detroit, Chicago, and other early twentieth-century boomtowns, Flint‘s 
rapid and largely unplanned growth spawned a series of housing, city service, and public 
health emergencies that shocked the sensibilities of civic reformers.  For tens of 
thousands of migrant laborers who worked at Flint‘s Buick, Chevrolet, AC Spark Plug, 
and Fisher Body plants, affordable housing was extremely difficult to locate in the 
decades preceding World War II.  In the congested and unsanitary neighborhoods 
surrounding the city‘s auto factories, tents, boxcar apartments, cardboard homes, tarpaper 
shacks, and other ―homes of the homeless‖ dotted the urban landscape.  As one observer 
sarcastically noted about Flint housing in 1916, ―they keep them [residents] so thick that 
their feet hang out the windows.‖
11
  Even during the booming 1920s—a decade in Flint 
marked by relatively high wages, economic expansion, and GM-sponsored housing 
construction programs—living conditions in huge swaths of the city were appalling and 
substandard, with thousands of new migrants reserving cots at the YWCA, sleeping on 
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Figure 1.1.  ―Homes of the Homeless.‖  Migrant housing near Flint‘s Buick facilities, ca. 
1920.  Courtesy of Perry Archives. 
 
The city‘s severe housing crisis, which had first taken shape in the 1910s and 
1920s, came to a head with the massive international economic depression of the 1930s.  
The Great Depression dealt a vicious blow to the American automobile industry and its 
workers.  Automobile manufacturers in the United States responded to sagging consumer 
demand with production cuts that reached as high as 75 percent.
13
  In Flint, the 
curtailment of manufacturing devastated the local labor market, generating 
unemployment rates that routinely approached 50 percent in the early 1930s.  By 1938, 
the number of Flint families on relief had reached 19,658, more than half of the 
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households in the city.
14
  In the housing sector, the economic crisis generated a cascade-
like effect in which lagging automobile production forced local banks to curtail lending, 
which in turn led builders to cancel new developments and homeowners to delay plans 
for home maintenance and the purchase of new dwellings. 
By the mid-1930s, the Flint area‘s housing stock was among the poorest and most 
dilapidated in the United States.  As later surveys would reveal, Flint was also among the 
most racially segregated and spatially fragmented cities in the nation.  In January 1934, 
Elroy S. Guckert, director of the Flint Institute of Research and Planning, in collaboration 
with famed city planner Edmund Bacon, local real estate developers, GM officials, and 
federal officials from the Civil Works Administration (CWA), organized a detailed 
survey of the city‘s housing and economic conditions.  CWA surveyors began by 
dividing the city into forty-one small districts, ―laid out to be homogeneous economically 
and socially, to the extent permitted by other considerations.‖  After creating and 
mapping the forty-one subunits—later incorporated by federal officials to map the city‘s 
census tract boundaries—CWA surveyors visited every dwelling unit in Flint between 
January and March of 1934.  They found that nearly 15 percent of the city‘s thirty-five 
thousand housing units required major structural repairs and at least 2 percent of the 
city‘s housing—deemed uninhabitable by city building inspector Peter J. Weidner—
warranted immediate demolition.  Of the inhabited homes in Flint, more than 20 percent 
had no working baths and 13 percent lacked toilets.  As well, Guckert and his associates 
learned that one in four Flint homes had no access to hot water, while at least 6 percent of 
city homes had no running water at all.  ―If cleanliness is next to Godliness,‖ opined a 
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local journalist after viewing the survey results, ―another black mark is checked against 
Flint.‖
15
   
Beyond finding widespread dilapidation and unsanitary living conditions, CWA 
surveyors also discovered grave housing shortages.  Citywide, CWA workers and local 
officials counted 35,248 dwelling units—nearly all of which were single-family, 
detached, wood-frame structures—with an average of over four persons living in each 
home.  Because the city‘s housing stock consisted primarily of small, one- and two-
bedroom ―workman‘s cottages,‖ however, the average number of persons per bedroom in 
the city as a whole was 1.7, with several sections of the city posting occupancy rates in 
excess of two persons per bedroom.  Guckert and his colleagues also noted that thousands 
of unemployed autoworkers had left the city during the early 1930s.  While many 
returned to their birthplaces in the South, others acquired new lots and built their own 
homes in Flint‘s largely undeveloped suburbs, where they grew crops and raised 
livestock to make ends meet.  The outmigrations of unemployed autoworkers during the 
1930s significantly reduced overcrowding in the city‘s residential areas, but Flint‘s 
housing shortage nonetheless persisted throughout the decade.  During a 1930s address, 
building inspector Weidner noted, ―Flint has always had a housing shortage, even during 
the worst of the depression.‖  According to Weidner and other local officials, the dearth 
of standard housing stemmed primarily from the city‘s rapid, unplanned growth during 
the 1910s and 1920s—which had created severe housing shortages that lingered until 
well after World War II—and the almost complete collapse of the residential building 
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industry during the 1930s.  Between 1925 and 1929, local builders constructed an 
average of 1,786 dwellings per year in the city.  That number dropped to an annual figure 
of only one hundred units between 1930 and 1936, however.
16
  Conservatively, Weidner 
and other CWA investigators estimated that the city needed at least five thousand new 
homes to meet the housing needs of its nearly 150,000 residents.  Upon completing the 
survey, Guckert promptly forwarded the results to federal officials in Washington.  
Guckert‘s survey, along with thousands of other local studies conducted throughout the 
United States, helped to shock federal officials into action to solve the nation‘s deep 
housing crisis.                                         
Along with the charts, tables, and maps that formed the crux of the 1934 study, 
Guckert and other members of the CWA team also provided narrative reports on housing 
and neighborhood conditions in selected parts of the city.  Specifically, Guckert drafted 
detailed reports on six residential neighborhoods that he believed represented the overall 
spectrum of housing and neighborhood conditions in the city.  These in-depth reports on 
neighborhood conditions offer a revealing glimpse of the city‘s built and lived landscapes 
of the 1930s.  Perhaps more importantly, however, the reports outline the calculus 
employed by federal and local surveyors in determining a neighborhood‘s desirability, 
property values, development potential, and quality of life.
17
   
On the city‘s far north side, just south of the Carpenter Road boundary that 
separated Flint from Mt. Morris and Genesee Townships, CWA surveyors found District 
1, a ―low grade peripheral white section, started as a series of cheap subdivisions and 
inadequately provided with such urban facilities as sewers, sidewalks and paving.‖  As in 
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virtually all other residential enclaves on the city‘s largely underdeveloped suburban 
fringe, residents of District 1 were exclusively white and relatively uneducated, and the 
area‘s housing stock contained many one-room ―garage houses‖ and other temporary, 
jerrybuilt homes of ―flimsy construction.‖  In describing the poor housing that ringed the 
city‘s borders, Weidner warned, ―Now Flint is fringed on all sides with shanty towns and 
blighted areas.‖
18
  Although this district and other outlying residential neighborhoods 
contained many new housing units, a plethora of open space, and low-density patterns of 
development—all positives under the CWA‘s rubric—Guckert assigned District 1 the 
lowest grade because of the area‘s poor planning and building standards, the lack of 
education among its residents, and the inadequacy of its utilities and other city services.
19
  
 Several miles south of District 1, on the city‘s west and near northwestern sides, 
CWA surveyors found two upper middle-class neighborhoods, Districts 22 and 38, along 
with several other high- and medium-grade white residential subdivisions.  Unlike the 
working-class migrant neighborhoods that straddled the city‘s suburban borders, Civic 
Park, Mott Park, Glendale Hills, and other premier neighborhoods on Flint‘s west side 
had full access to municipal services and utilities, featured many new homes of sound 
construction, and contained a highly educated, economically stable mix of skilled auto 
workers, tradespersons, retail workers, and professionals.  With over 98 percent of its 
homes in good repair, the west side‘s housing stock was among the most modern in the 
city.  In Guckert‘s estimation, stability was both a physical and a social variable, 
however.  For Guckert and his CWA colleagues, neighborhood stability stemmed not 
simply from access to utilities, newness of homes, or residential lot sizes, but also from 
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the presence or absence of social homogeneity.  Concerning its social stability, the west 
side of the city also fared well, containing a population that was ―almost entirely white‖ 
with ―few machine operators or unskilled workers‖ and virtually no immigrants from 
outside of northern Europe.
20
         
Moving in a southeasterly direction from Districts 22 and 38, CWA officials 
located a number of older, transitional neighborhoods ringing the city‘s downtown 
commercial core.  In his report on District 29, for instance, Guckert noted that the once 
―aristocratic‖ Grand Traverse neighborhood had suffered from population loss, the 
conversion of large homes to rental units, and the spread of rooming houses and 
commercial structures.  Beyond describing the ―slow deterioration‖ of Grand Traverse‘s 
older housing stock, Guckert also cited the ―highly mixed‖ social composition of the 
neighborhood and its proximity to ―more seriously depreciated sections‖ as factors 
shaping the neighborhood‘s transitional status.  Although the neighborhood featured 
many stately old homes and a relatively well-educated population with many skilled 
workers and professionals, the possible encroachment of Negroes, southern European 
immigrants, and other ―undesirable‖ social groups—along with the neighborhood‘s 
proximity to declining, inner-city residential areas—led Guckert to conclude, ―The fate of 
the district is undecided.‖
21
   
 Geographic proximity to either dilapidated housing or nonwhite neighborhoods 
did not always render a district transitional under the CWA‘s rating schema.  The 
presence of neighborhood barriers—whether topographic, economic, or social—
persuaded Guckert on several occasions to issue a high rating in spite of an area‘s 
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location near ―less desirable‖ residential districts.  On the eastern edge of downtown 
Flint, Guckert found the Woodlawn Park neighborhood, District 16, the city‘s premier 
and most exclusive residential enclave.  Home to Charles Stewart Mott, GM‘s largest 
stockholder, along with dozens of other top GM executives, Woodlawn Park featured a 
mix of elegant mansions and attractive brick and masonry homes.  With nearly 95 percent 
of its homes constructed since 1924, Woodlawn Park contained the newest, sturdiest, 
priciest, and most carefully restricted housing stock in the city.  Although Guckert noted 
that Woodlawn Park was close to an ―older, undesirable section‖ to the north—home to 
hundreds of the black domestic workers who worked in the all-white area—the 
neighborhood nonetheless received a high grade because of its new housing, the 
educational level of its residents, the overall appeal and prestige of the district, and the 
abundance of high-end consumer products such as ―mechanical refrigerators and oil 
burners‖ in the area‘s homes.  CWA surveyors failed to mention the racially restrictive 
covenants that barred Negro buyers from moving to Woodlawn Park in their narrative 
reports, but the presence of such agreements undoubtedly shaped Guckert‘s conclusion 
that ―the district may be considered today‘s aristocratic section.‖
22
   
 Several miles north of Woodlawn Park sat the ―older, undesirable‖ District 5, the 
St. John Street neighborhood on Flint‘s near north side.  ―District 5,‖ Guckert wrote, ―is a 
deteriorated residence section, more than a third negro, adjoining and partly enclosing a 
part of the Buick factories.‖  Guckert classified the neighborhood as deteriorated based 
upon its older, more dilapidated housing stock, its reputation for gambling, prostitution, 
and other criminal activities, its large number of unskilled factory workers, and its ethnic 
and racial diversity.  ―Nativity is highly mixed,‖ Guckert reported, ―with negroes largely 
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from the south and a large number of white occupants from central, eastern and southern 
Europe.‖  ―There is also,‖ he added, ―a considerable number from Asia Minor and from 
Mexico.‖
23
  The quality of housing in St. John was superior to that in several more 
highly-rated sections of the city, and the neighborhood included many small business 
owners and professionals, yet Guckert nevertheless concluded that the presence of 
Negroes and other nonwhites, along with the area‘s reputation for vice, were sufficient to 
warrant a rating of deteriorated.  Race, though only one of many variables that surveyors 
measured in determining grades for residential areas, was an essential component of the 
1934 CWA survey.            
The CWA report confirmed that poor housing and poverty proliferated throughout 
the city during the 1930s.  Still, Guckert and his colleagues found that the housing crisis 
hit especially hard in the St. John Street and Floral Park enclaves, the two inner-city 
neighborhoods that housed virtually all of the city‘s six thousand black residents.
24
  Yet 
in his narrative reports on neighborhood conditions, Guckert did not attempt to explain 
the correlation between housing quality and racial occupancy.  The patterns of residential 
segregation and neighborhood deterioration that Guckert and his assistants found in Flint 
were anything but accidental, however.        
 
Building a Segregated Metropolis:  
Private Action, Public Policies, and the Culture of Jim Crow in Prewar Flint 
 
The St. John Street area contained the city‘s largest concentration of poverty and its 
second-highest proportion of African Americans.  Surrounded on three sides by the Buick 
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factories, the Flint River, and a labyrinth of rail lines, the teardrop-shaped community 
formed the historical heart of the city‘s North End.  Remarking on its near complete 
isolation, a writer for the Flint Journal once noted, ―St. John is virtually an island in a 
city.  On its west side the massive Buick complex is like a mountain range.  On the east is 
the Flint River.  There are few ways to get in and out.‖
25
  On Flint‘s North End, 
unregulated industrial and residential building during the early decades of the twentieth 
century brought neighborhoods and factories into close geographic proximity, frustrating 
city planners, residents, and GM industrialists alike.  In a 1958 study of Flint‘s 
Depression-era political culture, urban geographer Peirce F. Lewis remarked on the close 
relationship between poor planning and residential blight on the north side: ―As Buick 
factory buildings spread along the Pere Marquette tracks, jerry-built houses mushroomed 
beside them, creating what are today Flint‘s most dismal slums.‖
26
      
Based in part upon the presence of Negro residents and immigrant ―aliens,‖ both 
St. John Street and Floral Park received low ratings in the 1934 CWA survey.  Yet the 
two neighborhoods were spatially, economically, and socially distinct.  African 
Americans lived in Floral Park, District 9 in the CWA study, dating back to the mid-
nineteenth century, when free persons of color and former slaves first arrived in the 
neighborhood.  Floral Park was located in the city‘s Ninth Ward, roughly bounded by 
Court Street on the north, the Grand Trunk Railroad tracks on the south, South Saginaw 
Street on the west, and Lapeer Road on the east.  Prior to World War II, African 
Americans could find housing only in a small section of the neighborhood near the Grand 
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Trunk rail lines.  Despite its rigid segregation, the Floral Park of the 1920s and 1930s was 
an economically diverse neighborhood of professionals, domestics, shopkeepers, and a 
growing number of unskilled and semi-skilled factory workers who worked at GM.  
Unlike householders from St. John—who suffered from extreme pollution, severe 
housing dilapidation, and spatial isolation—Floral Park residents benefited from the 
neighborhood‘s prime location near downtown shops and the Thread Lake recreation 
area.  The Clifford Street Community Center, Clark School, the legendary Golden Leaf 
nightclub, Lakeside Park, Quinn Chapel AME Church, and the Michigan Theater 
combined to anchor the south side‘s intensely segregated yet bustling public sphere.   
Poverty and substandard housing were common in Floral Park and the 
surrounding Thread Lake neighborhoods, yet black residents of the south side 
nevertheless enjoyed a privileged status that correlated with the neighborhood‘s distance 
from the North End.  In a study of black voting behavior in Flint, Peirce Lewis remarked 
upon the persistence of status distinctions between African Americans on the city‘s north 
and south sides:  
The difference in distance between the two areas was about three miles, 
but socially and economically, it was a difference between two worlds.  As 
time passed . . . the economic differences grew less acute.  Nevertheless, 
the physical distance still represented a considerable social barrier, with 
Thread Lake Negroes continuing to look on themselves as the custodians 
of Negro tradition in Flint, and in all ways superior to the upstart 
newcomers of the [North End‘s] Buick neighborhood.
27
   
 
Flint resident Willie Nolden offered a more blunt characterization of the class divides 
between North and South Enders: ―When I was a kid, if you were from the North Side 
you were a nothin‘.  If you were on the South Side, you were somethin‘.  It was kind of a 
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class struggle between the North Side and the South Side.‖
28
  As the city‘s black 
population soared during the 1940s and 1950s, Floral Park thus became a prized 
destination for thousands of southern black migrants seeking jobs at GM and a better life 
in Flint.  
 Floral Park, the nearby Thread Lake area, and St. John became popular 
destinations for African-American migrants during and after the 1930s in part because 
black home seekers in the Vehicle City had few other housing options.  The North End‘s 
peculiar urban and industrial geographies served to isolate St. John from the rest of the 
city.  Still, thousands of white and black migrants found well-worn paths both into and 
out of St. John and Floral Park during the 1920s and 1930s.  More than the Flint River 
divide, rail lines, and other geographic and industrial barriers, race, class, municipal 
policies, and discriminatory real estate practices shaped migratory flows to and from St. 
John and Floral Park.  Indeed, a potent mix of local housing initiatives and racial 
antipathies combined to harden the city‘s racial geography long before Flint residents 
knew anything about the Home Owners‘ Loan Corporation (HOLC), residential security 
maps, and federally sponsored ―redlining.‖      
The intense racial segregation that kept whites and blacks separate during the 
Depression stemmed in large part from the countywide use of court-sanctioned racially 
restrictive housing covenants by builders, developers, realtors, and homeowners.  From 
the 1910s through the close of the 1940s, virtually all new housing constructed in the city 
and its suburbs fell under restrictive deed covenants designed to preserve property values 
and protect living standards in white residential districts.  General Motors played an 
                                                 
28
 Ananthakrishnan Aiyer, ed., Telling Our Stories: Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement in Flint (Flint: 
Flint ColorLine Project, 2007), 26.  See also, Rhonda Sanders, Bronze Pillars: An Oral History of African-
Americans in Flint (Flint: Flint Journal and Sloan Museum, 1995), 10-22. 
58 
 
important role in the spread of such covenants through its local housing initiatives.  
Beginning in the 1910s, officials from GM and local builders designed restrictive housing 
covenants that formalized standards for new housing developments.  Between 1910 and 
1920, as the company struggled to meet the rising international demand for new 
automobiles, Flint‘s population rose from 38,500 to nearly 90,000.  Embarrassed by the 
tent cities and shantytowns that surrounded their factories—and hoping to recruit and 
retain new migrant workers—in 1919 GM officials organized the Modern Housing 
Corporation, the first and only division of the corporation devoted to housing 
construction.  Between 1919 and 1933, workers from GM‘s Modern Housing division 
joined other affiliated builders in erecting nearly three thousand new homes in three 
subdivisions on Flint‘s near northwest side.  Later named Civic Park, Chevrolet Park, and 
Mott Park, GM‘s new neighborhoods, which all rated highly on the CWA survey, offered 
buyers a choice of twenty-eight different types of home designs constructed with a 
variety of sturdy building materials.  The housing available in GM‘s subdivisions 
included bungalows as large as six rooms and two-story homes of up to seven rooms.  All 
of the units in GM‘s Modern Housing developments included freshly seeded lawns, 
shrubbery, sanitary sewer and water connections, gas and electric service, and newly 
constructed streets and sidewalks.  In their attempts to lure young families with children, 
GM officials persuaded members of the Flint Board of Education to construct two new 
schools for the children who moved to the Chevrolet, Civic, and Mott Park 
neighborhoods.  To make the homes affordable, General Motors offered generous 
financing terms to new homeowners that included loans at 6 percent interest, down 





  In 1916, journalist John Ihlder, reflecting upon Flint‘s meteoric, haphazard 
growth, had asked, ―When Men Build Automobiles, Who Builds Their City?‖
30
  With 
their Modern Housing Corporation initiative, GM officials attempted to answer Ihlder‘s 
pressing question.  
 Between 1919 and the early 1930s, thousands of working-class and professional 
families rushed to acquire GM‘s new houses.  The homes were not available on the free 
market, however.  Hoping to preserve future property values and a high quality of life in 
the new subdivisions, officials from GM attached stringent, legally enforceable deed and 
building restrictions to all of their lots and homes.  Specifically, GM mandated that only 
single-family homes could be built in its new subdivisions and barred all commercial 
establishments, except home-based doctors‘ and dentists‘ offices, from residential streets.  
In addition, the GM housing covenants prohibited owners and renters from keeping 
livestock, selling liquor, and constructing outdoor cesspools or privies.  These covenants 
also required racial segregation, stipulating that homes ―could not be leased to or 
occupied by any person or persons not wholly of the white or Caucasian race.‖
31
 
 After constructing the homes, Modern Housing Corporation officials turned over 
the properties to the Arthur E. Raab Realty Company, the exclusive selling agency for all 
General Motors lots and homes.  During the early 1920‘s, Raab and his associates 
published a widely circulated promotional brochure trumpeting GM‘s new subdivisions, 
―Flint‘s largest, finest, fully improved, close-in, restricted residential area; high and dry, 
being 100 feet higher than the downtown section and kept free from smoke and soot by 
the ever prevailing westerly winds.‖  Regarding building and deed restrictions, Raab's 
                                                 
29
 Dick Shappell, ―Looks at Flint and Its People,‖ Flint Journal, n.d. [ca. 1938]. 
30
 Ihlder, ―Flint.‖  
31
 Scott Peters, ―History of Mott Park Community,‖ (unpublished essay in author‘s possession). 
60 
 
literature reassured prospective buyers, ―Each Home owner will have a Homesite at least 
50 by 100 feet, with all improvements and with ample restrictions to protect his Home 
and to secure the maximum of beauty, utility and value.  No shacks, huts or foreign 
communities will be allowed.‖ 
 
 
Figure 1.2.  Modern homes in a modern city.  In 1927, workers from GM‘s Modern 
Housing Corporation constructed this three-bedroom, one-bathroom home at 2514 
Paducah Street on Flint‘s west side.  This house, along with all others constructed by 
General Motors, fell under deed restrictions that prohibited African-American occupancy.  
Photograph by Andrew R. Highsmith, 2004.   
 
Arthur Raab and his colleagues sprinkled many references to modernity 
throughout their advertising circulars, reminding buyers that GM home sites provided 
―modern‖ homes with ―modern‖ conveniences and assuring parents that children in the 
61 
 
neighborhood would have access to the finest, most ―modern‖ schools.  GM and Raab 
representatives believed that new homes complete with flushable toilets, electricity, water 
and sewer lines, and paved roads were indispensable components of modern living.  By 
invoking modernity, however, they also made broader social claims about race, space, 
citizenship, and value.  ―Land values depend upon location, transportation, restrictions, 
improvements and rapidity of development,‖ the Raab brochures maintained.  A modern 
house was not only a sturdy, sanitary, spacious dwelling with attractive furnishings, but 
also a home in a neighborhood protected from incompatible land uses and other noxious 
influences.  Officials from Raab Realty and General Motors thus went to great lengths to 
ensure prospective homeowners that they would never have to live next to a chicken 
coop, and that nonwhites would never threaten their property values or quality of life by 
purchasing property nearby.  Following the early twentieth-century principles of zoning 
and real estate, themselves reflections of a broader cultural consensus on racial 
exclusions, Arthur Raab and his employers at General Motors viewed residential 
integration as a grave threat to quality of life, neighborhood stability, and property values.  
Consequently, the covenants that governed all home construction, purchasing, and 
leasing in GM‘s new subdivisions guaranteed new buyers that, henceforth, they would 
not have to live next door to a privy, a tavern, or a Negro.
32
                           
 From the 1910s through the close of the 1940s, as builders, urban planners, and 
realtors rushed to meet the housing needs of the city‘s new white migrants, restrictive 
housing covenants spread to both new and existing neighborhoods throughout Flint and 
its suburbs.  In the elite Woodlawn Park enclave, the James A. Welch Company, a 
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prominent local real estate firm, offered new home sites in ―a district fully restricted and 
possessing the proper social atmosphere – where environs will always be pleasant and 
where values will steadily increase.‖
33
  ―In Woodlawn Park,‖ Welch assured buyers, ―no 
resident ever will be compelled to sell out and move because the property next door is 
being handled in a manner adverse to the well being of the whole district.‖  With the 
assistance of landscape architect William Pitkin, Jr., and renowned city planner John 
Nolen, Welch compiled a set of restrictions that he believed would preserve the high 
standard of living and inflated land costs in the area.  Specifically, the housing covenants 
for Woodlawn Park stipulated, ―No poultry, cattle, live stock, except watch dogs and 
family pets and driving horses, shall be kept.  No bill board shall be erected or 
maintained.  No building used for the sale of intoxicating liquors.‖  Recognizing the 
special needs of the neighborhood‘s wealthy residents, Welch also crafted a racial 
restriction that allowed visits and overnight stays from service workers while still 
prohibiting black occupancy: ―No negroes or persons of negro extraction (except while 
employed thereon as servants) shall occupy any of the land.‖  As in many other deed 
restrictions, Woodlawn Park‘s housing covenant included the prohibition of Negro 
occupancy in a section devoted to nuisances.
34
  In Woodlawn Park, as elsewhere, the use 
of racially restrictive covenants provided homeowners with the privilege of preselecting 
their future neighbors into perpetuity.        
During the 1920s and 1930s, realtors and developers routinely referenced 
restrictive covenants in their marketing campaigns for new housing developments.  In the 
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spring of 1930, George C. Kellar advertised lots for sale just to the east of Woodlawn 
Park, in the Brookside neighborhood, ―one of the most desirable home building sections 
in Flint.‖  Like Welch, Kellar promised buyers ―adequate restrictions to protect your 
home investment.‖  During that same year, realtor Don D. Waters marketed ―beautiful 
homesites, adequately restricted – moderately priced,‖ for residents seeking to build new 
homes in the west side‘s Glendale Hills subdivision.  Hoping to reassure prospective 
buyers that their lots were safe investments, Waters and many other local realtors 
reminded purchasers that all of their home and lot sales were subject to the terms 
established by the segregated National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), ―an 
organization governed by a code of ethics, conceived for the protection of property 
buyers, owners and sellers.‖
35
  As part of its code of ethics, NAREB prohibited member 
realtors from selling property to nonwhites in segregated white neighborhoods.            
 By the close of the 1930s, restrictive housing covenants had played a decisive role 
in making the Vehicle City one of the most segregated cities in the United States.  In 
1951, sociologists Donald O. and Mary S. Cowgill released the results of a national 
survey of housing segregation in 187 of America‘s largest cities.  Based upon block-level 
housing data from the 1940 census, the Cowgills‘ study ranked Flint as the third most 
segregated city in the United States, surpassed only by Miami, Florida, and Norfolk, 
Virginia.
36
  Though geographically ensconced within the industrial North, less than an 
hour‘s drive from the Canadian border, the city of Flint was more segregated than 
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virtually every other city in the nation.  ―Flint,‖ African-American resident Angela 
Sawyer recalled, was ―the new old South.‖
37
   
Racial segregation extended well beyond the sphere of housing, however.  In 
addition to residential segregation, African Americans in interwar Flint faced an 
uncodified yet formal and rigid system of Jim Crow that kept whites and blacks separate 
at workplaces, in schools, and at most places of public accommodation.  Prior to World 
War II, black workers found it nearly impossible to gain employment at General Motors, 
except as janitors or foundry workers.  Likewise, retailers serving the city‘s downtown 
business district refused to hire black salespersons and clerks until well after the close of 
the war.  In the city‘s ―neighborhood schools,‖ housing segregation and widespread 
school district gerrymandering combined to keep black and white pupils rigidly 
segregated.  Moreover, with few exceptions, white proprietors of local barbershops, 
restaurants, hotels, and taverns denied service to black customers until after World War 
II.
38
  Downtown, at the famed Durant Hotel, managers refused to accept black occupants 
until 1954, when lightweight boxing champion Jimmy Carter broke the color bar.
39
  ―You 
couldn‘t stay at any of the downtown hotels,‖ recalled Alvin Loving.  You couldn‘t eat in 
a downtown restaurant.  This town!  God, I didn‘t know that existed anymore.‖
40
  At 
movie theaters, amusement parks, skating rinks, bowling alleys, and other places of 
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leisure, owners and managers either refused service altogether for African Americans or 
established designated days, times, or spaces to accommodate black customers.
41
  During 
the Depression, for instance, black moviegoers could attend shows at the Michigan 
Theater near Floral Park, but only if they sat separately in the balcony, or ―crow‘s nest.‖
42
  
Managers of the Industrial Mutual Association (IMA) auditorium north of downtown 
required visiting bands to perform two acts, one for white patrons from 9 p.m. to 
midnight, and the second, for African Americans, from 1 to 5 a.m.
43
  The structures of 
Jim Crow were so thoroughly embedded in the city‘s culture that the color line, for 
virtually all Flint residents, extended beyond death.  Due to racially restrictive burial 
covenants, nearly all privately owned cemeteries in the county refused to bury black 
bodies until 1964, when Genesee County Circuit Judge Stewart A. Newblatt overturned 
the practice.
44
  ―Jim Crow was the rule in Flint, that‘s plain as day,‖ Mary Helen Loving 
remembered.
45
              
 Private acts of discrimination, though often upheld by courts, helped to maintain 
strict color lines in the neighborhoods, restaurants, movie theaters, hotels, amusement 
parks, and taverns of interwar Flint.  The city‘s culture of Jim Crow did not derive solely 
from the private sphere, however.  During the 1920s and 1930s, municipal officials 
helped to maintain segregation in the city‘s schools, parks, and neighborhoods.  Outside 
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of the well-defined borders of St. John and Floral Park, black pedestrians and motorists in 
white residential districts faced near-constant harassment by officers from the Flint Police 
Department.  Referring to the Flint River color line that divided St. John Street from the 
all-white east side, Reverend Eugene Simpson, pastor of the Mt. Tabor Baptist Church, 
remembered that during the 1930s, ―Blacks weren‘t allowed across the river unless they 
were going to school.‖  To the west of the Buick facilities, Saginaw Street was yet 
another carefully policed color line.  As Simpson recalled of one west side street, ―When 
I was a young boy coming along, Blacks weren‘t even allowed to walk up and down 
Welch Boulevard . . . unless you were going to work for some white person.‖
46
   
Local school and recreation officials also adhered to the tenets of Jim Crow.  At 
Central High School and other public school facilities in the city, members of the board 
of education prohibited black children from using swimming pools until 1944, when 
officials granted black boys an opportunity to use the pool once per week for segregated 
recreation.
47
  Likewise, parks officials at Berston Field House and other public facilities 
maintained separate schedules for white and black swimmers during the 1930s and 
1940s.  Berston employees allowed black swimmers to use the pool on Wednesdays.  To 
accommodate black residents the rest of the week, city officials operated outdoor 
sprinklers across the street from the field house.  ―We would always have access to the 
pool after it had been used by the white community,‖ north side resident Max Brandon 
remembered.   
And when we finished using the pool that evening, all the water would be 
drained out.  All the splash boxes would be empty.  And the next day, the 
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white community would have access to clean swimming water to swim in 
and clean splash boxes to step in before entering the pool.   
 
Brandon and other black children also faced discriminatory rules at the Berston Field 
House Library, where black children could only access books during official, school-
sponsored visits.
48
   
 Segregated schools, parks, and swimming pools fit comfortably within the city‘s 
broader prewar civic culture; and so too did minstrelsy and other Jim Crow performances.  
In 1940, George Oscar Bowen, the Flint Board of Commerce‘s official ―songleader,‖ 
published Book of Songs, a compilation of popular local anthems.  Not surprisingly, 
Bowen‘s collection included patriotic standards such as ―The Star Spangled Banner‖ and 
―Michigan, My Michigan.‖  However, the pamphlet also contained the lyrics to minstrel 
songs such as ―Old Black Joe‖ and ―Carry Me Back to Old Virginny.‖
49
  In Flint, elected 
officials often joined members of the Kiwanis Club and other civic organizations in 
performing annual minstrel shows to fund anti-tuberculosis efforts and other charitable 
causes.  During the 1933 Kiwanis show, Flint‘s mayor, Raymond A. Brownell, city 
commissioners Harry M. Comins and George A. Barnes, school superintendent L. H. 
Lamb, city parks chairperson Arthur H. Sarvis, and Forest W. Boswell, a member of the 
Flint Board of Education, donned ―blackface and grotesque attire,‖ hoping to raise funds 
for a children‘s health camp.
50
  White leaders in the Vehicle City ―blacked-up‖ on a 
regular basis to raise money for a variety of important charitable causes, but these 
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minstrel routines were also spectacles of racial power.  The maintenance of Jim Crow 
entailed more than simply segregating black and white bodies.  ―Jim Crow performances‖ 




 In the decades preceding World War II, white citizens of Flint united around a 
broad cultural consensus on the need for strict racial segregation.  By the mid-1930s, 
when federal housing officials began taking an active interest in the local real estate 
market, private restrictions and municipal policies had converged to make Flint one of the 
most segregated cities in the nation.  Deeply rooted in the civic and political cultures of 
Flint and other American cities, Jim Crow neighborhoods, schools, parks, shops, and 
workplaces predated the 1930s births of the Home Owners‘ Loan Corporation and the 
Federal Housing Administration.  Nevertheless, through a series of pre- and postwar 
interventions in the local housing market, federal and local officials worked together to 
codify and formalize the cultural mandates for racial segregation in the Vehicle City.      
 
Tests of a Reject Neighborhood:  
The Home Owners‘ Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration  
 
Real estate broker Arthur Raab spent most of the 1920s serving as the primary agent 
marketing GM‘s newly constructed homes in west Flint.  During the early 1930s, GM 
began phasing out its home construction initiatives, however, and Raab turned his 
attention towards the CWA survey and other efforts to rebuild the depression-ravaged 
city.  One of the study‘s financial backers and a close advisor to survey coordinator Elroy 
Guckert, Raab authored a plethora of letters in 1934 and 1935 on the long-range 
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importance of the CWA‘s efforts.  Raab hoped that the survey and other federally 
sponsored studies would allow civic leaders to assess the nature and scope of the city‘s 
housing slump.  More importantly, though, he and other local real estate developers 
believed that the survey would help municipal and federal officials design a plan of 
action for rebuilding Flint‘s housing stock.  Within weeks of the survey‘s completion, 
Raab had contacted Flint City Manager J. M. Barringer and local GM executives Charles 
Stewart Mott and Harlow Curtice, imploring them to join a citywide steering committee 
to direct Flint‘s future growth.  Raab sought to use the CWA survey as a guideline for 
mapping and planning the city‘s future.  As a realtor, Raab clearly stood to benefit 
financially from any rebuilding efforts in the region.  ―The selfish interest,‖ Raab 
admitted, ―is, that my business being real estate, when the re-building comes, which must 
come, it means a return of the business about which I have a bit of knowledge come by 
through experience.‖  Still, however, Raab sincerely believed that the city‘s future 
depended upon using ―scientific‖ surveys to spur revitalization.   
I love this city.  My people were among its founders.  My roots are deep in 
this soil.  This city was once getting some traditions.  I want to see it 
gather more and better.  This Survey will lead to such.  It can‘t help but do 
so.  And, the City is more than a manufacturing center, it is a laboratory of 
human relationships; as such it fascinates me.
52
   
 
Raab hoped that the CWA study would become a road map for resurrecting the Vehicle 
City from the ruins of the Great Depression. 
 It is unclear whether local GM executives accepted Raab‘s offer to form a 
steering committee to guide the city‘s reconstruction.  Although Raab indicated in his 
correspondence that Mott, Curtice, and other GM representatives were deeply intrigued 
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by the prospect of such a body—and though GM executives and other industrial leaders 
convened regularly to discuss municipal affairs—no evidence confirms that Raab‘s 
organization ever operated, at least publicly, in Flint.  As with corporate leaders in other 
urban areas, General Motors officials in Flint participated quietly in the city‘s political 
affairs.  Local realtors, developers, and federal housing officials announced their interest 
in the CWA survey publicly, however.  The Genesee County Real Estate Board donated 
$500 to fund the survey program.  Upon its completion, Flint realtors and developers 
began contacting Raab to view the survey files.  On February 27, 1935, Raab informed 
City Manager Barringer that housing appraisers sought to use the CWA survey records as 
part of their property assessments.  Hoping to gain a wider audience for the survey 
results, Raab instructed Barringer to place all of the ―spot maps, tables, charts, graphs, 
etc.‖ in the municipal vault, ―where they may be accessible to those who want the 
information they hold.‖
53
  In particular, Raab wished to make the CWA data available to 
realtors, appraisers, builders, and bankers, who he hoped would use the survey results to 
guide local redevelopment efforts.   
Among the more detailed of the federally sponsored city surveys conducted in the 
United States during the 1930s, the 1934 Flint study also attracted attention from federal 
administrators in Washington, D.C.  In June 1934, CWA officials in Washington directed 
Raab to forward the completed survey ―at the earliest possible moment.‖
54
  Interest in the 
Flint survey among national-level administrators and policymakers signaled a radical 
shift in federal housing policies that was unfolding during the 1930s.  Hoping to arrest the 
downward spiral of the nation‘s home building, sales, and finance industries, federal 
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legislators crafted a series of policies during the mid-1930s that revolutionized housing 
markets across the nation.  In June 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law 
the Home Owners‘ Loan Act, which created the Home Owners‘ Loan Corporation, to 
help reduce housing foreclosures.  As David Freund has shown, HOLC officials helped to 
stabilize local housing markets by ―purchasing delinquent home loans from banks, S&Ls, 
and other lenders, and refinancing them with new long-term, low-interest, fully amortized 
loans.‖  By 1936, HOLC officials had purchased and refinanced the mortgages of more 
than 20 percent of the nation‘s nonfarm, owner-occupied housing units.
55
  Beyond 
stabilizing the nation‘s housing industry and stemming the rash of home foreclosures, the 
HOLC also helped to revolutionize the ways in which Americans thought about home 
finance, race, and the stability of neighborhood housing markets.
56
    
 After just three years of intense activity, the HOLC ceased its mortgage 
purchasing program in June 1936.  Nevertheless, the HOLC‘s policies introduced 
millions of Americans to the concept of low-interest, long-term, fully amortized home 
mortgages.  Prior to the HOLC‘s creation, private lenders in Flint and elsewhere 
effectively dissuaded many prospective home buyers by offering only short-term 
mortgages, often with large ―balloon‖ payments due at the end of the loan.  In a 
confidential report authored in July 1937, HOLC field agent Clark Waters estimated that 
99 percent of the homeowners in the city of Flint had obtained their residences via ten-
year home loans at 6 percent interest with a 10 percent down payment.
57
  By 
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demonstrating that long-term, low-interest loans could help to prevent home foreclosures 
while still generating profits for lenders, the HOLC‘s policies radically altered the terms 
upon which bankers issued home loan mortgages.  Significantly, HOLC administrators 
also designed a formal, racially biased mechanism for measuring risk, value, and stability 
in residential neighborhoods.       
 As part of its mortgage purchasing program, the HOLC devised a system for 
rating neighborhood stability, housing quality, and property values in residential districts.  
During the 1930s, members of the HOLC‘s appraisal department joined representatives 
from the agency‘s research and statistics division to create ―residential security maps‖ for 
Flint and 238 other metropolitan centers across the United States.  Designed to measure 
mortgage risk factors, housing conditions, and the overall desirability of residential 
districts, the security maps ranked neighborhoods on a descending scale from A to D.  
The neighborhoods with the most desirable and valuable housing received a grade of A, 
color-coded with green on the security maps, while ―second-grade‖ B neighborhoods 
were colored blue.  The least desirable residential areas earned C and D grades, with C 
neighborhoods colored yellow and ―fourth-grade‖ D areas shaded in red.  The term 
―redlining,‖ used to describe the discriminatory home mortgage lending practices 
employed by bankers and federal housing officials during the postwar era, derived from 
the HOLC‘s use of red in mapping the least desirable, or D, neighborhoods.   
 HOLC officials often subcontracted with local realtors to create the residential 
security maps.  In Flint, the HOLC employed the real estate firms of Keller, Murphy, and 
Van Campen; Leinoch and Humphreys; along with H. H. Darby, Claude Perry, Robert 
Gerholz, Chester Sibilsky, Mark Piper, and E. E. Burger, all of whom were ―realtors of 
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experience and standing,‖ to create the city‘s security map.
58
  To assist the local realtors 
who served as map consultants, officials from the HOLC asked surveyors to classify 
neighborhoods based upon eight criteria.  HOLC administrators instructed surveyors to 
measure and rank neighborhoods by the intensity of sale and rental demand; the 
percentage of homeowners; the age and type of buildings; economic stability; the social 
status of residents; the sufficiency of public utilities; accessibility of schools, churches, 
and business centers; and the building, deed, and zoning restrictions established to protect 
the neighborhood from inharmonious social groups and incompatible land uses.  In order 
to receive an A rating, a neighborhood had to be only partially developed and situated 
within a new, well-planned section of the city, and its housing stock had to be in high 
demand regardless of the economic climate.  HOLC surveyors relied heavily on local 
bankers to determine which neighborhoods were the best.  An A neighborhood, a HOLC 
report maintained, was usually ―synonymous with the areas where good mortgage lenders 
with available funds are willing to make their maximum loans to be amortized over a 10-
15 year period.‖  Neighborhoods in the B category were usually fully developed and 
consisted of sturdily built yet not top of the line homes.  ―The second grade or B grade 
areas,‖ the HOLC‘s instructions revealed, ―are like a 1935 automobile – still good, but 
not what people are buying today who can afford a new one.‖
59
   
Implicitly, HOLC officials assumed that first- and second-grade neighborhoods 
would be all white.  The HOLC made no explicit reference to the racial demography 
necessary for a neighborhood to obtain a rating of either A or B in its formal instructions 
to surveyors.  In the descriptions of typical C and D neighborhoods, however, race and 
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ethnicity played prominent roles.  Besides containing more obsolete homes, offering poor 
access to transportation facilities, and providing inadequate utility service, third-grade 
areas, in the HOLC‘s calculus, often had no racially restrictive housing covenants and 
suffered from ―infiltration of a lower grade population.‖  Third-grade areas also 
contained a preponderance of ―jerrybuilt‖ housing as well as ―neighborhoods lacking 
homogeneity.‖  At the bottom of the HOLC‘s continuum, fourth-grade D areas suffered 
from severe housing decay and the widespread influx of nonwhite residents.  The least 
desirable neighborhoods, in the opinion of HOLC officials, ―are characterized by 
detrimental influences in a pronounced degree, undesirable population or an infiltration 




HOLC officials and local realtors visited and rated every neighborhood in Flint 
and its immediate suburbs during the summer of 1937.  As they traveled through the area, 
surveyors carried one-page instruction sheets, which they used to complete ―area 
descriptions‖ for residential districts.  The instruction sheets reminded surveyors to assess 
the quality of each neighborhood‘s parks and recreation services, ―scenic features,‖ 
transportation infrastructure, zoning, residential restrictions, schools, churches, business 
centers, and utilities.  Additionally, the HOLC instructed mapping consultants to search 
for nuisances, ―such things as obnoxious odors, noises, traffic conditions, fire hazards 
from certain types of plants such as cleaning plants, refineries, slaughter houses, disposal 
and reclaiming establishments.‖  According to the HOLC‘s instruction form, 
―infiltrations of lower grade population or different racial groups,‖ along with the 
―encroachments of apartments commercial or industrial properties,‖ were also nuisances 
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that detracted from a neighborhood‘s rating.
61
  To measure the favorability of an area‘s 
social characteristics, the HOLC asked surveyors to list the percentage of Negroes, 
foreign-born residents, and relief families in each neighborhood and to assess the risk of 
―infiltration‖ by these undesirable social groups.  By the HOLC‘s explicit standards, 
racial and class segregation were essential components of residential security and 
neighborhood stability.                     
By the close of their 1937 study, the HOLC‘s surveyors and map consultants had 
divided the city and its immediate suburbs into fifty residential areas.  Overall, the Flint 
region rated very poorly under the HOLC‘s criteria.  Only two small residential enclaves 
received A ratings—a section of Woodlawn Park east of downtown and the elite 
Woodcroft Estates subdivision on Flint‘s far west side.  Home to many of the city‘s top 
industrial executives, Woodlawn Park and Woodcroft Estates featured many elegant new 
homes with modern amenities and strict racial restrictions that kept both areas exclusively 
white.  Only seven neighborhoods received B grades on Flint‘s residential security map.  
The blue areas included several neighborhoods adjoining Woodcroft Estates and 
Woodlawn Park, GM‘s Modern Housing subdivisions, and several other west side 
enclaves.  Surveyors reported that the seven blue neighborhoods contained no Negroes, 
only a few foreign-born occupants, and ―few–if any‖ families on relief.
62
   
 Of the remaining forty-one residential areas in metropolitan Flint, eighteen 
received a rating of C.  Scattered throughout the city, these third-grade districts received 
their ratings for a variety of reasons that included substandard housing, the encroachment 
of rental units and commercial establishments, the presence of foreign-born and poor 
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families, and proximity to factories, slums, and other nuisances.  Significantly, none of 
the city‘s eighteen C-grade districts contained Negro residents.  The HOLC‘s survey 
team viewed the presence of foreign-born residents—especially southern and eastern 
Europeans, Mexicans, and Asians—as a reliable indication that a neighborhood was in 
gradual decline.  For example, regarding neighborhood C-10, a segregated working-class 
neighborhood east of the Flint River and St. John Street, an unnamed HOLC surveyor 
explained the yellow designation by writing, ―Gradually declining—too many aliens.‖  
Along with race and ethnicity, class also played a role in the HOLC survey.  In a number 
of instances, surveyors colored all-white working-class areas yellow, or even red, based 
primarily upon the still dreary employment prospects for idled General Motors workers.
63
   
 Race was central to the creation of the residential security maps, yet it was only 
one of the factors that led surveyors to redline twenty-three of the fifty neighborhoods in 
metropolitan Flint.  Of the three neighborhoods in the Flint area that contained Negro 
occupants in 1937, each received a grade of D.  In explaining the rating for the still 
integrated St. John district, neighborhood D-12, surveyors noted, ―Undesirables – aliens 
and negroes.‖  Related factors that led surveyors to assign C or D grades were proximity 
to Negro residential areas and the presence or absence of either physical or socially 
constructed barriers between ―inharmonious‖ racial and ethnic groups.  In all but one 
case, the all-white neighborhoods that bordered areas with Negro residents received 
either C or D grades.  The sole exception was neighborhood B-6, which formed the 
western edge of Woodlawn Park.  Populated primarily by business executives, the west 
side of Woodlawn Park was an all-white neighborhood of middle-class and wealthy 
property owners, many of whom lived in newly built single-family homes.  Nevertheless, 
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the western edge of the neighborhood bordered Lapeer Road, the dividing line separating 
Woodlawn Park from the integrated Floral Park area.  As HOLC surveyors noted, 
neighborhood B-6 was, ―Too close to ‗C‘ and ‗D‘ areas to the west.‖  Rather than assign 
the neighborhood a C or D grade, however, HOLC officials issued a B designation for the 
area, concluding, ―Will hold up.  Pride of ownership.‖
64
  West Woodlawn Park no doubt 
contained many proud homeowners, yet the neighborhood‘s blue grade stemmed also 
from its racially restrictive housing covenants and the impermeability of the Lapeer Road 
color line that separated it from Floral Park.  Indeed, during the 1930s and 1940s many 
black residents of Floral Park referred to Lapeer Road as the Mason-Dixon Line.
65
                               
 Most historians of suburban development in the United States have argued that 
the HOLC‘s residential security maps rewarded segregated suburbs over integrated urban 
areas.
66
  For instance, David Freund has pointed out that nationwide, ―The majority of the 
residential sections receiving the D rating had an African American presence.‖
67
  While it 
is undeniable that HOLC surveyors, and later FHA appraisers, privileged whiteness and 
penalized neighborhoods that housed racial and ethnic minorities, the Flint case suggests 
the need for a more careful, locally oriented analysis of the residential security maps and 
the FHA‘s early mortgage insurance policies.  Of the twenty-three Flint neighborhoods 
redlined by HOLC surveyors, only three contained Negro occupants.  Moreover, of the 
all-white suburban districts surveyed in 1937, none received a grade of A.  Among all of 
the suburban areas included in the HOLC‘s Flint survey, only two small slivers of land in 
the city of Mt. Morris received B grades, with the rest of the municipality‘s 
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neighborhoods earning either C or D ratings.  For the entire city of Grand Blanc, located 
in south suburban Flint, HOLC appraisers issued a C grade, while warning of a ―trend 
toward ‗D‘ rating.‖  To all of the close-in residential areas that ringed the city of Flint‘s 
borders, HOLC categorically assigned D grades.
68
        
Beyond weighing racial and economic considerations, HOLC surveyors also paid 
careful attention to building and zoning codes, housing quality, utility services, tax rates, 
and the development of urban infrastructure.  HOLC appraisers listed no African-
American residents in their area descriptions of suburban Flint, but they did find 
thousands of poorly constructed homes that lacked municipal water, sanitary sewers, and 
other urban utilities.  Such neighborhoods fared poorly in the HOLC surveys.  For 
neighborhood D-22, a residential area in Burton Township just south of the city limits, 
surveyors explained their D rating with a few clarifying remarks: ―Comparatively new 
section of cheap construction.  Laborer‘s homes.  Outside the city.‖  Similarly, regarding 
neighborhood D-20 just beyond Flint‘s southeastern border, a map consultant noted, 
―Cheap laborers‘ cottages.  Some as small as two rooms.  Easternmost three streets are 
outside the city limits.‖  Under the HOLC‘s rating system, Flint‘s suburbs rated more 
poorly than neighborhoods in the city.
69
          
 The HOLC‘s 1937 survey of Flint reveals several important truths about the 
complex relationships between race, space, and the processes of suburban development in 
Genesee County.  HOLC surveyors looked askance at integrated neighborhoods wherever 
they existed.  Still, though, those same surveyors also redlined virtually all of suburban 
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Genesee County, primarily because Flint‘s still underdeveloped suburbs lacked zoning 
codes, building regulations, and municipal services.  By assigning low grades to suburban 
districts, appraisers from HOLC—and, later on, the FHA—offered a powerful 
inducement to township officials and suburban homeowners who wanted to bring modern 
urban services and housing investment to the out-county.  Hoping to increase living 
standards and property values through the construction of both federally insured and 
privately financed housing, postwar suburban officials rushed to expand city services and 
build urban infrastructures in what were previously undeveloped agricultural areas.  The 
rapid development of suburban infrastructure and the wave of suburban municipal 
incorporations that ensued during the postwar era would ultimately hold grave 
consequences for city officials in Flint who hoped to expand the city‘s territory through 
metropolitan consolidation, annexation, and other political means.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that the HOLC‘s surveys did not reward all-white suburban areas in 
Genesee County with high security grades.  Rather, the HOLC redlined suburban areas 
due to their poorly developed physical and political infrastructures.  In order to receive 
federal support for housing development, the maps demonstrated, suburban officials 
would have to bring urban services and amenities to residents of outlying areas.               
 Federal officials relied heavily on the lending habits of local bankers when they 
rated residential areas.  Beyond surveying neighborhood conditions, HOLC surveyors 
also measured lending practices throughout the city and its adjoining suburbs.  The 
HOLC‘s reports on mortgage availability confirm that racial considerations figured 
prominently in the Depression-era calculus of local bankers.  Included in each of the 
HOLC‘s neighborhood descriptions were sections on the availability of local mortgage 
80 
 
funds for both existing home purchases and new home construction.  For every 
neighborhood in metropolitan Flint, appraisers measured the willingness of lenders to 
issue mortgages—using the categories ―good,‖ ―fair,‖ and ―limited‖—as a factor in 
determining security grades.  In all but two instances, HOLC appraisers rated the lending 
activity as good in first- and second-grade neighborhoods.  Among C-grade 
neighborhoods, the HOLC survey categorized lending activity as good in seven areas, fair 
in ten others, and limited in one subdivision.  District C-16, the only third-grade 
neighborhood in which lending activity was limited, sat immediately south and east of the 
integrated Floral Park area.  Regarding the region‘s twenty-three D-grade neighborhoods, 
none of which received an investment ranking of good, surveyors determined that lending 
activity was fair in seventeen areas and limited in five.  Included among the five redlined 
districts in which lending activity was limited were the racially transitional St. John Street 
and Floral Park areas, an integrated neighborhood bordering St. John, an all-white 
neighborhood immediately west of Floral Park, and an all-white subdivision of 
predominantly self-built homes just south of the Flint city limits.  Long before the federal 
government took an active interest in the Flint real estate market, local bankers and 
developers had created their own maps and their own policies of racial segregation and 
inner-city divestment.  With only slight deviations, HOLC and FHA surveyors employed 
that same racialized spatial logic in creating mortgage risk maps.
70
     
 Historians have hotly debated the importance and legacy of the HOLC‘s 
residential security maps.  While many scholars have argued that the creation of the 
security maps signaled an expansion of government-sponsored racial segregation, others 
                                                 
70
 Area Descriptions for Flint, Michigan, RG 195, Records Relating to the City Survey File, 1945-1940, 
box 23, NA. 
81 
 
have concluded that the HOLC‘s mortgage refinance program was in fact beneficial to 
thousands of African Americans and other residents of third- and fourth-grade urban 
neighborhoods.
71
  During the 1930s, the HOLC refinanced thousands of black-owned 
homes in C and D neighborhoods.  Nationwide, according to David Freund, African 
Americans held approximately 5 percent of the HOLC‘s refinanced mortgages.
72
  In a 
report that accompanied the Flint residential security map, HOLC officials reminded 
federal administrators and local lenders alike that low-risk mortgages could be issued to 
residents of third- and fourth-grade neighborhoods: ―We do not intend to imply,‖ the 
report stated, ―that good mortgages do not exist or cannot be made in the Third or Fourth 
grade areas.‖  Nevertheless, the same report concluded that mortgages in C and D areas 
―should be made and serviced on a different basis than in the First and Second grade 
areas.‖
73
  Hoping to forestall additional foreclosures, HOLC officials rated and appraised 
neighborhoods to determine the risk factors associated with mortgage lending.  The 
creators of HOLC‘s Flint survey made explicit connections between racial segregation, 
housing values, and actuarial risks.  Just as realtors, bankers, and builders had done for 
decades, the HOLC‘s city survey teams characterized both racial integration and 
proximity to Negroes and other nonwhites as a detrimental influence on real estate 
values, mortgage risk, neighborhood stability, and quality of life.  Although HOLC 
officials did in fact invest in C and D neighborhoods, the agency also insisted that local 
lenders should adopt a more conservative approach to lending in low-grade residential 
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neighborhoods.  Race, though not the only consideration, played a central role in the 
HOLC‘s determination of these security grades.  Indeed, every neighborhood in the city 
that contained any African Americans, regardless of the percentage or the economic 
status of residents, received a D rating, a distinction that rendered the entire area as a high 
actuarial risk.  The racial and spatial considerations that informed the HOLC‘s city 
survey program—ultimately adopted and codified by administrators from the Federal 
Housing Administration and local lenders nationwide—constituted a new and explicit 
government mandate for both the development of suburban infrastructure and rigid 
residential segregation.      
 In a 2003 journal article on the HOLC‘s redlining practices in Philadelphia, 
historian Amy E. Hiller argued that the agency‘s critics have overstated the importance of 
the 1930s residential security maps.  Among other things, Hillier claimed, ―lenders were 
avoiding areas colored red before HOLC made its maps, that HOLC‘s maps were not 
widely distributed, and that lenders had other sources of information about real estate risk 
levels.‖
74
  An analysis of the Flint security maps confirms many of Hillier‘s central 
claims.  The HOLC‘s neighborhood descriptions and maps of Flint reflected a series of 
assumptions about race, real estate values, and mortgage risks that local lenders, realtors, 
and homeowners already subscribed to—and had enforced via the establishment of 
restrictive housing covenants—prior to the 1930s.  In the Flint case, in fact, HOLC field 
representatives went so far as to incorporate pre-existing lending practices as part of their 
neighborhood rating rubric.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to support the claim that local 
lenders, builders, and real estate brokers in the Flint area did not have access to the 
HOLC‘s findings.  During the 1937 study of Flint, HOLC officials employed the city‘s 
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top mortgage lenders and real estate firms, all members of the city and county boards of 
real estate, to serve as mapping consultants.  ―These maps and descriptions,‖ a HOLC 
report maintained, ―have been carefully checked with competent local real estate brokers 
and mortgage lenders, and we believe they represent a fair and composite opinion of the 
best qualified local people.‖
75
  Additionally, CWA surveyors, who made their findings 
widely available to local housing officials, employed the same racial logic as HOLC 
appraisers.  Moreover, even if the maps themselves did not circulate widely, the logic 
embedded within the HOLC‘s rating schema informed every firm in the city devoted to 
the lending, real estate, and building industries.  Most important, however, is the fact that 
the HOLC maps reached officials from the Federal Housing Administration, who 
ultimately formalized the racial and spatial calculus that informed HOLC‘s surveyors.       
In June 1934, federal legislators passed the National Housing Act, which in turn 
triggered the formation of the Federal Housing Administration.  Like HOLC officials, 
representatives of the FHA believed that the health of the private housing market 
depended upon the spread of long-term, low-interest, fully amortized loans.  In order to 
further those aims, the FHA-insured mortgages issued by local lending agencies on new 
and existing homes.  It is difficult to overstate the extent to which the FHA‘s mortgage 
insurance program affected residential landscapes in cities such as Flint.  Indeed, 
historians such as Kenneth Jackson have argued that the FHA exerted more influence on 
postwar Americans than any other federal agency.  By reducing the mortgage risks of 
local lending institutions, the FHA induced bankers to issue more loans and reduce 
interest rates on long-term, fully amortized mortgages.  In Flint and elsewhere, the results 
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of their efforts were astounding.  Between 1934 and 1972, the FHA insured mortgages 
for eleven million homeowners and helped to increase home ownership rates nationwide 
from 44 to 63 percent.
76
  In the Vehicle City, where single-family homes already 
predominated, the FHA‘s liberal mortgage insurance policies helped to push home 
ownership rates far above national averages.  Just between 1942 and 1947, for instance, 
the proportion of homeowners in the city increased from 63 to 77 percent.
77
     
 Among its many legacies, the FHA helped to standardize building regulations, 
zoning codes, and other policies designed to protect residential neighborhoods from 
inharmonious land uses.  Following in the HOLC‘s tradition, the FHA also established 
national standards for the appraisal of housing quality, neighborhood desirability, and 
mortgage risks.  Like the HOLC‘s field agents during the 1930s, FHA appraisers and 
underwriters used a set of racially biased criteria in rating residential neighborhoods.  
Those criteria included measuring a neighborhood‘s economic stability and tax structure, 
the proximity of adverse influences and hazards, the quality of transportation and utility 
services, the area‘s geographic positioning vis-à-vis civic institutions and commercial 
facilities, and the neighborhood‘s social appeal.  Following a basic mathematical formula, 
FHA mortgage underwriters studied and rated neighborhoods and established strict 
guidelines for local lenders on which sections of metropolitan areas were safe 
investments and thus eligible to receive FHA-insured mortgages.                                              
 In order to guarantee uniformity in its housing and neighborhood appraisal 
program, FHA officials drafted underwriting manuals and other widely circulated 
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guidelines that outlined the agency‘s policies on insuring home mortgages.  As with the 
HOLC, the FHA rated neighborhoods on a descending scale from A to D.  Beyond 
measuring housing quality, the credit background of prospective buyers, and other 
ostensibly colorblind factors, FHA surveyors and underwriters also gauged an area‘s 
proximity to environmental hazards and other nuisances along with its degree of racial 
segregation.  FHA officials did not always use the same color scheme as the HOLC in 
rating residential neighborhoods, but their racial, spatial, and economic logic was 
essentially the same.  In a 1935 report on housing appraisals in Springfield, 
Massachusetts, for instance, nationally renowned real estate theorist Homer Hoyt, an 
official with the FHA‘s Economics and Statistics Division, offered advice on how to 
divide cities into homogeneous neighborhoods and how to locate ―reject‖ neighborhoods.  
First, Hoyt suggested that appraisers should draw lines around the central business 
district, industrial areas, and areas that included apartment buildings with eight or more 
units.  Next, Hoyt instructed surveyors to subdivide the city into single- and two-family 
residential districts according to rental values.  ―Having completed the rental map,‖ Hoyt 
continued, ―you are now to draw a blue pencil around all blocks in which there are more 
than 10% Negroes or race other than white; also indicate areas in which there are a 
considerable number of Italians or Jews in the lower income group.‖  For Hoyt, 
neighborhoods marked by low rental values, dilapidated housing, and the presence of 
nonwhites were ―undesirable for loan purposes.‖  ―On the other hand,‖ Hoyt suggested, 
―where rents are high, the percentage of owner occupancy is high, the condition of the 
buildings good and there is no race other than white, there will be found areas that rate 
high for loan purposes.‖
78
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 Like their counterparts from the HOLC, FHA appraisers also rated neighborhoods 
based upon proximity to Negro residential districts and the presence or absence of 
physical barriers separating white and black spaces.   
A neighborhood should be graded down even though it is now a very good 
neighborhood if it is in the path of a low-grade neighborhood that is 
growing in its direction.  In estimating the stability of a neighborhood, the 
strength of the barriers dividing it from poor neighborhoods should also be 
considered.   
 
According to Hoyt and other FHA officials, appraisers needed to consider not only the 
current social status of neighborhoods, but also its future prospects for resisting ―the 
infiltration of undesirable elements.‖
79
  So that his instructions were unmistakably clear, 
Hoyt provided Springfield appraisers with a short list of criteria to distinguish ―reject‖ 
areas from the ―best,‖ safest neighborhoods for FHA investment.  A reject neighborhood, 
Hoyt advised, was one that had ―an intermixture of races and nationalities.‖  Once 
designated, reject neighborhoods were ineligible for FHA insurance.  Conversely, A-
grade neighborhoods could contain ―no residents of a race other than white nor of a 
nationality on a lower economic scale than the old American stock.‖  In order to preserve 
the stability of property values in highly rated neighborhoods, Hoyt also stipulated that 
first-grade neighborhoods maintain proper zoning and deed restrictions to stop the 
―infiltration of undesirable races.‖
80
  Not at all peculiar to Springfield, Massachusetts, 
Hoyt‘s instructions to appraisers ultimately found their way into the FHA‘s official 
Underwriting Manual, which advocated racially restrictive housing covenants.  In the 
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1938 version of the Underwriting Manual, FHA administrators famously informed 
appraisers, ―If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall 
continue to be occupied by the same racial group.‖
81
                
 From the mid-1930s through the post-World War II era, neighborhoods with 
African-American occupants simply could not obtain A and B rankings, often a 
prerequisite for receiving both FHA-insured mortgages and conventional home loans.  
When rating black neighborhoods that scored highly based upon ostensibly non-racial 
factors such as utility services and transportation access, Hoyt and other FHA officials 
instructed appraisers to crunch numbers to ensure a D grade.  In his guidelines for 
Springfield‘s appraisers, Hoyt revealed a glimpse of the social mathematics that made it 
virtually impossible for black people to obtain federally insured mortgages, even when 
their neighborhoods met the FHA‘s rigid, race-conscious standards: 
It is not necessary for all of these worst elements to be combined before a 
neighborhood is rejected, but some of the worst neighborhoods do have a 
great many of these worst elements in combination.  All areas that have 
the lowest rents in the city, the greatest number of buildings needing major 
repairs, an intermixture of races, and which are generally regarded as vice 
or slum areas, should not be given a higher rating than one on stability of 
the neighborhood, protection from adverse influences, and appeal of the 
neighborhood.  Such ratings will take off 44 from the total rating and 
almost assure the rejection of the neighborhood unless the score on all the 
other factors is perfect.  Since slum areas may frequently be rated as 
perfect with respect to adequate transportation and sufficiency of utilities 
and conveniences which would give them 25 points, it is necessary to rate 
stability, protection from adverse influences, and appeal of neighborhood 
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According to both the explicit and implicit policies of the FHA, neighborhoods that 
contained black people were ―unquestionably slums,‖ or well on their way towards 
becoming so, and therefore ineligible for federal mortgage insurance.   
__________ 
 
In February 1967, over three decades after the creation of the FHA, the National 
Committee against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) released How the Federal 
Government Builds Ghettos, a pamphlet that described how federal housing policies 
helped to sustain residential segregation.  The publication included an essay by Richard 
and Diane Margolis, entitled ―The Ghetto and the Master Builder,‖ which charged the 
FHA and other government agencies with being, ―the prime carrier[s] of galloping 
segregation.‖  ―Nearly everything the Government touches turns to segregation,‖ the 
Margolises wrote.  ―And the Government touches nearly everything.‖
83
  Through its 
massive mortgage insurance and neighborhood appraisal programs, the FHA became one 
of the nation‘s primary, though not exclusive, sponsors of racial segregation.        
The Margolises offered a fair assessment of the FHA‘s racial policies.  During the 
1930s, federal officials created the HOLC and the FHA to attack substandard housing and 
to remedy deep crises in the real estate and development industries.  Working alongside 
local bankers and other representatives of the private housing industry, those same 
federal officials designed and codified appraisal and lending policies that helped to 
solidify the color line in postwar Flint.  Nevertheless, the FHA was only one entity in a 
broad constellation of private and governmental forces that sustained Jim Crow in the 
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Vehicle City.  Furthermore, housing was only one venue in which the broader struggle 
over race and space unfolded in the twentieth-century metropolis.  Educational policies, 
though most urban and suburban history scholars have devoted little attention to them, 
played an equally important role in maintaining racial and spatial inequalities in Flint and 
other metropolitan centers.  In Flint, ―community education‖—the brainchild of Charles 
Stewart Mott, Flint‘s leading citizen—played a decisive role in keeping neighborhood 
schools as segregated, and sometimes even more so, than the segregated residential 





Making Better Citizens and a Stronger Community: 
The Birth of Community Education and Neighborhood Schools 
 
 
Between the 1930s and the 1950s, the Vehicle City gained international acclaim for both 
its stylish cars and its neighborhood-based approaches to public education.  As with the 
home mortgage financing programs of the HOLC and the FHA, Flint‘s system of 
―community education‖ grew out of the turmoil of the 1930s, a decade in which mass 
poverty, economic crisis, and class conflict engulfed Flint and the nation at large.  In the 
city of Flint, industrial unionism, private property rights, and civil disorder emerged in 
the 1930s as key social and political issues that galvanized industrialists and urban 
reformers alike.  In response to the UAW organizing drives and factory occupations that 
culminated in the famous Flint sit-down strikes of 1936-37, local GM industrialist and 
civic benefactor Charles Stewart Mott inaugurated a citywide health, recreation, and 
education program as a means to restore civil order, economic growth, and social 
harmony to a city rent by class conflict.  Under the leadership of the Charles Stewart 
Mott Foundation, a powerful coterie of local civic leaders and industrialists forged a 
unique partnership with the board of education that brought millions of dollars in 
corporate-generated private funding to the public schools of Flint.  On the strength of that 
partnership, the Flint Public Schools pioneered a system of community education that 
hundreds of cities across the country copied during the postwar period.  Mott and other 
civic elites envisioned ―community schools‖ as all-purpose ―lighted community centers‖ 
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where trained professionals could educate rural migrants, promote public health and 
morality, combat communism and juvenile delinquency, and restore harmony and 
economic growth to a city in crisis.     
The Mott program expanded its reach into thousands of homes and dozens of 
neighborhoods during the 1930s and 1940s, helping to preserve social order and 
economic growth during a tumultuous era of mass migrations and industrial conflict.  
Open during the evenings and in the summer, Flint‘s community schools offered 
hundreds of outreach programs, courses, recreational opportunities, and health initiatives 
for youth and adults alike of all races.  Because of the tangible educational, recreational, 
social, and public health benefits it provided to working-class families and the poor, the 
Mott program was extraordinarily popular throughout Flint, especially within the 
working-class white neighborhoods that benefited disproportionately from its 
programming.  Leavened by its successes, the Mott Foundation and its local boosters 
attempted to spread the Flint model of community education to the nation as a whole 
during the postwar era.  On the strength of a massive, nationwide publicity campaign that 
brought many thousands of visitors to the city‘s schools each year, community education 
programs spread rapidly during the postwar decades, with hundreds of school systems 
copying the Flint model.   
The Mott initiative defies simple characterization.  Community schools were 
undoubtedly an early and extremely popular form of compensatory education for less 
advantaged families in the Flint community.  Over the course of its nearly forty-year 
existence, the Mott program brought families together for community events, provided 
job training to the unemployed, taught illiterate citizens to read and write, and delivered 
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essential health care services to indigent children and families.  Though its charitable 
contributions undoubtedly bettered the lives of thousands, the Mott initiative also 
institutionalized patterns of racial segregation, educational disadvantage, and economic 
inequality that helped to make Flint one of the most racially and spatially divided cities in 
the United States.        
The Mott Foundation program propounded politically conservative visions of 
community, citizenship, and individual rights that consistently undermined the 
progressive values of the New Deal and the moral imperatives of the local labor and civil 
rights movements.  Men such as Charles Stewart Mott and Frank Manley, the ―father‖ of 
Flint‘s community schools, envisioned community education as a privatized alternative to 
the social reforms of the New Deal and Great Society eras, and they viewed the free 
market and charity as legitimate alternatives to the welfare state.  Its creators and 
proponents saw community education as a local pilot project that could be duplicated 
nationwide as a replacement for a government-sponsored social safety net.  In stark 
contrast to the integrationist values that later drove the school desegregation movement, 
the creators of the Mott program also believed that successful community education 
depended upon segregation, both racial and economic.  Believing that social harmony 
could only take root in homogeneous neighborhood groupings, Mott and his powerful 
contingent of supporters on the school board attempted to revivify the Flint community‘s 
esprit-de-corps by first re-imagining and then reifying the social and spatial boundaries 
between its neighborhoods.  In exchange for the foundation‘s sponsorship, the Flint 
Board of Education redesigned its curriculum, reorganized its attendance policies, and 
refashioned its existing public school infrastructure to create segregated, neighborhood-
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based ―community schools‖ that also served as civic centers for each of the city‘s 
neighborhoods.  Flint‘s system of community education served as a foundation for the 
ubiquitous social construct known as the ―neighborhood school.‖  For racial 
conservatives such as Mott, who believed implicitly in the naturalness of racial and 
economic distinctions, true community schools depended upon exclusionary policies that 
sorted and separated citizens by race, space, and class. 
   
Mr. Flint Formalizes the Informal Partnership: 
Charles Stewart Mott, the Great Depression, and the Origins of Community Education 
The Great Depression dealt a vicious blow to the city of Flint.  Along with the massive 
unemployment and poor housing that plagued working families during the Depression, 
the 1930s brought high rates of disease, poverty, delinquency, and a myriad of urban 
problems that further sullied the city‘s once prosperous image.  According to a 1934 
government survey of twenty-two cities containing between 100,000 and 250,000 
persons, Flint ranked fourth in the infant death rate, sixth in maternal deaths, and tenth in 
the typhoid fever and diphtheria mortality rates.
1
  Dentally, the Flint of the 1930s was as 
unhealthy as any city in the country, with 90 percent of its children in need of 
professional treatment.
2
  Flint‘s poor statistical record in matters pertaining to public 
health belied the city‘s carefully cultivated reputation for prosperity and modern living, a 
fact that made GM recruiters and other Vehicle City boosters positively squeamish.   
In spite of the devastation it caused, the Great Depression failed to generate any 
sustained response from city officials and civic benefactors.  During the early 1930s, the 
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city of Flint spent a paltry fifty cents per capita each year on public health programs, the 
lowest amount in the nation among cities of similar size.  As one local reformer 
remembered, ―The situation in Flint in the 1930s was sad indeed . . . and the health 
picture in the entire community, compared to others of its size, was one of the worst in 
the nation.‖
3
  The deadly combination of housing shortages, a feeble public health 
program, and rampant unemployment made the Flint of the Thirties an exceedingly 
unhealthy place for its most vulnerable citizens.  It was a city whose ―golden streets had 
turned to lead.‖
4
      
 As the economic crisis unraveled, relief caseloads quickly overwhelmed the 
private volunteer agencies that had traditionally managed the city‘s welfare programs.  
Churches, civic organizations, and local charities, as they always had, oversaw early 
relief efforts by sponsoring food drives, opening soup kitchens, and delivering free milk 
and food to the hungry.  But Flint‘s ad hoc private relief sector ultimately collapsed under 
the weight of the 1930s crisis, simply unable to meet the local demands for food, shelter, 
health care, and employment.  With the onset of the New Deal in 1933, the federal 
government emerged to coordinate local relief efforts, effectively replacing Flint‘s 
informal private sector.  The shift from private charity to publicly financed aid programs 
marked a distinct turning point in Flint‘s twentieth-century development.  Regarding the 
local significance of the shift wrought by the New Deal, historian William Chafe 
concluded, ―By injecting an outside influence, the state usurped local power, replaced 
voluntarism, forged a new structural apparatus to attack the Depression, and in the 
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process fostered significant changes in the administration and philosophy of local relief.‖
5
  
Though New Deal policies did not, in the end, return Flint and its citizens to prosperity—
and although a disproportionate share of government stimulus funds privileged white 
citizens over African Americans—emergency federal initiatives in the areas of housing, 
public health, and hunger relief nonetheless marked a fundamental change in the local 
organization of welfare programs.  Remarking on the shift from private to public forms of 
relief, one citizen noted, ―The human care of dependents has gone past private agencies 
and is now a public job—a big job.‖
6
 
 The New Deal policies of the 1930s signaled a paradigmatic shift in local 
approaches to poverty.  Prior to the Depression, Flint‘s industrial and civic leaders 
administered public aid out of a collective sense of noblesse oblige, and they tended to 
see relief not as a basic right for all citizens but rather as a two-pronged system of charity 
and self help that local benefactors either offered or refused at their own discretion.
7
  For 
industrialists such as Charles Stewart Mott—who believed deeply in the virtues of self 
help, privatized charity, and laissez fare approaches to social welfare—the political 
transformations wrought by the New Deal struck a raw, exposed nerve.  Seeing most 
forms of government aid for the poor as creeping socialism, Mott never made his peace 
with the New Deal and never embraced the bipartisan liberal consensus that allegedly 
shaped much of American political discourse during the mid-twentieth century.  Indeed, 
from the onset of the New Deal until his death some forty years later, Mott fought an 
intense, fiercely local battle against the tenets of redistributive liberalism.  Mott‘s choice 
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Flint‘s community education program bore the unmistakable philosophical 
imprint of its sole benefactor, Charles Stewart Mott, known locally as ―Mr. Flint, First 
Citizen.‖  Like most other automobile industry pioneers, Mott was a product of the 
Gilded Age, born in 1875 in Newark, New Jersey.  His father, John Coon Mott, owned a 
successful cider and vinegar business and instilled in Charles an abiding love for both 
engineering and big business ventures.  After graduating from the Stevens Institute of 
Technology in 1897 with a degree in mechanical engineering, Mott joined the U.S. Navy 
and served briefly in the Spanish-American War as a gunner‘s mate.  Upon his return 
from battle, Mott reluctantly entered the family business, which by then had expanded 
well beyond fruit and cider production.  Perhaps as a concession to his son‘s interest in 
heavy manufacturing, in 1896 John Coon Mott bought into a Utica, New York, wheel and 
axle business.  Mott enthusiastically accepted a sales executive position with the Weston-
Mott axle company shortly after the Spanish-American War, relieved to have found 
employment options outside of the fruit and cider industry.
9
   
Originally a supplier of wheels and axles to bicycle and carriage companies, 
Weston-Mott began producing automobile wheels after the turn of the century.  The 
younger Mott acquired a substantial portion of the company‘s stock from his family and 
quickly rose to become president and general manager.  Under Charles Stewart‘s 
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leadership, the company grew tremendously, doubling the size of its factory and gaining 
business from automobile manufacturers across the country.  News of the company‘s 
successes eventually reached the city of Flint, where carriage manufacturing tycoon Billy 
Durant and a cadre of soon-to-be General Motors executives were organizing the Buick 
Motor Company.  Shortly after celebrating his thirtieth birthday in the summer of 1905, 
Mott received a business proposition from Durant, requesting that he move the Weston-
Mott Company to Flint.  Hoping to establish a wheel and axle plant adjacent to Flint‘s 
proposed Buick facilities, Durant offered Mott an enticing deal which included a large 
parcel of land on the city‘s north side, local stock subscriptions in the amount of 
$100,000, and a guarantee that Buick would purchase all of its axles from Weston-Mott.  
Mott made the decision to move his axle and wheel business to Flint in September of 
1905 after a whirlwind tour of the city and several weeks of negotiations with Durant and 
other local officials.
10
   
 Weston-Mott began its Flint operations in 1907.  In the years immediately 
following Mott‘s arrival, the local automobile industry grew tremendously.  After GM‘s 
September 1908 incorporation, Durant moved to acquire competing automobile 
companies and integrate its supplier networks.  In 1913, Durant purchased the Weston-
Mott Company, forever tying C. S. Mott to General Motors and Flint.  With incredible 
business acumen, Mott accepted Durant‘s buyout offer in exchange for a sizable share of 
General Motors stock and a seat on its board of directors, which he occupied until his 
death in 1973.  Although Charles Stewart tended to downplay his wealth, industry 
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observers reported that Mott‘s holdings in excess of $50 million made him GM‘s single 
largest stockholder and one of the richest men in the nation.
11
 
 Mott made a fortune in boomtown Flint and helped to create thousands of new 
jobs for local workers.  Nevertheless, the economic volatility of the automobile industry 
and the city‘s undeveloped infrastructure made it difficult for ordinary workers to secure 
decent housing and long-term economic security.  Poor housing and working conditions, 
overcrowded schools, inadequate municipal water and sewage systems, and cramped 
living environments angered thousands of migrant autoworkers, contributing to a 
contentious political climate during the 1910s.  Exacerbating matters, Durant‘s reckless 
corporate acquisition program, from which Mott benefited immensely, had, by 1910, left 
the cash-starved company on the brink of bankruptcy.  In order to pay off GM‘s 
mounting debt, Durant obtained loans from eastern banks in excess of $9 million.  In 
exchange for the loans, GM‘s financiers insisted that Durant withdraw from management 
and that the company institute an austerity program of layoffs and speedups to increase 
profitability.
12
   
Flint‘s Socialist Party successfully tapped into the popular discontent that 
accompanied the reorganization.  In 1911, party members captured the mayor‘s office 
and three seats on the city commission.  In response, Mott and a large group of Flint‘s 
leading citizens formed the Independent Citizen‘s Party—a bipartisan, ad hoc political 
organization created with the sole purpose of defeating municipal socialism.  Flush with a 
sense of obligation to the city that had given him so much, the staunchly Republican Mott 
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agreed to run for mayor in 1912 on the Independent Citizen‘s ticket.  Promising to bring a 
―business administration‖ to city government, Mott defeated John A. C. Menton, the 
Socialist incumbent, in a landslide.  In an editorial about the election, Flint‘s pro-business 
daily newspaper, the Flint Journal, remarked on the Vehicle City‘s brief encounter with 
municipal socialism and its subsequent turn toward capitalist efficiency: ―The people of 
Flint were suffering from the hookworm in their city affairs until the Socialists pricked 
them and awakened the electors to the fact that Flint ought to have a business 
administration and an efficient city government.‖
13
  The 1912 campaign marked the first 
of many political forays in which Mott sought to tilt a left-leaning city back to the right.                 
As a three-time mayor—elected in 1912, 1913, and again 1918—Mott fulfilled 
his promise of a business-friendly municipal administration.  Mayor Mott oversaw the 
modernization of the city‘s accounting and records procedures, cost-cutting municipal 
purchasing measures, water delivery and sewer improvements, a new building code, road 
and bridge construction, and a complete reappraisal of the city‘s municipal assets.  In 
recognition of the city‘s infrastructure and utility improvements, Chevrolet announced in 
1912 that it would base its production on Flint‘s west side, a major political coup for an 
administration that sought to lure big business ventures to Flint.  Not all of Mott‘s 
accomplishments were in the sphere of industry, however.  Mott understood that political 
success in a predominantly working-class city such as Flint depended upon compromises 
between the interests of capital and labor.  Though Mott did not consider himself a 
Progressive, he endorsed a variety of initiatives that his socialist and progressive 
opponents championed, including tougher meat and milk inspection ordinances and the 
preservation of public space for parks and recreation.  During the 1910s, Mott also 
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experimented with the local philanthropic initiatives for the poor that would make him 
famous two decades later.  Among other gifts to the city, Mott donated money to 
construct a modern hospital and set aside thousands of dollars each year to fund citywide 
recreation facilities and summer camping programs for underprivileged children.  
Through his early experiences in politics and philanthropy, Mott came to an 
understanding of his civic duties that ultimately drove the community education program:  
It seems to me that every person, always, is in a kind of informal 
partnership with his community.  His own success is dependent to a large 
degree on that community, and the community, after all, is the sum total of 
the individuals who make it up.  The institutions of a community, in turn, 
are the means by which those individuals express their faith, their ideals, 
and their concern for fellow men.
14
   
 
After three intermittent terms as Flint‘s mayor—and an unsuccessful run for governor in 
1920—Mott returned to private life, secure in the knowledge that he and his supporters 
had met the challenge of socialism.  Little did he know, however, that the 1930s would 
usher in another wave of political volatility that once again threatened corporate profits, 
industrial peace, and civic order.
15
 
 After losing his 1920 bid for governor, Mott returned to Applewood, his large 
estate near Woodlawn Park, to focus on philanthropy and his ongoing duties as a GM 
executive.  Taking advantage of federal tax incentives for charitable giving, which 
allowed benefactors to deduct donations of up to 20 percent of their income, he 
established the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation in 1926.
16
  Though the historical record 
is scant regarding the origins of the foundation, there can be little doubt that Mott‘s desire 
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to establish a charitable foundation stemmed from a variety of competing motivations.  
Clearly, Mott wished to protect a large portion of his wealth from federal taxation.  As 
evidenced by his many public remarks and at least one particularly angry diary entry, 
Mott loathed the progressive federal income tax and felt personally insulted by high 
taxes, believing that they penalized success and rewarded sloth: 
The government has so governed my business that I do not know who 
owns it.  I am suspected, expected, inspected, disrespected, examined, re-
examined, until all I know is that I am supplicated for money for every 
known need, desire or hope of the human race, and because I refuse to go 
fall and go out and beg, borrow or steal money to give away I am cussed 
and discussed, boy-cotted, talked to, talked about, lied to, lied about, held 
up, held down and robbed until I am nearly ruined; so the only reason I am 




Wishing to limit the federal government‘s share of his wealth and, perhaps even more 
important, hoping to exercise direct control over its expenditure, Mott transferred a 
sizable portion of his stock assets to the foundation after its establishment.  According to 
his biographers, the genesis of the Mott Foundation reflected ―an engineer‘s kind of 
planning for the future, a way of organizing his help to the community and making it 
business-like—taking as much care in the spending of his money as he had devoted to 
earning it.‖
18
  Clearly, the Mott Foundation was much more than a tax shelter. 
When he established the charitable foundation, Mott had not yet formalized the 
philosophy that ultimately drove his philanthropic spending.  Initially, he funded a range 
of local institutions, agencies, and programs that included Hurley Hospital, the Flint 
YMCA, the Rotary Club‘s Crippled Children‘s Program, Kiwanis Health Camp, the Flint 
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Community Fund, and the American Red Cross.  Mott almost always favored self-help 
initiatives over direct assistance to the poor, and he had a predilection for recreational and 
child-centered programs, but he lacked a coherent philanthropic vision prior to the 1930s.  
That all changed in 1935, though, courtesy of another ambitious New York transplant 
named Frank Manley.  Before arriving in Flint, Manley attended Michigan State Normal 
College in Ypsilanti during the 1920s, where he studied physical education under Wilbur 
P. Bowen, an early advocate of schools-based community recreation programs.  A sports 
and recreation devotee, the young Manley saw recreation as a panacea for crime, 
delinquency, and a myriad of social problems.  Manley exaggerated his philosophy only 
slightly when he remarked that ―athletic participation was a sort of saving grace for all 
mankind.‖
19
  Carrying a boundless enthusiasm for his sports-centered worldview, Manley 
arrived in Flint in 1927 to work as a physical education instructor.  After an impressive 
year of teaching and networking, Manley landed a job in 1928 as the citywide supervisor 
of physical education for the Flint Public Schools.  In the process of overseeing physical 
education programs throughout the city, Manley developed a special concern for child 
safety and juvenile delinquency, issues that fueled his interest in community education.
20
            
The Great Depression left Flint‘s education system in deep crisis.  As in other 
urban centers, decreasing tax rolls and declining population forced the Flint Board of 
Education to curtail both the length of school days and the duration of the school year.  
With neither a traditional school calendar nor an adequate system of recreation, 
thousands of unsupervised children often gathered for play on the streets, in the Flint 
River, and in other dangerous places.  Consequently, juvenile delinquency and a ―steadily 
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mounting traffic slaughter‖ of child pedestrians became grave social problems in Flint‘s 
crowded central city neighborhoods.  Angered by the situation, Manley complained,  
Every year we have eight or nine children killed while playing in the 
streets.  Scores of others are becoming juvenile delinquents because we 
don‘t like the way they utilize their leisure.  Who‘s to blame?  We are, 
because we don‘t give them any place to play but the streets, and we don‘t 
provide any recreation or amusement for them.
21
   
 
Espousing an almost religious devotion to the power of play, Manley believed that Flint 
could solve its delinquency and child safety problems if only civic leaders and school 
officials could sponsor neighborhood ―tot lots‖ and summer recreation programs for 
children and their families.  His early efforts culminated in 1934 with the Flint Plan for 
Recreation, a citywide program of neighborhood playgrounds, summer camps, sports 
leagues, and other forms of supervised recreation.  In conjunction with federal work relief 
programs, which sponsored adult education, nursery schools, and community recreation, 
the Flint Plan for Recreation significantly reduced the juvenile death and delinquency 
rates in the city.  Still, the Flint Plan nearly succumbed to bankruptcy at the conclusion of 
its first season.  Unable to gain financial support from the city, Manley sought out 
speaking and fundraising engagements with a host of local civic and philanthropic 
organizations to advertise his initiatives.   
In the summer of 1935, with the future of his program in jeopardy, Manley 
delivered a fateful speech to Charles Stewart Mott and other members of the Flint Rotary 
Club.  Frustrated over his inability to gain financial support and adequate meeting space 
for community recreation, Manley chastised local Rotarians for their inaction in the face 
of Flint‘s grave social problems.  ―I ridiculed those men for sitting so comfortably and 
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complacently in their club meetings while all Flint‘s social ills continued unabated,‖ 
Manley later remembered.
22
  Following the June Rotary meeting, where Manley spoke 
about the need for backyard tot lots, Mott invited the crusading physical educator to 
Applewood for a game of tennis.  According to local legend, Mott informed Manley 
during their match that he was interested in funding a new boys club for Flint youth, to 
which Manley responded, ―I think the boys‘ clubs are wonderful; it‘s just too bad we 
can‘t open the forty boys‘ clubs we have here in Flint.‖  Pointing out nearby Central High 
School, which adjoined the estate, Manley articulated a blueprint for what was to become 
the Mott program of community education: 
There‘s one [community center], I said [pointing to Central High School].  
It‘s closed down at 4 o‘clock, when a boys‘ club should be open.  It‘s 
complete with two gymnasiums, a swimming pool, a cafeteria, shops—
everything you would want in a boys‘ club, along with what you‘d want 
for girls‘ club, mothers‘ club, family club, a complete community center.  
Only we can‘t use it.  And that‘s just one.  There are forty such schools in 
Flint—one within half a mile of every man, woman, and child in town.  
They all stand idle after 4 o‘clock every day, because the Board of 




As they discussed the issue, Mott surely recognized the origins of Manley‘s idea.  During 
the 1910s, the Flint Socialist Party platform included a demand that ―school buildings 
shall be open for the use of the public, when not in use for school purposes.‖  Mott 
opposed the plan during the 1912 mayoral campaign, but he did so only out of opposition 
to the Socialist Party‘s managing the content of educational programming.  When offered 
a chance to fund and oversee his own school-based recreation programs, Mott seized the 
opportunity.
24
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 Appealing to the executive‘s personal frugality and deeply ingrained business 
sense, Manley suggested a pilot program that would limit capital expenditures by 
partnering the Mott Foundation and the Flint Public Schools for the purpose of 
sponsoring recreation programs in five public schools: Martin, Lowell, McKinley, 
Zimmerman, and Homedale.  According to Manley‘s plan, the Mott Foundation would 
provide funds to open the five schools for after-hours and weekend use in exchange for a 
commitment from the board to provide building space, heat, light, and custodial service.  
Impressed by the plan—and ever cognizant of the access to power guaranteed by his 
personal wealth—Mott introduced the initiative by hosting a dinner party for the entire 
board of education.  At the conclusion of the evening, Mott and Manley had, for an initial 
outlay of only $6,000, convinced the school board to open five public school buildings—
all of them in segregated, all-white neighborhoods—for the purpose of community 
recreation.   
 Though it originated as a recreational venture, the Mott program intended to meet 
the larger needs of the neighborhoods surrounding each of the pilot schools.  As Manley 
remembered, ―Activities of each school were designed to meet the recreational and 
educational needs of the particular area it served.‖
25
  To further that end, the Mott 
Foundation organized school officials and community members from each of the schools 
into separate committees to identify the special needs of each neighborhood.  The 
committees uncovered specific community problems, proposed recreation programs to 
ameliorate them, and then worked with school officials and the Mott Foundation to 
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deliver programming for residents.  Staffed primarily by physical education teachers, 
high school seniors, and community volunteers, the program proved to be an immense 
success in the pilot neighborhoods, attracting a weekly citywide attendance of 5,456 in its 
inaugural year.  With a variety of activities that included athletic competitions, scouting, 
neighborhood square dances, and roller skating, the Mott program brought white children 
and their parents off the streets and into the schools to recreate in a safe, ―wholesome‖ 
environment.       
 
Civilizing the City 
Initially, Manley and Mott envisioned the Flint program of recreation as a remedy for the 
specific problems of juvenile delinquency and child safety.  However, local events in 
1936 and 1937 compelled Manley and Mott to reassess the nature and scope of the city‘s 
urban problems and the remedial power of sports and leisure.  On December 30, 1936, 
the Great Sit-Down Strike erupted in Flint.  One of the most consequential labor struggles 
in American history, the strike pitted members of the newly formed United Automobile 
Workers against Mott and other General Motors executives in a battle for union 
recognition.  The striking workers occupied local automobile plants for forty-four days 
during that frigid winter in order to win collective bargaining rights.  On February 11, 
1937, the bitter dispute ended when GM formally agreed to recognize the union and 
engage in collective bargaining with the striking workers.  The workers‘ victory served as 
a catalyst for a wave of industrial organizing drives throughout the United States during 
the 1930s and 1940s.  The Flint sit-down strike also marked the birth of the UAW and its 
parent organization, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), as a force in both 
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industrial relations and American politics.  Community education was Mott‘s local 
response to the social and political challenges of organized labor.
26
             
Mott reacted harshly to the news of industrial organizing drives and factory 
occupations in Flint, believing that the sit-down strike was an illegal and discourteous 
violation of GM‘s property rights.  In a later interview with journalist Studs Terkel, Mott 
insisted that the strikers should have been shot, and even killed, for refusing to leave the 
factories.
27
  For a time in the late 1930s (and again in the 1960s), Mott became 
preoccupied with fears of lawlessness.  At one point, he even considered investing in 
Elmer Carlstrom‘s ―Up-the-Sleeve Tear Gas Gun‖ and other futuristic technologies 
designed to repress crime and civil disorder.
28
  Where some held hope for a greater 
democracy in the rise of industrial unionism, Mott saw the CIO and the UAW as proto-
socialist threats to private property and the rule of law.  Like Manley, Mott hoped that 
Flint could triumph over the forces of industrial unionism with a sweeping program of 
community recreation, company-sponsored housing, and other forms of welfare 
capitalism.
29
  As the victorious automobile strikes proved, however, the Flint of the late 
1930s was a fractured and contested city in which GM and its local representatives could 
dictate neither the private values nor the public behaviors of workers.  Deeply moved by 
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the social transformations wrought by the New Deal and sit-downs, Mott understood his 




Figure 2.1.  ―These Were Happy Days.‖ Charles Stewart Mott (seated in the center of the 
wagon) making a nostalgic statement at a parade through downtown Flint, ca. 1954.  
Courtesy of Flint Public Library. 
 
Beyond the leftist threats that he associated with the New Deal and the sit-down 
strike, Mott also found the urban landscape of the 1930s deeply troubling.  When he had 
arrived in Michigan in 1905, Flint was a small, relatively homogeneous city of native-
born whites, many of whom found employment in the skilled trades associated with 
carriage making.  Looking back nostalgically at turn-of-the-century Flint, men such as 
Mott saw a small, cohesive town linked by sidewalks and horse-drawn carriages—a 
socially intimate place where urban planning, transportation technology, architecture, 
ethnic homogeneity, and racial segregation combined to create a thick veneer of 
109 
 
community solidarity.  By the mid-1930s, however, the city had become virtually 
unrecognizable to the automobile pioneers who had first organized General Motors—a 
diverse, fractious city of big cars, big factories, and big unions.  Though the earliest 
incarnation of the Mott program had accomplished a great deal in reducing child traffic 
deaths and juvenile delinquency, the hydra of poverty, unemployment, and disease 
remained, stripping the city of its prosperous and modern image.
30
  Socially, the Flint 
region had grown both numerically and geographically such that incoming migrants felt 
very little sense of community and neighborliness.  ―We must build back to community 
activities to get people to know their neighbors and bring about a wholesome, small-town 
atmosphere in a big city,‖ Mott claimed.
31
  Ironically, the city‘s deeply entrenched 
automobile culture—which Mott himself had played a major role in constructing—
consistently frustrated his attempts to restore social harmony, cultural consensus, and 
neighborliness.  As Mott noted in an especially revealing diary entry, car culture in the 
United States represented a significant obstacle to community building: ―I live four 
months each year in Bermuda, where, thank heaven, automobiles are not allowed on the 
public roads and transportation is principally by horse-drawn vehicles and bicycles.‖  ―At 
any rate,‖ he continued, ―we are much more primitive than here in the United States and 
perhaps more civilized in our relations with other people.‖
32
  In the aftermath of the sit-
down strikes, it became clear to both Mott and Manley that child safety and recreation 
programs could not, on their own, solve the myriad social problems that plagued Flint.  
As the Depression gave way to wartime mobilization, the Mott program entered a new 
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phase of development that brought its expanded vision of community education to the 
entire city. 
By 1937, the Mott program of recreation had expanded to reach twenty-two 
schools in neighborhoods across the city.  Despite the impressive scope of the recreation 
program, however, Manley increasingly understood the limitations of the foundation‘s 
―bat and ball‖ approach to urban problems.  ―To know the child,‖ Manley now believed, 
―the school had to know his total environment.‖
33
  Acting on that realization, the Mott 
program increased its budget nearly five-fold and expanded its reach directly into the 
homes of community members.  With the approval of Mott and the always-supportive 
school board, Manley hired a cadre of ―visiting teachers‖ to investigate the home lives of 
the city‘s children.  Much to their consternation, the visiting teachers discovered deep 
poverty, correctible diseases and ailments, and unsanitary living conditions in thousands 
of homes across the city.  ―Of what use were sports to a child in poor health or a child 
with a physical handicap,‖ Manley concluded.
34
  The visiting teachers also found—
especially in working-class, Catholic, and migrant communities—living arrangements, 
family structures, and cultural practices that shocked their middle-class, Protestant 
sensibilities.  Among other surprises, they discovered single parent families, working 
mothers, and extended family living arrangements in which multiple generations 
cohabited under one roof.  In many migrant communities, the visiting teachers uncovered 
child rearing philosophies, cooking and cleaning styles, modes of worship, and other 
cultural practices that conflicted with the bourgeois, Victorian standards of civic elites.  
Even more disconcerting—at least for business Republicans such as Mott—the visiting 
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teachers saw a working-class, increasingly heterogeneous city that had expressed both at 
the polls and in the shops an almost reverential devotion to the Democratic trinity of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the United Auto Workers, and the New Deal.  Flint‘s 
problems, as Mott and Manley understood them, were more widespread than local elites 
had ever imagined.     
 Based upon the startling reports from visiting teachers, the Mott Foundation 
expanded its programs during World War II, adding a health center, a vocational training 
program, an adult homemaking course, and a Mother‘s Club for the domestic training of 
women.  Simultaneously, the foundation shifted its political emphasis from the UAW-
controlled city commission to the board of education.  In recognition of the UAW‘s 
growing electoral power—which manifested itself most clearly in the ward-based 
elections for the Flint City Commission—the Mott Foundation sought to wield its 
authority in the at-large, citywide races for the board of education.  As Manley noted,  
What has happened during the years is that we‘ve pretty much given up on 
changing the character of that august body [the city commission], and 
concentrated instead on getting the real leaders of our community on the 
board of education and in other influential positions. . . . The union is a 
pretty strong electoral force here in Flint.
35
   
 
 
Race and the Birth of Neighborhood Schools 
The wartime expansion of the Mott program—facilitated by the foundation‘s successful 
strategy of electing sympathetic school board members—helped bring to fruition 
Manley‘s vision of a ―school-centered‖ community in which public schools became the 
focal points for self-help, recreation, and community betterment.  Yet it was not until the 
conclusion of World War II when the first community school pilot project opened in 
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Flint.  In a move that broke sharply with the racial precedent established under the 
recreation plan, the Mott Foundation chose predominantly black Fairview Elementary 
School for its inaugural demonstration program.  Through its first decade of existence, 
the Mott program had operated exclusively in segregated, all-white schools, serving at 
most a handful of African-American residents who had slipped across Flint‘s rigidly 
enforced residential color line.  Following the Detroit race riot of 1943, however, local 
officials feared an outbreak of violence in Floral Park, St. John, and along the borders of 
Flint‘s growing North End ghetto.  Hoping to improve race relations in the city, the Mott 
Foundation responded with two rather incongruous initiatives.  In 1945, only two years 
after the epic Detroit riot, the foundation opened the Flint Interracial Community Center, 
a facility designed ―to work toward the improvement of better living, working, and 
playing conditions . . . between the races, in the fields of recreation, social, moral, and 
civic affairs.‖
36
  Though the foundation launched the interracial community center with 
the expressed intention of bringing whites and blacks together to reduce racial tensions, 
its social value was almost entirely symbolic.  Located near Fairview School in the center 
of the increasingly segregated St. John Street neighborhood, the interracial center offered 
only limited programming that typically revolved around music, boxing, and self-
improvement workshops.  During its short five-year existence, the center‘s 
overwhelmingly male visitors were almost exclusively black and Mexican residents of 
the surrounding neighborhood.   
The Mott Foundation allowed the interracial center to continue until 1951, when it 
shuttered the facility and shifted its recreation programs to the segregated St. John Street 
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Community Center.  In an unpublished report to the Mott Foundation‘s coordinating 
committee, the director of the center explained the decision to close:  
It [Flint Interracial Community Center] was founded at a time when racial 
tension in Flint had reached the riot stage.  Today, nearly five years after 
its program began, Flint is enjoying inter-racial and inter-cultural harmony 




Once satisfied that civic order had returned, the Mott Foundation abandoned its short and 
limited experiment with integration.     
The Mott Foundation launched its second racially oriented initiative, the Fairview 
project, in 1947.  The Fairview program represented a sharp turn away from even limited 
forms of integration.  In fact, when they designed the Fairview pilot, foundation officials 
had dropped all pretense of racial integration in favor of an experiment in community 
improvement within a segregated neighborhood school.
38
  The portion of the St. John 
Street neighborhood that surrounded Fairview was predominantly black by the close of 
World War II.  In 1947, the school had an enrollment of 393 students, 92 percent of 
whom were African American.  Home to approximately half of Flint‘s black residents 
and businesses, the St. John Street neighborhood was an economically diverse 
neighborhood of workers, professionals, and unemployed persons.  Still, though, St. John 
was among the most polluted, overcrowded, and dilapidated communities in the city.  In 
St. John, a local historian remarked, ―Sooty pollution from the Buick foundry and dust 
from unpaved roads blighted what age and neglect didn‘t get first.‖
39
  Residents of St. 
John inhabited the city‘s oldest homes and suffered disproportionately from disease, 
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crime, and poverty.  In its annual report for 1947-48, the Mott Foundation described the 
social conditions that shaped educational outcomes for Fairview students:  
In the Fairview District, the serious-minded parents who want better 
things for their children find life a continuous struggle to combat 
destructive influences.  Children whose parents have long since bowed to 
prevailing conditions come to school in a poor state of nutrition and 




Still concerned about the prospect of riots and other civil disturbances, the Mott 
Foundation designed the Fairview project as a means to ―lessen frustration and 
aggression‖ among African Americans.  Mott and Manley hoped to do this by improving 
the social conditions in one specific neighborhood.  More generally, though, the 
foundation‘s strategy at Fairview and in other segregated black schools was to combat 
inequality by raising the living standards and intellectual capacities of a few select 
African Americans.  As Manley noted, ―It doesn‘t mean that the races have to date or 
inter-marry . . . [but] we should put the Negro on our middle class level of thinking.  We 
have to take out the good Negro and bring him along to our middle class.‖
41
  Like most 
white Americans at mid-century, Manley and Mott abhorred ―social equality‖ between 
the races, believed that only ―good‖ Negroes could be assimilated, and viewed racial 
inequities primarily as a function of black anomie and backwardness.  
 Prior to the launch of the Fairview pilot program, the Mott Foundation conducted 
extensive neighborhood surveys through home visits and community tours, using its 
findings to create in-service training in the fields of health and child development for the 
school‘s teachers.  Additionally, the foundation purchased new furniture, lights, artwork, 
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and educational materials to enhance the learning environment in the school building.  
Mott also funded a complete educational survey that resulted in numerous changes to the 
Fairview curriculum.  For its part, the board of education approved a school orchestra, a 
series of enrichment field trips for students, an intensive physical education program, 
longer class periods, regular intelligence and achievement testing, and a smaller pupil-
teacher ratio.  In support of the more rigorous academic program, the foundation also 
organized a variety of programs to improve the health and wellness of community 
members.  For the poorest students at Fairview, Mott subsidized physical exams and a 
free breakfast program along with an extended-day program for the children of working 
parents.  Making Fairview a true community school, however, entailed bringing adults 
into the building.  For parents and other adults in the attendance district, Fairview 
provided free meeting space and opened its doors during the evenings for homemaking 
courses, adult education, and recreation.  Among the most important activities offered at 
Fairview, according to foundation officials, was the adult homemaking program, which 
taught mothers to plan and cook meals, clean house, and make clothing.  Believing that 
knowledge, uplift, and moral reform were the keys to eradicating poverty in the St. John 
neighborhood, the school board and foundation officials deployed teams of visiting 
teachers to recruit poor mothers for its classes. 
 Beginning in the summer following the opening of the Fairview community 
school, the Mott Foundation launched a massive publicity campaign to spread news of its 
successes in the North End.  Because the foundation released little data regarding the 
Fairview experiment, it is unclear whether the pilot project significantly improved health 
outcomes or reduced unemployment and poverty in the St. John Street community; no 
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evidence supports such claims.  Yet in creating a vibrant community center for residents 
of all ages, the Fairview project was a rousing success.  Hoping to publicize the results of 
the Fairview experiment, Manley and a growing number of disciples on the board of 
education designated the school as a ―showcase‖ for residents across the city to view the 
successes of community education.  By the close of the decade, hundreds of citizens had 
crossed the color line to see firsthand the community schools program at Fairview.  The 
publicity campaign expanded well beyond visitations, however.  As Manley later 
remembered, ―Almost every organized group in the community had at least one speaker 
who discussed in detail what was taking place at Fairview.‖
42
  For black residents of the 
North End, it was obvious by 1950 that the Mott Foundation had planned to let the Flint 
Interracial Community Center languish; but it was equally clear by then that community 
education had emerged as the foundation‘s new segregated paradigm for civic harmony 
and social uplift.  In defense of the shift towards neighborhood schools programming, C. 
S. Harding Mott, son of Charles Stewart and vice-president of the Mott Foundation, said, 
―We cannot solve world affairs satisfactorily without first tackling our community 
problems.  We believe we have the best chance for doing this at the neighborhood 
school.‖
43
  By the end of the Fairview experiment, the segregated neighborhood school 
had emerged as ground zero for community education.         
 
The Spread of Community Education 
Mott was frugal by nature and never intended to fund Flint‘s community education 
program on his own.  Rather, he and Manley hoped to ―grease the gears‖ of the existing 
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schools machinery through strategic donations to the Flint Board of Education and 
massive publicity campaigns aimed at the taxpaying public.  In the five years following 
World War II, the foundation orchestrated its local public relations efforts almost 
exclusively for the purpose of raising additional public monies for Flint‘s perennially 
impoverished schools.  Compared with other school systems of similar size, the Flint 
Public Schools typically ranked near the bottom in per pupil expenditures, teacher pay, 
and school construction outlays.  A combination of factors including the city‘s rapid 
growth, its arcane system of local tax limitation, and the school board‘s ―pay as you go‖ 
financing left the schools in deep crisis by the late 1940s.
44
  Because of Michigan‘s 
restrictive tax limitation laws—enacted in 1932 to provide property tax relief during the 
Great Depression—property in Flint could not be taxed beyond a strict fifteen-mill limit 
for local purposes unless specifically authorized by voters.  Prior to the postwar economic 
boom, the board of education found it exceedingly difficult to obtain popular consent to 
exceed the fifteen-mill limitation.  Consequently, the city constructed no new public 
schools between 1929 and 1950 and operated a full ten-month school year only once 
between 1932 and 1946.  Hoping to expand the community schools concept citywide by 
capitalizing on the successes of the Fairview project, supporters of the Mott program 
waged an aggressive school bond campaign in 1950.  At a June 1 birthday celebration 
sponsored by the board of education, Mott announced a major gift to the Flint school 
system—a $1 million donation to fund the construction of a four-year college in Flint.  
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Ever the practical businessperson, Mott offered the donation only on the condition that 
voters approve a new schools millage to fund four new elementary schools, building 
additions for three additional facilities, a new junior college, a new public library, and a 
new school administration building.  After an intensive citywide campaign that gained 
immeasurable momentum following Mott‘s announcement, voters, by a four-to-one 
margin, approved an unprecedented $7 million bond issue on June 6, 1950.  Flush with 
desperately needed funds, the Flint Board of Education moved in the 1950s and 1960s to 
formalize the Mott program by implementing community education on a citywide basis.
45
   
When Flint voters visited the polls in June 1950, they approved a school millage 
for the first time in the city‘s history, inaugurating what the Flint Journal dubbed a 
―golden era‖ of public education.  The approval of the 1950 bond issue, along with the 
passage of four additional school millages in the next dozen years, allowed the board of 
education to proceed with an ambitious capital projects campaign that brought new 
school buildings and community schools programs first to the segregated white 
neighborhoods on the city‘s fast growing fringe and later to the predominantly black 
schools in the city‘s impoverished core.  The board of education‘s postwar building 
strategy, which represented a substantial investment in the city‘s outermost 
neighborhoods, mirrored the broader decentralized patterns of private capital investment 
during the 1940s and 1950s that rewarded communities in accordance with their distance 
from the increasingly black inner city.   
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By the end of the 1950s, the school board had used its increased revenues to 
construct eight new elementary schools in the city of Flint.  Out of the eight new 
elementary schools opened during the 1950s, only one, Stewart School, contained black 
pupils; it opened in 1955 with an 83 percent black enrollment.  The remaining seven 
schools, all located in the segregated white neighborhoods that ringed the city‘s core, 
served a combined total of over five thousand students, none of whom was black.  
Although the all-white schools constructed in the 1950s—each of them fully equipped as 
school-community centers—quickly became the new public relations centerpieces for its 
program, the Mott Foundation went to great lengths to expand its community schools 
initiatives to the entire city during the 1950s and 1960s.  For its supporters in Flint and 
elsewhere, the twenty years between 1950 and 1970 marked the historical apex for 
community education, a period in which the Mott Foundation persuaded not only the 
Flint Board of Education, but also thousands of white and black citizens to embrace a 
neighborhood schools paradigm for personal uplift and urban renewal.  Echoing the 
popular enthusiasm for community education, the editors of the Flint Journal cheered the 
expansion of the Mott program.  ―Better education means better citizens,‖ they claimed.  
―Better citizens mean a better community.  Better communities mean a better Nation, and 
a better democracy.‖
46
  For Mott and Manley, community education was a vehicle for 
building better citizens, healthier neighborhoods, and a stronger, more segregated 
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The Political Content of Community Education 
Within a year of the 1950 millage victory, the Flint Board of Education had opened 
Freeman School, the city‘s first elementary school designed specifically to accommodate 
community education programs.  Located in the Farnumwood neighborhood near Flint‘s 
southern boundary with Burton Township, Freeman served an all-white, mixed income 
neighborhood just to the east of the city‘s massive Fisher Body 1 plant.  The board of 
education trumpeted its newest ranch-style school—which opened on October 22, 
1951—as the architectural and semiotic embodiments of community education.  In 
recognition of its significance, the school board used Freeman‘s utilitarian design as the 
blueprint for all future school construction in the city, going so far as to publicize its 
specifications nationally for other interested school districts.   
In order to accommodate both students and community members, Freeman sat on 
five acres of land and contained approximately 43,000 square feet of floor space, 
significantly more than in the older two- and three-story central city schools.  Complete 
with a wooded grove for outdoor theater projects, picnic tables, and a large parking lot 
for off-street parking, the spacious grounds of the Freeman School signaled the board‘s 
embrace of the suburban ideals of open space, single-story architecture, and automobile-
centered transportation.  Designed to cater to a multiplicity of community needs, Freeman 
held eight traditional classrooms, two kindergartens, a gymnasium, library, arts and crafts 
room, a community conference room, health room, teachers‘ rest area, administrative 
offices, and a power plant.
47
  Its gymnasium, envisioned as a primary site for community 
events in the evening and on weekends, was significantly larger than traditional school 
gyms, with space necessary to host community dances, roller skating, shuffleboard, 
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volleyball, and badminton.  For larger events, the gym had rollaway bleachers that could 
quickly add either floor space or seating depending upon needs.  Equipped with public 
toilets accessible from the lighted play lots and ball fields outside the school, Freeman‘s 
interior design reflected the board‘s desire to bring the public into the school building.  
As with the gymnasium, Freeman‘s auditorium could accommodate large crowds for 
assemblies, town hall meetings, community plays, and other neighborhood events.  The 
school library at Freeman also served as a public library branch for the Farnumwood 
community, open to all neighborhood residents during the evenings.  Like Fairview, 
Freeman also contained a community room equipped with furniture, cabinets, cooking 
appliances, and a refrigerator.  To promote good health among neighborhood residents, 
the board of education included a community health room at the new school, where 
indigent children and families could obtain periodic checkups.  The design of the 
building, Manley and Mott recognized, was a clear ―physical expression of an 
educational philosophy,‖ signaling to community members the type of activities that its 
sponsors wished to promote.  Perhaps less obvious to casual observers, however, were the 
political philosophies and social considerations that drove the burgeoning community 
education movement in Flint.
48
 
 According to its widely circulated promotional material, the purpose of the Mott 
program was ―to discover and demonstrate means whereby a community can use its own 
resources to solve its own problems, thus helping to make the City of Flint a model 
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community, worthy of emulation by others.‖
49
  To further that aim, the Mott Foundation 
coordinated a citywide program that consisted of eleven overlapping divisions, all of 
them operating under the broadly defined framework of ―community education.‖  The 
Mott program included the Community Recreation Program, the Adult Education 
Program, Economics and Leadership Training, Experimental Programs in Curriculum 
Enrichment, the Graduate Training Program, Mott Camp, Big Brothers of Greater Flint, 
the C. S. Mott Children‘s Dental Clinic, the C. S. Mott Children‘s Health Center, the 
Stepping Stone Program, and the Flint Committee on Alcoholism.   
 The recreation initiative, which consisted of athletic leagues and courses in nearly 
thirty different sporting and leisure events, anchored the Mott Foundation‘s evening and 
weekend programming.  Offering everything from football and baseball to ice skating 
and square dancing, the athletics and recreation program attracted the city‘s largest 
enrollments and was by far the most popular Mott division.  However, the recreation 
program also served as a gateway to the adult education courses.  Specifically, Manley 
envisioned recreation as a lure of sorts, a means to ―bring people into the school so that 
their interest would draw them into projects which would lead to a better community.‖
50
  
By the 1960s, Flint‘s adult education program offered over twelve hundred courses in 
fifty-four community school centers in the city.  With courses in traditional academic 
subjects, ―cultural studies,‖ arts and crafts, sewing, home and family living, recreation, 
vocational and business education, and special courses for the disabled, the adult 
education program drew yearly enrollments of approximately fifty thousand and had a 
wide appeal throughout the city.  For a nominal fee of between $1 and $3, depending 
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upon the course, adults in Flint could attend evening and weekend classes designed ―to 
improve the cultural and intellectual life of the community, to increase citizens‘ 
knowledge of their economy, home roles and heritage, and to meet the special needs of 
the people.‖
51
  For thousands of Flint residents, special needs included treatment and 
support for alcoholism, which the Mott Foundation and the local Red Feather Agency 
coordinated through a separate program.    
 The Mott Foundation‘s economics and leadership training initiatives were central 
to both the adult and child education programs of the Flint Public Schools.  Designed for 
the Mott Foundation by the Industrial Relations Center of the University of Chicago, the 
community economics program offered conservative counterpoints to both Soviet-style 
communism and Keynesian economic theory through its ―Economics of Our 
Community‖ courses and other offerings.  Informed by Mott‘s ―common sense‖ 
opposition to ―the New Deal and other wild goose activities,‖ the foundation distributed a 
series of pamphlets about local industries, entitled ―The Work We Live By,‖ to describe 
the benefits of free market capitalism to Flint‘s economy.  Its conservative political 
content was both intentional and unmistakable.
52
  Alongside its innovative economics 
initiatives, the Mott Foundation sponsored the Personalized Curriculum Program (PCP) 
for potential dropouts, the Better Tomorrow for the Urban Child Program (BTU) for 
black, inner-city children, and other experimental programs designed to uplift poor, 
underperforming, and underprivileged youth.  The PCP and BTU emphasized vocational 
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training and ―life skills‖ instruction, casting aside what Manley called the 
―intellectualism‖ of traditional education in favor of practical training courses for poor 
and minority children.  ―Educators these days are concentrating on geniuses,‖ Mott 
observed, ―but we‘re more interested in the hoi polloi . . . so we‘re promoting education 





Figure 2.2.  Mott adult education leaflet, ca. 1950.  Courtesy of Scharchburg Archives. 
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The Mott Foundation offered a variety of short-term services to promote the 
health and well-being of indigent children.  Mott Camp, located twenty miles from Flint 
on Pero Lake, served as a summer destination for impoverished boys where volunteers 
taught social and outdoor living skills.  The foundation also sponsored the Big Brothers 
of Greater Flint, which annually recruited thousands of volunteer adult mentors ―to help 
brighten—and sometimes reconstruct—the lives‖ of over a thousand fatherless boys.  For 
girls, the Mott Foundation coordinated the Stepping Stone Program, designed to teach 
young women home management skills and ―the art of gracious living.‖
54
  With programs 
in thirty-six schools across the city, Stepping Stones attracted an annual membership of 
nearly a thousand local girls.  The C. S. Mott Children‘s Dental and Health Clinics were 
among the most popular of the foundation‘s programs.  These clinics served students 
from across the city by offering preventative medical exams and early treatment for poor 
children.  Though most children in the city were ineligible due to family incomes, the 
Mott Health Clinic served approximately 25,000 children per year through its pediatric 
facilities.   
Mott officials worked diligently to record accurate data and attendance figures for 
each of their divisions.  Yet because of the sheer popularity of their programming and the 
extent to which citizens enrolled in multiple classes simultaneously, it was almost 
impossible to track with precision the number and percentage of citizens who participated 
in Mott programs.  Still, reasonable estimates suggest that well over half of the nearly 
200,000 residents of postwar Flint enrolled in one or another of the Mott Foundation‘s 
activities on an annual basis.  ―At our house,‖ a Mott participant pointed out, ―we just 
take it for granted that we are all going to take Mott Foundation classes.  If it weren‘t for 
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the Mott Foundation, this sure would be a different kind of town.‖
55
  As many observers 
noted, the foundation owed its ability to reach such a large number of local residents to 
its unique relationship with the public school system.  In deploying its great wealth and 
resources to meet grassroots demands for health, education, and recreation programming, 
the Mott program revolutionized the role of the school in the process of community 
building.  By opening the schools on weekends and evenings, and by bringing families 
and neighbors together for education, recreation, and community building exercises, the 
Mott program successfully transformed Flint schools into the lighted community centers 
that Frank Manley first envisioned during the Great Depression.  Energized by their local 
successes, Manley and Mott moved in the 1960s to nationalize Flint‘s model through 
massive recruitment and a rigorous publicity campaign.        
From the start, Mott sought to create in Flint an imitable community whose efforts 
in civic improvement could be duplicated in other cities.  Among the most significant of 
the Mott Foundation‘s efforts in that arena was its graduate training program.  In order to 
train community schools administrators, the Mott Foundation partnered with Michigan 
State University and other institutions of higher learning to launch graduate programs in 
community education.  The graduate training program spread rapidly in the 1960s and 
1970s.  By 1978, the foundation had organized nearly one hundred community education 
centers in universities across the country.  Though the graduate program was a key part of 
its publicity campaign, the foundation‘s workshop and visitation program brought the 
message of community education to a national audience of policymakers.  The 
foundation formalized its approach to public relations in 1957 by instituting regularly 
scheduled conferences and open houses designed to promote the concept of community 
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education.  Throughout the 1960s, these workshops and open houses attracted well over 
ten thousand visitors annually to the Flint schools, many of them superintendents and 
school board members from districts interested in the community education model.  
Although Michiganders predominated, visitors from every state in the nation as well as a 
number of foreign dignitaries came to Flint to observe its schools.  By 1970, the 
foundation‘s publicity campaign had helped to spread community education programs to 
over three hundred school districts nationwide.
56
     
Charles Stewart Mott‘s devotion to community education was part of a larger 
political project that reflected his most deeply cherished beliefs.  Mott and his advocates 
on the school board believed that community education held the promise of solving 
vexing international problems such as poverty, crime, disease, and unemployment.  At 
times, proponents of the program went so far as to posit community education as a 
complete solution to all forms of suffering in the world.  As Manley and Fred Totten 
wrote in The Community School: Basic Concepts, Functions, and Organization,  
We have so much faith in the power of community education that we 
believe that, if by some magic all schools could be converted into broad 
based service centers, within a few generations, human suffering and 
despair could virtually be eliminated from the face of the earth.
57
   
 
At the root of the nation‘s social problems, they believed, were liberal social and 
economic policies that weakened the free market and rewarded the sloth and indolence of 
Negroes and the poor.  Implicitly, Mott and Manley accepted the notion that poverty and 
want stemmed primarily from the personal deficiencies and educational shortcomings of 
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the poor.  Through community education, they sought to construct a national model for 
self help, personal improvement, and private welfare that would simultaneously 
strengthen democracy and free enterprise.  Mott saw the New Deal, and later the Great 
Society, as the greatest domestic policy threats to that promise.  Imbued by their faith in 
the power of community education, Manley and Mott sought to transform the city of Flint 
into a ―model city‖ whose programs could be copied anywhere.  In time, they hoped to 
position community education as a viable replacement for the welfare state and the 
broader politics of redistributive liberalism.  Such beliefs formed the core of Mott‘s 
conservative worldview and informed both the philosophy and practice of community 
education in Flint.  
 Proponents of community schools in Flint criticized traditional curricula for being 
overly concerned with the intellectual aspects of education while devoting little energy to 
its practical uses.  At its core, community education existed to help citizens become 
better, more efficient workers and to teach poor and working-class migrants how to 
assume personal responsibility for fulfilling their basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, 
and health care.  Regarding the issue of hunger, Manley and the foundation‘s cadre of 
visiting teachers blamed poor women for their laziness and roundly criticized ―mothers 
who are too dilatory or too indolent to get up in the morning to prepare breakfast for their 
children.‖  Recognizing student hunger as an impediment to educational achievement, the 
Mott Foundation reluctantly sponsored free breakfast programs for a small number of 
children as part of the community education program.  Yet as Manley acknowledged, the 
foundation offered such forms of direct assistance ―for a limited time only—only for the 
time required to rehabilitate the mother and teach her the necessity for assuming the job 
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that rightfully belongs to her.‖  For foundation officials, the solution to the problem of 
hunger rested in the rehabilitation of poor mothers and not in government-sponsored 
relief programs.  Similarly, in order to address the clothing needs of poor children, 
community schools officials distributed donated clothing to the needy on a limited, short-
term basis.  To solve the larger problem, the foundation offered adult education courses 
in sewing, clothing construction, and clothing care to teach women to make, maintain, 
and repair garments.  With respect to housing and unemployment, again the Mott 
Foundation advocated a combination of private giving, volunteerism, short-term 
assistance, job training, and individual reform that anticipated Ronald Reagan‘s approach 
to poverty in the 1980s.  ―The community school,‖ as Manley readily acknowledged, 
―involves itself rather extensively in the area of home and family living.‖  But it did so in 
a manner that rejected both the structural explanations of poverty and the efficacy of 
direct assistance to the poor.  Instead, Mott and Manley focused their resources on 
reforming the attitudes and behaviors of poor people.
58
 
 Mott and Manley viewed the Mott Foundation‘s health-related activities with 
special pride.  During the late 1940s, when President Harry Truman and other Fair Deal 
Democrats advocated national health insurance, the Mott Foundation actively promoted 
its ―Health Guard‖ plan for children, a program that brought preventative medicine into 
the public schools.  To promote good health among the city‘s youth, the foundation hired 
doctors and dentists to provide complete physical examinations to all of the children 
enrolled in the Flint Public Schools.  In elaborate ceremonies held in school auditoriums, 
the foundation awarded special ―Health Guard‖ badges to children who were ―free from 
all correctible physical and dental defects.‖  For those with correctible ailments, the 
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foundation provided counseling and guidance, but it intentionally withheld care in all but 
the most extreme cases.  As with the child breakfast and homemaking programs, the Mott 
plan for health care hinged primarily on education, training, and targeted giving to only 
the most ―deserving‖ of the poor.  The Mott Foundation countered calls for national 
health care by promoting its Flint initiatives in other cities, advertising them as a free 
market answer to the specter of ―socialist‖ medicine.  ―We want to preserve private 
medicine,‖ claimed Dr. Arthur Tuuri, director of the Mott Health Center.  ―We don‘t 
want bureaucracy and inefficient medicine.‖  The Mott Foundation‘s public health 
initiatives elevated prevention over guaranteed primary health care.  As stated in 1949 by 
Dr. Henry Cook of Flint, a former president of the Michigan State Medical Society and 
an active proponent of the Foundation, ―It is more important to teach people to take care 
of themselves than to take care of them.‖
59
   
Regardless of the social issue in question, the Mott program of community 
education offered itself as a national alternative to the tenets of redistributive liberalism.  
As a core aim, the community schools initiative sought to remind citizens that ―to help 
one‘s neighbors should be recognized and undertaken as a personal responsibility rather 
than as the official business of impersonal welfare organizations.‖
60
  Following that 
conservative logic to its political end, Manley and other community schools proponents 
in Flint loathed liberal and leftist leaders such as Walter P. Reuther and Martin Luther 
King, Jr., condemning them as ―unscrupulous agitators‖ whose struggle for social equity 
could only be satisfied by ―dragging down everyone to their level of misery.‖
61
  
Community education was never solely a school policy, but rather an expression of a 
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profoundly conservative worldview that sought to alleviate suffering without any 
reallocation of the government‘s resources.  As he often did, Manley expressed the 
foundation‘s philosophy in an anecdote: 
We accept the idea that people of affluence have every right to fulfill their 
wants insofar as they are able, even though their wants may include 
luxuries, conveniences, travel, and services not available to people of 
lesser means.  The community school can help people of affluence learn 
how to fulfill some of their wants just as it can help others learn how to 
fulfill their basic needs.  There may be a tendency for people of great 
affluence to waste materials, capital, and services to a greater degree than 
others.  Most people, even those in poverty, waste certain items.  Some 
waste their money on non-essentials that could be used to buy food, while 
others waste time and opportunity.  We all know that many people go to 
bed hungry each night.  Many of us have seen enough food wasted at a 
banquet to feed many hungry people.  So all of us, affluent as well as 
deprived, need to put our heads together and come up with some bold new 
ways of distributing goods and services in such a manner that those who 
―have‖ will not actually have their substance taken away, and those who 
―have not‖ will learn how to merit, conserve, and use that which is wasted 
and that which can be earned and purchased from those who ―have.‖  It is 




The Mott Foundation‘s fierce opposition to the welfare state renders troubling any 
notion of a postwar consensus that united liberals and conservatives around the tenets of 
the New Deal.  To be sure, no such agreement existed in the Vehicle City.  This is not to 
say, however, that Democrats and Republicans in Flint found no common ground on 
important political and social issues.  Indeed, whites of all political persuasions and class 
backgrounds responded similarly to the rapid expansion of Flint‘s black population.  In 
the 1940s and 1950s, Flint‘s African-American community grew exponentially as 
thousands of black agricultural workers from the South sought out new lives and 
opportunities.  The growth of Flint‘s black population put extreme pressure on the rigid 
color lines that kept the city‘s schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods divided.  
                                                 
62
 Totten and Manley, The Community School, xxvii. 
132 
 
Nevertheless, a combination of state-sponsored housing segregation, school district 
gerrymandering, and widespread employment discrimination helped to sustain Jim Crow 
during the long postwar era.  Just as they had during the Depression, Frank Manley and 
Charles Stewart Mott would continue to play an instrumental role in maintaining 




Formalizing the Pigment Partition:  
Public Policies and Racial Segregation in Postwar Flint 
 
 
A combination of public policies and private racism continuously reconfigured the color 
line in postwar Flint, making it virtually impossible for white and black residents to live, 
learn, and play in integrated settings.  By the end of the 1930s, privately orchestrated 
racial restrictions and newly created federal and local mandates for residential Jim Crow 
had converged to make Flint the third most segregated metropolis in the United States.  
Both before and long after World War II, local bankers, realtors, builders, white 
homeowners, and other non- and quasi-governmental actors played an important role in 
constructing what Dr. Albert Wheeler, president of the Michigan Conference of NAACP 
Branches, called the ―Pigment Partition.‖
1
  Yet with the establishment of the HOLC and 
the FHA, the federal government and its local subcontractors from the private housing 
industry formalized and effectively codified the cultural prejudices and court-sanctioned 
housing covenants that had previously shaped the residential housing market.  During the 
postwar era, private discrimination, federal segregation mandates, and municipal policies 
reinforced and recreated residential Jim Crow in Flint‘s neighborhoods and schools. 
 Postwar federal housing policies restructured housing markets and reordered 
racial geographies in cities and suburbs throughout the United States.  New Deal and 
postwar federal housing initiatives contained an explicitly anti-urban bias.  In 
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metropolitan areas across the nation, policymakers from the HOLC and the FHA 
typically preferred to insure mortgages for new homes in suburban developments over 
existing structures in urban neighborhoods.  Nevertheless, the story of federally financed 
housing discrimination cannot be narrated simply as a national development in which 
municipal actors played only subsidiary roles.  Local actors and conditions played a key 
role in shaping the implementation of federal housing policies, the pace of 
suburbanization, and the spatial trajectory of metropolitan development.  By framing the 
history of residential resegregation as one in which ―the national is local,‖ many housing 
policy scholars have underestimated the agency of local actors who implemented federal 
housing programs and the place-specific political, economic, social, and cultural 
considerations that informed private and public housing policy decisions in all 
metropolitan areas.
2
   
The Flint case suggests the need for a more balanced view of the relationship 
between federal and municipal housing policies.  In the Vehicle City, local lenders, 
HOLC surveyors, and FHA loan underwriters initially favored all-white urban 
neighborhoods over the poorly serviced, predominantly jerrybuilt suburbs in Genesee 
County.  During the 1940s and 1950s, federal mortgage insurance policies forced 
suburban officials to develop new urban services and build modern political 
infrastructures as prerequisites to gaining FHA subsidies.  While suburban officials 
worked to urbanize the suburbs, federal and local officials rewarded all-white 
neighborhoods in the city with new housing developments and thousands of mortgages 
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for new homes.  Viewing integration as a mortgage risk factor and a clear detriment to 
property values, housing officials in the public and private sectors denied black buyers 
the opportunity to purchase homes in neighborhoods outside of Flint‘s increasingly 
segregated, overcrowded, and dilapidated ghettoes.   
Segregated housing patterns played a key role in maintaining Jim Crow in Flint.  
Yet segregation also derived from the racial policies of the Mott Foundation, whose 
leaders helped to maintain Jim Crow both in Flint‘s schools and in the city‘s broader 
public sphere through community education and neighborhood schools.  During the 
postwar decades, Mott Foundation officials and members of the Flint Board of Education 
manipulated school transfer policies, built new schools in segregated neighborhoods, and 
gerrymandered school district boundaries in an attempt to boost property values and 
maintain the color line.  Although Flint‘s community education program emerged in an 
historical context in which issues of class and nationality dominated local political 
debates, the leaders of the Mott initiative always operated within a segregationist racial 
paradigm.  As a consequence of the board‘s postwar policies, schools were, in many 
instances, even more segregated than the racially divided residential neighborhoods they 
served.  Because schools served as the focal points for community activities throughout 
the city, the gerrymandering of boundaries affected nearly everyone in Flint, regardless of 
age.  In Flint, segregated neighborhoods did not stem solely, or even primarily, from 
housing discrimination.  Indeed, as much as subdivision lines, school attendance zones 
effectively created neighborhood boundaries and established the rules of membership and 
exclusion in the city‘s rigidly segregated public sphere.  The public policies that 
maintained segregation in Flint‘s schools and neighborhoods reflected a broad cultural 
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consensus among whites that blamed racial integration for declining property values and 
weak community ties.   
 
Federal Housing Policies and Postwar Urban Development 
Collectively, scholars of suburban development have made a compelling case that the 
FHA and members of local housing industries fulfilled their racially coded vision of the 
ideal, orderly, and growth-friendly metropolis by rewarding segregated suburban spaces 
over integrated urban ones.  By systematically redlining inner-city areas and insuring 
home mortgages for millions of whites in segregated suburbs, many have argued, the 
FHA simultaneously orchestrated large-scale urban divestment and the resegregation of 
metropolitan America.  When analyzed over the long term, those conclusions are difficult 
to dispute.  Nevertheless, an investigation of Flint‘s postwar development suggests the 
need for a subtler, more locally rooted, and place-based understanding of the ways in 
which federal policies towards cities and suburbs changed over time.
3
                   
As with HOLC surveyors during the Depression, FHA officials in Flint initially 
looked disdainfully at huge swaths of suburban Genesee County.  Federal appraisers paid 
special attention to the poor housing and inadequate utilities and services that suburban 
governments offered residents.  In addition to requiring racial segregation, FHA officials 
also sought to use their mortgage insurance program to spur the development of modern 
suburban infrastructure.  Racial restrictions were not sufficient to secure federally insured 
investment.  FHA representatives also wanted suburban governments to develop better 
roads and schools, cleaner water, modern sewer systems, and sufficiently restrictive 
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building and zoning codes.  At the onset of the post-World War II housing boom, the 
infrastructure of suburban Flint remained largely undeveloped, however.  In the county as 
a whole, only the city of Flint and portions of Mt. Morris and Burton Townships could 
claim public water and sewer systems.  According to the authors of a 1953 FHA report on 
Flint‘s housing market, ―In the post-War years, home building became more firmly tied 
to water and sewer lines and to Government minimum property requirements for 
mortgage insurance.‖  ―This revived a concentration of building in the City of Flint,‖ the 
report continued, ―which is just now beginning to spill over its legal boundaries in a 
conventional urban sprawl.‖
4
  During a 1947 interview with local reporters, realtor John 
W. Davis, president of the Genesee County Board of Real Estate, affirmed that mortgages 
tended to follow sewer lines.  ―Financing a home without plumbing is almost an 
impossibility nowadays,‖ he stated.
5
  For a multiplicity of reasons, the FHA in Flint and 
elsewhere exhibited a strong pre-determined preference for suburban over urban 
developments, but federal officials nonetheless withheld mortgage insurance from all but 
three suburban Flint townships during the 1930s and most of the 1940s, preferring instead 
to invest in communities that either possessed or had planned for modern physical and 
governmental infrastructures.  According to a 1951 study of postwar home building 
conducted by University of Michigan researcher Tom Dinell, ―Almost all FHA insured 
mortgages that are made in the Flint Metropolitan Area are made in the city.‖  While 
municipal and township officials in suburban Flint rushed to dig wells, lay sewer lines, 
implement zoning codes, and lure private housing investors, the FHA, at least in its early 
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years, turned its attention towards segregated white neighborhoods in the central city and 
its most urbanized Jim Crow suburbs.
6
             
The mortgage insurance program of the Federal Housing Administration—and, to 
a lesser extent, the home financing provisions of the 1944 Servicemen‘s Readjustment 
Act, or GI Bill—helped to resurrect the dormant home building and sales industries of 
metropolitan Flint.
7
  In 1933, just a year prior to the passage of the National Housing Act, 
the city of Flint issued a mere thirteen permits for new homes.  Seven years later, that 
number had increased to 629.
8
  By the close of the 1940s, builders were constructing 
nearly a thousand new homes per year in the city, and home ownership rates in Flint had 
increased to approximately 80 percent.
9
  Nevertheless, the racial and spatial calculus 
employed by HOLC and FHA appraisers ensured that Flint‘s housing boom would 
reward, except in rare instances, only white homebuyers in segregated, carefully 
restricted residential neighborhoods.   
 The city of Flint issued a record number of building permits for new homes 
during the 1940s.  Postwar building activity centered on the elite, carefully restricted 
neighborhoods of Woodlawn Park and Woodcroft Estates as well as the quasi-suburban, 
all-white neighborhoods that formed the inside edges of the city‘s municipal boundary.  
In Woodlawn Park and the neighboring Brookside subdivision, both of which rated 
highly on the HOLC‘s residential security maps, builders constructed 838 new homes in 
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the 1940s.  Likewise, Woodcroft Estates and its adjoining neighborhood to the east 
gained nearly 750 new units.  Previously redlined by the HOLC due to inadequate 
utilities and unplanned housing developments, the neighborhoods forming the city‘s outer 
edge rapidly acquired municipal services during the postwar era.  In acknowledgement of 
the city‘s commitment to building new infrastructure, the FHA and local bankers 
rewarded Flint‘s outer-ring neighborhoods with a rash of postwar construction.  During 
the 1940s, the city issued over four thousand new building permits for homes located in 
racially restricted subdivisions in the city‘s outermost census tracts.
10
  Of these new 
permits, nearly half went to local developers Robert P. Gerholz and Gerald Healy, who 
together built sixteen hundred west side homes for white buyers on land previously 
owned by GM‘s Modern Housing Corporation.  One of the city‘s most prominent real 
estate developers and civic leaders, Gerholz, at various points in his career, served as a 
trustee of the Urban Land Institute, director of the Michigan National Bank, and president 
of the National Association of Realtors, the Michigan Real Estate Association, and the 
United States Chamber of Commerce.  Gerholz also served as a mapping consultant for 
the HOLC‘s 1937 survey of Flint and was thus an architect of the federal government‘s 
newly codified racial policies.  During the 1940s, Gerholz actively implemented the 
federal government‘s redlining initiatives by building and selling new homes in 
neighborhoods available only to white purchasers.  By 1958, the Federal Housing 
Administration had recognized Gerholz‘s contributions to the local real estate industry by 
naming him an official government advisor.
11
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 FHA administrators and their local confidants such as Gerholz provided Flint‘s 
builders with explicit instructions on where, and for whom, to build new housing; and 
they also informed lenders which areas of the metropolis were safe for home mortgages.  
Just as important, however, federal guidelines designated the home sites and 
neighborhoods within cities and suburbs that were unsafe places for investment.  
Following both the FHA‘s explicit recommendations and their own pre-existing 
practices, Flint lenders and real estate developers constructed only a handful of dwellings 
for black buyers during the 1940s and 1950s.  Between 1940 and 1947, the city‘s black 
population nearly doubled to approximately twelve thousand.  Yet over the same duration 
builders erected only twenty-five privately financed new homes for black purchasers, all 
of them within the rapidly transitioning St. John and Floral Park districts.
12
  In a 1941 
column entitled ―Democracy Is Out in Flint,‖ an unnamed author from the Brownsville 
Weekly News, an African-American newspaper, described the FHA‘s neglect of black 
loan seekers, noting, ―Flint colored people cannot secure an FHA loan to improve their 
property nor to build any.‖
13
  ―The colored people were positively fenced in,‖ a 1946 
editorial from the Flint Spokesman, another black paper, observed.  ―He was allotted the 
areas adjacent to the plants, where he was held in a vise-like grip.  Fenced in by 
covenants and secret agreements, the Negro had to stay in his own juice.‖
14
  By the close 
of the decade, the Flint Urban League‘s Charles Eason could confirm that little had 
changed: ―It is difficult to persuade builders to construct for the Negro market because of 
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the popular myth it‘s not a good economic risk.‖
15
  Together, argued civil rights activist 
James L. Rose, ―Discrimination and segregation form one of the vital lubricants in the 
operation of the housing market.‖
16
   
 Throughout the postwar era, African-American activists challenged the prevailing 
notion among housing officials and white homeowners that racial integration had a 
detrimental effect on neighborhood stability and property values.  In Flint, as in other 
cities, civil rights activists organized educational campaigns to demonstrate that black 
homeowners and renters were just as committed as whites were to upgrading their 
properties.  In 1955, Flint Urban League officials Frank J. Corbett and Arthur J. Edmunds 
coordinated a citywide survey of black property owners, which they in turn forwarded to 
local builders, bankers, and real estate brokers.  Corbett and Edmunds surveyed a large 
number of the 3,716 Negro-owned dwellings in Flint to measure the proportion of 
homeowners who had recently upgraded their properties.  They found that one-third of 
the black homeowners surveyed had painted their homes in the last two years, while 
approximately five hundred of the homes had received new exterior siding.  Moreover, 
they determined that half of the Negro-owned homes in the city featured ―attractive‖ 
lawns and shrubs.
17
  In spite of the best efforts of many black homeowners to improve 
their properties, however, Corbett and Edmunds concluded that local builders and 
bankers had largely ignored the black demand for new housing and home improvement 
loans.    
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 During the 1940s and 1950s, federal officials only rarely insured home mortgages 
for black buyers.  When FHA representatives agreed to insure loans for blacks, they did 
so only after careful and often lengthy negotiations with builders and bankers.  In Flint, 
those negotiations often hinged on finding developers willing to build for African 
Americans and securing segregated sites for new Negro housing developments.  In 1944, 
the Flint Urban League launched an effort to secure federal financing for fifty new homes 
for black buyers in Floral Park.  After finding no local builders willing to construct the 
homes, Urban League officials broadened their search, ultimately gaining a commitment 
from Merrill and Company, a New York City building firm.  After ten months of site 
negotiations, the FHA agreed to insure the development on the condition that the new 
single- and two-family homes were constructed in a segregated, deteriorated residential 
area bounded by Twelfth Street, Fern Avenue, and Liberty Street.
18
  Likewise, in 1949 
the Veteran‘s Administration and local builder Ira MacArthur announced plans to build 
twenty-six federally backed homes for Negro veterans on Florida and Idaho Avenues in 
the northern half of the St. John neighborhood.
19
  Reacting against the federal and local 
policies that circumscribed housing options and neighborhood choices even for veterans 
and well-qualified middle-class black buyers, Corbett and Edmunds observed,  
The main deterrent in the Negro‘s efforts to improve his housing 
conditions is not the lack of interest in or desire for adequate and decent 
homes.  Instead, it is the controls that restrict his housing opportunities to 
the extent that he can only live in the worse [sic] neighborhood in the 
city.
20
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During the 1930s and 1940s, activists from the NAACP, the Urban League, and 
other civil rights groups challenged FHA officials to abandon their openly segregationist 
policies.  In 1947, just a year prior to the United States Supreme Court‘s landmark ruling 
in Shelley v. Kraemer, which held that racially restrictive housing covenants were not 
legally enforceable, FHA officials deleted all references to race in the federal 
Underwriting Manual.
21
  Two years later, during a speech to the Detroit Mortgage 
Bankers Association, FHA Commissioner Franklin D. Richards trumpeted the agency‘s 
new policies and encouraged lenders to give special consideration to loan applications 
from African Americans and other racial minorities.  ―I want to stress the fact that it 
seems to me that minority housing is a good mortgage lending field,‖ Richards stated, 
―and that emphasis should be placed on meeting the demand for housing for this segment 
of our population.‖
22
  In 1952, FHA commissioner Walter L. Greene went even further, 
informing Urban League officials, ―FHA policy is to insure projects for open occupancy.  
We have done so in the past and we shall continue to do so.‖
23
  Although civil rights 
activists won an important victory in forcing the FHA to revise its Underwriting Manual 
and disclaim restrictive housing covenants, Greene did not speak the truth.  Indeed, 
federal housing officials would not abandon racial integration as a mortgage risk factor 
until well into the 1960s.  As David Freund points out in Colored Property, FHA 
underwriters continued to recognize African Americans specifically and racially 
integrated neighborhoods in general as adverse influences on neighborhood property 
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values.  Moreover, at the local level, most builders, realtors, and lenders maintained a 
strict adherence to segregated housing and discriminatory lending practices into the 
1970s.  In spite of the 1947 revisions to the federal Underwriting Manual and the 
subsequent remarks of FHA leaders, during the first half of the 1950s Flint builders 
constructed fewer than a hundred new homes for Negro occupancy—all of them within 
segregated black neighborhoods—out of nearly six thousand new homes built 
concurrently in the city.
24
             
When confronted by civil rights activists who demanded better housing options 
for African Americans, federal housing officials accepted little responsibility for Jim 
Crow neighborhoods.  Often, FHA administrators deflected blame towards local real 
estate developers, ―the market,‖ and the private animosities of white homeowners.  
Representatives from the FHA maintained that local lenders, builders, realtors, and racist 
homeowners, in spite of the federal government‘s updated recommendations, had 
willfully discriminated against black buyers and neglected the African-American housing 
market.  During his 1952 speech to Urban League members in Cleveland, the FHA‘s 
Walter Greene observed that bankers seemed unwilling to acknowledge the pent up 
purchasing power of African-American home seekers: ―I have talked to many bankers as 
recently as the last few weeks and some of them seemed unaware of the new buying 
power of this group—and its fine credit record.‖
25
  Several years later, during a 
conference on Negro housing in Detroit, Albert M. Cole, an administrator from the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency, affirmed that racial discrimination ―is not a federal 
problem,‖ stating,  ―The real problem lies with citizens, the businessmen, the builders, the 
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lenders, the realtors and the civic leaders.‖
26
  For their part, local builders, lenders, and 
real estate brokers charged the federal government with establishing strict national 
guidelines and ―market rules‖ upon which all builders, lenders, and appraisers assayed 
mortgage risk and housing values.  In truth, however, private and public housing policies 
worked in tandem to maintain rigid racial segregation and poor housing in the city‘s 
growing black ghettoes.   
__________ 
 
Albert Cole was partially correct when he blamed Flint‘s color line on private citizens.  
To be sure, individual acts of white supremacy helped to sustain Jim Crow in Flint and its 
suburbs.  Yet deliberate federal and municipal public policies also bolstered segregation 
in the Flint region.  When Cole displaced the government‘s share of responsibility for 
segregation onto ordinary citizens, he deployed the language of ―de facto‖ segregation to 
describe a privatized, regionally distinctive, ―northern style‖ of Jim Crow that never in 
fact existed.  Beyond obscuring the state‘s role in upholding residential segregation, the 
de facto framework severely distorted broader public debates over the structure of 
segregation in the North.  In particular, the discourse on de facto segregation relied upon 
a misleading distinction between public and private forms of Jim Crow.  Moreover, the 
theory of de facto segregation established a false dichotomy among housing and schools.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, defenders of the color line often pointed to private housing 
discrimination to explain racial segregation in Flint‘s ―neighborhood schools.‖  Echoing 
Cole, officials from the Mott Foundation and the Flint Board of Education maintained 
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that any racial imbalances between schools were the products of the local housing 
market.   
Without question, residential segregation played a major role in shaping Flint‘s 
school enrollment patterns.  Occasionally, however, African-American homebuyers—
especially professionals, skilled craftspersons, and business owners with ample funds—
were able to pierce through the residential color line by purchasing homes up front in 
cash or through informal ―land contracts.‖  Often, these black pioneers moved into all-
white blocks on the borders of Flint‘s overcrowded ghettoes.
27
  In response to such 
moves, the Flint Board of Education routinely intervened to ensure that the city‘s public 
schools remained segregated.  In fact, the community education policies of the Mott 
Foundation and the board of education were instrumental in upholding separate and 
unequal schools and neighborhoods.  Although most scholars of urban history have 
ignored educational politics, school district boundaries were as important as redlining to 
the delineation of racial borders between neighborhoods.                                              
 
Community Schools and the Magic Lines of Segregation 
At the first National Community Schools Clinic in 1959, hundreds of school officials, 
civic leaders, legislators, and researchers gathered in the Vehicle City to discuss the 
merits of community education.  Fittingly, the Mott Foundation took the opportunity to 
outline for its visitors the core values of the community schools movement.  In its report 
to the conference, the foundation offered a philosophical statement that identified urban 
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neighborhoods and community schools as the key spatial venues for the cultivation of 
civic harmony:  
The Mott Foundation believes that world peace and understanding among 
men must begin in men‘s hearts; that neighbor must understand neighbor 
and that people must learn to live together in neighborhoods and cities 
before nation can understand nation and a world can live in peace.   
 
―To this end,‖ the statement continued, ―people must be provided the opportunity at a 
grassroots level to learn to understand one another‘s problems, to work together and to 
find the means to improve themselves and their cities.‖
28
  According to this formulation, 
justice and social harmony derived not from the transformation of economies, laws, or 
public policies, but instead from within individual hearts and minds.   
As a consequence of its individualized, geographically circumscribed vision of 
social progress, the Mott Foundation identified the neighborhood school as the basic unit 
for the urban public sphere—the key social and educative space for personal and thus 
societal transformations.  For Frank Manley and Charles Stewart Mott, community 
education existed for the sole purpose of creating ―better‖ citizens who would in turn 
create ―better,‖ more productive, and harmonious communities.  ―Flint Community 
Schools are grounded in one basic human principle,‖ Manley revealed: ―People who have 
learned to live together in a neighborhood can live together harmoniously as a nation and 
as a world.‖
29
  The philosophy driving the Mott program reflected a top-down 
commitment to social uplift that started on the white side of the city‘s color line.   
With the community education initiative in Flint, the Mott Foundation demarcated 
neighborhoods within the city according to the attendance boundaries of its public 
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elementary schools.  Foundation officials believed that virtually all of the solutions to the 
city‘s social problems could be found within the ten square blocks of each elementary 
school district.  Because foundation officials believed that ideal neighborhoods should be 
small, walkable spaces, they pointed to local elementary schools—not churches, union 
halls, civic clubs, or even junior and senior high schools—as the obvious geographic 
focal points for community development.  Defining the spatial parameters of 
neighborhoods, identifying a community‘s problems, and then devising programs to 
refashion the hearts and minds of its residents, were thus central to the larger project of 
community education in Flint.   
The Mott Foundation‘s vision of neighborhoods and the internal nature of their 
problems depended upon at least two great fictions, however.  By framing social 
problems primarily in personal terms, the foundation denied the structural salience of 
both race and class in the construction of urban neighborhoods.  From the 1930s onward, 
a powerful combination of racial discrimination and government-sponsored housing 
initiatives created a very rigid pattern of residential segregation in Genesee County.  
Residential Jim Crow—which, as much as any other factor, shaped the racial composition 
of Flint‘s community schools—effectively denied black citizens the right to attend 
schools and occupy housing in the neighborhoods of their choice.  These structural 
barriers to fair housing were, to use the language of the Mott Foundation, ―external‖ to 
the city‘s segregated black communities.  Segregation and racial inequality in Flint and 
elsewhere stemmed from a combination of private beliefs and public policies that 
continuously reinforced one another.  Yet in narrating neighborhood problems such as 
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poor housing, segregation, and blight in ―internal,‖ personal terms, the Mott Foundation 
denied the structural barriers to free markets and open housing.     
The second great fiction of community education stemmed from the geographic 
neutrality that the Mott Foundation assigned to neighborhood schools.  In adopting and, 
in turn, naturalizing school boundaries as the legitimate, inviolable barriers between 
neighborhoods, the Mott Foundation and its supporters on the school board elided their 
role in maintaining state-sanctioned racial apartheid.  Although an 1867 state law forbade 
racial segregation in Michigan‘s public schools, the Flint Board of Education routinely 
redrew school attendance zones in the postwar period to maintain racial separation, in the 
process creating social and geographic constructs known as ―neighborhood schools.‖  In 
a number of instances, the gerrymandered districts embraced racial exclusion at the 
expense of student proximity to school facilities.  Neighborhood schools were not 
geographically neutral, colorblind entities.   
The Mott Foundation was a key player in school districting decisions.  In the mid-
1940s, the Flint Board of Education reorganized its governing structure, granting official 
representation to the Mott Foundation by appointing Frank Manley to the position of 
Assistant Superintendent of Community Education.  The Mott Foundation obliterated all 
but the most trivial distinctions between private civic interests and the public policies of 
the board of education through its community education program.  As noted in a 
confidential 1956 survey of Flint schools, ―Frank J. Manley is, for all practical purposes, 
the superintendent of Flint‘s schools and through him the influence of the foundation is 
applied . . . to every sector of school programming.‖
30
  ―It [the Mott Foundation] 
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contributes directly to the school board‖ a 1968 Time magazine column pointed out, ―but 
only after Mott and his aides study and approve of the board‘s plans for spending the 
money.‖  ―Let‘s not kid ourselves,‖ one local observer added, ―We want the money and 
are willing to make some concessions to get it.‖
31
  Although foundation officials helped 
to orchestrate the board‘s segregationist policies, the racial gerrymandering of Flint‘s 
schools nonetheless reflected a broad ideological agreement among whites in Flint on the 
desirability of racially homogeneous schools and neighborhoods.  Through its 
neighborhood schools programming, the board of education nurtured and cultivated a 
vision of community solidarity that deepened the already strong white consensus on 
racial exclusion.    
Prior to 1954, when the Flint Board of Education officially adopted and published 
boundaries for elementary and junior high schools, school officials created and altered 
school attendance zones using an ad hoc calculus that revolved around new housing 
construction, building capacities, travel times for students, natural barriers, safety factors, 
and race.
32
  During that period, the board handled student transfers on an individual, case-
by-case basis.  ―In the absence of an official policy,‖ a 1949 school board report noted, 
―applications for transfers have been considered more or less in accord with unwritten 
precedents stemming from a combination of past practice, custom, and administrative 
dicta.‖
33
  Race played a key role in shaping the practices and customs that informed 
student transfer policies.   
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Postwar conflicts over the city‘s school boundaries often revolved around the St. 
John Street and Floral Park districts, the two inner-city enclaves that contained the 
overwhelming majority of Flint‘s segregated black population.  The Floral Park 
neighborhood, located southeast of the city‘s downtown business district, contained a mix 
of business owners, professionals, domestics, and working-class black families, and its 
housing stock reflected the neighborhood‘s economic diversity.  The poorer and more 
isolated St. John Street community—which occupied a narrow slice of land between the 
Buick complex, the rail yards, and the Flint River—formed the heart of Black Flint.  
Because Flint‘s pre-World War II black community remained relatively small and almost 
completely segregated within the areas served by the four elementary schools of the St. 
John and Floral Park neighborhoods, school officials only seldom employed racial 
gerrymandering prior to the 1950s.  For white children who resided in these districts, the 
absence of codified school boundaries and student transfer policies allowed for easy, 
voluntary transfers to segregated white schools.  Attendance and transfer policies 
exhibited no such fluidity when black families moved into segregated white 
neighborhoods, however.
34
   
The first verifiable instance of racial gerrymandering occurred in 1935, when the 
board of education shifted the unofficial boundaries between Dort and Parkland 
elementary schools, two adjoining districts serving Flint‘s North End.  In February 1935, 
in response to neighborhood tensions over the movement of a handful of black pupils 
from the integrated Parkland school district into the all-white attendance zone of Dort 
School, the board quietly shifted school boundaries one block southward, which resulted 
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in the immediate return of all of Dort‘s black pupils to Parkland.  Though members of the 
Parkland School and St. John Street communities did not lodge any formal protests 
against the school board‘s action, and although the board of education never 
acknowledged the segregationist intent of its decision, the 1935 boundary move marked 
the first documented case of deliberate segregation in the Flint Public Schools.  Scores 
more would soon follow.
35
   
Prior to the Supreme Court‘s Brown decision, a powerful combination of state-
sanctioned housing discrimination, white violence, and informal gerrymandering of 
school attendance zones had resulted in a highly segregated pupil geography in Flint that 
kept virtually all black students confined to a handful of inner-city schools.  Out of the 
city‘s twenty-seven public elementary schools open in 1950, nineteen were all white, two 
were over 95 percent white, and two were over 95 percent black.  Out of the four 
remaining schools, only Dewey and Jefferson, which served working-class 
neighborhoods bordering the North End, could reasonably be characterized as integrated, 
with black enrollments of 14 percent and 41 percent, respectively.
36
  In spite of large 
black population increases in the 1950s, the racial geography of the Flint schools changed 
very little during the Brown era.  In a number of instances, segregation actually increased 
during the 1950s and 1960s.  By 1960, the Flint Board of Education operated thirty-five 
public elementary schools with an enrollment of nearly twenty-five thousand pupils.  Out 
of the elementary schools open in 1960, sixteen were all white, six were at least 95 
percent white, and three were at least 95 percent black, with one school posting an all-
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black enrollment.  Out of the nine remaining schools, seven tallied black enrollments of 
over 50 percent while the final two schools, Lincoln and Oak, posted black enrollments 
of 12 percent and 9 percent, respectively.  Citywide, 6,490 black pupils attended Flint 
elementary schools by the end of the 1950s, yet not a single black student studied in a 
building that represented, within ten percentage points, the racial demographics of the 
system as a whole.  Perhaps more revealing, over half of the elementary students in the 
Flint Public Schools attended completely segregated schools that contained pupils of only 
one racial group.  The moral demands embedded within the Court‘s Brown decision did 
not, in any meaningful sense, affect public policy in the Flint Public Schools.
37
 
School construction, location, and boundary decisions played a decisive role in 
maintaining the educational color line in postwar Flint.  The 1950s witnessed a massive 
growth in elementary school enrollment, both in the increasingly black North End and in 
the all-white neighborhoods that ringed the city‘s central core.  As in other cities, the 
Flint Board of Education provided large subsidies for segregation by constructing new 
schools within all-white, FHA-backed, suburban-style neighborhoods.  Of the nine new 
elementary schools constructed during the 1950s, eight served all-white student bodies 
primarily on the urban fringe, while the ninth, Stewart School, served an overwhelmingly 
black student body south of Floral Park.  Following the tenets of the community school 
philosophy, the board located its new elementary schools, as often as possible, at or near 
the center of both newly constructed and existing residential neighborhoods.  The board‘s 
school location policies sought to ensure that all pupils in each elementary school district 
lived within one-half mile of their neighborhood school.  On the strength of its unbroken 
string of successful millage campaigns, the board continued its neighborhood schools 
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construction policies throughout the 1960s, opening thirteen additional elementary school 
facilities primarily within segregated residential enclaves.
38
  Among the elementary 
schools constructed during the decade, five had all-white enrollments while two 
contained black enrollments of less than 1 percent.  Of the remaining six schools, only 
four opened with pupil mixtures that reflected the broader racial demography of the 
public school system at large.  Due to pupil transfers, school redistricting, and the 
processes of racial succession in residential neighborhoods, however, these schools 
quickly transitioned towards segregation.  Nevertheless, the Flint Board of Education 
accepted no blame for pupil segregation.  In defense of its construction policies, board 
members, Mott Foundation personnel, and school Superintendent William J. Early 
maintained that ―de facto‖ segregation in newly constructed elementary schools stemmed 
exclusively from segregated housing in the city.  In a 1966 speech to the Michigan Civil 
Rights Commission, Early stated unequivocally, ―The degree of racial imbalance that 
exists in some of the elementary schools in Flint Community Schools is a result of long-
established patterns of housing segregation in the city of Flint.‖
39
  Early spoke the truth in 
linking housing and pupil segregation, but residential segregation could not explain the 
transfer and boundary policies that maintained artificial segregation on the city‘s rapidly 
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 Raymond L. Gover, ―38 Million: Construction Program Had ‗Golden‘ 10 Years,‖ Flint Journal, 
December 27, 1959. 
39
 William J. Early, ―Presentation to Civil Rights Commission of the State of Michigan,‖ December 1, 
1966, Beasley Papers, box 29, folder 21, GHCC.  
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Elementary Schools 1950-51 1955-56 1959-60 
 
Civic Park 0/899 0/879 1/831 
Clark 474/645 559/582 611/614 
Cody 0/555 0/724 0/742 
Cook 0/514 0/591 0/557 
Coolidge 0/517 0/815 0/525 
Cummings   0/664 
Dewey 65/463 355/710 474/712 
Dort 0/615 251/739 626/949 
Doyle 0/402 37/530 404/623 
Durant-Tuuri-Mott 1/363 8/402 21/474 
Fairview 385/393 524/535 531/531 
Freeman  0/761 0/908 
Garfield 0/699 0/776 0/679 
Gundry  0/655 0/1,103 
Hazelton 0/282 13/321 8/260 
Homedale 0/759 0/809 11/830 
Jefferson 181/440 660/776 954/980 
Lewis 0/800 2/499 1/712 
Lincoln 0/627 9/388 47/379 
Longfellow 0/746 0/916 0/936 
Martin 0/494 115/639 750/1,007 
McKinley 0/460 0/734 0/852 
Merrill  0/800 0/757 
Oak 0/437 2/489 37/435 
Parkland 394/395 585/591 615/618 
Pierce  0/479 0/484 
Pierson 0/883 0/916 0/909 
Potter  0/864 0/1,386 
Roosevelt 428/516 592/623 570/718 
Selby   0/811 
Stevenson 0/361 0/366 1/371 
Stewart  440/530 621/819 
Walker 14/475 190/542 207/412 
Washington 0/933 0/699 0/572 
Zimmerman 0/725 0/907 0/591 
 
TOTAL 1,942/15,398 4,342/21,557 6,490/2,4751 
 
Table 3.1.  Racial segregation in Flint elementary schools.  Number of black pupils and total school 
enrollment, 1950-1960.  SOURCE: ―Racial Distribution by School, K-12—1950-1968,‖ Manley Papers, 
box 23, 78-8.3-31f, Scharchburg Archives. 
 
Shortly after the opening of Freeman Elementary, the city‘s flagship community 
school, the school board opened Pierce School in one of Flint‘s most exclusive and 
segregated east side neighborhoods.  Located in a verdant setting just east of Woodlawn 
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Park, Pierce opened in 1952 with a 100 percent white enrollment.  As in several other 
instances during the 1950s, the board had an opportunity to integrate Pierce from its 
inception by doing nothing more than adhering to the neighborhood schools policy that 
sent children to the schools closest to their homes.  If the board had honored the 
geographic imperatives of community education, then the Pierce School would have 
drawn a significant number of black pupils from the Sugar Hill section of Floral Park, a 
predominantly middle-class black enclave immediately southwest of the new school.  
Prior to the construction of Pierce, students from Sugar Hill attended Clark School, a 
decaying, overcrowded structure with a black enrollment of over 95 percent.  Yet when it 
established the Pierce boundaries, the board chose Gilkey Creek—a narrow, meandering 
stream that separated the segregated communities of Sugar Hill and Pierce Park—as its 
southwestern boundary.
40
  The board‘s decision allowed Pierce to open in 1952 with an 
all-white student body while the nearly all-black Clark School remained well over 
capacity.  Upon learning of the gerrymandered boundaries and the mismatched 
enrollments of the two schools, a number of black parents from Clark requested pupil 
transfers to Pierce, citing both its greater proximity and its modern amenities.
41
  Although 
Pierce did not reach full capacity until the early 1960s, the board, without explanation, 
refused all transfer requests from black pupils, granting them only to white students from 
Clark School.  As a result of the board‘s districting decisions on the near south side, 
neighbors from the same street at times attended different ―neighborhood schools.‖  For 
Ruth Scott, Minnie Simpson, and other black residents on the south side, the fleeting, 
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 On Gilkey Creek as a symbolic racial barrier, see Van G. Sauter and John L. Dotson, ―How Flint Deals 
with Racial Problems,‖ Detroit Free Press, June 14, 1965.  
41
 Black parents repeatedly sought to enroll their children at Pierce during the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
See Flint Board of Education, Official Minutes (May 23, 1961), 330a-330c. 
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oddly shaped Pierce-Clark boundary line eviscerated the notion that a colorblind ideal of 
proximity drove the neighborhood schools and community education concepts.  ―They 
drew boundaries around houses,‖ Scott remembered, ―down the middle of the street. . . . 
When blacks moved onto a street, they would change the boundaries.‖
42
  As a direct 
consequence of the board‘s decisions in the 1950s, Pierce remained all white at the end of 




When the school board announced the opening of Stewart elementary in 1955, it 
again found itself facing the Pierce-Clark segregation issue.  Located approximately one-
half mile south of Pierce and three-quarters of a mile east of Clark, Stewart served the 
area south of the Lapeer Road residential color line in the eastern section of Sugar Hill.  
Prior to the opening of Stewart, the board refused all requests to send black pupils to 
Pierce, choosing instead to house nearly three hundred African-American students from 
the overcrowded Clark building in decaying frame houses known as the Crago and Elm 
Park temporary structures.  Through the careful drawing of erratically shaped boundaries 
between the three schools, the board relieved overcrowding at Clark while maintaining 
racial homogeneity at Pierce.  In order to exclude the integrated neighborhoods that 
bordered Sugar Hill from the Pierce district, the board once again violated its proximity 
policy by extending the Stewart boundary over a mile and a half to the north and east, 
resulting in an 80 percent black enrollment at Stewart while Pierce remained under 
capacity and all white.  In effect, the construction of the Stewart School allowed the 
board to ease overcrowding at Clark by sending white pupils to Pierce and black pupils to 
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 The quotation is from R. Sanders, Bronze Pillars, 117. 
43
 Mines to Clancy, August 29, 1975.  See also, Flint Board of Education, Frequency Distribution of Pupils 
by Race (Flint: Flint Board of Education, n.d.). 
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Stewart, regardless of their proximity to either.
44
  For those white pupils who still found 
themselves enrolled at Stewart, school officials established separate classrooms for white 
and black children.
45
  Edgar Holt of the Flint NAACP resorted to using supernatural 
metaphors in an attempt to communicate the geographic absurdity of Flint‘s 
neighborhood schools: ―There were magic lines for racial discrimination.  The Flint 
Board of Education used these magic – racial lines in establishing school boundaries as if 
they were sacred.‖
46
  Flint‘s ―neighborhood schools‖ were not neutral entities that 
corresponded to colorblind demographic and geographic forces.  Rather, they were 
malleable, socially constructed institutions that reversed even modest breaches of the 
residential color line.  Flint‘s neighborhood schools were geographic fictions. 
 The Flint Board of Education formalized school attendance boundaries 
throughout the city on February 9, 1954, just three months prior to the Supreme Court‘s 
release of the Brown decision.  Though it would take nearly twenty years for the federal 
government to acknowledge their illegality, the 1954 boundary reorganizations 
represented a preemptive negation of the court‘s ruling that ―separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.‖  Belying the later protestations of school board 
members and Mott Foundation personnel, the 1954 boundary decisions marked the 
unmistakable expansion of government-orchestrated segregation within the Flint Public 
Schools.  As in other cities, Flint‘s school board maintained segregation most effectively 
in the smaller attendance zones that served elementary schools.  In order to preserve 
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 On the Pierce, Stewart, and Clark boundaries, see Flint Board of Education, Official Minutes and Reports 
(July 19, 1955), 17-28. 
45
 Affidavit of Edgar B. Holt, filed regarding the case, Holman, et al., v. School District of the City of Flint, 
et al., Civil Action No: 76-40023, United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern 
Division (1976).  The Stewart case was not an isolated example of segregation within an integrated school.  
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Aiyer, ed., Telling Our Stories, 18.     
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segregation in the schools that serviced integrated and transitional neighborhoods on the 
border of Flint‘s North End, the board allowed racial transfers, altered school boundaries, 





Map 3.1.  Flint Public Schools map, ca. 1955.  Courtesy of Scharchburg Archives. 
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 Flint Board of Education, Official Minutes (September 10, October 8, November 5, 1953, February 4, 
1954).  See also, Mines to Clancy, August 29, 1975. 
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The use of temporary classrooms allowed the board to develop a novel and 
flexible approach to balancing student enrollments with the exigencies of racial 
segregation.  On the northeast end of the city, the 1954 boundary plan split the integrated 
enrollment of Roosevelt School between the official school site on Thetford Road and a 
temporary structure located a mile and a half to the northeast.  The board‘s plan assigned 
approximately six hundred pupils to the main school building, located in a majority-black 
neighborhood near the intersection of Stewart Avenue and Dort Highway, while 
assigning an additional fifty pupils to temporary structures located in a segregated white 
neighborhood on Flint‘s northern border with Genesee and Mt. Morris Townships.  For 
the main Roosevelt building, the board drew attendance boundaries that resulted in a 95 
percent black enrollment.  To the temporary structures northeast of Roosevelt—which 
would later become part of the Carpenter Road School when it opened in 1965—the 
board assigned fifty white pupils and perhaps one black student.  The 1954 plan 
effectively split the Roosevelt enrollment along both racial and geographic lines, 
establishing separate sites for the white and black students of a single school.
48
   
 A similar situation occurred in the late 1950s on the northwest side of the city, 
where the school board constructed temporary structures—known in Flint as ―primary 
units‖—as a means of preserving segregation in the face of racial transition and student 
enrollment increases.  Unlike the temporary trailer classrooms erected by boards of 
education across the country during the postwar era, which typically sat on parking lots, 
ball fields, or on other land adjoining school buildings, Flint‘s primary units could be 
found scattered throughout the city‘s residential neighborhoods, often at significant 
distances from official school facilities.  Primary units resembled single-family ranch 
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 Flint Board of Education, Official Minutes (February 4, 1954); Mines to Clancy, August 29, 1975. 
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homes, with each structure housing one classroom, and were virtually indistinguishable 
from the surrounding residential landscape.  During the 1950s and 1960s, school board 
members promoted the units as fiscally sound solutions to the problem of overcrowding, 
arguing that they could be re-sold as single family homes upon the final resolution of 
enrollment crises.  Because primary units allowed the school board to maintain pupil 
separation without shifting attendance boundaries, they were also useful tools for 
promoting racial segregation.  Between 1950 and 1966, the Flint Board of Education 
constructed 116 such structures, primarily within the still booming white neighborhoods 
on the city‘s segregated fringe.
49
 
 During the postwar era, the north and northwest sides of the city became focal 
points for the black community‘s expansion.  In order to accommodate Flint‘s 
demographic and population shifts, the school board constructed no fewer than forty-one 
primary units on the northwest side.  Board members could have resolved both 
overcrowding and pupil segregation on the northwest side through limited boundary 
shifts between Martin, Jefferson, Pierson, and Gundry elementary schools, but instead 
they chose to construct primary units to relieve overcrowding.  By the 1959-60 school 
year, the board‘s construction decisions had resulted in an especially glaring disjuncture 
between the Pierson and Jefferson Schools.  Although only a half-mile separated the two 
facilities, Pierson contained an all-white enrollment of 909 pupils in a building intended 
to house 1301 students.  By comparison, Jefferson—which claimed seven primary 
units—had an enrollment of 980 pupils, 954 of whom were African American, in a 
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building constructed to hold only 906 children.  Maintaining segregation on the northwest 




     
 
Figure 3.1.  Leaflet promoting Flint‘s primary units, n.d.  Courtesy of Scharchburg 
Archives. 
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Black population increases between the close of World War II and the mid-1950s 
placed extraordinary pressure on Flint‘s residential color line.  Prior to the war, Saginaw 
Street formed a nearly impermeable barrier between the solidly black and transitional 
neighborhoods of the North End and the segregated white neighborhoods on Flint‘s west 
side.  As the St. John Street neighborhood reached its capacity in the 1950s, black 
families began relocating west of Saginaw Street, moving African-American pupils into 
previously segregated white schools.  Such residential movements presented the board 
with several opportunities to integrate a handful of schools, especially in the junior high 
school districts that served larger residential areas.  Yet the board continued its policy of 
segregation, shifting junior high boundaries to preserve the color line, just as it did for 
elementary schools.  In April 1954, the board unveiled an official boundary plan for 
junior high schools.  For Longfellow Junior High School—located approximately two 
miles north of the Flint River within a segregated west side neighborhood—the board 
drew an oddly shaped, zigzag boundary that pulled handfuls of white students into the 
Longfellow district while pushing black pupils into the neighboring Emerson area.  The 
boundary line resulted in a 100 percent white enrollment at Longfellow that held 
throughout the 1950s.  At Emerson, which also served portions of the west side in 
addition to the segregated black neighborhoods of the North End, the 1954 boundary 
created a substantially larger black enrollment of 23.9 percent, which by 1959 had 
increased to nearly 35 percent.  As in other instances, the board employed a 
discriminatory transfer policy that allowed white students from Emerson to switch to 
Longfellow while denying Emerson‘s black students the same privilege.  Spatially, the 
Longfellow-Emerson boundary resolution represented another clear violation of the 
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geographic principle of neighborhood schools, with both black and white students often 
traveling to the more distant of two ―neighborhood schools.‖  A 1958 editorial from the 
Bronze Reporter, the city‘s leading black newspaper, reflected upon the arbitrary 
boundaries that separated students by race: ―If children were simply sent to the schools 






Figure 3.2.  Primary unit.  Once a primary unit for public school children, this structure 
on Flint‘s west side now serves as a single-family home.  Photograph by Andrew R. 
Highsmith, 2006. 
 
As black families from the overcrowded and deteriorating North End began to 
move north and west into previously segregated white neighborhoods in the late 1950s 
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and early 1960s, the board of education worked feverishly, if less successfully, to 
maintain pupil segregation.  For its junior and senior high schools, which drew pupils 
from larger portions of the city, the board managed boundaries and transfers to minimize 
interracial enrollments.  At the high school level, the board‘s attendance boundaries 
served to concentrate black pupils at Northern and Northwestern High Schools while 
diluting black enrollments at Central and Southwestern High Schools.  In Flint and other 
smaller cities, school boards found it impossible to zone for complete pupil segregation at 
the junior and senior high school levels.  For elementary school children, however, the 
board continued to plan for rigid segregation wherever possible.  In the St. John 
neighborhood, outward black migrations due to urban renewal (see Chapter 9), along 
with the departure of the few remaining white children, resulted in numerical and racial 
enrollment mismatches between neighboring schools.  Lewis and Fairview elementary 
schools, separated by approximately one mile on Flint‘s North End, presented stark 
demographic contrasts.  Located west of the Flint River in the St. John district, Fairview 
had the capacity to hold 445 pupils, yet it contained only 305 students during the 1964-65 
school year, 302 of whom were African American.  By comparison, Lewis School, 
located just east of the Flint River in a working-class white neighborhood, contained five 
African Americans out of 882 pupils.  With a capacity enrollment of only 661, Lewis was 
severely overcrowded in spite of its proximity—and easy access, via vehicle and 
pedestrian bridges—to Fairview.  The school board refused to allow transfers between 
the two buildings, however, preferring instead to maintain a system of educational 
apartheid and pupil-teacher mismatches that undermined educational quality on both 
sides of the river.
52
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The pattern of overcrowded white schools adjacent to integrated and all-black 
facilities replicated itself across the city as the color line shifted to the north and west in 
the 1960s.  Yet the school board refused to relieve pupil overcrowding by breaching the 
color line.  Such refusals resulted in severe student-teacher mismatches between 
neighboring school districts.  At Fairview, for instance, the movement of white students 
to the overwhelmingly white Lewis, Kearsley, and Homedale districts reduced the 
student teacher ratio to a figure of 27:1.  Student-teacher ratios exceeded 36:1 at 
Kearsley, however.  When parents criticized school officials for their inability to solve 
school overcrowding in the white neighborhoods surrounding the St. John community, 
the board of education drew from a pre-Brown political discourse that framed 
segregationist policies as a form of compensatory education for underprivileged black 
students: ―Occasionally,‖ a board report asserted, ―socio-economic factors make a lower 
pupil-teacher ratio desirable for a given school.‖
53
  On its own, such a statement could be 
read as a laudable attempt to level the educational playing field for disadvantaged 
children.  Yet when viewed alongside the gross resource inequities between black and 
white schools and the clear evidence of gerrymandering, the board‘s defense of lower 
student-teacher ratios at Fairview constituted a colorblind marketing strategy that sold 
compensatory education from within a segregationist paradigm.
54
  As Superintendent 
Early noted in a 1966 speech, the board proposed solving segregation at some unknown 
                                                                                                                                                 
Flint Board of Education, Official Minutes (September 23, 1964).  The board used primary units to 
maintain racial imbalances between Lewis and Fairview.     
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 Flint Board of Education, Official Minutes 13:122 (January 8, 1953).  The quotation is from the board of 
education‘s Staff Report Number 122. 
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 On resource inequities between black and white schools, see ―Flint NAACP Fact Sheet,‖ n.d., Holt 
Papers, box 4, folder 13, GHCC. 
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future date by first improving the education and living standards of Flint‘s black 
community:  
I suggest that we not overlook the importance of present efforts to greatly 
improve our inner-city schools. . . . Such efforts are being made not to 
persuade Negroes to accept segregation, but rather, to use education as the 
ladder out of poverty, substandard living, and with it, segregation.
55
       
          
During the 1960s, the Flint Board of Education responded to the suburban 
migrations of white children, black pupil increases, and pressure from local civil rights 
groups to invest in inner-city schools by shifting construction initiatives from the 
segregated urban fringe towards the racially transitional northwest side.  The opening of 
Bunche School, in 1967, and King School, in 1970, presented the board with another 
series of opportunities to further racial integration in elementary schools.  Located near 
Forest Park on the city‘s near northwest side, Bunche claimed an attendance zone 
adjacent to that of Merrill School.  Though separated by less than a mile, Bunche and 
Merrill contained radically different student bodies.  Bunche opened with a black 
enrollment of 43 percent, which had nearly doubled to 75 percent by 1971.  Merrill, by 
contrast, which served the still segregated neighborhoods west of Forest Park, contained a 
white majority of over 99 percent in the year that Bunche opened.  Though Merrill‘s 
black enrollment increased during the late 1960s and early 1970s, primarily due to 
freeway and urban renewal relocations that brought over a thousand black families to the 
northwest side, it still held a large white majority of 86 percent in 1972.   
In the Martin Luther King-Civic Park case, the processes of ―tipping‖ and racial 
succession stemmed directly from pupil assignment policies.  Just to the south of Bunche 
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and Merrill, the adjoining King and Civic Park districts had similarly dichotomous 
student bodies.  Serving a transitional neighborhood just north of Bassett Park, Civic Park 
was moderately integrated in the late 1960s, with a steadily growing black enrollment 
that had reached approximately 10 percent in 1969.  However, when the board opened 
King in 1971, it shifted half of Civic Park‘s black pupils to the new school.  Less than a 
half-mile east of Civic Park, King opened with a black enrollment that exceeded 87 
percent.
56
  In recognition of the intentional gerrymandering that resegregated Civic Park 
and other integrated schools in the 1960s, the federal government later went so far as to 
acknowledge ―the substantial duality of the Flint School System.‖
57
  That the board of 
education named two of its racially identifiable new schools after the nation‘s leading 
integrationists must have represented a bitter irony for Flint‘s African-American 
community. 
 By the close of the 1960s, national civil rights laws and federal desegregation 
rulings had failed to alter patterns of government-backed segregation in the Flint schools.  
Of the forty-two public elementary schools open in Flint in 1969, nine contained all-
white student bodies and three additional schools claimed fewer than ten black pupils.  
On the other side of the color line, ten of the city‘s elementary schools possessed black 
student majorities of greater than 90 percent.  With a total elementary student population 
of 27,540, 39 percent of whom were African American, the district contained only five 
integrated elementary school buildings.  Between 1951 and 1971, the number of black 
children attending majority-black schools remained essentially unchanged in Flint.  In the 
1950-51 school year, 86.5 percent of the city‘s black children attended schools in which 
                                                 
56
 Morrissey, ―Board of Ed. Orders Changes of Boundaries for Five Schools,‖ Flint Journal, February 26, 
1970. 
57
 Mines to Clancy, August 29, 1975. 
169 
 
they were the majority.  Twenty years later that number had only dropped by a single 
percentage point.  Over the same period, the number of white children attending 
majority-white schools declined only slightly from 93.1 percent to 89.4 percent.
58
   
The numbers tell only part of the story, however.  Stark as they may have been, 
the glaring contrasts among schools at times masked the segregation of pupils that 
occurred within buildings.  By 1960, a handful of African-American families had crossed 
the Flint River color boundary east of St. John.  Like Lapeer Road and Gilkey Creek on 
the south side of the city, the Flint River was a powerful symbol of the city‘s rigid 
segregation.  Homedale elementary, which served the working-class white neighborhoods 
east of the river and St. John Street, gained its first black pupils in the late 1950s.  In 
1959, eleven of its 830 children were African American.  For second-grader Wesley King 
and perhaps other black pupils at Homedale, integration proved to be a frightful 
experience.  After receiving complaints from white parents who opposed integrated 
education, an unnamed teacher decided to place King‘s desk inside a cramped and dark 
coat closet, physically removed from the other children.  Once alerted by King‘s mother, 
the Flint NAACP responded with an unannounced visit to the school, where they 
confirmed the young boy‘s story.  The sole black student in a class of thirty, King 




There can be no way of knowing how many black children experienced similar 
forms of racism.  Fearful of reprisals and additional humiliation from unsympathetic 
teachers and administrators, black parents and students often declined to file reports on 
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discrimination and segregation within integrated schools.  Nevertheless, the 
reminiscences of African-American citizens suggest that black pupils who crossed the 
city‘s educational color line suffered through indignities similar to those experienced by 
King.  In a 1993 interview with local historians, Reverend Eugene Simpson of Flint‘s Mt. 
Tabor Baptist Church recalled an especially scarring incident from the mid-1930s that 
occurred while he was enrolled at Fairview School.  One of only a small cohort of black 
students at Fairview at the time, Simpson regularly performed minstrel songs for his class 
at the request of his teacher.  According to Simpson, ―the teacher would have me stand in 
front of the class and I would sing, ‗I‘m a manish [sic] pickaninny, blacker than a 
crow.‘‖
60
  As Simpson story reveals, the maintenance of Jim Crow entailed more than 
simply segregating black and white bodies.  Jim Crow was also a daily, public 
performance.                       
The cases of Wesley King and Eugene Simpson may have been exceptional by 
virtue of their cruelty, but board-sponsored racial segregation and discrimination within 
ostensibly integrated schools was extremely common in the Vehicle City.  Beginning in 
1958, the Flint Board of Education and the Mott Foundation officially adopted the 
―primary cycle‖ and the ―Strawman Procedure on Grouping,‖ forms of pupil tracking that 
segregated students by ability levels.  Following the dictates of the Strawman and 
primary cycle methods, Flint teachers ranked and separated children according to 
classroom performance, achievement tests, and intelligence quotient measurements.  In a 
city where black children typically scored two grade levels below their white peers on 
achievement tests, tracking and other forms of ―ability grouping‖ contributed greatly to 
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the segregation of pupils within school buildings.
61
  Specifically, the board‘s adoption of 
the Personalized Curriculum Program (PCP), which sorted pupils into the Talented Child 
and the Better Tomorrow for the Urban Youth (BTU) programs, allowed school officials 
to maintain pupil separation by race and student performance under the guise of a 
colorblind assessment of achievement levels.  As NAACP activists pointed out on a 
number of occasions, black children simply could not gain access to the city‘s gifted and 
talented programs, in part because the board implemented the vocational and life skills 
oriented BTU program in each of its majority-black schools.
62
  According to Woody 
Etherly, Jr., who graduated from Northern High in 1962 and later served on Flint‘s city 
council, black students rarely found themselves in college preparatory tracks in the Flint 
Public Schools: ―Most black folks they put on the track system.  They‘d train you to be 
able to go into General Motors but not to be able to go to college.  That‘s the kind of 
system they had you on, taking home economics and gym.‖
63
  Likewise, Charles Brooks 
lambasted the board of education for its curricular priorities for black children: ―You tell 
us we need education and you stick a gym down our throat.  We don‘t need a gym; we 
need a gym like we need a tornado in this town.‖
64
         
By the close of the 1960s, the board of education‘s racial policies had 
significantly remapped neighborhood geographies throughout the city, undermining even 
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the slightest shifts towards residential integration.  Because schools served as the focal 
points for community activities, the gerrymandering of student boundaries affected nearly 
everyone in Flint, regardless of age.  In Flint, housing and schools constituted 
neighborhoods.  The government policies that created segregated neighborhoods and 
gerrymandered neighborhood schools nurtured an artificial sense of community solidarity 
among white civic boosters, media observers, and community schools participants.  In a 
1956 article on the Mott program, Coronet magazine echoed white optimism for 
community schools by labeling Flint the ―Happiest Town in Michigan.‖
65
  In similar 
fashion, Reader‘s Digest announced that ―Flint‘s Gone Crazy Over Culture,‖ while 
Family Circle magazine referred to Mott‘s ―life-saving, blues-curing plan‖ that had 
people ―dancing in the streets.‖
66
  White support for community education reached a 
pinnacle by the end of the 1950s, but the white consensus on community education 
stemmed as much from government-sponsored segregation as it did from the innovative 
programming of the board of education.   
__________ 
 
During World War II and the immediate postwar era, Mott Foundation officials and 
executives from GM boasted that new homes, community schools, and high-paying 
industrial jobs helped to transform Flint into an ―engine of American progress.‖  Flint, 
these civic boosters claimed, was a model city of educational and industrial opportunity 
where all citizens could obtain economic security, self-improvement, and consumer 
prosperity.  Like their Republican and pro-business counterparts, trade union leaders and 
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members of the city‘s liberal establishment also heralded the special opportunities 
available to Flint‘s citizens.  Union activism, they claimed, had helped to make Flint one 
of the most progressive and racially ―open‖ cities in the United States.  For tens of 
thousands of white autoworkers in Genesee County, the twenty-five years following 
World War II were, in many ways, an amazing era of job security and consumer 
prosperity.  Due to the advance of community education, these decades were also marked 
by an expansive public culture organized around school-based activities.  Yet for African 
Americans who lived in Flint, discrimination and segregation persisted.  As in Flint‘s 
schools and neighborhoods, race played a key role in delineating the social and economic 
opportunities available to black workers.  At mid-century, personnel supervisors from 
GM, downtown retailers, and other local employers maintained rigidly demarcated hiring 
and promotion policies that severely limited the employment options of black residents.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, black workers waged vigorous direct action campaigns 
against the residential, educational, and occupational color lines.  Like the struggles that 
emerged over segregated schools and neighborhoods, battles over occupational 
discrimination and employment equity were key components of the black freedom 
struggle in postwar Flint. 




Jim Crow, GM Crow: 
Black Workers and the Limits of Postwar Abundance 
 
 
The Great Sit-Down Strike of 1936-37 was an iconic moment in Flint‘s history.  On 
February 11, 1937, after a violent, forty-four day strike that polarized residents of the 
Vehicle City, the fledgling United Auto Workers union and General Motors settled the 
dispute.  After learning that GM officials had formally recognized the union and agreed 
to participate in collective bargaining, striking workers from Plant 4 of Flint‘s Chevy in 
the Hole complex triumphantly exited the factory for a long-awaited victory celebration 
with supporters, friends, and family.  Roscoe Van Zandt, perhaps the only black 
participant in the Flint sit-down strike, stood at the head of the procession.  In a 
photograph published by newspapers across the world, Van Zandt, wielding an American 
flag, led the victorious UAW delegation out onto Chevrolet Avenue and into the history 
books.  Prior to exiting Plant 4, strikers had chosen Van Zandt to lead the workers from 
the factory.  Though only a symbolic gesture, the workers‘ decision to honor Van Zandt 
demonstrated the very real ways in which industrial organizing undermined the 
foundations of the color line.  Among thousands of trade unionists in Flint, the image of 
Van Zandt leading his white co-workers has become a cherished symbol of organized 
labor‘s ability to combat racial prejudice.  In spite of its power and potential, however, 
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the iconic photograph of Roscoe Van Zandt conceals as much as it reveals about the mid-
century experiences of African-American workers at Flint‘s GM facilities.
1
    
During the 1940s and 1950s, tens of thousands of African Americans moved to 
the Vehicle City in search of good jobs, economic security, and first-class citizenship.  
Between 1940 and 1960, Flint‘s black population increased from 6,559 to 34,521.
2
  Yet 
when black migrants arrived in the city, they quickly discovered that GM and other local 
employers were staunchly committed to maintaining the occupational color line.  During 
and after World War II, black workers waged a fierce struggle for equal employment 
opportunities in Flint and suburban Genesee County.  In the 1950s, that struggle centered 
on an unsuccessful campaign to win municipal fair employment legislation.  Following 
the defeat of the Flint Fair Employment Practices Commission, African-American 
activists launched a vigorous direct action campaign against the discriminatory practices 
of General Motors officials and other local employers.  By the dawn of the 1960s, the 
battle for employment equity had expanded beyond the shop floor to include a fight 
against urban deindustrialization and the flight of capital and jobs from the inner city to 
the segregated suburbs of Genesee County.  Black workers in Flint fought not only for 
access to better-paying jobs, but also for the right to live and work in the high-growth 
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―The Hardest, Dirtiest, Lowest-Paying Jobs‖ 
Prior to World War II, African Americans comprised only a tiny fraction of the auto 
industry‘s labor force.  In 1910, automobile manufacturers employed fewer than six 
hundred black workers nationwide, less than 1 percent of the industry‘s total domestic 
workforce.  By 1940, that number had grown to 23,015, roughly 4 percent of the national 
total.  Among the ―Big Three‖ automakers—Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler—Ford 
consistently outpaced its competitors in the hiring of black workers, employing four 
times as many African Americans as any other firm in the industry.  Of Ford‘s ninety 
thousand black workers in Michigan in 1940, 12.22 percent were African American.  By 
comparison, black workers at GM‘s Michigan and Indiana facilities—home to the 
majority of the company‘s Negro wage earners—constituted only 2.5 percent of the total 
laboring force.
3
  The disparity stemmed in large part from the fact that General Motors, 
like many other automakers, adhered to a thoroughly decentralized management 
structure.  At GM, as corporate vice president Louis Seaton once acknowledged, the 
individual divisions of the company exercised almost complete control over hiring 
decisions.
4
  Because of GM‘s decentralized management operations, black employment 
opportunities varied widely between plants depending upon past practices, the 
prerogatives of local executives and plant managers, white public opinion, and the status 
of the labor market.  Nevertheless, across its many divisions, General Motors recruiters 
tended to hire black workers only for the least desirable positions.  According to Lloyd H. 
Bailer, who conducted extensive surveys of the auto industry during the 1930s and 1940s, 
―the vast majority of Negro automobile workers are employed in the foundry, paint, and 
                                                 
3
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maintenance departments (chiefly as janitors) or as unskilled labor.‖  Of GM‘s 2,500 
prewar black employees in Michigan and Indiana, two thousand worked in the foundries 
of Flint, Saginaw, and Pontiac.  With few exceptions, the remaining five hundred worked 
as paint chippers, car washers, sanders, machine cleaners, scrap handlers, and janitors.
5
                                  
During the 1920s and 1930s, GM supervisors maintained almost complete racial 
segregation in the city‘s plants.  At Fisher Body and AC Spark Plug—where the color 
line was most intense—the workforce was nearly all white with the exception of several 
black custodians.  In 1941, AC Spark Plug employed approximately 3,500 local workers, 
yet only twenty-three were African American, all of them janitors.  During the same year, 
Flint‘s two Fisher Body plants, which had well-deserved reputations for ―lily whiteness,‖ 
employed only six black workers as either janitors or car washers.  On the eve of the war, 
approximately three hundred African Americans worked at Flint‘s Chevrolet division 
complexes, all of whom served as either janitors, truck drivers, or machine cleaners.  At 
Buick, African Americans fared slightly better.  Outside of the custodial and maintenance 
departments, black job seekers at Buick could find employment only in Plant 70, the 
foundry, or in Plant 71, the cleaning room.  In 1941, Buick employed approximately six 
hundred black workers within its foundry division.
6
   
Foundry jobs were among the most unpleasant, dangerous, and difficult positions 
available in the auto industry.  ―That [foundry work] was the black man‘s job,‖ 
remembered Charles Skinner.  ―That‘s where you hid, that‘s where you were supposed to 
be, in the foundry. . . . Those were the hardest, dirtiest, lowest-paying jobs that they had.  
                                                 
5
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And that‘s where they placed us.‖
7
  Although Buick officials proved more willing to hire 
African Americans than their counterparts at Chevrolet, Fisher, and AC, racial 
segregation within the North End plants was formal and rigid.  According to Harry Rolf, 
a time study official at Buick, until the 1940s GM maintained a firm policy of refusing all 
transfer requests for black foundry workers: ―No one was allowed to transfer out of the 
Foundry.  If you were in the Foundry, that‘s where you stayed.‖
8
  Reflecting back upon 
his experiences as a foundry supervisor at Buick, Melvin ―Pudge‖ Van Slyke described 
the work conditions and the rigidity of the color line at General Motors facilities:  
It was always hot, dirty work.  That‘s why it was ninety percent colored.  
If a black person went to the employment office looking for a job, he 
would be sent to the Foundry. . . . The core room where the cores were 
made was mostly Hungarian and Polish.  No colored at all.
9
   
 
During the workday, foundry supervisors carefully policed the movements of black 
workers.  According to Roger Townsend, Buick supervisors forcibly confined prewar 
black employees to their work stations and forbade them from exiting the foundry, even 
to use the bathroom: ―Blacks were limited to the foundries part, they were not permitted 
to go beyond the imaginary line [that separated black and white spaces] even to use the 
bathroom.  They had certain bathrooms that were off limits to them.  Whites could 
naturally go there.‖
10
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World War II and the Double V Campaign 
World War II opened a vast array of new opportunities for black autoworkers.  In Flint, 
Detroit, and other ―arsenals of democracy,‖ the outbreak of the war created massive labor 
shortages during a period of unprecedented federal demand for new industrial products.  
In order to meet federal requests for tanks, aircraft, and other high-tech materiel, 
automobile manufacturers nationwide re-tooled their plants for war production, a process 
that created hundreds of new job categories and increased demands for skilled laborers.  
During the war, GM added 25,000 new jobs in Genesee County alone.  Viewing the war 
as an opportunity to secure new civil rights protections, black labor activist A. Philip 
Randolph led a nationwide movement in the 1940s to demand a federal ban on 
employment discrimination.  Concerned that Randolph and other civil rights protesters 
would undermine the government‘s military preparedness, in June 1941, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which prohibited GM and other 
government contractors from practicing racial discrimination in defense-related 
industries.
11
  Although Roosevelt‘s enforcement agency, the Fair Employment Practices 
Commission (FEPC), had little authority to combat discrimination, government 
negotiators from the Office of Price Management (OPM) and other federal agencies 
persuaded automobile executives to relax the color bar at defense facilities.  In September 
1941, OPM officials signed an agreement with automobile manufacturers and the UAW 
protecting seniority rights and mandating that existing employees receive priority 
treatment for all war-related job openings.  At Buick, where the conversion to defense 
work resulted in the temporary closing of the foundry, the OPM agreement allowed 
                                                 
11
 On Executive Order 8802 and the creation of the FEPC, see Nancy MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: 
The Opening of the American Workplace (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 22. 
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hundreds of unskilled and semi-skilled black workers to transfer to less arduous, higher 
paying positions on the assembly line.  Motivated to act by a nationwide grassroots 
campaign for a ―Double V‖ victory over fascism abroad and Jim Crow at home, federal 
officials successfully persuaded GM and other employers to weaken long-standing 
proscriptions against black employment.
12
   
During the war, local GM executives recruited thousands of southern blacks to 
work in Genesee County‘s auto factories.  From 1941 to 1945, GM‘s African-American 
workforce in the Flint area doubled.  Likewise, between 1940 and 1960, the city‘s black 
population grew to over thirty thousand.  For black migrants such as Layton Galloway, 
who arrived in Flint in 1942 to work as a janitor at GM, World War II brought 
unprecedented opportunities for jobs on the assembly line and other positions outside of 
the foundry and custodial departments.  ―I went out to Plant 3 and went to work the same 
day,‖ Galloway remembered.  ―They needed workers.  I started sweeping Plant 3.  I did 
that for about four months, then went into production.  My first job was putting small 
parts in bins.‖
13
  In 1943, Annalea Bannister shattered a major barrier—and raised quite a 
few eyebrows—by becoming the first African American to hold an office job at the AC 
Spark Plug facility on Dort Highway.  ―I was the first black girl to work in the office at 
AC Spark Plug,‖ Bannister recalled.  ―There were people walking past my office in 
droves trying to see the black girl.‖
14
  The war opened up the first opportunities for black 
workers to cross the color line that had formerly confined them to the most onerous jobs.  
As Anna L. V. Howard remembered, ―It took WWII to put black men in the shop on 
production.  Before, they were janitors and did menial work.  My husband got a better 
                                                 
12
 Bailer, ―The Negro Automobile Worker,‖ 424-425; and Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, 26-28 
13
 The quotation is from R. Sanders, Bronze Pillars, 59. 
14
 R. Sanders, Bronze Pillars, 59. 
181 
 
job.  He came out of that foundry and got to be a finisher.  That‘s what he always wanted 
to be.‖
15
   
With few exceptions, job opportunities for African-American workers in Flint 
continued to expand after World War II.  During the 1940s and 1950s, residents of the St. 
John neighborhood coined a term to describe the great migration of blacks to the Vehicle 
City: ―the rush-in.‖  For John Rhodes, the rush-in of newcomers signaled that a new era 
of possibilities had arrived for black workers in the Vehicle City: ―Flint was crowded.  
Plenty of jobs.  You could get a job anytime.‖
16
  Rhodes‘s optimism reflected a broader 
strand of public opinion among Flint‘s black citizenry.  Yet the postwar era was also a 
period of rising expectations among black workers, for World War II had inaugurated a 
new, more militant phase in the long civil rights era.  After defending liberty abroad, 
thousands of black veterans returned to Flint and other cities with a renewed commitment 
to challenging Jim Crow at home.  As Flint resident Dolores Ennis recalled, ―Those 
young [black] men who served in the war, they were not going to come back and take 
less.‖
17
  In spite of the gains made during the war, however, African Americans in 
postwar Flint confronted a corporation and a city government that had always offered less 
to black people.  By war‘s end, the stage was set for a fierce battle over employment 
equity at General Motors and in workplaces throughout the city. 
 
Municipal Politics and the Postwar Campaign for Employment Equity 
The postwar movement against employment discrimination in Flint centered on General 
Motors.  Yet throughout the city, black activists challenged the racial barriers to equal 
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employment opportunities.  During the early 1950s, civil rights and left-wing trade union 
activists fought for the passage of municipal fair employment legislation and the creation 
of a Flint Fair Employment Practices Commission (FFEPC).  In a strategic maneuver, 
black supporters of the FFEPC allied themselves with the local leadership of the UAW-
CIO in order to gain a favorable majority on the Flint City Commission.  Although trade 
unionists possessed a great deal of electoral power in Flint, UAW-sponsored candidates 
consistently failed to hold a stable majority on the city commission.  After holding a slim 
majority during the war, the UAW-CIO lost control of the commission in 1946 to a bloc 
of GM-backed supporters, only to win it back again in 1948.  In 1950, General Motors 
executives united with Michael Gorman, editor of the Flint Journal, to support a pro-
business slate of candidates for the commission.  In a bitterly fought, polarizing election 
that pitted the UAW and its supporters against the GM-backed Civic Research Council, 
organized labor lost control of the commission in 1950.  Although the UAW continued to 
endorse candidates during the 1950s, supporters of the FFEPC lacked the majority 
necessary to implement municipal civil rights legislation.
18
       
The UAW‘s inability to maintain control of the city commission had grave 
consequences for supporters of workplace equity.  In October 1951, Commissioner 
Robert Carter, a regional director for the UAW-CIO, introduced fair employment 
legislation for the commission‘s consideration.  However, pro-business legislators 
rejected the bill in a six-to-three vote.  Mayor Paul Lovegrove defended his negative vote 
by asserting that the FFEPC would drain the city‘s coffers of much-needed funds.  
Opponents of the legislation also claimed that it was impossible to legislate against racial 
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prejudice.  Angered by the defeat, on November 1 Carter published a blistering editorial 
in the Searchlight, the official newspaper of UAW Local 659.  ―The average Flint voter 
will not let these commissioners get away with this type of reaction,‖ Carter predicted.  
―Just remember that a group [General Motors] more powerful than us apparently is 
advising certain commissioners.‖
19
      
 Carter misjudged the Vehicle City‘s electorate.  Throughout the early 1950‘s, 
Flint voters consistently elected city commission candidates who opposed fair 
employment legislation.  Undaunted by their losses, in 1954 supporters of the FFEPC 
organized the Citizens Committee of 100, a group comprised of one hundred of the city‘s 
leading citizens, to lobby for antidiscrimination legislation.  Early in 1955, members of 
the committee introduced a second proposal for a nondiscrimination law.  On March 14, 
1955, the city commission, by a six-two vote, endorsed the proposal on its first reading.  
Angered by the commission‘s betrayal, AC Spark Plug manager Joseph A. Anderson and 
G. Keyes Page of GM‘s Civic Research Council led a campaign to kill the legislation that 
included the leadership of the Flint Chamber of Commerce and Flint Journal editor 
Michael Gorman.  On April 7, 1955, in an unmistakable show of force, General Motors 
supervisors from across the county packed the city commission chambers to witness the 
second reading of the fair employment ordinance.  The FFEPC legislation went down to 
defeat on its second reading by virtue of a four-four deadlock.
20
  When pressed to defend 
their positions, Mayor George Algoe and other opponents of the FFEPC pointed to three 
factors.  First, they argued that education, not legislation, was the most appropriate means 
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of combating discriminatory practices.  Second, anti-FFEPC commissioners maintained 
that color-conscious antidiscrimination legislation was an unjust remedy for racial 
prejudice.  Finally, opponents of the legislation, almost without fail, referenced their own 
personal abhorrence of discrimination and their ―many friends‖ within Flint‘s ―colored 
community.‖  According to Harry Cull, the city clerk who recorded Algoe‘s statement, 
―He [Algoe] stated he has many friends among the colored people in Flint and he 
appreciates them for what they are, not for their color.‖
21
  Mayor Algoe‘s friendship was 
not enough, however, for proponents of fair employment legislation.   
The demise of the FFEPC reminded many African Americans of Jim Crow‘s 
essential compatibility with postwar American culture.  Throughout the 1950s and early 
1960s, black job seekers in Flint confronted near-daily reminders that virtually all of 
Vehicle City‘s employers remained committed to the color line.  During the late 1950s, 
the Hardy family, makers and distributors of Holsum Bread, and the Wittaker family, 
operators of a North End Dairy Queen, became two such exceptions.  In 1956, the 
Hardy‘s became the first white bakers in Flint to hire a Negro salesperson.  To publicize 
the achievement, William Hardy, Jr., purchased advertising space in the Bronze Reporter.  
The Hardy‘s ran a prominent photograph of the Negro employee in their ads along with a 
reminder that theirs was ―The First Bakery to Hire a Negro Bread Salesman in Flint.‖
22
   
Among Flint employers, the Hardy family was somewhat exceptional, however.  
The Flint Journal published race-based classified advertisements for jobs and housing 
until the early 1960s.  In the summer of 1957, the Journal ran a want ad seeking a 
―YOUNG WOMAN (WHITE)—to operate Dairy Queen afternoon and evenings.  
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Experienced preferred, but not necessary.  Apply in person, 1013 E. Stewart.‖  Angered 
by the notice, which sought a white employee for a store in a black neighborhood, 
William Hardy, Jr., and C. F. Williams, director of the Flint Civic Organization, helped to 
organize a boycott of the Dairy Queen.  After a series of negotiations brokered by 
Williams and Glenora Roland, editor of the Bronze Reporter, the Wittakers quickly 
agreed to hire a black woman for the job.
23
  For Hardy, Williams, and other activists, the 
Dairy Queen affair demonstrated that civil rights activists could successfully challenge 
the color line in North End workplaces through selective buying and other consumer-
based strategies.     
 Following the 1957 boycott at Dairy Queen, activists in Flint set their sights on 
the downtown retail establishment.  In July 1958, members of the Flint NAACP‘s 
employment committee picketed in front of the Smith-Bridgman department store, the 
city‘s largest downtown retail establishment, for refusing to hire black workers in 
positions other than maintenance.  The Mott Foundation owned Smith-Bridgman, which 
maintained a well-deserved reputation for discrimination that lasted well into the 1960s.  
Frank Manley responded to the 1958 demonstration by spearheading the formation of the 
Flint Citizens‘ Study Group (FCSG), an informal, secretive organization that brought 
together leading members of the city‘s black and white communities.  Comprised of 
―people interested in helping develop better understanding and relationships in the 
community, with minority groups,‖ the FCSG convened once per month for quiet 
negotiation over workplace discrimination in downtown Flint.
24
  Because it emerged 
during the severe 1957-59 economic recession, when unemployment in the Vehicle City 
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reached its postwar peak, the FCSG also worked to create job retraining programs for 
unemployed black workers seeking new opportunities in the service sector.  ―What we‘re 
anxious to do,‖ Manley asserted, ―is something about training and retraining these people 
who are sitting around waiting to be called back to a job that will probably never exist 
again.‖
25
  Although job training and education were central components of the FCSG‘s 
program—and though its leaders sought change in a ―non-protest manner‖—the FCSG 
nonetheless defined itself as ―an action group, not just a discussion one.‖
26
   
The FCSG relied upon referrals from the Flint Urban League.  As in other cities, 
the Urban League maintained a long list of black job seekers, complete with 
recommendations and resumes, which it routinely submitted to Manley and other FCSG 
members.  After testing and interviewing candidates, white members of the FCSG quietly 
negotiated with employers on behalf of ―deserving‖ black applicants.  At the FCSG‘s 
June 17, 1959 meeting, Dr. Donald Swank, who administered the group‘s testing 
program, provided detailed descriptions of twelve black job applicants.  On behalf of 
Ellen Marie Burton, Swank authored the following report:  
BURTON, ELLEN MARIE—has good test results and recommendations, 
is excellent typist, attractive appearance, wants clerical or selling position.  
Recommendation: Dr. Swank will tell Miss Burton to see John Stout 
regarding possibly being employed at [J. C.] Penn[e]ys, after Dr. Swank 
has briefed Mr. Stout regarding the applicants [sic] qualifications.
27
   
 
If prospective applicants performed well on Dr. Swank‘s test and possessed strong 
recommendations, an ―attractive appearance,‖ and stellar qualifications, white members 
of the FCSG would negotiate with local employers on their behalf.             
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 Number of Negro 
Salesclerks 
Department Stores  
Herbert N. Bush, Inc. 0 
The Fair Store 0 
Federal Department Store 0 
King Clothing Company 0 
Mill End Stores 0 
J.C. Penney Company 0 
Sears-Roebuck Company 3 
Smith-Bridgman 0 
  
Five, Ten, and One Dollar Stores  







A.M. Davison 0 




Hardware and Housewares  
Hubbard‘s 0 
  
Ladies Stores  











Table 4.1.  Downtown employment figures.  The number of 
Negro sales clerks employed in downtown Flint during the 
1959 holiday shopping season. SOURCE: Richard A. English, 
Survey of the Number of Negroes Employed as Salesclerks in 
Flint during the 1959 Christmas Shopping Period (Flint: Urban 
League of Flint, Industrial Relations Department, 1960), 6. 
 
As an ―action group,‖ the FCSG failed miserably.  To test the efficacy of the 
FCSG‘s program, the Flint Urban League commissioned a survey of downtown 
employers during the 1959 Christmas shopping season.  After surveying twenty-six 
downtown retailers, Richard A. English found only eleven Negro sales clerks, all 
employed at just four establishments.  Notably, English found that Smith-Bridgman, the 
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target of the NAACP‘s 1958 protest, had still not hired any Negro clerks.
28
  The FCSG‘s 
policy of gradualism and private negotiation generated few employment opportunities for 
black workers.  Even for members of the Urban League, who had maintained a firm 
commitment to quiet, negotiated racial change, the pace of progress in the Vehicle City 
was depressingly slow.  In her preface to English‘s study, Edwyna Jones, the chair of the 
Flint Urban League‘s Vocational Services Committee, painted a pessimistic portrait of 
race relations in the Vehicle City: ―We must face the fact that Flint continues to progress 
feebly in the development of better race relations. . . .‖  ―Certainly,‖ she continued, this 
study points out that that ‗every man at his best job and for every job the best man‘ is at 
best a catchy phrase lost in a hodge podge of bias and bigotry.‖
29
  As black activists in 
postwar Flint discovered, however, the bias and bigotry that sustained the color line often 
operated beneath the radar, hidden within a pervasive embrace of equal opportunity and 
colorblindness.  
 
Jim Crow Must Go, GM Crow Must Go  
In or around 1964, an anonymous activist authored a short, untitled satirical play focusing 
on employment discrimination at General Motors.  Set on ―a day in January, 1964‖ at ―an 
eastern division of America‘s largest corporation,‖ the play features five actors: Mr. 
Smith, a personnel manager from GM; Mr. Bryant and Miss Fuller, Negro job applicants; 
Mr. Edward ―Ed‖ Thornton, a white job seeker; and Charlie, a Negro janitor.  The play 
opens in a GM employment office, where Miss Fuller, an applicant for a secretarial 
position, greets Mr. Smith beneath a sign reading, ―General Motors – An Equal 
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Opportunity Employer.‖  Miss Fuller, a graduate of Bryant and Stratton College with two 
years of secretarial experience, presents her application to Mr. Smith.  After reviewing 
her credentials, Mr. Smith concludes, ―There‘s no question that you have the 
qualifications, Miss Fuller, but we had in mind a much older person, with more 
experience.‖  After promising to keep her application on file, Mr. Smith thanks Miss 
Fuller for stopping by and bids her farewell.
30
   
 The next applicant, Mr. Bryant, arrives shortly after Miss Fuller‘s departure.  An 
experienced millwright with six years of experience, Mr. Bryant had responded to a 
recently published classified advertisement for a millwright‘s position at GM.  Though 
impressed by Mr. Bryant‘s credentials, Mr. Smith does not offer him the position.  ―After 
summing it up,‖ Mr. Smith announces, ―you are exceptional.‖  ―Unfortunately the 
millwright jobs have all been filled.  It just so happens that we have an opening in the 
foundry for an iron pourer.  The job‘s a little hot and dirty but being a healthy Negro, 
you‘ll be able to stand the heat.‖  Unemployed for over two years and desperate for 
income, Mr. Bryant has little choice but to accept the foundry position.  After thanking 
Mr. Smith for his offer, Mr. Bryant exits the stage. 
Following Mr. Bryant‘s departure, Mr. Thornton, a white job applicant, enters Mr. 
Smith‘s office.  After overhearing Mr. Bryant‘s interview, Mr. Thornton states, ―I was 
thinking of applying for a millwright position, but I‘ll accept a position in the foundry.‖  
Looking through Mr. Thornton‘s application, Mr. Smith responds, ―Wait a minute, Ed. . . 
. I see you worked in a paper factory for six months – unemployed for over three years – 
then you worked for Minute Car Wash approximately one year. . . .What‘s wrong with 
the job you have now?‖  ―The job only pays a dollar an hour,‖ Thornton responds.  ―A 
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Negro can live on small wages even with a large family.  I‘m not married but it takes 
more for me to live like a white person‘s accustomed to.‖  Persuaded by Mr. Thornton‘s 
explanation, Mr. Smith decides to offer Ed the millwright position: ―Ed, I can work it so 
that you can be placed in a millwright job.  Let‘s forget what happened here today.  This 
colored boy had a little experience but we like to hire white men for the skilled trades.‖ 
 As Mr. Thornton departs the scene, Charlie, a Negro janitor, enters Mr. Smith‘s 
office carrying a broom.  While Charlie sweeps the floor, Mr. Smith says, ―I hear that a 
bunch of agitators from out of town are stirring up trouble for the company.‖  Charlie 
responds, ―Are you referring to the demonstration at the Auto Show that the N-double A-
CP is planning?‖  ―Charlie,‖ Mr. Smith asks, ―when are you people going to wise up and 
stop this nonsense.‖  ―You know, as well as I do, that there are Negroes in all kinds of 
jobs around here.‖  ―Yes sir,‖ Charlie replies, ―but how many are there in the skilled 
trades and white-collar jobs?‖  Reassuringly, Mr. Smith answers, ―Things like this take 
time, Charlie.‖  ―Rome wasn‘t built in a day.‖  Frustrated by Mr. Smith‘s response, 
Charlie exclaims, ―But it‘s been over a hundred years now, sir.‖  ―Charlie,‖ Mr. Smith 
angrily asserts, ―did it ever occur to you that all this agitation isn‘t making the U.S. look 
too good to the rest of the world?‖  ―This country has done a lot for you people.  You 
ought to show a little more appreciation.‖  Stung by Mr. Smith‘s remarks, Charlie 
interjects, ―Sir, no one loves America more than Negro people.‖  After debating the issue 
for several minutes, Mr. Smith abruptly ends the discussion with the patronizing 
statement, ―O.K. Charlie.‖  As he prepares to exit the office, Mr. Smith reminds Charlie 
to empty all of the ashtrays in the office.  The scene concludes with Charlie sweeping the 
floor of the office. 
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 The origins of this play are a mystery.  There can be no way of knowing who 
wrote it, its exact setting, or whether actors ever performed it publicly.  Nevertheless, a 
copy of the script ultimately found its way into the hands of Edgar Holt, president of the 
Flint NAACP.  If Holt distributed the script among African Americans in Flint, then it 
surely resonated powerfully with individuals who had firsthand experience with GM‘s 
employment policies.  For although the play was fictional, it spoke volumes about the 
quotidian realities of Jim Crow within the world‘s largest corporation.  Even during the 
height of the civil rights era, as the play suggests, GM‘s black employees tended to work 
in either foundry or custodial positions.  In postwar Flint, GM often refused to hire black 
workers for skilled trades and managerial positions, regardless of their experience or 
qualifications.  Additionally, like the character Mr. Bryant, thousands of African 
Americans in the Vehicle City experienced bouts of long-term unemployment during the 
1950s and 1960s, even during periods of sustained economic expansion.  When asked to 
explain their employment policies, officials from General Motors rarely exhibited the 
same candor as Mr. Smith, however.  As indicated by the sign in Mr. Smith‘s office, by 
the 1960s GM officials in Flint and elsewhere had publicly embraced the principle of 
equal employment.  If challenged by activists such as Charlie, corporate spokespersons 
offered colorblind defenses of the segregated status quo.
31
   
GM officials are the primary targets of the play.  Nevertheless, the play conveys a 
subtler point about the racial politics of the UAW through the author‘s decision to omit 
organized labor.  Mr. Bryant and Miss Fuller surely understood the racial calculus behind 
Mr. Smith‘s decisions, yet neither of them sought protection from the union.  Indeed, the 
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playwright never even mentioned the UAW.  Though postwar observers often, and with 
good reason, ranked Walter Reuther and the UAW among the most consistent supporters 
of the black freedom struggle, activists in cities such as Flint understood the gaps 
between the formal policy positions of the UAW leadership and the day-to-day politics of 
its various locals.
32
  The gulf between the UAW‘s national and local policies on racial 
discrimination was especially wide in the Vehicle City.  Understanding labor‘s reluctance 
to challenge Jim Crow employment practices at the local level, black actors such as the 
fictional Charlie engaged in activism beyond the shop floor.  By picketing auto shows 
and dealerships, passing out leaflets, filing claims with the state civil rights commission, 
and organizing protest marches against workplace discrimination, activists in Flint and 
other cities brought the issue of employment to a wider audience outside of the factory 
gates.   
 Like the fictional Mr. Bryant, black workers in Genesee County faced many 
obstacles in their attempts to challenge employment discrimination at General Motors.  
Once inside the plants, those obstacles remained.  On the shop floor, struggles over civil 
rights often centered on the complex, often contentious relationships between black line 
workers, their supervisors, and UAW shop stewards.  During the 1950s and 1960s, 
supervisors from Plant 2 at Chevy in the Hole developed a nasty reputation for the 
harassment of black workers.  In March 1953, Raymond Walker, a shop steward from 
Plant 2, reported, ―Management of Plant 2 is trying to run their plant like a concentration 
camp.‖   
                                                 
32
 On Walter P. Reuther and the UAW‘s formal positions on civil rights, see Lichtenstein, The Most 
Dangerous Man in Detroit, passim; and Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, passim.  
See also, Reuther, ―Statement to the United States Commission on Civil Rights on ‗Equality of Job 
Opportunity and Civil Rights,‘‖ December 14, 1960, Beasley Papers, box 16, folder 15, GHCC. 
193 
 
All that is lacking is the electrically charged barbed wire.  They are using 
every tactic known to man, including a member of supervision over each 
employee with stop watches, pencils, and paper breathing down the men‘s 
necks; making catty remarks, threats, intimidations, reprimands and 
penalties using the most vile Jim Crow and discriminatory tactics.   
 
Nearly every day, as Walker noted, supervisors from Plant 2 invoked Shop Rule 29, a 
vague prohibition against ―restricting output,‖ to penalize black workers.  On March 24, 
1953, a supervisor from Plant 2 suspended Paul Kenny, a black honing worker, for 
restricting output.  Kenny received a three-day suspension as punishment for the offense.  
The following week, on March 30, managers penalized Kenny yet again for violating 
Rule 29, issuing an even harsher one-week suspension.  On both occasions, Walker 
confirmed that Kenny had produced a higher than average output for the day.  Kenny‘s 
case was not an isolated example of racial harassment, however.  As Walker noted in his 
report, ―there are dozens more of such cases that I for one could report.‖
33
                             
 A staunch defender of black workers, Raymond Walker was somewhat of an 
anomaly among shop committee representatives in Flint.  At plants throughout the region, 
black workers often accused UAW stewards and other union officials of ignoring racial 
discrimination on the shop floor.  In 1968, racial tensions flared again in Plant 2, when 
nine black workers filed a racial harassment claim with the state civil rights commission.  
One of the complainants, Clay Stuart, had received a disciplinary suspension for asking a 
white female co-worker what time she was going home.  Stuart and his colleagues also 
charged Plant 2 managers with a long list of civil rights violations that included 
disregarding the seniority rights of Negro workers, suspending black men for talking to 
white women, sexually harassing black female employees, and unfairly punishing black 
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employees for ―restricting output.‖  According to Stuart and his co-workers, UAW 
officials refused to address civil rights infractions.  ―Union representatives,‖ they 
claimed, ―show no interest in civil rights violations in the plant and are either reluctant to 
write grievances or compromise with management in cases of racial discrimination.‖  In 
her report on the case, Flint activist Olive Beasley, a local representative from the 
Michigan Civil Rights Commission, noted, ―Negro men have reached the end of their 
tolerance of the treatment they received.‖
34
             
Unable to find sympathetic union and corporate officials to mediate grievances, 
black workers often found themselves in direct confrontations with plant supervisors.  On 
January 3, 1956, black activist John Hightower came to blows with Terry Wilk, a white 
foreman at the Buick foundry.  Hightower, a member of the UAW‘s FEPC committee, 
routinely confronted Wilk, a man who had ―for weeks, subjected workers to vile 
language and harsh treatment.‖  Prior to the January confrontation, Wilk had called 
Hightower a ―nigger‖ on at least one occasion.  In response, Hightower filed a grievance.  
Yet after a three-month investigation, officials from Buick and the UAW found that there 
was not enough evidence to punish the foreman.  Remembering the initial incident, 
Hightower commented, ―I turned and went around the corner and cried and became 
emotional because I‘d just gotten out of the war and I said, ‗How could this person . . . be 
allowed to call me a nigger?‘‖
35
  On January 3, during another especially heated 
exchange, Wilk called Hightower a ―dirty, black, stinking nigger.‖  This time, however, 
Hightower took matters into his own hands, delivering a ―smashing right cross to the 
jaw‖ of his supervisor.  Years later, Hightower remembered the details of the 
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confrontation: ―I beat him severely. . . . I used to smoke a pear-witted pipe and I took my 
pipe out and I told him for the rest of your life here was a nigger you‘d never forget.‖  
Buick officials summarily fired both men as punishment for the incident.
36
  
The experiences of Paul Kenny, John Hightower, and other black workers at 
GM‘s Flint plants stood in stark contrast to the corporation‘s official proclamations on 
employment discrimination.  Throughout the postwar era, GM executives in Flint and 
Detroit openly endorsed the principle of equal employment opportunity.  In 1965, Harold 
S. McFarland, the director of personnel services at General Motors, published an article 
on GM‘s commitment to ―minority group‖ employment.  McFarland trumpeted GM‘s 
record of racial fairness and affirmed the corporation‘s willingness to abide by Title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which mandated nondiscrimination in employment.  
McFarland also pointed out that the automaker employed 44,000 ―nonwhites,‖ who 
accounted for nearly 10 percent of the company‘s domestic labor force.  Moreover, 
McFarland asserted that GM maintained a strong commitment to hiring more black 
supervisors and recruiting African Americans for positions in engineering, management, 
and other elite job classifications.
37
  For charitable observers of the automobile industry 
such as Herbert R. Northrup, Chairman of the Department of Industry at the University of 
Pennsylvania‘s Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, McFarland‘s article 
represented ―a good statement of General Motors policy by the staff official responsible 
for it.‖
38
  Yet among the corporation‘s black critics in Flint, GM‘s record did not warrant 
such high praise.   
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In 1964, just a year prior to the publication of McFarland‘s article, Herbert Hill, 
the NAACP‘s national labor secretary, organized sustained protests in fifty cities against 
employment discrimination at General Motors.  Although he had planned to inaugurate 
the national demonstrations with a May 4 rally in Detroit, Hill gave a special exemption 
to activists in Flint who wanted to organize earlier protests.  ―We had so many complaints 
[from Flint],‖ Hill explained, ―that we allowed them to demonstrate before May 4.‖
39
  On 
Saturday, April 25, 1964, Flint NAACP President Edgar Holt led picketers who rallied at 
the north side Buick plants and in front of GM‘s flagship Buick dealership in downtown 
Flint.  During the 1964 protests, where activists chanted ―Jim Crow Must Go, GM Crow 
Must Go,‖ Holt angrily denounced GM‘s record of employment discrimination:  ―GM 
like Rip Van Winkle has slept too long.  The world and events have passed them by.  Of 
course their machines are modern and pretty but their concern for humanity stinks worse 
than the manure of a thousand dinosaurs.‖  What GM executives needed, Holt asserted, 
was to ―open their doors and let freedom winds blow through.‖
40
   
 Edgar Holt‘s seething denunciation of GM Crow reflected the widespread 
frustrations of black workers in postwar Flint.  In the two decades between the close of 
World War II and the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, African Americans in Flint 
fought fierce battles against employment discrimination, segregation in automobile 
factories, and corporate divestment from the city.  Yet for Holt and other activists those 
battles seemed to bring few victories.  During the 1964 demonstrations against GM, Holt 
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and Sydney Finley, the national field secretary of the NAACP, held a joint press 
conference at which Finley reminded reporters of the lack of progress at GM: ―Eighty 
percent of the Negro workers employed by GM are either foundry workers, toilet 
attendants, window washers, or performing some other menial task.  We are cognizant of 
the facts of flagrant discriminatory practices.‖
41
  Although by the 1960s GM had a highly 
publicized policy of nondiscrimination, Finley and Holt pointed out that all of its plants 
and offices in Genesee County remained rigidly segregated.   
Perhaps more than any other facility in the region, the General Motors Institute of 
Technology symbolized the hardness and persistence of the Vehicle City‘s color lines.  
At GMI—which by 1966 had enrolled sixteen black students—many white faculty 
members and students vehemently resisted even token forms of desegregation.  During 
the early 1970s, some students and at least one faculty sponsor organized the Stoner‘s 
Society for the Preservation of White Supremacy, a group dedicated to expelling all black 
students and staff from the campus.  Stoner‘s Society members distributed insulting 
leaflets, issued death threats, and pressured the school‘s administrators to end their 
limited experiment with desegregation.  To dramatize their efforts, group members 
distributed a cartoon depicting a lynching and a ―Nigger Application for Employment,‖ 
which asked imaginary black applicants to name their ―motha‖ and ―fatha‖ if known, list 
the number of their children on welfare, and answer how many words they could ―jive‖ in 
one minute.
42
  Upon learning of the harassment, Holt approached GMI‘s administrators, 
who assured him of their commitment to nondiscrimination.  Yet at GMI and other 
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corporate facilities throughout the region, Holt discovered a startling reluctance among 
local executives to combat even such overt forms of discrimination and racial 
harassment.  Addressing the difficulties he encountered in communicating with GMI 
officials, plant managers, and executives, Holt wrote, ―Most of the times [sic] we do not 
get common courtesy.  We try without success to relay the corporation‘s policy of 
fairness and equal opportunity but they think this applies to Mars.‖
43
       
In 1966, an investigation by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission revealed how 
little progress ―non-white‖ workers in Flint had made at General Motors.  At Buick 
during that year, non-white workers represented 15 percent of the hourly-rated 
workforce.  Yet among Buick‘s 7,499 salaried and skilled-trades employees, non-white 
workers comprised only 1 percent of the total.  Of the 1,727 salaried and skilled-trades 
employees at Fisher Body 1, only twenty-one were nonwhite.  Moreover, as in Detroit 
and other cities, African Americans in Flint found it nearly impossible to secure 
apprentice positions at General Motors.  Throughout Genesee County, the company 
employed at least 359 apprentices, only three of whom were nonwhite.  According to the 
authors of the 1966 study, who found few reasons for optimism, ―the fact that General 
Motors has expressed its nondiscrimination policy in writing seems to have had little 
bearing on the effectiveness with which the policy has been applied, or on the extent to 
which Negroes have been employed or promoted.‖
44
  At times, the reasons offered by 
GM personnel managers who rejected black job seekers bordered on the absurd.  In 1977, 
for instance, Holt wrote a letter to Laurence Vickery, GM‘s director of employment 
practices, in which he complained about the extraordinary number of black job applicants 
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in Flint rejected for having ―UTE,‖ a mysterious disorder that reputedly caused ―curved 
backs.‖  ―The number of blacks rejected for employment because of curved backs is 
phenomenally high,‖ Holt asserted.  ―Yet these same people [who are rejected] are 
athletes, Marines, and acceptable to other GM plants.  The high number of blacks 
discharged for UTE is disgusting.‖
45
  Even in the 1970s, it seems, at least a few GM 
























White 14,380 2,200 9,050 4,000 5,617 4,500 2,601 42,348 
Non-
White 
2,219 700 1,050 800 825 500 499 6,593 
Salaried 
Employees 
White 4,449 568 2,686 690 913 919 620 10,845 
Non-
White 




White 3,050 180 1,197 549 814 699 1,327 7,816 
Non-
White 




148 75 49 59 25 356 
Non-
White 
2 0 0 1 0 3 
 
Table 4.2.  General Motors employment figures.  The number of white (W) and non-white (NW) employees in selected job categories 




During the era of mass suburbanization, the struggle for work-related civil rights in Flint 
necessarily took on a spatial dimension, bringing the racial politics of suburban 
development into the forefront of fair employment debates.  The struggle for employment 
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equity in Genesee County took place on the shop floor, at city hall, in boardrooms, on the 
streets, and in the courts.  Often, black workers such as John Hightower who experienced 
discrimination at work found that they had to circumvent shop stewards and other UAW 
officials.  In the absence of a municipal FEPC, many black workers took their claims to 
Olive Beasley, the Flint representative on the Michigan Civil Rights Commission.  
During the postwar era, Beasley and other MCRC field officers received hundreds of 
complaints from black employees and unemployed job seekers throughout the region.  
Significantly, many of the complaints that Beasley processed arrived from black workers 
who had experienced job discrimination in Flint‘s growing suburbs.  In May of 1966, for 
instance, Cynthia Higgins, one of only a handful of black employees at the Chevrolet 
National Parts Distribution office in suburban Swartz Creek, reported that her immediate 
supervisor, Don Stewart, had subjected her to threats, verbal abuse, and near ―continuous 
harassment.‖
46
  Several years later, in 1969, black workers at GM‘s Coldwater Road 
facility in Beecher formed an organization called ―Equality for All‖ to protest against 
employment discrimination and poor union representation.  Like workers in other GM 
facilities throughout the county, members of Equality for All charged GM officials with 
racial harassment, biased disciplinary actions, and employment discrimination, especially 
in the skilled-trades and white-collar sectors.  Led by Anna Jean Miles and Sam V. Cade, 
Equality for All members also charged officials from UAW Local 326 with ―unjust 
representation‖ and conspiracy to block promotions for black workers.
47
   
Among African-American activists in the Vehicle City, the daily battles for 
employment equity were intimately connected to broader struggles over fair housing, 
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deindustrialization, and metropolitan development.  During the postwar era, as black 
workers fought to gain a foothold in local industry, a combination of municipal growth 
strategies, Cold War defense initiatives, corporate expansion efforts, and federal housing 
policies hastened the suburbanization of capital and labor.  The postwar suburbanization 
of white homeowners, jobs, and industry created economic turmoil in Flint and produced 
a fundamental shift in metropolitan power relations in Genesee County.  As evidenced by 
the increased complaints filed against suburban employers, the spatial reorganization of 
capital and power in Genesee County also gave rise to new civil rights struggles over 
urban deindustrialization, municipal divestment, and suburban residential exclusions.  
Civil rights activists were not the only opponents of Flint‘s metropolitan growth machine, 
however.  By the close of the 1950s, the rapid but uneven growth of Flint‘s suburbs had 
produced a new political consciousness among white homeowners and suburban officials 
who sought independence from the central city and its problems. 




Suburban Strategies:  
Building Flint’s Industrial Garden 
 
 
In 1952, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed the president of General 
Motors, Charles E. Wilson, to the cabinet position of national defense secretary.  When 
asked during his senate confirmation hearing if he could envision making policy 
decisions that would adversely affect GM, Wilson uttered a famous reply that revealed 
the operating ethos of the world‘s most powerful industrial corporation.  "For years,‖ 
Wilson said, ―I thought that what was good for the country was good for General Motors 
and vice versa.  The difference [in interests] did not exist.‖
1
  Wilson viewed corporate 
and civic interests as one and the same.  Moreover, Wilson and his GM colleagues 
believed that economic growth—wherever, whenever, and however it sprouted—was 
good for the United States and its citizens.  Not unfairly, many Americans have since 
paraphrased Wilson‘s statement to read, ―What‘s good for GM is good for America.‖ 
Wilson‘s remarks provide an excellent context for viewing GM‘s postwar 
corporate expansion initiatives and the dramatic yet unexpected effects they had on plant 
cities such as Flint.  During and after World War II, GM executives devised an 
aggressive corporate growth strategy that centered on the spatial decentralization of 
automobile production.  By building new plants in rural and suburban areas, Wilson and 
other executives in Detroit and Flint hoped to reduce production costs and tap expansive 
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new markets for their cars and trucks.  As well, GM officials sought to take advantage of 
new federal and local subsidies designed to promote industrial and commercial expansion 
outside of central cities.  GM‘s suburban investment strategy had profound and 
unforeseen implications for the city of Flint.   
GM‘s suburban building campaign was part of a nationwide city-to-suburb 
migration of capital and labor that occurred during the postwar era.  In the 1940s and 
1950s, a combination of federal tax and defense initiatives, municipal growth policies, 
and corporate expansion strategies converged to drive the suburbanization of industry and 
retail in Genesee County.  Over the same period, local real estate investors, municipal 
and township officials, and administrators from the Federal Housing Administration 
oversaw the rapid development of modern land use plans, new utility services, and other 
infrastructural improvements in suburban Genesee County.  The modernization of Flint‘s 
suburbs triggered a prolonged housing boom in the segregated subdivisions of the out-
county.   
Local public policies played a decisive role in shaping the pace and trajectory of 
capital, labor, and population migrations.  Accepting Wilson‘s statement as a truism, 
Mayor George Algoe and other civic and political leaders in the Vehicle City believed 
that Flint‘s future depended upon the construction of new factories, residential 
subdivisions, and retail outlets, even if those new developments were located outside of 
the city‘s boundaries.  Flint‘s city commissioners subsidized the migrations of white 
homeowners and businesses by providing water and sewer lines to outlying plants, 
offering discounted utilities to suburban customers, and building new roads for long-
distance commuters.  As a general rule, GM‘s leaders, city commissioners, and other 
204 
 
members of Flint‘s pro-growth coalition embraced new housing developments and 
business growth wherever they took shape, viewing the city and its inner-most suburbs as 
part of an organic, metropolitan whole.  Not all of the county‘s residents endorsed the 
city‘s metropolitan growth strategy, however.  By the middle of the 1950s, cracks in the 
postwar growth consensus had begun to emerge on both sides of the color line. 
 
Suburban Strategies 
At mid-century, Flint‘s industrial garden of factories and neighborhoods was largely an 
urban phenomenon.  Prior to the Second World War, all of GM‘s major industrial 
facilities in Genesee County were inside the city of Flint, with most factories located 
adjacent to the city‘s rail lines and the Flint River.  During the mid-1920s, however, GM 
executives began shifting their investments towards the city‘s urban fringe.  In 1926, GM 
acquired the Fisher Body 1 plant via purchase, the company‘s fifth major industrial 
facility in Flint.  Sitting just north of the city‘s southern border with Burton Township, 
approximately three miles south of Flint‘s central business district, the Fisher Body 1 
plant was Flint‘s first GM factory situated on the city‘s urban-suburban fringe.
2
  In due 
time, more factories and people would follow.     
In 1940, officials from GM‘s AC Spark Plug division opened a second plant near 
the city‘s boundary line—a 156,000 square-foot facility on Dort Highway.  Located on 
the city‘s eastern border with Burton Township, the AC facility, complete with employee 
parking, air conditioning, locker and shower rooms, and other rare amenities was, in the 
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words of one observer, ―the most modern structure of its kind in the world.‖
3
  Although 
the new AC plant did not open until 1940, this and other pre-World War II capital 
migrations were many years in the making.  Dating back to the 1910s and 1920s, the 
Buick, AC Spark Plug, Chevrolet, and Fisher Body plants that dominated Flint‘s 
industrial landscape had very little room for expansion.
4
  Hoping to open up new land for 
industrial development, in 1920 the Flint City Planning Board created The City Plan of 
Flint, Michigan.  According to this master plan, ―All new industries and similar 
undertakings should, if possible, be located in the large tract east of the city now 
definitely acquired and designed for industrial purposes.‖
5
  The Flint City Planning 
Board—which created the industrial district later occupied by the AC facility—thus 
played a key role in driving the shift towards suburban manufacturing.  The 1920 plan did 
little, however, to free up new space in the city for factories.  By the close of the 1930s, 
the city‘s automobile plants were virtually landlocked, hemmed in on all sides by 
crowded working-class neighborhoods, roads, and shops.  Though both the Fisher Body 1 
plant and the new AC factory on Dort Highway were inside of Flint‘s city limits, GM‘s 
decision to operate plants on the city‘s urban fringe foreshadowed the company‘s postwar 
suburban strategy.  Still, however, until the close of the 1930s, automobile production in 
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Flint was an urban enterprise.  Indeed, in 1940, less than 3 percent of GM‘s Flint area 
workers labored outside of the city.
6
   
In the 1940s and 1950s, General Motors executives in Flint rethought their prewar 
strategy of industrial urbanism.  During World War II and its aftermath, the American 
automobile industry and the industrial geographies of its plant cities underwent dramatic 
transformations.  In the months following the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, automobile 
executives across the nation halted the production of vehicles for the civilian market, 
shifting their focus from automobile manufacturing to the production of guns, bombs, and 
other materiel.  Initially, GM executives were reluctant to convert their facilities to 
government uses.  By the close of the war, however, GM workers had delivered over $12 
billion worth of defense materials to the federal government.
7
  In wartime Flint, 
autoworkers from GM‘s Buick, AC Spark Plug, Fisher, and Chevrolet divisions produced 
aircraft engines, machine guns, tanks, gun and bomb sights, armored cars, and a host of 
additional military items.  Taking advantage of the city‘s highly skilled workforce and its 
well-developed industrial infrastructure, the federal government invested heavily in the 
economy of metropolitan Flint.  Between 1942 and 1945, federal officials ordered the 
construction of two defense plants in suburban Genesee County.  The first, a large plant 
located in south suburban Grand Blanc, produced Sherman tanks for the U.S. Army, 
while the second, located within Flint‘s sprawling Buick complex, produced aluminum 
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for the war effort.
8
  By the mid-1950s, GM‘s Grand Blanc tank facility—redesigned 
following the war as a metal stamping plant—employed three thousand workers who 
produced parts for Fisher Body.  During the Korean War, GM executives and federal 
officials oversaw the construction of two new suburban factories devoted to the 
production of jet engines.  The largest of these, a massive, two million square-foot plant 
in suburban Beecher, just north of the city, employed nearly seven thousand workers.  At 
the close of the Korean War in 1953, with federal demands for jet engines lagging, GM 
acquired the Beecher plant and converted it to an automotive hardware facility managed 
by the company‘s Ternstedt division.
9
  By the end of the year, GM executives had 
purchased all of the government‘s major defense plants in Genesee County and resumed 
a full vehicle production schedule for the consumer market.  Beginning with the new 
defense plants constructed in the 1940s and 1950s, GM executives affirmed their desire 
to decentralize automobile production in Genesee County.  
Massive federal investments allowed the Vehicle City‘s economy to prosper 
during World War II.  Nevertheless, Genesee County‘s postwar economic boom did not 
truly begin until the end of the 1940s.  Between 1945 and 1948—and, to a lesser extent, 
then again in the mid-1950s following the Korean War mobilization—GM officials in 
Flint and other plant cities worked feverishly to modernize the company‘s plant 
infrastructure and resume the mass production of automobiles for the civilian market.  By 
1948, GM had returned to prewar levels of car and truck production and sat poised to 
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capitalize on the pent up transportation demands of millions of American consumers.  
During the war mobilization, with no new cars and trucks available to replace the 
nation‘s aging stock of vehicles, the number of privately owned automobiles in the 
United States dropped from thirty million to twenty-two million.  ―Of the twenty-two 
million,‖ reported a writer for Fortune magazine, 50 percent are 10 years old.‖
10
  By the 
close of the war in 1945, consumer demand for automobiles had reached unprecedented 
levels.  Well aware of the prospect of huge sales, in 1945 GM Chairman Alfred P. Sloan 
announced plans to spend $500 million on a postwar reconversion and expansion 
program.
11
  After seven years of limited production, Sloan‘s plans first bore fruit in 1949, 
when GM produced 2,800,000 vehicles and earned $656 million, at the time the largest 
profit ever recorded by an American corporation.
12
  Between 1946 and 1955, GM 
executives invested a total of $3 billion on new construction, plant modernization, and 
other capital improvements, and the company‘s net annual sales mushroomed five-fold to 
over $10 billion.
13
         
As GM‘s primary North American production hub, the Flint metropolitan area 
received a substantial portion of the corporation‘s postwar investments.
14
  Between 1940 
and 1960, GM executives coordinated major expansions at nearly all of the region‘s 
existing plants and ordered the new construction of eight major industrial facilities in 
metropolitan Flint.  Over the same period, GM‘s countywide employment rose to nearly 
eighty thousand.  As one former Buick employee remembered nostalgically, ―The money 
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  During the 1940s and 1950s, hardly a month went by without the 
Flint Journal reporting on one or another of GM‘s expansion projects in Genesee 
County.
16
  Local executives earmarked substantial funds for the development of GM‘s 
suburban plant infrastructure.  By 1955, GM had converted its Beecher aircraft engine 
and Grand Blanc tank facilities to civilian production.  In 1956, AC Spark Plug 
executives announced a major 225,000 square foot addition to their parts plant on Dort 
Highway.  With the new addition, GM‘s east side AC facilities crossed the border 
between Flint and suburban Burton Township.
17
  One year later, Chevrolet relocated its 
service and parts distribution warehouse from Chevy in the Hole to the suburb of 
Otterburn—later absorbed by the municipal incorporation of Swartz Creek—ten miles 
southwest of downtown Flint.
18
  GM‘s most significant postwar capital investments, 
however, took place in southwest suburban Flint Township, where the company‘s 
Chevrolet division constructed an ultramodern manufacturing, assembly, and corporate 
office complex. 
 GM‘s Flint Township facilities, located near the intersection of Van Slyke and 
Bristol Roads just south of the city, were the showpieces of its postwar construction 
campaign.  The Van Slyke complex first took shape in 1947, when GM‘s Chevrolet 
division opened, under one roof, a dual-purpose body manufacturing and assembly plant.  
Equipped with a stunning array of modern conveniences, the two-in-one plant was a 
source of great civic pride.  In an article commemorating the opening of the new 
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facilities, a Flint Journal reporter provided a detailed description of the many amenities 
available to workers at the Van Slyke complex:  
Employee comfort and convenience has been given unusual attention in 
the design of the new Chevrolet-Fisher Body assembly plant at Van Slyke 
and Atherton Roads. . . . At the new plant the employee may park in a 
paved lot, enter the plant via a special employee entrance and descend to 
the basement of the assembly building without crossing any street or 
highway.  In the employee locker room, steel lockers are assigned to each 
individual.  Twelve wash fountains are available, as well as two tiled 
shower rooms.  Opposite the locker room is the employee cafeteria, 
seating 800 and providing facilities for hot meals as well as a snack bar.  
Kitchen equipment is of the finest.  Complete medical facilities in the 
well-appointed hospital include a short wave machine, special baths for 




To celebrate the opening of the new 1,100,000 square foot Flint Township factory, 
Chevrolet general manager M. E. Coyle sponsored a parade in downtown Flint.  At the 
celebration, over fifty thousand spectators, many of them children, lined the street and 
―engaged in a mad scramble for the 20,000 pieces of bubble gum and 20,000 balloons 
tossed by clowns from the sides of two gaily decorated trucks that preceded the parade.‖  
Shortly after the complex opened, a Flint Journal reporter remarked upon the collective 
good will generated by GM‘s new suburban plants, writing, ―Addition of this new 
General Motors unit has opened up many new jobs, and Flint turned out in larger 
numbers to demonstrate its gratitude that this community was selected as the site of the 
assembly plant.‖
20
  Significantly, very few Flint residents seemed to notice, or care for 
that matter, that GM‘s new plants were outside of the city.  
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Nevertheless, the opening of the new suburban plants marked an important spatial 
shift in the local economy.  Prior to 1947, Chevrolet workers manufactured automobile 
bodies and conducted final assembly operations at Flint‘s densely-packed Chevy in the 
Hole complex.  After shifting operations to the Van Slyke plant in Flint Township, Coyle 
announced plans to terminate body production and assembly work at Chevy in the Hole.  
Six years later, in 1953, Chevrolet opened a third plant at the Van Slyke Road site.  
Originally designed as an aircraft engine facility, the third plant ultimately produced 
GM‘s popular V-8 engines.  Shortly after opening the V-8 engine complex, GM opened a 
fourth plant—a stamping and frame manufacturing facility—at the Van Slyke 
compound.
21
  As with the body manufacturing and assembly plants, Chevrolet‘s new, 
highly automated engine and stamping facilities replaced older, more labor intensive 
plants from the city‘s Chevy in the Hole complex.  In a 1954 speech to the Flint Industrial 
Executives Club, Chevrolet general manager T. H. Keating reflected triumphantly on 
GM‘s new suburban plants, claiming, ―Flint is the fastest-growing center in the 
automobile industry and shows the way when big things are doing in America.‖
22
   
Coyle, Keating, and other GM boosters consistently failed to acknowledge the 
fact that virtually all of GM‘s major postwar construction initiatives in Genesee County 
occurred in suburban areas such as Flint Township.  Yet city officials in Flint could not 
tax these new plants directly.  The new suburban facilities contributed only indirectly—
via jobs, wages, and other means—to the city‘s tax base.  Nevertheless, Keating spoke 
truthfully when he identified the Flint region as the fastest growing automotive center in 
the United States.  By the close of the 1950s, GM employed nearly twenty-one thousand 
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workers in its new suburban facilities.  In Flint Township alone, GM spent $78 million on 
its postwar construction campaign and, by 1960, employed twelve thousand workers in 
its Van Slyke and Bristol Road plants.
23
  Increasingly, automobile production in the 
Vehicle City was becoming a suburban vocation.     
 
―Love Your Neighbor‖:  
Public Policies, Corporate Strategies, and Suburban Development 
 
Urban land shortages played a critical role in shaping GM‘s suburban strategy.  In 
describing the criteria that the company used for postwar plant construction, Frederick G. 
Tykle, the director of GM‘s Argonaut Real Estate division, explained the urban land 
limitations that helped to drive the suburbanization of automobile production: ―First of 
all, when we plan a new plant we look for a site of 250 or 300 acres.  That automatically 
puts us more or less out in the country.  There are no such sites left in cities.‖
24
  Though 
urban land shortages were a key factor in the suburbanization of auto manufacturing, a 
complex combination of corporate production interests and public policies drove GM‘s 
shift towards the urban fringe.
25
  Cheap land, the growth of automobile markets outside 
of cities, lower suburban tax rates, federal subsidies for industrial decentralization, UAW 
demands for large employee parking lots, readily available city services in the suburbs, 
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and convenient freeway access via Interstate 75 all shaped the suburbanization of the auto 
industry in Genesee County.
26
   
Federal defense policies played a major role in the postwar suburbanization of 
industry.  During the late 1940s, as concerns mounted about the possibility of an atomic 
attack against the United States, federal officials advocated a policy of industrial 
decentralization.  In 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed into law the National 
Security Resources Act, legislation designed to foster ―the strategic relocation of 
industries, services, government and economic activities.‖
27
  ―Since there is no known 
defense against the atomic bomb itself except space,‖ a 1951 federal report concluded, 
―dispersion is one of the first considerations for strategic safety of industrial facilities.‖
28
  
In order to speed the dispersion of industry, federal officials offered a variety of tax and 
loan incentives to General Motors and other defense contractors.  As a prerequisite to 
receiving federal construction loans from the defense department, manufacturers had to 
demonstrate that their facilities were distant enough from central cities to render them 
safe in the event of a nuclear attack.  For smaller urban areas such as Flint, federal 
guidelines stipulated that fifteen miles from the city center constituted appropriate 
dispersion.  Yet officials from the defense department generally allowed manufacturers 
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sole discretion over site selection, a loophole that allowed GM to construct most of its 
suburban Genesee County plants well within the fifteen-mile perimeter.
29
  Consequently, 
most GM workers who commuted to work in suburban Genesee County did not have 
very far to travel.  
 Beyond Cold War defense legislation, federal taxation and procurement policies 
also served to hasten the suburbanization of manufacturing.  In 1950, members of the 
United States Congress voted to amend the federal taxation code to allow defense 
contractors to deduct up to 100 percent of their capital expenditures on newly constructed 
facilities.  To qualify for the government‘s accelerated tax amortization plan, eligible 
plants had to be located outside of urban centers.  According to historian Margaret Pugh 
O‘Mara, ―Within six months of the establishment of this new program, over $4 billion 
worth of tax amortization had been awarded to U.S. firms.‖
30
  As one of the nation‘s 
primary defense contractors, General Motors was a major recipient of this largesse.   
Three years after legislators approved the accelerated tax amortization plan, the 
Congress dealt another severe blow to northern industrial cities such as Flint.  Shortly 
after taking office, President Eisenhower signed the Maybank Amendment to the 1953 
Defense Appropriations Bill.  Sponsored by Burnet R. Maybank, a powerful Democratic 
senator from South Carolina, the 1953 amendment helped to reshape the spatial 
organization of the American defense industry by requiring the government to purchase 
all of its defense materials at the lowest possible price.  In the years following the 
Maybank Amendment‘s passage, employers in high-wage, heavily unionized cities such 
as Flint found it virtually impossible to compete with low-wage, non-union firms in the 
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Sunbelt as well as suburban and rural employers nationwide.  Consequently, between 
1951 and 1984 the number of prime defense contracts per capita awarded to Michigan 
firms declined by approximately 75 percent.  By 1983, the state of Michigan, once known 
as an ―arsenal of democracy‖ during World War II, had slipped to thirty-sixth in the 
nation in defense production.
31
 
 During the postwar era, federal incentives for industrial dispersal dovetailed 
seamlessly with the GM‘s long-range plans to decentralize automobile production.  In 
their 1945 annual report to stockholders, GM officials unveiled plans to construct a 
nationwide network of branch assembly plants.  ―A better geographical distribution of 
assembly plants,‖ the report explained, ―provides for more efficient operations and makes 
possible better service to dealers and to the consuming public.‖
32
  Several years later, in 
their 1948 annual report, GM executives elaborated on their desire to move from 
centralized economies of scale to more efficient, decentralized economies of place: 
Greater efficiency in manufacturing and distribution, leading to lower 
costs and better products for customers, is a major objective of General 
Motors.  Wherever possible, operations are decentralized with 
manufacturing plants in areas convenient to sources of material supply and 
manpower, and assembly plants in the vicinity of the principal markets for 
General Motors products.
33
   
 
Corporate executives were especially interested in eliminating the high cost of shipping 
assembled vehicles to their far-flung network of dealerships.  The economic calculus 
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behind GM‘s strategy was simple.  While a standard rail container could hold only four 
fully assembled automobiles, that same container could contain twelve partially 
assembled vehicles.
34
  In 1965, the cost of shipping a fully assembled vehicle from Flint 
to cities on the Pacific Coast was approximately $270 per unit.  For GM executives, the 
construction of new assembly plants scattered throughout the nation—and, increasingly, 
the world—was significantly more profitable than concentrating production facilities in 
the state of Michigan.  As GM Executive Vice President M. E. Coyle explained, ―We 
have found that an area consumption of 400 cars and trucks daily for 200 days per year 
justified an assembly plant.  This insured an annual volume of 80,000 units.‖
35
   
Between 1945 and 1955, GM aggressively pursued its decentralization strategy, 
opening new assembly plants in California, Georgia, Texas, Delaware, and 
Massachusetts.  The dispersal of automobile assembly work had significant consequences 
for Michigan‘s economy.  From 1950 to 1961, Michigan‘s share of the nation‘s 
automobile industry employment dropped sharply from 56 to 40 percent.
36
  Moreover, the 
decentralization of automobile assembly operations caused a ripple effect in which 
suppliers also sought out new plants closer to branch assembly facilities.  In a 1959 
forecast of the auto industry‘s future, economic analyst Neil Hurley issued a prescient 
statement on the dim future of automobile production in Michigan: ―Although it will be 
decades before the primacy of Michigan as the nation‘s auto state will be seriously 
challenged, there seems little doubt that Michigan is losing its historic position of 
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  Workers in the city of Flint, GM‘s North American production hub, stood 
to lose more than their counterparts in virtually any other city in the United States.      
 Many rank-and-file workers and UAW leaders viewed GM‘s policy of 
decentralization as part of a broader ―southern strategy,‖ a pernicious plan to increase 
profits by shifting automobile production away from the high-wage, pro-union cities of 
the North to the South and West, where wages were lower and trade unions weakest.  
According to the authors of a 1987 study on postwar industrial location policies, the quest 
for a cheap, pliant labor force drove GM‘s southward capital migrations: ―In the US, 
General Motors adopted a ‗southern strategy‘ soon after the Second World War by 
diverting investment to states where the power base of the United Auto Workers was 
non-existent.‖
38
  Though GM‘s board chairperson Thomas A. Murphy denied having a 
southern strategy, labeling it a ―ridiculous‖ accusation, he nonetheless found it difficult to 
dispute the UAW's charges.
39
  Of the five new branch assembly plants that GM 
constructed between 1945 and 1955, all but one were located in either the South or West.  
During the 1970s, GM‘s migration toward the Sunbelt intensified.  Just between 1973 
and 1980, General Motors opened thirteen new facilities in the South—four in 
Mississippi, three in Louisiana, two in Georgia, and one each in Virginia, Texas, 
Oklahoma, and Alabama.
40
  Nevertheless, the ―southern strategy‖ framework obscures an 
even greater truth about GM‘s postwar building strategy—namely, that virtually all of the 
corporation‘s postwar domestic investments occurred either in rural areas or within the 
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racially segregated suburbs of large cities.  Of the thirteen facilities GM constructed in 
the South during the 1970s, only one was located inside of a major city.  A national 
phenomenon, the postwar shift of industrial resources from cities to suburbs and rural 
areas was even more pronounced than the Rust Belt to Sunbelt capital migrations.  The 
suburbanization of automobile work in Genesee County was a case in point.  
 A variety of political, economic, and social forces drove the suburbanization of 
auto work in the United States.  Chief among them, however, were local public policies.  
Only a few scholars have addressed the subject of capital decentralization from a local 
perspective, but municipal public policies were the sine qua non of GM‘s suburban 
strategy in Genesee County.  In order to operate their suburban facilities, GM plant 
managers required large quantities of water, sanitary sewers, police and fire protection, 
and other municipal services generally unavailable in Flint‘s underdeveloped suburbs.  
Between 1945 and 1960, as GM shifted its capital investments towards the suburban 
fringe, corporate officials pressed city commissioners to extend water and sewer lines to 
their suburban plants.  During the 1940s and early 1950s, the Flint City Commission had 
no formal rules on providing water and sewer service to suburban homes and businesses.  
Lacking a clear policy, city commissioners reviewed all petitions for water and sewer 
―hookups‖ on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.
41
  Over the objections of many UAW-CIO 
officials who opposed corporate subsidies, city commissioners approved water and sewer 
connections for all of GM‘s major suburban facilities.
42
  Commissioner Carl Delling and 
others who approved of the hookups argued that GM‘s new suburban plants, regardless of 
                                                 
41
 See Flint Journal, October 11, 1949. 
42
 On UAW-CIO opposition to the commission‘s policies, see, for instance, Searchlight, April 17, 1952; 
and AC Sparkler, October 29, 1953.   
219 
 
their location, stimulated the local economy and provided jobs for Flint residents.
43
  Like 
other growth-minded citizens, Delling viewed the city from a metropolitan perspective.   
The city commission‘s willingness to subsidize GM‘s suburban plants was a 
source of controversy in postwar Flint.  Even prior to building its suburban plants, 
General Motors used well over half of the city‘s annual water supply.  The decision to 
grant water and sewer hookups to GM‘s new suburban plants threatened to deplete the 
city‘s water resources and overburden its waste treatment facilities.  According to Flint‘s 
public works and utilities director Ted Moss, a consistent opponent of the commission‘s 
policies, the city simply did not have the capacity to provide services to GM‘s suburban 
plants.  In May 1953, under severe pressure from city engineers and UAW-CIO activists, 
the Flint City Commission abandoned its earlier ad hoc policy and formally denied water 
and sewer services to suburban customers.  Nevertheless, GM officials consistently won 
special exemptions for city services from sympathetic commissioners.
44
  By 1961, 
General Motors executives had persuaded the city commission to extend water and sewer 
lines to seven of its suburban complexes.  Although they were few in number, critics of 
the commission‘s policies loudly denounced the city‘s pro-suburban utilities policies, 
arguing that they only helped to speed the flight of industry from Flint.  As City 
Commissioner Robert Egan lamented in 1957, costly suburban water and sewer 
extensions only helped to ―send the plants away from Flint.‖
45
  In April 1952, after city 
commissioners voted to provide water and sewer lines to one of Chevrolet‘s new plants 
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on Van Slyke Road, Robert Clark, the director of Flint‘s CIO political action committee, 
denounced the city‘s pro-business policy:  
In taking this action the city fathers are completing the cycle and it now 
appears that General Motors plants outside the city are going to enjoy all 
of the major services rendered by the city, including fire and police 
protection; water and sewage disposal—everything except the doubtful 
privilege of paying city taxes.
46
   
 
Beyond providing water and sewer services to suburban plants, the city 
commission also subsidized GM‘s suburban development campaign by maintaining a 
stratified rate structure for water customers.  Unlike Seattle, New York City, Chicago, 
and other major cities where customers purchased water at a uniform per cubic foot rate, 
the city of Flint maintained a complicated three-tier plan with separate rates assigned to 
residential, commercial, and industrial users.  Residential customers purchased water at a 
rate of thirty-two cents per one hundred cubic feet of water for up to 10,500 cubic feet.  
By contrast, industrial customers obtained their water at the rate of twenty cents per 
hundred cubic feet for all water in excess of 105,000 cubic feet.  The city‘s rate policy, 
which rewarded the largest consumers of water, constituted a large subsidy for local 
industrialists.  Between September 1959 and January 1960, for instance, industrial 
customers used 53.7 percent of Flint‘s water output but paid only 37.2 percent of the 
city‘s water revenue.  Over the same duration, residential customers contributed 51.9 
percent of the city‘s water revenue while using only 34.5 percent of the total water 
purchased.  Although the city charged suburban water customers a special premium for 
service, the commission‘s discounts for industry offset the higher costs that GM and other 
suburban industrial consumers paid.  For Temple Dorr of the Taxpayer‘s Protective 
League, the city‘s ―love your neighbor‖ policy towards GM and other industrial water 
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customers in the city and suburbs constituted an unnecessary burden for the residents of 
Flint.  ―We, of our organization, believe that we should love our neighbor,‖ Dorr 
conceded.  ―But I don‘t think we should love our neighbor to the extent that if his house 
needs a coat of paint that we buy the paint and put it on, too.  And that‘s just what we‘re 
doing on this water and sewer problem.‖
47
  Corporate officials and other defenders of the 
city‘s utility policies countered critics such as Dorr by pointing to GM‘s commitment to 
the region and the company‘s role in generating growth for the Flint area economy.  ―We 
have to live here,‖ Commissioner Craig asserted, ―and without GM Flint wouldn‘t exist.‖  
―I‘ve made a wonderful living here,‖ he added, ―and I think most of us have and we can 
thank the industry that has provided that.  I don‘t believe in taxing or throwing them out 
of business.‖
48
  Municipal subsidies for suburban growth, GM boosters asserted, 
benefited the entire region.              
Between 1945 and 1960, a combination of public policies and corporate strategies 
converged to bring unprecedented economic development to suburban Genesee County.  
Embracing growth wherever it occurred, city officials and civic leaders in the Vehicle 
City issued an avalanche of postwar tributes and salutes to the industrial achievements of 
General Motors.  In 1954, on the eve of GM‘s Golden Carnival celebration, Flint Mayor 
George Algoe described the special bond between Flint and GM: ―The City of Flint . . . is 
proud, justifiably so, to be the birthplace of GM, and it is appreciative, deeply so, for 
what GM has meant to the City. . . . As a good neighbor, GM‘s record in Flint is truly 
memorable.‖
49
  Four years later, Flint citizens celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the 
founding of General Motors.  During the celebration, local author Clarence Young 
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reflected effusively on the seemingly unlimited opportunities that GM had made 
available to city residents: ―Flint, 1958—a good place and time to be alive. . . . A better 
place and time?  There never was one. . . . General Motors . . . stands today the proof, the 
source, the root of infinite opportunity, here, now, in Flint.‖
50
  Looking back upon GM‘s 
meteoric twentieth-century rise to industrial supremacy, a feat made possible only by the 
enduring partnerships between corporate executives, Flint city officials, and ordinary 
citizens, Clarence Young and other 1950s Vehicle City boosters believed that they had 
many reasons to celebrate.  They applauded all of GM‘s plants, even those outside of the 
city, because they viewed Flint through a broader spatial lens and rejected distinctions 
between the Vehicle City and its suburbs. 
Without either annexation or some form of metropolitan government, the 
distinctions between the city and its suburbs mattered greatly, however.  For many 
residents, the 1950s civic tributes to GM masked an important and frightening reality that 
few in the city seemed willing to acknowledge.  Specifically, Temple Dorr and other 
local critics believed that GM‘s postwar suburban building strategy marked the initial 
phase of the deindustrialization of Flint.  Dorr and other skeptics had many reasons to 
make such claims.  Of the eight new industrial complexes opened by GM in Genesee 
County between 1940 and 1960, none was located within Flint's municipal boundaries.  
Further, in many instances, the jobs created by GM‘s suburban construction campaign 
were not new, but rather they replaced existing jobs performed by workers in the city‘s 
aging turn-of-the-century plants.  In 1969, Charles Minshall, a surveyor from the Battelle 
Memorial Institute, described what appeared to him as a new economic paradigm for 
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Genesee County in which corporate expansion no longer guaranteed commensurate job 
growth:  
Major expansion is already occurring in General Motors activities in 
Genesee County without comparable increases in employment.  For 
example, between 1957 and 1967, General Motors‘ employment in 
Genesee County increased 3.2 percent.  Yet during this time, Chevrolet, 
Buick, and Fisher Body all carried out large expansions. . . . Automobile 
production may be expanded without a corresponding increase in 
employment.
51
   
 
In a number of cases, GM‘s postwar expansions actually coincided with sharp declines in 
employment, primarily due to automation.  At the North End Buick plants, for instance, 
the number of hourly-rated employees dropped from 27,500 to 10,000 between 1955 and 
1961.
52
  Likewise, from 1955 to 1960, employment at AC Spark Plug declined from 
12,000 to 9,100.
53
  During a 1963 meeting of the Flint City Commission, City Manager 
Thomas Kay acknowledged the growing trend towards automation and urban job losses:  
Fewer and fewer men are now producing more and more automobiles and, 
as the job supply in our basic industry dwindles, our population continues 
to increase.  From a high of 87,000 manufacturing jobs in this area in 1955 
we have dropped to barely 70,000 and this trend will continue.
54
   
 
To thousands of workers at Chevy in the Hole, Buick, Fisher Body, and other General 
Motors facilities in Flint, the company‘s suburban strategy seemed to amount to a zero-
sum spatial game in which ―new,‖ highly automated suburban jobs came at the expense 
of ―obsolete‖ urban jobs.
55
  Most urban and suburban historians have accepted the 
validity of such critiques, framing the postwar era as an epoch in which corporations 
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quietly abandoned central cities.
56
  In reality, however, the situation in Genesee County 
was much more complex.        
General Motors was the largest employer in postwar Genesee County.  As such, 
its suburban strategy played a decisive role in reshaping metropolitan employment and 
residential patterns.  Between 1940 and 1957, the proportion of GM‘s local employees 
working in the suburbs increased from 8 to 33 percent.
57
  The suburbanization of auto 
work was part of a much broader postwar shift towards industrial, residential, and 
commercial decentralization that transformed the spatial arrangement of capital and 
power in metropolitan Flint.  From 1940 to 1955, the proportion of Genesee County‘s 
non-GM industrial plants located in the city of Flint declined from 94 to 74.3 percent.  
Over the same time, the number of non-GM industrial plants in the four suburban 
townships surrounding the city increased from seven to 119.  ―Industrial development is 
increasing disproportionately in the areas beyond the city limits,‖ one researcher 
concluded, ―which means that taxable wealth is being added more rapidly in the fringe 
than in the city.‖
58
  Outside of Flint Township, the county‘s largest beneficiary of new 
industrial growth, the urbanized suburbs of Swartz Creek, Beecher, Fenton, and Grand 
Blanc—along with the townships of Mundy, Grand Blanc, and Burton—gained 
substantially from the suburbanization of manufacturing.  By the close of the 1960s, 
Burton Township could claim a portion of GM‘s AC Spark Plug plant on Dort Highway, 
Genesee Cement Products, Atlas Concrete Pipe, Moore‘s Iron Works, Dort 
Manufacturing, Mead Containers, and the General Foundry Corporation.  In south 
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suburban Fenton, where local Chamber of Commerce officials embarrassed their Flint 
counterparts by creating the county‘s first industrial development committee, tool and die 
manufacturing and aircraft engine finishing operations grew rapidly during the postwar 
era.
59
  In Fenton and other high-growth suburban areas, the flourishing of highway-
oriented industrial parks played an important role in the growth of manufacturing.  By the 
early 1980s, the county was home to fifteen industrial parks, but only three of them were 
in the city of Flint.
60
  Throughout the metropolitan area, the exodus of capital from Flint 
brought newfound wealth and power to previously impoverished municipalities and 
townships in suburban Genesee County.  In Flint Township, for instance, the opening of 
GM‘s $78 million Van Slyke Road complex brought a financial windfall to the Carman 
school district.  By 1960, GM‘s Chevrolet division paid 80 percent of Carman‘s school 
taxes, and the district could boast of a per pupil property tax valuation that doubled the 
city of Flint‘s.
61
   
Just as manufacturers migrated from the city to the suburbs after World War II, so 
too did retailers and service professionals depart from Flint‘s downtown and 
neighborhood shopping districts.  Occupying a narrow, one-mile long sliver of land 
centered on Saginaw Street south of the Flint River, Flint‘s central business district was 
the retailing and services hub of mid-Michigan prior to World War II.  Anchored by 
major chain stores such as Sears, J. C. Penney, Smith-Bridgman, Woolworth, and Kresge, 
Flint‘s downtown shopping district was also home to scores of locally owned restaurants, 
offices, taverns, clothiers, furniture warehouses, hardware outlets, and grocery stores.  
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Though the city‘s downtown retailing district maintained its market dominance over its 
neighborhood and suburban competitors throughout the 1950s, the postwar era brought 
the first signs of distress to Saginaw Street.  In 1930, Flint‘s central business district 
accounted for over 15 percent of the city‘s total property valuation.  Between 1930 and 
1951, however, the downtown‘s share of the city‘s overall property valuation declined to 
10 percent.
62
   
As downtown merchants lost business to suburban and neighborhood rivals, the 
number of retail and office establishments on Saginaw Street began a long, steep decline.  
From 1948 to 1954, the number of retail stores operating in the central business district 
decreased by thirty, a drop of 6 percent.
63
  In 1958, there were five movie theaters in 
downtown Flint, but by 1963, that number had dropped to three.  Over the same duration, 
the number of grocery stores in the Saginaw Street shopping district declined by over 5 
percent.  In total, between 1958 and 1963 the number of retail shops in downtown Flint 
dropped from 464 to 383, a dip of over 17.5 percent.
64
  More significant, perhaps, was the 
sharp postwar decline in downtown-based health services.  Between 1940 and 1950, the 
number of general medical practitioners in downtown Flint dropped by 21 percent while 
the number of surgeons practicing in the central business district declined by 10 
percent.
65
  During the 1940s and 1950s, downtown merchants and professionals 
increasingly eyed the suburbs for new development, hoping to tap into expansive new 
markets for their products and services.          
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The Rise of Suburban Homeownership 
The post-World War II decentralization of factories and retail outlets occurred coevally 
with a dramatic increase in Flint‘s suburban population.  In 1930, just over a quarter of 
Genesee County‘s 211,641 residents lived outside of Flint.  During the 1930s, that 
proportion increased to a third.  Between 1940 and 1960, however, the population of 
suburban Flint exploded, rising from 76,401 to 177,373.  By 1960, nearly 60 percent of 
the county‘s 374,313 residents lived outside of the Vehicle City.
66
  As stores and factories 
migrated from the city to outlying areas, thousands of white families sought out homes 
and neighborhoods in suburban Flint, where they could live closer to their workplaces, 
friends and family, and new shopping centers.  Likewise, the growth of Genesee 
County‘s residential suburbs encouraged local manufacturers and shopkeepers to open 
new branch plants and retail outlets closer to profitable suburban markets.  In Flint and 
other central cities, the suburbanization of capital and labor were mutually reinforcing 
processes.   
The demographic shifts that occurred in Flint were part of a nationwide mass 
migration from cities to suburbs that accelerated during the second half of the twentieth 
century.  At mid-century, only a small fraction of Americans, approximately 25 percent 
in all, lived in suburban areas.  By 1990, however, a stable majority of Americans—and a 
sizable majority of Genesee County residents—lived in suburbs.
67
  The mass exodus 
from cities to suburbs was one of the most significant and consequential spatial, political, 
and cultural migrations in American history.  Suburbia, according to historian Kenneth 
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Jackson, was not only a ―planning type,‖ but also a ―state of mind‖ deeply rooted in 
American culture.  During the nineteenth century, prominent intellectuals and planners 
such as Andrew Jackson Downing, Catherine Beecher, and Frederick Law Olmsted 
championed private homes, large residential lots, verdant landscapes, and semirural 
living arrangements.
68
  Following in that tradition, millions of twentieth-century 
Americans embraced single-family homes, automobile ownership, and the virtues of 
―country living‖ near urban job centers.  During a 1949 panel discussion on suburban 
growth in Genesee County, social scientists from the University of Michigan attributed 
Flint‘s increasingly decentralized patterns of development to a restless, ―pioneering 
spirit‖ among Americans.  ―The pioneering spirit, the same attitude which caused people 
to move to Michigan from New York generations ago, is the chief cause for Flint persons 
moving outside the City limits,‖ the panelists claimed.
69
  Mass suburbanization was not 
simply a manifestation of cultural ideals, however; nor was it the inevitable outcome of 
new transportation technologies, free markets, and Americans‘ love for open space, 
ranch-style homes, and bucolic landscapes.   
In Flint, as in other metropolitan regions, the rise of the suburbs depended upon 
political interventions into the market economy.  Over the course of the postwar era, the 
FHA exerted a dramatic influence on the residential real estate and home construction 
industries.  Through its offer of mortgage insurance to qualified buyers and lenders, the 
FHA induced private banks to grant millions of long-term, low-interest, fully amortized 
mortgages on new and existing homes.  Not all Americans benefited equally from FHA 
investments, however.  Believing that African Americans exerted a detrimental effect on 
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property values and neighborhood stability, appraisers and underwriters from the FHA, 
with few exceptions, refused to guarantee mortgages in racially integrated areas and 
withheld mortgage insurance from most black buyers.  Moreover, FHA guidelines on 
minimum lot and home sizes, construction standards, ―noxious influences,‖ and 
―neighborhood appeal‖ privileged low-density, primarily residential suburbs over high-
density, mixed-use urban areas.
70
  
Crowded, ethnically and racially diverse city neighborhoods, according to FHA‘s 
explicitly anti-urban and pro-segregation standards, were intrinsically less desirable than 
all-white suburban subdivisions with large lots and new single-family homes.  
Nevertheless, federal mortgage insurance policies did not reward all low-density 
residential suburbs with new investment.  The FHA withheld mortgage insurance from 
outlying ―rurban‖ areas that possessed inadequate civic, social, and commercial centers, 
poor utility services, insufficient transportation networks, and overcrowded schools.  
Though few scholars have written about the relationship between federal mortgage 
insurance policies and the development of suburban infrastructure, the FHA‘s utility and 
service stipulations decisively influenced the uneven patterns of development that 
occurred in postwar Genesee County.  In suburban Flint, FHA requirements on 
infrastructure and services exerted a strong influence on home sales figures, investment 
decisions, and building patterns.  Specifically, FHA standards required suburbs to meet 
minimum governmental, service, and utility requirements as a prerequisite to receiving 
federal mortgage subsidies.  At the close of World War II, however, only three urbanized 
suburbs satisfied the FHA‘s infrastructure requirements.  Consequently, Flint‘s federally 
sponsored building efforts during the 1930s and 1940s centered on fully serviced, all-
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white urban neighborhoods located just inside of the city limits.  During the postwar era, 
suburban officials in Genesee County developed new zoning and building codes, built 
new roads and schools, and worked to provide water and sewer services in their efforts to 
improve living conditions and secure new private and public investment dollars.   
Modernizing Flint‘s suburbs and making them attractive to investors was no easy 
challenge.  Between 1900 and 1950, Flint was the eleventh fastest-growing city in the 
United States.  This rapid population growth, fueled almost entirely by GM‘s seemingly 
insatiable need for new workers, quickly spilled over the city‘s borders.  Because the city 
grew so quickly during the early twentieth century, new suburban settlements tended to 
emerge in a chaotic and haphazard spatial progression.  In his 1916 essay on Flint‘s 
unplanned development, journalist John Ihlder painted a depressing portrait of sprawling 
development patterns and poor housing options in the Vehicle City.  While touring Flint 
and its suburbs, Ihlder found ―a family of seven in a two-room shack on the river 
bottoms, a family of five in one inside room of a down town block, three shifts in a Polish 
lodging-house in the North End,‖ and other egregious examples of dilapidation and 
overcrowding.  Ihlder also uncovered widespread land speculation in Flint.  During the 
1910s and 1920s, thousands of land speculators descended upon the city, hoping to earn a 
profit from the area‘s untapped—and largely unregulated—real estate market.  
Exaggerating only slightly, Ihlder wrote, ―In Flint there are two great industries, the 
manufacture of automobiles and the selling of land.‖  Throughout the city and its 
immediate suburbs of Genesee, Mt. Morris, Flint, and Burton Townships, speculators and 
developers purchased farms and large tracts of vacant land and hastily subdivided them 
into individual residential lots.  By 1924, speculators had subdivided land far in excess of 
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demand, leaving fifty-three thousand vacant, subdivided residential lots available for 
purchase in the Flint area.
71
  According to Ernest M. Fisher‘s 1928 study of land use 
patterns in nine urban areas, Flint had nearly twice as many lots per person as cities such 
as Cleveland and contained ―a generally high ratio of lots to population – certainly many 
more than could be expected to have structures erected on them in the foreseeable 
future.‖
72
  Although unscrupulous builders and land brokers operated in both the city and 
the suburbs during this period, Ihlder found that suburban developers were especially 
unprincipled.  Inside the city, most speculators refused to sell lots less than thirty-five feet 
wide, and they usually attached deed restrictions to real estate contracts that required 
builders to construct homes worth no less than $600.  Often those deed restrictions 
required landowners to exclude African Americans.  While most suburban developers 
also insisted on strict racial restrictions, speculators who owned land outside of the city 
did not typically require minimum lot sizes or building standards.  Because the suburban 
townships surrounding Flint possessed neither building nor zoning codes, real estate 
speculators operated there with impunity.  While visiting Genesee County, Ihlder noted 
the existence of many ―tarpaper shacks‖ and other suburban shantytowns where 
developers ―divided [plats] into smaller and smaller lots which are sold without 
restriction for $1 down and 50 cents a week.‖
73
     
 Land developers and real estate speculators were especially active in and around 
Flint during the boom years preceding the Great Depression.  Speculators carefully 
monitored the auto industry and acted quickly when GM executives and other local 
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investors unveiled plans for new plants and other development initiatives.  In July 1922, 
Billy Durant—by then ousted from GM and serving as the head of Durant Motors—
announced plans to build a new automobile plant on Flint‘s southern border with Burton 
Township.  Durant‘s new factory, later purchased by GM and reopened as the Fisher 
Body 1 plant, unleashed a speculative frenzy among landowners and investors in South 
Flint and suburban Burton Township.  In August 1922, on the same day that Durant 
attended a groundbreaking ceremony for the new plant, county officials recorded the plat 
for Baker Park, a new subdivision located just south of the plant in Burton Township.  
Baker Park consisted of sixty-eight commercial lots and nearly eight hundred home sites.  
Within two months, Thomas M. Wheat had surveyed and filed the plat for Dixieland, a 
subdivision of four hundred residential lots just east of Fisher 1.  By the close of 1922, 
surveyors and developers had platted four additional subdivisions—Baker Park No. 1, 
Bendlecrest, Newcombe Place, and Webber Place—in the area surrounding the Fisher 1 
plant.
74
  ―In a little more than four months time,‖ surveying scholar Donald G. Richards 
observed, ―some 3000 home sites and nearly 300 commercial lots had been created and 
the factory was not even operating yet.‖
75
  In interwar Flint, the booming residential real 
estate market in the suburbs was intimately connected to industrial expansions.       
After surveying and subdividing the land, developers sold individual plots to 
those who sought to build new homes.  During the 1920s speculative boom, well over 
half of the purchasers of suburban lots were either semi-skilled or unskilled workers, 
most of whom found employment at General Motors.  Many of these migrants could not 
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afford to hire professional builders to erect homes on their new lots.  Prior to World War 
II, self-building was thus an extremely common practice in suburban Flint.  To cite one 
example, a 1949 study estimated that between 25 and 40 percent of the homes in Burton 
Township were owner-built structures.  In north suburban Genesee Township and several 
other sections of the out-county, self-built homes comprised well over half of the overall 
housing stock well into the 1950s.
76
  Upon purchasing their lots, self-building suburban 
homesteaders typically erected their houses in stages, working in the evenings, on 
weekends, and during the annual summer layoff from GM.  Initially, many of these 
migrants constructed garages, barns, tarpaper-covered huts, and other temporary 
structures to live in until their homes were ready for occupancy.  In 1915, for instance, 
nearly 10 percent of the residential construction permits issued in the city of Flint were 
for barns, garages, and other temporary living quarters.  Although most townships in 
Genesee County did not maintain adequate records of residential construction, Ihlder and 
other observers during the 1910s and 1920s still noted a significantly higher frequency of 
garage homes and other self-built structures in suburban Flint.
77
   
Historian Becky Nicolaides, in her study of the Los Angeles suburb of Southgate, 
found that suburban self-builders often took a great deal of pride in their newly built 
homes.
78
  In suburban Flint, many self-builders no doubt felt the same way.  
Nevertheless, the structures erected during the interwar era tended to be small, sparsely 
furnished, and ill equipped for modern conveniences such as indoor plumbing and 
electricity.
79
  Describing the 1920s conditions in South Flint and Burton Township, 
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Donald Richards wrote, ―Infrastructure was built only after a sufficient number of homes 
had been erected to warrant construction.‖  ―Until then,‖ he continued, ―the lot owners 
made due with a rutted path that served as a street.‖  ―Their toilet was a humble 
outbuilding at the rear of the site; their water supply was drawn from the ground by a 
well.‖
80
        
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Flint‘s rapid growth 
produced a ripple effect in the local real estate market.  As shortages of safe and 
affordable housing emerged, residents competed with one another to find whatever 
homes they could.  ―There are few [housing] standards,‖ Ihlder acknowledged, and ―each 
[migrant] gets what he can.‖
81
  Driven by high consumer demands, real estate costs 
soared dramatically during the interwar decades, even for substandard homes and lots.  
Under these conditions, tens of thousands of Flint residents sought out small plots of land 
in suburban Flint, where land was inexpensive, taxes low, and building regulations 
minimal.
82
  Between 1910 and 1930, Flint‘s rough-hewn suburbs grew steadily as white 
migrants erected self-built homes, barns, and garages in fields and newly platted 
subdivisions just beyond the city limits.  During that period, Flint‘s suburban population 
increased from 26,005 to 55,149.  Most suburban migrants did not move more than a few 
miles from the city limits.  Of the over fifty thousand residents who lived in suburban 
Genesee County in 1930, nearly half resided in the townships of Burton, Flint, Genesee, 
and Mt. Morris, which formed a contiguous border around the city.     
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Flint‘s suburban migration intensified as the Great Depression unfolded.  Unable 
to afford the cost of living in Flint, thousands of idled autoworkers left the area 
altogether, many of them returning to their birthplaces in Arkansas, Tennessee, Missouri, 
and Kentucky.  Others, however, left behind their homes, rooming houses, and 
apartments in the city for new plots of undeveloped land in the suburbs.  The city of 
Flint‘s total population declined by five thousand during the course of the decade.  By 
contrast, Flint‘s suburbs gained over twenty thousand new residents over the same period.  
Like those who settled before them, many of Genesee County‘s Depression-era 
homesteaders built homes for themselves, cultivated gardens, and practiced other forms 
of self-provisioning to make ends meet during the prolonged economic downturn of the 
1930s.
83
   
 By the early 1930s, local and federal housing officials had taken notice of the 
migratory patterns of unemployed autoworkers and the harsh living conditions that 
existed in huge swaths of suburban Flint.  Upon receiving the results of the 1934 Civil 
Works Administration survey of housing, city building inspector Peter J. Weidner 
bemoaned the fact that Flint was surrounded with ―shanty towns,‖ ―garage houses,‖ and 
other ―blighted areas.‖  ―Because there are no building regulations outside of the City,‖ 
Weidner claimed, ―people build any old way.‖  ―Fire hazards, health measures and 
permanent values are ignored.  The result is shack towns and sub-standard housing.‖  
CWA surveyors counted 1,417 garage homes in Flint alone.  Though the CWA surveyors 
did not list the number of temporary homes outside of the city, thousands of garage 
houses and shacks also dotted Genesee County‘s suburban landscape during the 
Depression.  Beyond enabling the spread of disease, juvenile delinquency and ―immoral‖ 
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conduct, shack homes, in Weidner‘s opinion, ―lower the value of surrounding properties 
and stand in the way of a logical residential development.‖  Beginning in the 1930s, 
Weidner and other city and suburban officials joined federal housing administrators in 
waging a campaign against suburban blight and the ―horse-and-buggy‖ structure of 
government in the townships.
84
  
 During the Depression, housing conditions worsened dramatically in cities, 
suburbs, and rural areas throughout the United States.  The Federal Housing 
Administration‘s strategies for improving housing and revitalizing the nation‘s real estate 
industry hinged on mitigating risk factors associated with the real estate market.  By 
insuring lenders against home loan defaults, federal housing administrators hoped to 
induce bankers to issue more mortgages for new and existing homes.  The FHA also 
sought to stabilize real estate markets and maintain high property values by standardizing 
deed restrictions, building codes, municipal services, and zoning practices.  Before 
insuring mortgages, FHA administrators and local lenders measured the credit worthiness 
of applicants and surveyed homes and neighborhoods to determine whether a loan was a 
safe investment.  Under the FHA‘s rules, sound mortgage investments were those ―which 
could be effective for the best part of a generation.‖
85
  According to both FHA and 
locally devised standards, racially integrated areas in the city were unsafe places for 
home loans.  Consequently, the FHA ―redlined‖ all-black and integrated neighborhoods 
such as Floral Park and St. John Street.  However, lenders and federal officials also 
redlined many suburban neighborhoods that lacked building and zoning codes, utility 
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services, and other modern amenities.  During the 1930s and 1940s, FHA-backed 
building efforts thus centered on Woodlawn Park, Woodcroft Estates, Brookside, and 
other all-white neighborhoods inside the city that had access to water and sewer services, 
strict building and deed restrictions, zoning codes, and other modern services and 
amenities that sustained both racial segregation and high property values. 
 Areas such as Woodlawn Park and other elite neighborhoods in the city scored 
very highly under the FHA‘s rating schema.  Intensive building in these areas helped to 
push home construction figures in Flint to unprecedented levels during the immediate 
postwar era.  In 1932, city officials granted permits for only twelve new residential 
structures.  By 1950, that number had grown to over two thousand.
86
  Most 
neighborhoods in the city and the urban-suburban fringe did not fare as well as 
Woodlawn Park, however.  Inside the city, the FHA found few neighborhoods that 
qualified for federally insured mortgages.  In 1940, city planner Edmund N. Bacon 
published a study that explained why even all-white neighborhoods in Flint fared poorly 
under the FHA‘s property appraisal standards.  During the 1930s, there was no shortage 
of land available for home construction in Flint.  Using data from the CWA survey, 
Bacon found that there were 28,526 subdivided vacant residential lots in the city.  These 
lots covered over three thousand acres within the city limits and accounted for nearly half 
of the subdivided lots in Flint.  According to Bacon, however, ―at least 80% of these 
vacant lots lie in the peripheral belt where the houses are in the poorest condition.‖  
Though they were inside of the city and often serviced by municipal utilities, lots in the 
city‘s outermost neighborhoods were too close to ―inferior houses‖ that detracted from 
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property values.  ―By the principles of good business, expressed by the FHA, as well as 
sound common sense,‖ Bacon concluded, ―it would be poor judgment to pour good 
money for new construction into the bottomless pit of a blighted neighborhood.‖  ―This 
insecurity of neighborhoods, resulting from scattered development and rapid spread of 
blight, is one of several factors that makes mortgage lending in Flint a high-risk 




In 1951, Tom Dinell, a researcher from the University of Michigan, published a 
study that affirmed many of Bacon‘s findings.  Dinell‘s work focused on the FHA‘s 
influence on local building practices in and around Flint.  Like Bacon, Dinell found that 
Flint had a surplus of vacant, subdivided lots suitable for new home construction.  In 
1947, Flint contained 61,973 residential lots, nearly 40 percent of which were still vacant.  
The majority of the twenty-four thousand available residential lots had been subdivided 
during the speculative boom of the 1910s and 1920s.  Only a small portion of these lots 
met the qualifications for FHA-backed mortgages, however.  Less than 10 percent of 
Flint‘s vacant residential lots—2,226 parcels in all—were located in neighborhoods that 
the FHA rated as either ―excellent‖ or ―good.‖  Conversely, over 80 percent of the city‘s 
available residential lots were in either ―poor‖ or ―reject‖ areas.  Moreover, the FHA 
excluded an additional 6 percent of the city‘s vacant lots from mortgage insurance 
because they were situated in or near ―special‖ districts inhabited by Negroes.  By the 
early 1950s, the FHA and local lenders had thus redlined over 90 percent of the vacant, 
construction-ready properties inside the city.
88
 
                                                 
87
 Bacon, ―A Diagnosis and Suggested Treatment,‖ 79-81.  
88
 Dinell, The Influences of Federal, State, and Local Legislation, 60-75. 
239 
 
 City of Flint 
Burton, Flint, 





1930 360 827 552 1,739 
1931 122 119 79 320 
1932 12 150 100 262 
1933 13 68 45 126 
1934 20 143 95 258 
1935 68 225 150 443 
1936 261 302 201 764 
1937 257 585 390 1,232 
1938 138 437 291 866 
1939 439 739 493 1,671 
1940 629 543 362 1,534 
1941 720 753 502 1,975 
1942 250 389 259 898 
1943 356 115 77 548 
1944 301 152 101 554 
1945 243 181 121 545 
1946 705 739 493 1,937 
1947 875 876 584 2,335 
1948 658 679 453 1,790 
1949 978 538 359 1,875 
1950 2,015 775 525 3,315 
1951 1,035 667 450 2,152 
1952 1,400 700 475 2,575 
TOTAL 11, 855 10,702 7,157 29,714 
 
Table 5.1.  Residential dwellings constructed in the Flint metropolitan area, 1930-1952.  SOURCE: Federal 
Housing Administration, ―An Analysis of the Flint, Michigan SMA (Genesee County) as of January 1953,‖ 




The FHA redlined these vacant properties for a variety of reasons.  Some of the 
ineligible properties did not yet have utility services available, while others received low 
grades because they sat on small lots or were too close to dilapidated homes, factories, or 
commercial strips.  As well, local and federal underwriters ruled that nearly fifteen 
hundred of the city‘s vacant properties were ineligible for mortgage insurance because 
they were near structures inhabited by black people.  Though FHA policies helped to 
trigger a building boom in the city‘s most exclusive all-white neighborhoods during the 
1930s and 1940s, real estate developers quickly exhausted the number of federally 
approved lots in Flint.  Indeed, by the start of the 1950s, there remained only a handful of 
lots in the city that qualified for FHA mortgages.  ―High standards set by the Federal 
Housing Administration,‖ a Flint Journal article concluded, ―have cut considerably the 
number of acceptable lots within the City.
89
 
Prior to the 1950s, most of Flint‘s suburbs also failed to meet the FHA‘s exacting 
standards.  Lenders and federal underwriters looked favorably upon the racial 
composition of the suburbs, and they also endorsed the single-family, owner-occupied, 
large-lot homes that predominated outside of the city.  Nevertheless, suburban Flint 
contained thousands of ramshackle homes that lacked sewers, fresh water, and electricity.  
Moreover, mortgage underwriters and neighborhood surveyors looked askance at the 
sprawling, disorganized nature of development in the out-county.  During the 1930s and 
1940s, suburban ―slums‖ and shantytowns drew as much, if not more, attention from 
local and federal housing officials as impoverished, predominantly black urban 
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neighborhoods.  Even in carefully restricted suburban subdivisions that contained 
professionally built homes and middle-class occupants, the close proximity of ―shack 
towns‖ exerted a negative influence on property values and residential security grades.   
 
Weeds in the Garden 
Suburban slums and unplanned development in the out-county drew heavy criticism from 
social commentators, researchers, and members of the urban planning establishment.  
During the 1910s, John Ihlder expressed consternation over land speculation and the 
disorganized developments that had sprouted in suburban Flint.  Likewise, Depression-
era observers such as Edmund Bacon bemoaned the unregulated, self-built shacks that 
blighted the landscape of Flint‘s innermost suburbs.  During the 1930s and 1940s, social 
scientists and housing officials in Flint viewed ―spreaditis‖ and decentralized suburban 
developments as urgent problems to be solved through sound planning and other forms of 
government regulation.   
Yet those planners suffered many defeats during the first half of the century.  In 
1946, researcher Walter Firey published a study on land use patterns and social life in the 
suburbs of Genesee County.  In his report, Firey asserted that unplanned development 
had resulted in an ―unorderly and wasteful use of land.‖  ―All around Flint,‖ he wrote, 
―there are hundreds of acres that stand idle.   
Billboards notifying of ‗Lots for Sale—$1 Down, $1 a Week,‘ street signs 
that have no streets, sidewalks that have no houses, great expanses of land 
grown up to weeds, squatters living in tents and trailers—these are the 
tangible symbols of what has resulted from unguided settlement in the 




In sharp contrast to those who idealized postwar suburbs, Firey and other researchers 
documented substandard living arrangements in neighborhoods throughout the out-
county.  Quoting from a social service case report, Firey described one especially 
egregious instance in which a family of eight lived in a ―single room paper shack‖ just 
north of the city: 
The condition of the living quarters occupied by this family is almost 
indescribable.  The room is set on the rear of the lot and the outside paper 
covering flaps in the wind.  Outside some boards have been converted into 
a shed where a pig is kept.  Inside there are two beds and a cot which serve 
as sleeping quarters for the group.  There is a large heating stove and a 
rather good cooking stove, but the chimneys lead into open holes in the 
roof where the rain pours in during wet spells. . . . Bedding on the beds is 
stiff with dirt and the whole room carries a disagreeable odor.  Water is 
not available for a distance of three blocks and the family have no car. 
 
While Firey admitted that the case report described ―the extremity of blight‖ that existed 
in Genesee County, thousands of suburban families lived under similarly harsh 
conditions.
90
        
Prior to 1950, Flint‘s suburbs were disproportionately occupied by unskilled 
workers, the unemployed, subsistence farmers, and other low-income groups.  By the 
close of the 1940s, well over 50 percent of Flint‘s suburban residents were either semi-
skilled or unskilled factory workers.  The harsh living conditions that predominated in 
many outlying areas were a reflection of the broader class demography of suburban Flint.  
In 1940, over half of the homes in the suburban fringe had no running water, while nearly 
three-quarters lacked indoor toilets.
91
  Firey included detailed descriptions of several 
working-class subdivisions in suburban Flint in his 1946 report.  These accounts provide 
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an intimate glimpse of the living conditions and land use patterns that predominated in 
suburban Flint at the close of World War II.   
The first two neighborhoods that Firey described were the Fentonlawn and 
Romayne Heights subdivisions in south suburban Flint.  Located in Flint Township just 
to the south and west of the Fisher Body 1 plant, the contiguous areas of Fentonlawn and 
Romayne Heights—platted out of farmland in 1927 and 1929, respectively—were all-
white, working-class subdivisions.  The two neighborhoods consisted of small, cheap lots 
with a heavy concentration of inexpensive homes, many of them owner-built structures.  
Because many of the residents of Fentonlawn and Romayne Heights had migrated to the 
Vehicle City from the lower Mississippi valley, Flint citizens often referred to the area 
derisively as ―Little Missouri.‖  Fentonlawn and Romayne Heights, like other working-
class subdivisions in suburban Flint, experienced high turnover rates due to the 
vicissitudes of the local economy.  When GM sales boomed, the neighborhood quickly 
filled with migrants in search of work.  During economic downturns and the annual 
summer layoff, however, the neighborhoods emptied rapidly as workers sought out new 
employment opportunities.  Like their Depression-era forebears, a sizable number of 
residents in Fentonlawn and Romayne Heights kept livestock and engaged in subsistence 
gardening to help feed their families.  When Firey interviewed members of the 
community in 1945, residents complained of ―congestion in the neighborhood, of the lack 
of running water, and of the small lots.‖  While most residents appreciated the affordable 
housing available in their neighborhoods and enjoyed living close to the city, many 
others, especially long-term occupants, criticized the transient nature of the community 
and the dilapidated homes that lowered property values.  There were, for instance, three 
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large trailer camps near Fentonlawn and Romayne Heights that housed an ever-changing 
assortment of migrant laborers, many of them single men.  The trailers, according to 
many residents, detracted from the quality of life and home sales prices.
92
                               
Firey chose to write about Fentonlawn and Romayne Heights because they 
typified the conditions that existed in many other working-class neighborhoods.  At mid-
century, there were dozens of working-class and migrant neighborhoods surrounding the 
city.  Nevertheless, each suburban neighborhood possessed its own social dynamics and 
operated under its own particular set of development rules.  To illustrate this fact, Firey 
also studied the suburban neighborhoods of Dayton Heights and Thornton.  Situated 
immediately west of the Flint city limits in Flint Township, Dayton Heights and Thornton 
took shape in the early 1920s, when developers subdivided the Michael Lavelle and Mary 
Stockdale estates.  As in Fentonlawn and Romayne Heights, GM workers predominated 
in the two all-white neighborhoods.  Nineteen of the thirty residents that Firey 
interviewed worked as either shop operatives or laborers.  Unlike Fentonlawn and 
Romayne Heights, however, the Thornton and Dayton Heights subdivisions featured 
several deed and land use restrictions.  In Dayton Heights, builders could construct no 
homes worth less than $3,000.  Homeowners in Thornton had to abide by a much more 
modest $600 minimum for new dwellings.  Despite these rules, Firey found a wide range 
of structures in each neighborhood and noted that ―restrictions have not always been 
effective.‖  In fact, Firey discovered ―a number of two-room houses, basement houses, 
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and even tents‖ in Dayton Heights and Thornton, ―all of which testify to some degree of 
blight in the neighborhood.‖
93
   
Beyond their qualms about housing standards, residents of Dayton Heights and 
Thornton also complained about poor utilities, unpaved roads, and the lack of public 
transportation available to community members.  ―On the other hand,‖ Firey observed, 
―the residents speak with satisfaction of the fresh air, open yards, low taxes, and the 
possibilities of finding security on their small acreages.‖  Open yards were especially 
important to residents of Dayton-Thornton because many homeowners looked to the land 
to provide security during economic downturns.  ―That‘s one of the reasons we came 
here,‖ claimed one resident.  ―My wife and I talked it over and we figured that when I get 
laid off we‘ll have something to live on. . . . I‘ve planted some trees and some berries and 
we‘ve got a hundred chickens.  We‘re counting on this after I lose my job.‖  Economic 
uncertainty was a harsh fact of life in Flint‘s working-class suburbs.
94
   
 Not all of Flint‘s mid-century suburbs were dominated by shop workers, however.  
Firey and other postwar observers also found many middle-class enclaves in suburban 
Flint.  The final two subdivisions described in Firey‘s report, Suburban Homesites and 
Witham Place, were located in Burton Township, straddling Lapeer Road just east of 
Flint‘s city limits.  Suburban Homesites and Witham Place were relatively exclusive 
subdivisions that housed primarily managers and professionals.  Of the twenty-three 
residents that Firey interviewed, thirteen were employed as professionals, managers, 
business owners, or clerks.  Only two of the residents Firey met were shop workers.  The 
housing stocks in Witham Place and Suburban Homesites consisted of ―substantial 
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homes, some of them even costly,‖ and the neighborhoods were carefully restricted by 
race and class.  Deed and building restrictions in Witham Place prohibited garage homes, 
tarpaper roofs, dog kennels, billboards, and all non-residential structures.  In Suburban 
Homesites, property covenants forbade business establishments, dwellings costing less 
than $3,000, multiple dwellings on single lots, and billboards.  Both subdivisions also 
barred property owners from selling homes and lots to ―non-Caucasian‖ persons.  Like 
residents of Thornton and Dayton Heights, homeowners in the Witham Place and 
Suburban Homesites subdivisions enjoyed fresh air, open space, and gardening.  Yet the 
―gentleman farmers‖ who lived in Witham-Suburban Homesites engaged in gardening 
more for pleasure than out of necessity.  ―We‘ve had more fun experimenting with 
different things [in our garden], and it‘s given us health and satisfaction,‖ one resident 
claimed.
95
   
Most residents of the Witham Place and Suburban Homesites subdivisions 
seemed to enjoy their new surroundings in suburban Flint.  Yet these middle-class 
suburbanites still expressed many misgivings about suburban living.  Some residents, 
especially homemakers, indicated that they felt isolated from friends and families living 
in Flint.  Others complained that their homes were too distant from grocery stores, movie 
theaters, and other consumer and cultural attractions in the city.  As well, many 
homeowners in Suburban Homesites-Witham expressed fears over the unplanned 
developments that had sprouted near their subdivisions.  In particular, residents worried 
about the possibility of shoddily constructed homes and unrestricted neighborhoods 
detracting from their property values and quality of life.  Neighborhoods such as 
Suburban Homesites and Witham Place, in Firey‘s estimation, were ―an asset to the 
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whole community.‖  ―But, in the absence of zoning by which lower-investment land uses 
might be kept out,‖ Firey warned, ―such neighborhoods have all too frequently been 
invaded by tiny dwellings, service stations, and roadside stands.‖  Even carefully 
restricted neighborhoods such as Witham Place and Suburban Homesites were not 
immune to the encroachment of blighting influences: 
A common phenomenon is for one side of a street to be platted and built 
up as a high-class residential district, protected by deed restrictions as to 
land use and type of building.  Then a shrewd land developer will plat out 
the opposite side of the street, unload the lots at prices that are only 
possible because of the value of the adjoining neighborhood but which are 
still far less than they should be in order to maintain a high type of 
residential use.  These lots may be sold without restrictions as to use and 
occupancy, and before long the insidious blight of shacks puts in its 
appearance.  Property values depreciate all around, stable residents desert 
the neighborhood, and physical deterioration sets in. 
 
The specter of blight was an ever-present concern among suburban homeowners, even in 
completely segregated areas.
96
   
When Walter Firey ventured out into the neighborhoods surrounding Flint, he 
uncovered a diverse suburban landscape that included new subdivisions with stately 
homes, urbanized working-class neighborhoods with small lots and self-built structures, 
and isolated squatter camps that housed migrant workers.  ―The area surrounding Flint, in 
Genesee County, is a typical country-city fringe,‖ he wrote.  ―It is characterized by small 
part-time acreages, platted suburbs, blighted ‗shack towns,‘ gracious country estates, 
trailer camps, and other typical fringe manifestations.‖  During the 1940s, suburban 
Genesee County was a heterogeneous landscape of homes, farms, factories, commercial 
outlets, and open space.  Flint‘s suburbs were not at all diverse in terms of race, however.  
In 1940, there were only 109 African Americans residing in suburban Genesee County.  
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A decade later, that number stood at just 154.
97
  Following the racial logic of the FHA‘s 
policies, local builders and lenders denied black buyers the opportunity to purchase new 
homes and lots in the suburbs.  Moreover, homeowners and neighborhood associations 
followed the FHA‘s recommendations and established deed restrictions that explicitly 
prohibited black occupancy.  In poor and working-class areas such as Fentonlawn and 
Romayne Heights, where racially restrictive deed covenants were uncommon, FHA 
insurance policies and private forms of discrimination by builders, lenders, realtors, and 
homeowners helped to enforce rigid segregation.  From the perspective of white 
homeowners, however, racial integration was only one of many blighting influences that 
threatened property values.  During the 1940s and 1950s, suburban officials and members 
of Flint‘s housing and real estate industries responded to the FHA‘s mandates and the 
grassroots demands of suburban residents by bringing new infrastructure and services to 
the out-county.  They hoped that urban services and amenities, in conjunction with 
careful restrictions on land use and occupancy, would improve property values and the 
quality of life in outlying areas while simultaneously making the suburbs more attractive 
to investors from the governmental and private sectors.   
 The suburbs that Walter Firey visited in 1945-46 were far from idyllic places.  
Indeed, at the close of World War II, very few areas of suburban Genesee County 
resembled the finely manicured, prosperous, and always-friendly suburban 
neighborhoods portrayed in popular postwar television shows such as Leave It to Beaver 
and The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet.  In virtually every instance, new suburban 
developments brought together a mix of strangers from throughout the metropolis and 
beyond.  Between 1945 and 1948, nearly half of the families residing in the Flint 
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metropolitan area changed residences.  Just over half of the families who moved during 
that period relocated from the city to the suburbs.  Once they arrived in their new 
communities, suburban neighbors often battled with one another over land use, zoning, 
septic tank leaks, and school tax campaigns.  Regardless of the differences they may have 
had, however, most suburbanites did agree on a few things.  When asked to explain why 
they chose to live in the suburbs, residents of the fringe cited home ownership more than 
any other factor.  According to a 1956 study of taxes and home ownership in Genesee 
County, nearly 90 percent of household heads in suburban Flint either owned or were 
purchasing their homes, as opposed to 75 percent of city dwellers.
98
   
Suburban residents also left the city because they desired more space and privacy, 
better schools, and larger gardens.  Some families relocated to the suburbs for lower 
taxes, but anti-tax migrants only comprised a small percentage of Flint‘s suburban 
population.  In February 1946, the Flushing Observer ran an editorial entitled ―Drift to 
the Country,‖ which explained why village leaders in west suburban Flushing and other 
outlying areas expected to grow after the war:  
The idea of owning and occupying a home in some rural neighborhood 
and traveling daily to one‘s job in some city, is likely to be popular.  The 
family thus located can add to its income by gardening, keeping chickens, 
and perhaps pigs, and some may be able to raise some crops for sale in the 
markets.
99
   
 
Several weeks after the editorial ran, almost as if on cue, developers from Hillcrest 
Builders Corporation announced plans to construct a new, ―nicely restricted‖ subdivision 
in Flushing.
100
  Although postwar suburban migrants rarely cited racial concerns when 
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asked why they left the city, most agreed that African Americans should be excluded 
from suburbia. 
Flint‘s industrial gardens had their share of weeds.  Thousands of Flint families 
jumped at the chance to buy houses and lots in the verdant landscapes of suburban 
Genesee County.  Yet when they arrived in their new homes and neighborhoods, 
homeowners who had grown accustomed to urbanized infrastructure and services were 
often frustrated by the lack of amenities in the out-county.  At mid-century, most 
residential areas in the suburbs lacked paved roads, garbage collection services, public 
water and sewers, zoning and construction codes, and plat regulations.  As late as 1956, 
only 22 percent of the roads in Flint‘s innermost suburbs were paved.
101
  Additionally, 
police and fire services were almost non-existent in Flint‘s postwar suburbs.  ―In such 
basic services as water and sewage disposal,‖ one study claimed, ―the ‗rurbanite‘ too 
frequently finds that he is on his own initiative; he must provide his own well, pump, and 
septic tank or go without running water and flush toilets.‖
102
  During a July 1948 meeting 
of the Genesee County Board of Supervisors, Argentine Township Supervisor Charles 
Markley presented a report from the Board of County Road Commissioners on the 
problems associated with unplanned suburban growth.  According to the report, the 
postwar surge in home building in the townships surrounding Flint created ―a very 
serious problem not only from a highway standpoint but as it relates to drainage, sewers, 
water, fire control, schools, and other facilities desired by the people who wish to have all 
the conveniences that were afforded them while living in the city.‖  The report also noted 
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that suburban officials were receiving ―increased criticism‖ from suburban residents who 
feared that unregulated growth was ―seriously affecting their investments.‖
103
  ―The 
needs of township settlers for urban services have reached crisis proportions in many 
Michigan areas,‖ a 1951 report concluded.
104
      
 
The Modernization of Suburbia 
During the 1940s and 1950s, policymakers in suburban Flint worked with federal 
officials, lenders, and builders to boost property values in new subdivisions and resolve 
the mounting service and utility crises in Genesee County.  Following the FHA‘s explicit 
recommendations on housing and land use restrictions, township supervisors and 
suburban city council members developed new master plans, zoning codes, and building 
regulations.  By 1955, twenty-four of the twenty-nine governmental units in Genesee 
County had enacted zoning ordinances that established minimum home and lot sizes, land 
use guidelines, and basic building standards for new structures.  These zoning codes also 
severely limited—or prohibited altogether—apartment complexes, rooming houses, and 
other multiple-family housing units.
105
   
Federal housing administrators also used their mortgage insurance program to 
force developers and suburban officials to provide urbanized services to newly built 
subdivisions.  Just in 1947, village councilors in south suburban Fenton purchased a road 
grading machine, a two-ton truck, a snowplow, and a gravel loader to improve services 
for residents.  Throughout the course of that year, Fenton officials used the new 
                                                 
103
 Proceedings of the Board of Supervisors, Genesee County, Michigan, April 1948. 
104
 Tableman, Governmental Organization in Metropolitan Areas (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1951), 83. 
105
 See, for instance, Flint Journal, September 28, 1955. 
252 
 
equipment to pave two miles of roads, lay over a mile of new sanitary and storm sewers, 
and build six blocks of new sidewalks.  In order to meet the FHA‘s standards for new 
development, officials in suburban townships and villages had to prove that new sewers, 
sidewalks, schools, roads, and water would be available for residents.  If suburban 
governments could not satisfy local and federal underwriters, then the FHA canceled its 
support for new residential projects.  In 1952, the FHA threatened to withdraw financing 
from the Fairfield Addition—a proposed new subdivision of one hundred restricted 
building lots in northwest Fenton—until village officials had provided sewers, sidewalks, 
and water service.  ―The FHA stands ready to finance these buildings,‖ a local journalist 
pointed out, ―providing that Fenton can guarantee such municipal services as sewer, 
water and sidewalks. . . . However, the FHA demands that these services be available 
before construction starts.‖
106
  In Fenton, as in other townships and villages throughout 
the county, the FHA‘s regulations on services and utilities forced officials to abandon 
―pay as you go‖ financing and enact new taxes and bonding measures to fund 
development.  The FHA rewarded those commitments by offering mortgage insurance to 
new residential developments.                     
 Some suburban officials balked at complying with the FHA‘s infrastructure and 
service regulations.  One such example occurred in the far northern suburb of Clio.  Like 
other suburban areas, Clio grew rapidly during the immediate postwar era.  Between 
1930 and 1940, Clio‘s population increased by 14 percent.  Because a large portion of 
Clio‘s new residents were children, the population of the schools increased at an even 
faster rate.  Between 1925 and 1951, the enrollment in Clio‘s schools increased by 103 
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  Hoping to alleviate school overcrowding, members of the Clio Area Study 
Committee, on several occasions during the 1950s, recommended new taxes to fund two 
new elementary schools and major repairs to the district‘s high school.  In 1956, Clio 
voters—many of them farmers opposed to sprawling new development—rejected a bond 
proposal to fund the study committee‘s school improvement plan.
108
  Likewise, Clio 
voters opposed new taxes to build new water mains and sewer lines.  Anti-tax sentiment 
in Clio helped to bring new construction to a virtual standstill during the late 1950s.  In 
January 1957, the Clio Chamber of Commerce organized a meeting with Oren Stone, the 
director of Flint‘s FHA office, to discuss the lagging construction industry in the Clio 
area.  In spite of the town‘s advantageous location near Flint, its good roads, and the 
variety of shops and stores in the community, Clio had not kept pace with Fenton and 
other booming suburban areas, Stone claimed, because the city did not provide adequate 
schools, water, sewage disposal, and storm sewers.  Moreover, Stone informed Chamber 
members that the Clio City Council had not used its annexation powers wisely, allowing 
new developments to sprout outside of the city limits.  At one point during the discussion, 
one of Stone‘s associates scolded Clio officials and voters for neglecting to modernize 
the city.  If Clio citizens did not want to pay taxes for improvements, the FHA 
representative offered, ―They should sit down and get their horse and buggy back and 
keep on living in the past.‖  Under the FHA‘s stringent guidelines, Stone and his 
colleagues averred, new development would simply not occur without urbanized 
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infrastructure.  If Clio officials and residents declined to make such improvements, then 
they could not expect to benefit from the postwar housing construction boom.
109
 
 The situation in Clio was not an aberration.  In Mt. Morris, Flushing, and several 
other suburbs, tax-conscious voters and fiscally conservative township supervisors 
initially balked at funding schools, sewers, and other infrastructure improvements.  Over 
time, however, resistance to new taxes and development waned as homeowners‘ 
frustrations with hardscrabble living mounted.  For many suburban officials and out-
county residents, the suburb of Davison represented a model for development.  The 
suburban city of Davison, located eight miles east of Flint, grew faster than any other 
area of Genesee County during the fifteen years following World War II.  On April 19, 
1946, the Davison Index newspaper ran a column that listed the many construction 
projects that were underway in and around the city.  The projects included a new roller 
rink and bowling alley, the St. John‘s school and convent, a business office operated by 
the Leffler Gravel Company, a Davison Dairy outlet, a new grocery store, a storefront 
office operated by the Plymouth-DeSoto agency, Munsell Restaurant, a new hardware 
shop, and several new medical offices.  In addition to the new commercial developments, 
the article also described a booming residential real estate market.  In 1946, developers 
Bob Wisler and Harry Hill platted land and sought FHA approval for an exclusive new 
subdivision on the site of the Davison fairgrounds.  This proposed new development—
restricted to white occupants living in homes of at least $3,500—was to feature new 
streets, sidewalks, sewers, and water service.  Later that year, O. L. Adams offered lots 
for sale in a newly platted subdivision on Davison‘s west side.  In July 1946, City 
Superintendent Donald R. Smith announced plans to lay blacktop over two miles of dirt 
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roads in Davison—the city‘s first large-scale road paving initiative.
110
  All of the new 
development, the Index article conceded, had created a massive workload for members of 
the Davison City Council.  Just to accommodate the rash of new zoning requests that they 
received in 1946, the city council increased its meetings to twice per month.
111
 
In October 1946, the FHA approved the subdivision plans submitted by Robert 
Wisler and Harry Hill.  Later renamed Rosemore Park, the new subdivision received the 
FHA‘s full backing.  Rosemore Park consisted of 133 carefully restricted residential lots, 
each no smaller than 66 by 132 feet.  Before selling the lots, Wisler and Hill agreed to 
install sewer hookups, water lines, and graded, gravel streets.  As well, Consumers Power 
Company pledged to connect each of the new properties to the gas and electric grids.  In 
order to insulate the subdivision from nearby traffic on Clark Street, the FHA required 
Wisler and Hill to construct a sixteen-foot planting strip that bounded the neighborhood 
on the south side.  In addition, the FHA insisted that all new homes in Rosemore Park 
face toward the center of the subdivision.  Hoping to minimize traffic, a prime FHA 
concern, Wisler and Hill also agreed to construct only one entrance into the subdivision.  
Upon purchasing new lots, buyers who required federal financing could either choose 
from a list of home designs or submit their own blueprints to the FHA before 
commencing with construction.  According to the FHA‘s strictly enforced rules, no 
homes costing less than $6,000 could be built in Rosemore Park.
112
                    
New lots sold quickly in Rosemore Park and other new FHA-backed subdivisions 
in Davison.  By 1954, Rosemore Park was fully occupied.  Between 1946 and 1949, 
developers added the Adams, Daniel Allen, and George P. Hill subdivisions to the city‘s 
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growing list of new residential developments.  On July 8, 1949, the Davison Index 
published another column that boasted of the city‘s growth:  
There has been no other town in Genesee County that has gone so 
extensively into the building project.  Fenton has a few new homes but 
most of them have been built previous to the last year or so.  Growth in 
Clio, Flushing, and Mt. Morris, to mention a few, seems to be 
momentarily at a standstill; yet, day after day, another basement is being 
dug and a house frame erected here in Davison.   
 
According to the city‘s boosters, homebuyers sought out property in Davison because, ―It 
is already a prosperous town and is also conveniently located.  There are many good 
businesses in Davison of every variety. . . . House to house mail delivery is now serving 
all residents; and there is a [sic] excellent public school system.‖  As well, boosters 
explained the growth by pointing to Davison‘s well-equipped fire department, modern 
utility services, newly paved roads, and its growth-friendly city government.  Unlike their 
counterparts in Clio, Davison‘s postwar civic boosters embraced new development, even 
when it required higher taxes and new layers of government.  ―Each new resident in 
Davison means increasing prosperity for the town,‖ the Index promised.  ―For more 
residents in Davison means more patrons of the home town business firms, and there is 
no greater preventative against a financial slump as normal buying and selling.‖  Though 
the July column failed to mention federal housing policies, Davison‘s growth and the 
health of its consumer economy were closely connected to the new infrastructure and 
housing starts sponsored by the Federal Housing Administration.
113
   
Taxpayers and local officials did their part to support development and protect 
property values in Davison by passing new building and zoning regulations, annexing 
neighboring land, funding new schools for children, and keeping the suburb entirely 
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white.  Davison enacted its first zoning ordinance in 1940, several years prior to the city‘s 
major postwar expansion.  The original ordinance contained only three zoning districts: 
residential, commercial, and industrial.  In 1948, the Davison City Council developed a 
master plan and passed a revised zoning ordinance which expanded the number of 
restricted land use districts from three to eight.  Under the new ordinance, Davison 
officials strictly limited the areas of the city in which developers could erect multiple 
family housing, commercial establishments, and industrial facilities.
114
  The 1948 zoning 
ordinance was part of a larger pro-growth campaign waged by civic leaders, school board 
members, and the Davison City Council during the 1940s and 1950s.  In 1951, eighty-
eight local business owners and professionals organized the Davison Area Chamber of 
Commerce.
115
  Also that year, the Davison Public Schools absorbed the nearby Townsend 
School District.  Three years later, area voters overwhelmingly endorsed a plan to 
combine Davison‘s schools with twelve rural school districts surrounding the city.  The 
consolidation, which dramatically increased local tax revenues, generated funds to 
expand Davison High School, build a new elementary school on the city‘s northwest side, 
and construct a new stadium and athletic field.
116
   
The Davison City Council did not hesitate to annex new land in order to meet 
FHA standards and capture new developments that grew outside of the city limits.  In 
September 1953, developers announced plans to build Manford Heights, a new 
subdivision just south of the city limits.  On May 10, 1954, city council members voted to 
annex the proposed ninety-acre subdivision.  As part of the agreement, the council also 
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agreed to provide homes in Manford Heights with water, sewers, and roads.
117
  In 
response to the successful annexation and the city‘s utility agreement, the FHA offered its 
full support to the project and agreed to underwrite homes for approved buyers in the 
proposed neighborhood.  Within weeks of receiving the FHA‘s endorsement, builders 
from Blackford Brothers Construction Company, Rasak Home Builders, and other local 
firms began erecting 190 new homes in the subdivision.  On September 12, Flint area 
bankers, Davison City Council members, FHA administrators, and local residents 
attended an official ceremony to mark the opening of Manford Heights.  During the 
celebration, which featured tours of the Aristocrat, the Woodland, and several other 
model homes, the developers heralded the modern amenities available in the new houses 
and the ―rigid restrictions‖ designed to maintain property values and a high standard of 
living in the neighborhood.  According to the property restrictions, all lots in the 
neighborhood had to have a minimum frontage of sixty feet.  Moreover, builders in 
Manford Heights could erect only single-story, contemporary-styled homes with a 
minimum floor area.  As well, Manford Heights had only curvilinear streets named 
exclusively after varieties of evergreen trees.  In keeping with the forest theme, the 
builders added exterior finishes of ―pre-painted cedar shake trimmed with painted 
plywood and colorful brick‖ to the model homes.  Inside, the Aristocrat, the Woodland, 
and other model homes featured pine paneling, ―range-vent hoods in the kitchen . . . as 
well as a ‗Waste-King‘ Garbage disposal unit, copper plumbing throughout, forced-air 
heat, divided basement with added strength to insure proper upper wall support, and 
automatic hot-water heaters.‖  In order to protect their large capital investments, 
developers enforced strict building regulations in the neighborhood and selected 
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respected real estate agent Frank Hachtel to handle all marketing and sales.  Though by 
the early 1950s the FHA could no longer advocate racially restrictive housing covenants, 
Hachtel—like all other realtors serving the Davison community—accepted as gospel the 
notion that racial integration detracted from neighborhood stability and property values.  
As a reflection of that belief, Hachtel and his colleagues in the real estate industry refused 
to show homes and lots in Manford Heights and other suburban subdivisions to African 
Americans.
118
                                         
 During the 1940s and 1950s, local growth initiatives and federal housing and 
development policies combined to spur an unprecedented economic boom in and around 
Davison.  As 1954 came to a close, the editors of the Davison Index paused yet again to 
reflect upon the city‘s growth.  ―Davison is recognized today as the fastest growing area 
in Genesee County and one of the fastest growing communities in the State of Michigan,‖ 
they wrote.   
The pattern of Davison‘s future was stamped years ago when leaders 
changed from a village to a city, established a modern school system, set 
up a zoning ordinance and building code, built a modern, large capacity 
sewage disposal plant to make Davison the most logical building site in 




The newspaper editors were correct.  By embracing urban-style government, population 
growth, and the federal government‘s new, highly restrictive rules for suburban 
development, Davison‘s civic leaders transformed their city into an attractive place for 
white homeowners, shopkeepers, and investors.  Between 1940 and 1950, Davison‘s 
population increased from 1,397 to 1,745, a jump of nearly 25 percent.  In the 1950s, 
government officials tightened building and zoning regulations, enlarged the city‘s school 
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system, annexed new land in Davison Township, and granted new services and utilities to 
homeowners.  In exchange for these commitments, private lenders and FHA officials 
endorsed the construction of hundreds of new homes and businesses.  By the close of the 
decade, Davison‘s population had more than doubled to 3,761.  As new residents moved 
there, businesses followed suit.  Just between 1947 and 1960, the number of privately 
operated businesses in Davison increased by fifty-nine, a gain of 93 percent.
120
   
Davison was not alone.  After World War II, most of Flint‘s suburbs experienced 
dramatic growth.  During the 1940s, all but one grew in population.  With few 
exceptions, Flint‘s innermost suburbs—especially those that met the FHA‘s requirements 
for zoning, building restrictions, schools, water, roads, and sewers—grew faster than 
areas that lacked municipal utilities and other urbanized governmental services.  In the 
1940s, the populations of Mt. Morris and Burton Townships grew by 109 and 66 percent, 
respectively.  Similarly, the townships of Genesee and Flint each posted population gains 
in excess of 40 percent during the decade.  Even in north suburban Clio and other areas of 
the out-county where voters clung to ―horse and buggy‖ governments, the postwar era 
brought impressive growth statistics.  Between 1940 and 1950, Clio‘s population climbed 
from 1,711 to 1,963.
121
                            
By the mid-1950s, civic boosters in Davison had claimed success in their quest to 
build a model suburb.  ―The die has been cast and Davison is headed down the broad 
highway of unlimited expansion,‖ the Davison Index predicted.  Amazed by the changes 
unfolding around them, Davison‘s civic leaders expressed an unbridled confidence in the 
future.  Most residents and officials in suburban Genesee County did not share that sense 
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of optimism, however.  Throughout the county, suburban officials struggled mightily to 
meet the growing service needs of new homeowners, shopkeepers, and investors.  
Township supervisors and suburban city council members found it almost impossible to 
satisfy all, or even most, of the wishes of residents.  Thousands of residents who 
relocated to Flint‘s suburbs wanted new schools and roads, more shopping centers, 
stricter building and zoning regulations, clean water, modern sewer systems, police and 
fire protection, and other costly urban services.  However, in many instances suburban 
officials were simply unable to provide the services and utilities that their residents 
expected.  Further complicating matters, many other residents preferred smaller, less 
intrusive government and loathed the growth that was occurring around them.  These 
anti-growth homeowners fought to keep their taxes low and restrict new developments.  
Rarely did either side get what they wanted, though.  During the 1950s, suburban 
frustration reached a boiling point as new residents and new problems continued to pour 
into the cities, villages, and townships surrounding Flint.  Throughout Genesee County—
and, indeed, the nation as a whole—a growing chorus of voices bemoaned the 
overdevelopment of suburban areas and the political chaos that seemed to accompany 
unrestricted growth.  Meanwhile, civil rights activists in Flint were busy organizing 
against the underdevelopment of the city and the racial exclusions embedded in mass 
suburbanization.    
 
The Birth of Metropolitan Solutions 
During the long postwar era, critiques of metropolitan ―spreaditis‖ dovetailed with a 
nascent political discourse on urban deindustrialization and the inner-city crises that 
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seemed to be brewing in America‘s central cities.  For their part, white suburbanites in 
Genesee County were never as happy as they seemed on television.  Likewise, many 
African Americans in the city resented the postwar growth of suburbs, though from a 
very different perspective than their white suburban counterparts.  In 1969, William R. 
Morris, the NAACP‘s national director of housing programs, released a bulletin to all 
local branches that reinforced the link between urban deindustrialization, black 
unemployment, and suburban housing segregation.  Morris‘s communiqué, entitled 
―Suburban Plant Location and Equal Housing Opportunity,‖ explained how the 
suburbanization of industry created spatial barriers between black urban neighborhoods 
and suburban job centers.  ―Centers of employment in manufacturing industries are 
increasingly located in suburban and outlying parts of metropolitan areas,‖ Morris 
argued, ―while the black and the poor continue to be contained in inner cities, physically 
separated from many jobs they could fill.‖
122
  That same year, Jeanne R. Lowe described 
the link between black unemployment and housing discrimination in an article published 
in the Saturday Review: ―The Negro faces an employment handicap experienced by no 
other worker in our history—the denial of residence reasonably near his job.‖  Between 
1954 and 1965, Lowe reported, well over 50 percent of all industrial and commercial 
construction in the United States took place outside of the nation‘s central cities.
123
  The 
sprawling of the United States, these critics charged, had created new forms of social 
inequality on a metropolitan scale.      
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William Morris and Jeanne Lowe were correct.  In Flint and many other 
metropolitan regions, African Americans could not obtain housing of any kind, except 
under the rarest of circumstances, in high-growth suburban areas.  Across the country, the 
shift towards suburban and rural investment had profound and unexpected implications 
for central cities such as Flint and their growing African-American populations.  Echoing 
the arguments of Morris and Lowe, many scholars of urban history have concluded that 
the combined forces of capital decentralization and whites-only suburbanization created a 
condition of ―spatial mismatch.‖  According to this model, the suburbanization of 
industrial jobs and white taxpayers left African Americans in cities such as Flint with 
fewer employment opportunities, blighted and abandoned neighborhoods, and a declining 
standard of living.  Proponents of spatial mismatch also argue that the suburban 
migrations of capital and labor accelerated urban crises by eviscerating the tax bases of 
central cities.  As this theory suggests, African Americans trapped in the ghetto by 
residential segregation paid a disproportionate share of the costs associated with suburban 
development.
124
   
Spatial mismatch was a very real phenomenon in postwar Flint.  In 1939, the city 
of Flint contained 95 percent of the taxable wealth in the metropolitan area.  By 1956, 
however, suburban migrations had driven that figure down to 79 percent.
125
  The mass 
suburbanization of white homeowners, industry, retail, and services created many tax and 
service gaps for city officials, business owners, and residents who remained in the city.  
Moreover, African Americans, more than any other group of citizens, bore the weight of 
the economic asymmetries created by the post-World War II decentralization of capital.  
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Nevertheless, the theory of spatial mismatch conceals a great deal about the racial 
implications of capital migrations and almost completely obfuscates the metropolitan 
growth agenda that fueled both suburban residential development and GM‘s 
decentralization strategy.  The notion of mismatch also subsumes the local particularities 
of job seeking among urban residents, especially in relatively small, automobile-centered 
cities such as Flint.  In the postwar era, the Vehicle City‘s per capita automobile 
ownership rate was higher than in any other major city in the United States.
126
  According 
to one 1957 study, there were slightly less than two citizens, of any age, for each of the 
137,200 cars registered in the metropolitan area.  Virtually every family in the city owned 
at least one vehicle.
127
   
Most black workers at General Motors, even when their plants relocated to 
suburban Genesee County, could—and did, in fact—commute to work.  At GM, plant 
suburbanization did not coincide with declining black employment figures.  According to 
a 1965-66 Michigan Civil Rights Commission survey of GM‘s hourly-rated workforce in 
Genesee County, the percentage of black workers in the corporation‘s Flint plants was 
roughly the same as in its newer suburban facilities.  Of the two GM plants in Genesee 
County that employed the smallest proportion of black workers, AC Spark Plug and 
Ternstedt, one was in the city while the other was in the north suburbs.
128
  To be sure, 
black workers faced intense racial discrimination at all of GM‘s facilities in Genesee 
County.  However, employment discrimination resulted more from the company‘s 
personnel policies than from geographic mismatches.  Likewise, black job seekers in all-
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white suburbs found it nearly impossible to secure employment.  In 1965, for instance, 
only two black workers found employment outside of the domestic service industry in the 
all-white suburb of Flushing.
129
  Yet results such as this were less a function of spatial 
mismatch than an indication of how deeply entrenched racism was among white 
employers in both the city and the suburbs.  Indeed, black workers needed to look no 
farther than their own neighborhoods or the readily accessible department stores in 
downtown Flint to discover how rigid the postwar color line could be in the arena of 
employment.                     
 Proponents of spatial mismatch often employ metaphors of flight and 
abandonment to describe human and capital migrations from cities.  In many cases, the 
theory of spatial mismatch hinges on the notion that all outward capital migrations, no 
matter where employers and white taxpayers relocated, were part of a zero-sum contest 
between cities and their suburban and rural competitors.  According to this binary 
framework, cities suffered because they ―lost‖ factories and shopping centers to their 
suburban and exurban rivals.  There can be little doubt that suburban developments drew 
capital, taxes, and resources away from the city.  Nevertheless, the opening of new plants, 
shopping centers, and subdivisions just across Flint‘s border was not the equivalent of 
building new facilities overseas or far away in the Sunbelt.  For workers in Flint, to 
whom precise distances mattered immensely, the suburbanization of industry and 
commerce presented few geographic obstacles to employment.  Moreover, when viewed 
from the perspective of local GM executives and Flint‘s political leaders, the implications 
of postwar suburban development were even less consequential.  Among the local 
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industrialists, civic leaders, and booster journalists who embraced metropolitan 
development, GM‘s suburban strategy and the rise of Flint‘s suburbs were of very little 
significance.  Men such as Clarence Young, who viewed the city and its suburbs as part 
of an organic, regional whole, believed that Flint would always be ―the greatest work-
maker, wage-payer, idea-market ever known,‖ even if GM built its ―empire of progress‖ 
outside of the city limits.
130
  Young believed this because he and other members of Flint‘s 
growth coalition viewed the city through a metropolitan lens.  When GM executives built 
new plants outside of the city, they did so under the assumption that the city of Flint 
would one day absorb those factories.  This fact became apparent during the massive 
economic downturn of the late 1950s.  
During the 1950s, the city experienced three major economic recessions that 
brought the implications of GM‘s suburban strategy and the overdevelopment of the out-
county to the center of local political culture.  The severest of the three recessions 
occurred between 1956 and 1959.  In the peak production year of 1955, nearly thirty 
thousand Buick workers in Flint produced slightly fewer than 800,000 vehicles, a 
division record.  By 1958, however, that production figure had declined precipitously to 
232,000.
131
  During the 1956-59 economic slowdown, dubbed the Eisenhower Recession 
by the president‘s Democratic opponents, General Motors laid off nearly thirty thousand 
workers in Genesee County, causing unemployment to increase to 10 percent.  Among 
African Americans, unemployment reached nearly 20 percent during this period.  In 
1957, the federal department acknowledged the severity of the crisis by reclassifying 
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Flint as an economically depressed area.
132
  Hoping to arrest Buick‘s downward spiral, in 
the fall of 1957 General Motors President Harlow Curtice delivered what he hoped would 
be a humorous, uplifting address to local Buick officials.  ―I am certain that you are 
wholly dissatisfied with the status quo,‖ Curtice acknowledged, ―which, as the darkie 
said, is ‗the hell of a mess we all is in.‘‖
133
  Curtice‘s racial remarks probably lightened 
the mood at the 1957 event, but they did little to revive the economic fortunes of the city.  
By the spring of 1958, GM had idled nearly one in two Buick workers in Genesee 
County.
134
  Though workers at Buick, the city‘s largest employer, suffered the brunt of 
the downturn, tens of thousands of autoworkers throughout Flint lost their jobs during the 
late 1950s slump.   
Desperate for solutions to the economic recession, Curtice, Joseph Anderson, and 
other local GM officials rallied behind a Sunbelt-style campaign to bring new economic 
growth to Flint.  That plan arrived in 1958 in the form of ―New Flint,‖ a proposal to 
consolidate the entire Flint region under a single government.  In the short term, GM 
executives hoped that a larger city would resuscitate the region‘s failing economy.  Yet 
New Flint was also part of a broader, long-term development agenda that sought to 
overcome the growing gulfs between the Vehicle City and its suburbs.  New Flint 
represented a metropolitan approach to solving both underemployment in the city and 
overdevelopment in the suburbs.  For a brief period during the late 1950s, debates over 
New Flint highlighted the links between urban crises and suburban chaos while helping 
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to illustrate the interconnectedness of the grassroots anger that brewed on both sides of 




Chaos in the Suburbs: 
The Life and Death of New Flint 
 
 
Social critic Lawrence Lader abhorred the disorder he found in America‘s postwar 
suburbs.  In the October 1958 issue of Better Homes and Gardens, Lader published 
―Chaos in the Suburbs,‖ a polemic against ―Paradise Lost‖ in suburbia.  While 
conducting research for his exposé, Lader visited Genesee County and many other 
metropolitan areas throughout the United States, where he spoke with scores of angry 
suburbanites and overburdened government officials.  During their conversations with 
Lader, these citizens painted extremely unflattering portraits of life on the crabgrass 
frontiers of suburban America.
1
  In sharp contrast to those who reflexively embraced and 
uncritically celebrated mass suburbanization, Lader and many of the citizens he 
interviewed believed that the unplanned rush to the suburbs had created unnecessarily 
harsh living conditions in new suburban neighborhoods.  More importantly, however, 
Lader contended that the unregulated rise of the suburbs had generated a profound crisis 
in American democracy.  The new suburban crisis of the 1950s, according to Lader, 
stemmed from the ―chaos of conflicting local governments, all squabbling over 
responsibilities instead of working together for the benefit of the whole metropolis.‖  In 
suburbia, Lader warned readers, ―Armies of horse-and-buggy governments, moving in 
foolhardy isolation and without foresight, are duplicating services, shunning 
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responsibility, and throwing away your money.‖  A harsh critic of governmental waste, 
Lader viewed metropolitan government as the only lasting solution to substandard living 
and suburban anarchy.
2
     
To illustrate his critique of suburban inefficiency, Lader documented the 
confusing array of governments and agencies that existed in several of the nation‘s major 
metropolitan centers.  In and around Miami, Florida, Lader found a web of independent 
local governments that seldom worked together for the common good.  In Dade County 
alone, for instance, there were ―26 different police forces, a sheriff‘s office, a highway 
patrol, and county park police, in addition to a bevy of constables serving the justices of 
the peace.‖  According to Mrs. Cyril Smith, president of the Miami League of Women 
Voters, the proliferation of overlapping bureaus and agencies in Dade County confused 
ordinary civilians and government workers alike.  After witnessing a fire erupt near a 
busy intersection between two jurisdictions, Smith reported, ―A sheriff‘s patrol car and a 
West Miami police car rushed to answer the alarm.  Then they argued about which 
municipality should be called to put out the fire while the building burned to the ground.‖  
At times, as Smith‘s story illustrated, governmental polarization in metropolitan areas 
produced hazardous and potentially deadly service gaps.  Furthermore, even when the 
fragmentation of suburban governments endangered neither private property nor human 
life, the labyrinthine nature of local government in metropolitan areas such as Dade 
County was simply confusing and inefficient.  In the greater Miami area, to cite another 
of Lader‘s examples, there were no uniform speed limits to guide motorists as they 
traveled through the metropolis.  As well, Dade County, like most other metropolitan 
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areas in the United States, lacked area-wide building codes, tax policies, and commercial 
licensing guidelines, which created numerous problems for entrepreneurs, investors, and 
business owners.  ―Isn‘t it fantastic that for my 50 restaurants I have to get 26 different 
sets of licenses?‖ the owner of a hamburger chain complained.  Governmental 
inefficiency and ―red tape‖ not only hurt citizens, Lader charged, but they were also 
anathema to economic growth.
3
 
In metropolitan Seattle, Washington, Lader discovered more than sixty-seven 
overlapping water supply districts, each with its own independent fee and service 
structure.  Even more polarized than Miami and Seattle, metropolitan Pittsburgh 
contained no fewer than 612 units of local government.  By the late 1950s, there were 
174 major metropolitan centers in the United States.  Within those densely populated, 
urbanized regions, there were an astonishing 15,658 local governments.  Although the 
greater Flint area covered only twelve square miles of land during the 1950s, it contained 
at least forty-five separate units of government, each with its own governing authority, 
tax levy, and administrative structure.
4
  Throughout the nation, Lader and other postwar 
critics of suburbia encountered thousands of examples of metropolitan political 
fragmentation that wasted tax dollars, undermined property values and quality of life, and 
threatened public health standards.   
In suburban Flint, Lader uncovered an especially egregious example of the 
dangers that accompanied unplanned development.  Lader reported that sanitary services 
in Genesee County were appallingly substandard.  ―Frequently throughout the year, Flint 
literally is surrounded by an open sewer,‖ admitted a local journalist.  Because two-thirds 
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of the governments in the county did not possess modern sewage disposal systems, 
children living outside of Flint often played dangerously close to open cesspools.  In 
north suburban Mt. Morris, one mother observed, ―Children are coming home with 
sewage clinging to their clothes.‖  The central problem in Miami, Flint, and other cities, 
Lader maintained, was that suburbs had exploded in population without any coordinated 
metropolitan planning efforts:  
We have plunged into a radically new way of life.  Our sleepy suburban 
towns have become virtual cities—sprawling municipalities around the 
central city.  Yet we are still attempting to meet the crushing problems of 
suburban chaos with a horse-and buggy system of government that 
belongs to the last century.   
 
Like a growing number of Americans during the 1950s, Lader believed that cities and 
suburbs were part of a larger metropolitan polity and that the problems generated by 
sprawling suburban development necessitated regional political solutions.  The 
controversial New Flint proposal was a manifestation of Lader‘s political viewpoint.
5
                                    
Lawrence Lader‘s article identified a rarely acknowledged facet of postwar 
suburban culture in the United States.  During the Eisenhower Era of the 1950s, both 
critics and defenders of suburbia often painted simplistic, grossly inaccurate portraits of 
suburban affluence and conformity.
6
  In reality, however, very few postwar suburbs 
resembled the idyllic, lush places portrayed in popular culture.  Moreover, suburbanites 
were not always conformists, and seldom were they as optimistic and happy as Ward 
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Cleaver and other iconic television characters made them seem.  In Flint and elsewhere, 
suburbs were not monoliths of prosperity and contentment.  During the 1950s and 1960s, 
white homeowners and business proprietors received many federal and local subsidies to 
move from Flint to the segregated, fast-growing suburbs of Genesee County.  Once they 
arrived, however, many suburban taxpayers found unexpectedly poor living conditions 
and work environments in their new subdivisions, plants, and shops.  Hoping to satisfy 
FHA regulations, state health standards, and the service demands of ordinary taxpayers, 
suburban governments built millions of dollars worth of new infrastructure during the 
postwar era.  In order to build and maintain good schools and roads, safe water supplies, 
sanitary sewers, and a high standard of living, these governments floated bond proposals 
and levied new and higher taxes on suburban homeowners and businesses.  Ever 
cognizant of the tax burdens they had accumulated by building new infrastructure, many 
homeowners in the out-county developed a fiercely independent political consciousness 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  That consciousness exploded in opposition to the New Flint 
plan.   
The battles over New Flint brought white homeowners and township officials into 
open conflict with GM executives, Flint city commissioners, and other members of the 
Vehicle City‘s pro-growth coalition.  Because GM‘s postwar suburban strategy depended 
upon a metropolitan spatial vision for development, the corporation offered its full 
support to New Flint and other forms of regional government.  In 1958, GM officials 
helped to launch the New Flint campaign, a Sunbelt-inspired economic growth initiative 
to enlarge the city‘s boundaries and create a unified and more efficient metropolitan 
government.  Although GM executives actively supported New Flint, thousands of white 
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homeowners and suburban officials revolted against the prospect of a new ―super city‖ 
and the ―super tax dollars‖ they feared it would require.  Opposition to New Flint united 
taxpayers from across Flint‘s diverse suburban landscape.  In Flint Township and other 
industrialized suburbs, voters rallied against what they viewed as a plant-grabbing plan.  
Even in largely residential suburbs, however, voters who were mindful of the high 
service costs of suburban development organized to block metropolitan government.  By 
the close of 1958, suburban opponents of regional government had helped to defeat the 
controversial proposal.   
Though only rarely articulated in public, unspoken racial fears also informed the 
opposition to New Flint.  The campaign against New Flint was not an example of white 
suburban backlash against the civil rights movement, however.  In fact, the suburban 
revolt against New Flint clearly preceded the wave of open housing and school 
desegregation campaigns of the mid-1960s.  Instead, the controversy illustrated how the 
rapid and uneven growth of Flint‘s suburbs—by itself, and without much provocation 
from civil rights agitators—produced a new, increasingly conservative, and explicitly 
anti-urban and anti-integrationist political consciousness among white suburban 
residents.  The demise of New Flint also set the stage for a series of hostile annexation 
drives and metropolitan desegregation campaigns during the 1960s and 1970s that further 
inflamed suburban opposition to the city of Flint and its nascent black majority.   
 
Studying Suburban Growth 
The New Flint Proposal of 1958 grew out of an unusual partnership between academic 
researchers at the University of Michigan, corporate growth boosters, and concerned 
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citizens in the Flint metropolitan region.  In the fall of 1946, an interdisciplinary team of 
scholars affiliated with Michigan‘s Horace Rackham School of Graduate Studies and the 
Institute for Human Adjustment organized the Social Science Research Project (SSRP), 
―a novel experiment with the dual purpose of providing field research for graduate 
students in the social sciences and providing information to the people of the Flint 
Metropolitan Area.‖
7
  Between 1946 and 1960, professors and graduate students 
affiliated with the SSRP produced over twenty detailed reports and several major 
publications on metropolitan development in Genesee County.  Under the direction of 
Arthur W. Bromage, Amos H. Hawley, Basil G. Zimmer, and other scholars devoted to 
regional governance, graduate student researchers from the SSRP focused much of their 
attention on the fraught and complex relationships between Flint and its suburbs and the 
problems associated with the rapid development of the urban fringe.   
Not surprisingly, SSRP researchers found that the city‘s innermost suburbs—
namely, the four townships contiguous to Flint, along with the suburban municipalities of 
Mt. Morris and Grand Blanc—had all experienced rapid growth.  The populations of the 
four townships bordering Flint climbed by an average of 55 percent in the 1940s, while 
the city itself grew by only 7.7 percent.
8
  By 1950, Flint‘s share of the county‘s overall 
population had declined to 60 percent.
9
  Suburban growth continued apace during the 
1950s.  Between 1950 and 1960, suburban Genesee County added seventy thousand new 
residents.  The populations of Mundy Township, Grand Blanc Township, and several 
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other inner-ring suburbs nearly doubled over the course of the decade.  Although the 
central city also gained new residents during this period, suburban growth was six times 
that recorded in the Vehicle City.
10
  Along with federal mortgage subsidies, the 
suburbanization of industry and retail helped to drive this residential migration.  As GM 
and other area employers opened new facilities in suburban Genesee County, the pace of 
outmigration intensified as white workers sought out new homes for sale in recently 
opened subdivisions close to their workplaces and new commercial establishments.  
 The quest for land and new homes fueled suburban growth.  In 1948, SSRP 
researcher Betty Tableman authored a study on migratory flows in the Flint area.  Based 
upon interviews that she and others conducted with 517 families in the Flint metropolitan 
region, Tableman‘s report demonstrated that the desire for home ownership was 
instrumental in driving the mass migration to the suburbs.  ―Movement in the fringe is 
predominantly a movement from rental housing toward home ownership,‖ she concluded.  
In 1955, three-fourths of Flint residents either owned or were purchasing the homes in 
which they resided.  Outside of the city, however, homeowners and home mortgage 
holders comprised approximately 90 percent of the population.
11
   
Beyond the allure of home ownership, several push factors also contributed to 
suburban migration.  Many of the residents Tableman interviewed claimed that they had 
left Flint because of their dissatisfaction with the quality of housing, traffic congestion, 
―urban blight,‖ high building costs, and small residential lots.  When asked to explain 
why they chose their present neighborhood in the urban fringe, suburban residents 
overwhelmingly indicated that the quality and availability of housing and land outside of 
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Flint was the most important factor shaping their decision to relocate.  As well, large 
numbers of residents cited the larger lots available in the suburbs, the prestige of a 
suburban address, and their desire for more open space.  Significantly, taxes played only 
a minor role in the suburban migrations of the 1940s and 1950s.  According to Tableman 
and other SSRP researchers, only 23 percent of suburban residents cited lower taxes as an 
important factor fueling their desire to move.  Over time, this number would diminish 
even further.
12
                       
 In 1955, SSRP researchers released the results of a more extensive survey of the 
factors driving suburban migrations in Genesee County.  According to the 1955 survey of 
approximately seven hundred area residents, nearly 50 percent of fringe dwellers cited 
housing, in a variety of capacities, as the primary reason they selected their current 
suburban neighborhood.  These suburban residents pointed to home ownership, more 
than any other variable, as the central concern shaping their decision to migrate.  When 
asked about their reasons for leaving Flint, residents of the urban fringe mentioned urban 
blight, lack of privacy and space, and the ―unwholesome‖ living conditions in the city.  
Though most white residents of Flint‘s suburbs agreed that their neighborhoods should 
exclude African Americans, ―white flight‖ played only a minor role in driving 1950s 
suburban migrations.  Indeed, only 1.6 percent of the fringe residents polled for the 1955 
survey claimed that they had relocated to the suburbs because of the presence of Negroes 
in their old city neighborhoods.  Likewise, less than 1 percent of suburban residents 
claimed that racial factors influenced their decision to choose their current residence.  
When SSRP researchers asked suburban homesteaders what they liked about their new 
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neighborhoods, none mentioned the fact that their subdivisions barred Negroes.  
Although racial prejudices undoubtedly shaped whites‘ perceptions of ―urban blight,‖ 
―neighborhood filth,‖ and the dangers of city living, Flint‘s neighborhoods and schools 
nonetheless remained rigidly segregated throughout the 1950s, a fact that tended to 
mitigate the significance of racial panic selling and other forms of white flight from the 
city.  In most cases, white residents of both the city and the suburbs accepted racial 
segregation as a default condition and never seriously considered even the possibility of 
living in an integrated neighborhood.  Though dear to their hearts, racial segregation was 
not foremost in the minds of the suburban residents that SSRP researchers surveyed.  As 
a result, only a small fraction of Flint‘s suburban residents referenced race a primary 
factor when they discussed their decisions to relocate.
13
    
 
Suburban Anger 
During the 1950s, tens of thousands of white families living in Flint packed their 
belongings and headed off to the rigidly segregated suburbs of Genesee County.  They 
moved to acquire newer and better housing, more space and privacy, and because they 
had grown tired of their cramped living quarters, urban pollution, crime, traffic 
congestion, and the unwholesome cultural atmosphere of the city.  Upon arriving in their 
new subdivisions, thousands of these migrants found much to like about their new living 
arrangements.  According to the 1955 SSRP survey, a third of suburban residents cited 
―friendly, helpful, and congenial neighbors‖ as the thing they liked most about their 
communities.  An additional 17.6 percent reported that they most appreciated that their 
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neighborhoods were ―quiet, clean, safe, and wholesome.‖  When asked to name 
something they disliked about their new suburban neighborhoods, 43.3 percent of the 
SSRP‘s survey respondents could not name anything at all.
14
   
Still, however, a clear majority of new homeowners in the out-county found that 
suburban living was not all that they hoped it would be.  In their surveys of suburban 
residents and officials, SSRP researchers uncovered surprising degrees of unhappiness 
and frustration.  Though the quest for better housing, open space, and bucolic 
surroundings had fueled the migration to Flint‘s urban fringe, new residents of Genesee 
County‘s growing suburbs found that conditions there were more difficult than they had 
anticipated.  In many cases, the squalid living arrangements that Walter Firey described 
after World War II persisted into the 1950s.  ―The fringe,‖ noted a rather pessimistic 
1957 report, ―is deficient in virtually all of the services required for reasonably efficient 
and sanitary urban living.‖
15
  In 1954, a survey of suburban housing warned that weak 
zoning and building codes had created ―potential slums‖ outside of the city.  ―In many 
cases,‖ a 1955 Flint Journal article added, ―families are permitted to move into homes 
that have curtains strung up instead of partitions, no doors on bathrooms and bedrooms, 
no finished flooring, the electrical wiring in but little else.‖
16
  Several years later, 
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geographer Peirce Lewis claimed that in the Flint area, ―the edge of the city is marked by 
what is euphemistically called ‗sub-standard housing‘—in fact rural slums.‖
17
   
During their 1950s surveys, researchers from the SSRP encountered suburban 
dystopias in cities and townships throughout the out-county—places where thousands of 
white homeowners not so silently fumed about foul tasting well water, poorly drained 
septic fields, bumpy roads, taxes, unplanned development, and mediocre, overcrowded 
schools.
18
  To thousands of unhappy fringe dwellers, it seemed that Flint‘s suburbs had 
grown too quickly and chaotically.  Unchecked growth, many feared, was undermining 
suburban tranquility, lowering property values, and creating severe infrastructural crises.  
Moreover, SSRP researchers found that GM‘s suburban investment strategy had created 
massive tax and revenue imbalances between the townships and municipalities of 
Genesee County.  In industrialized suburbs such as Beecher, which claimed GM‘s large 
Ternstedt facility, corporate taxes funded over three-fourths of the cost of schools and 
local government.  Likewise, GM‘s new plants on Van Slyke Road provided a financial 
bonanza for Flint Township and allowed board members from the Carman School 
District to increase per pupil expenditures to among the highest in the county.  In the 
Carman district, school officials in the late 1950s could claim an amazing $39,773 in 
taxable property for each pupil.  Only a few of the fringe‘s sixteen suburban school 
districts possessed substantial industrial and commercial tax bases, however.  Unlike 
Carman, the Genesee School District in north suburban Flint received its taxes almost 
exclusively from homeowners, most of whom were shop workers at GM.  In that district, 
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school officials drew from a significantly smaller tax base of $4,821 per student.
19
  
During the postwar era, Flint‘s suburbs developed in a highly uneven fashion, and many 
suburban communities never experienced the tax revenue boom created by new industrial 
and commercial developments.  By publicizing the shared frustrations of suburban 
residents, SSRP researchers hoped to generate support for metropolitan government, their 
solution to the problem of ―spreaditis.‖    
 Lawrence Lader‘s vivid description of ―open sewers‖ and other unsanitary 
conditions in Flint‘s suburbs embarrassed and angered suburban officials in Genesee 
County.  Nevertheless, his claims were accurate.  There were few regulations on garbage 
disposal in Flint‘s postwar suburbs.  As late as 1957, only two of the four townships 
surrounding the city offered rubbish disposal services.  In many areas of the out-county, 
homeowners burned, buried, or simply dumped their garbage in open fields or wooded 
areas.  Furthermore, sewers were almost non-existent in suburban Genesee County.  
Outside of the city of Flint and the north suburb of Beecher—which contracted with the 
city for sewage disposal—homeowners relied on either outhouses or private septic 
systems.  As suburbs grew, septic system failures and effluent seepage into local wells, 
ponds, and rivers became pressing public health problems.
20
   
Septic seepage was a harsh and disgusting reality in Flint‘s postwar suburbs.  In 
his 1947 study of local government in suburban Flint, Israel Harding Hughes claimed, 
―Septic tank effluent flows from the townships through Flint in nearly every direction.‖  
Carman Creek was a prime example.  Hughes found that the malodorous water in 
Carman Creek contained large amounts of partially diluted sewage.  The poor water 
                                                 
19
 Flint Journal, July 8, 1958.  See also, Zimmer, Flint Area Study Report, v. 1, ch. 7. 
20
 Hughes, Jr., Local Government, 47-50; E. J. Elliott, Hetrick, and S. Johnson, Urban-Fringe Problem; 
Zimmer, Flint Area Study Report, v. 1, ch. 3; and Flint News-Advertiser, January 22, 1954.  
282 
 
quality in Carman Creek shocked public health officials, offended the sensibilities of 
nature lovers, sickened untold numbers of suburban water drinkers, and created a major 
nuisance in the downtown Flint area, where the creek emptied into the Flint River.  
Hughes discovered that dangerous levels of septic tank effluent polluted virtually all of 
the drainage areas around the city.  Septic system failures and effluent seepage into 
private wells and streams occurred for a variety of reasons including insufficiently large 
drainage fields, non-absorbent soils, runoff, and improper maintenance.  The relatively 
impervious clay soils that predominated in many parts of Genesee County presented a 
special problem for septic tank users.  According to one report, ―the prevalence of heavy 
clay soils results in surface drainage of much of the effluent and subsequent seepage into 
wells.‖  Even when the systems worked correctly, however, the overdevelopment of the 
suburbs brought neighbors closer together and, with that, wells and other water sources 
invariably came into greater proximity with privies and septic drainage fields.  It was 
common, noted Homer E. Dowdy in a 1953 Flint Journal column, to find ―wells and 
septic tanks or privies on lots sometimes no wider than 30 or 40 feet.‖  ―What some 
people thought was a move out of town for healthful conditions has turned into the 
opposite.‖  ―Sewage is a problem plaguing the fringe,‖ Dowdy and others concluded.
21
   
Though the Genesee County Health Department was in charge of regulating 
septic systems and outdoor privies in the out-county, the rapid growth of the suburbs 
made it impossible for county health officials to monitor improper sewage disposal and 
septic system failures.  Concerns over septic seepage and well contamination were thus 
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widespread in suburban Flint.  According to one 1950s study, at least a third of the 
residents of suburban Flint expressed ―distinct dissatisfaction‖ with the sewage facilities 
in their neighborhoods.  Many more were simply unnerved by the manner in which 
suburban governments and homeowners handled human waste.  By 1954, suburban 
sewage disposal problems had become so severe that the Michigan Water Resources 
Commission ordered governments throughout the out-county to install modern sewer 
systems by the beginning of 1958 or face the prospect of stiff fines.
22
 
 Among suburban residents, the quality of water services in the out-county was 
another major source of anxiety.  At the end of the 1940s, just over half of Flint‘s one 
hundred thousand suburban residents possessed both running water and toilets inside of 
their homes.
23
  In the north suburban city of Mt. Morris, which operated one of the only 
public water systems outside of Flint, residents enjoyed plentiful supplies of high-quality 
municipal drinking water.
24
  Still, the overwhelming majority of suburban residents who 
had access to fresh water relied upon private, backyard wells.
25
  Throughout the county, 
even in areas that operated government-owned wells, effluent contamination was a major 
cause of worry.  As well, homeowners and public well operators in suburban Flint often 
complained about falling water tables and insufficient water supplies, poor water 
pressure, and smelly, briny-tasting water.  In a 1954 report on suburban development, 
Dowdy pointed out, ―Wells are running dry and whole communities are concerned about 
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an adequate water supply.‖  Four years later, SSRP researchers warned, ―An acute water 
shortage looms in the near future.‖
26
 
The 1950s water crisis was especially severe in the northwestern suburb of 
Flushing.  Between 1940 and 1950, the village of Flushing and Flushing Township added 
1,422 new residents, an increase of over 25 percent.
27
  During the early 1950s, the growth 
of Flushing continued unabated.  As new residents dug private wells and tapped into the 
village‘s antiquated community water system, the water table fell rapidly and 
homeowners began reporting shortages.  By 1953, an especially dry year in Genesee 
County, the area‘s water supply had reached a ―critical stage.‖  In response, the Flushing 
Village Council approved a plan to dig a new community well and implemented a water 
rationing program for area residents.
28
  These plans failed to solve the water crisis, 
however.  At 10:30 a.m. on January 29, 1954, Flushing ran out of water and the area‘s 
public water system shut down completely.  Hoping to avert a potentially devastating 
public health crisis, the village council searched for new wells and implemented 
―Operation Tanker,‖ a plan to purchase and transport water from Flint via large trucks.  
For the remainder of the year, as village officials desperately searched for a new source, 
workers labored around the clock to deliver Flint water to thirsty customers in Flushing.
29
                 
 For most Flushing residents, the $7,000 that it cost to run Operation Tanker was 
money well spent.  Yet hauling water from Flint was only a short-term solution to the 
community‘s long-standing supply and delivery problems.  On November 23, 1954, the 
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Flushing Village Council passed a major new water infrastructure program.  The 
$300,000 project, which included a new community well, water mains, pumping 
equipment, a 750,000-gallon storage tower, and a well house, was the largest and 
costliest development ever undertaken in village history.  In order to fund the new 
system, the village council issued revenue bonds and increased fees for water customers.  
Although Flushing‘s shortage was more severe than in other areas of the county, 
suburban governments across the metropolitan region confronted similar water crises 
during the 1950s.  These emergencies forced village, city, and township governing bodies 
to develop expensive new urban infrastructure projects.
30
   
The year 1954 was a momentous and pivotal one in Flushing, Michigan.  Not 
surprisingly, the water emergency drew a great deal of attention from local observers.  
For many homeowners, the system‘s failure served as a grave reminder that the village 
simply could not sustain unlimited population growth.  Yet the 1954 emergency did little 
to slow the pace of new home construction in and around the village.  In 1954, builders 
broke all existing records by erecting fifty-nine new homes in the Flushing area, most of 
them located in the Bonnie View Gardens subdivision.
31
  Because the Flushing Village 
Council acted quickly to resolve the water shortage, these new homeowners, as well as 
existing residents, could expect a stable and safe supply of drinking water into the 
foreseeable future.   
Sewers, however, were another matter entirely.  Prior to the mid-1950s, Flushing, 
like most other suburbs in Genesee County, had no publicly financed sewer system.  
Instead, homeowners used outdoor privies or septic systems, or they relied upon private 
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drainage lines that emptied into the Flint River.  In the fall of 1946, the Federal Works 
Administration approved a grant of $130,000 to help fund a sanitary sewer system in 
Flushing.  However, between 1946 and 1950, Flushing voters narrowly rejected two 
ballot proposals to raise the village‘s portion of the cost for new sewers.
32
  Despite the 
setbacks, members of the Flushing Village Council persisted in their efforts to gain the 
necessary two-thirds majority of voters needed to approve the project.  In March 1952, 
voters in Flushing, by a margin of just one vote, endorsed a $165,000 bonding proposal to 
construct sewer lines and a waste treatment plant.
33
  Convinced that they lacked a strong 
public mandate for the project, village officials waited until 1954 to implement the sewer 
program.  In that year, just as the water crisis was unfolding, state officials from the 
Michigan Water Resources Commission threatened punitive action against Flushing and 
other suburbs that did not operate sanitary sewer systems.  Soon after that, the FHA 
entered the fray.  Reacting quickly to the state‘s announcement, the FHA ruled that it 
would approve no new home loans in Flushing until the village council had built a 
modern sewer system.  Within days of the FHA‘s announcement, the Flushing Village 
Council had agreed to construct a new system—including sewer mains, an interceptor, 
and a disposal plant—by no later than January 1, 1957.  In response to the council‘s 
pledge to act, the FHA lifted its ban in January 1955.
34
                               
The threat of losing FHA mortgage subsidies played a decisive role in shifting 
public opinion in favor of the new sewer project.  For the most part, frustrated residents 
ultimately supported the village council‘s decision to undertake infrastructural 
improvements.  As well, civic boosters in the area breathed a collective sigh of relief 
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when the FHA rescinded its prohibition of mortgage insurance for the village.  Flushing 
boosters argued that the new improvements, while costly, were essential to maintaining 
growth and prosperity in the village.  Local builders and other real estate investors agreed 
wholeheartedly.  In 1956, the year after the resolution of the sewer crisis, the village 
issued construction permits for forty-one new homes, the second-highest total in Flushing 
history.
35
  In June of that year, builders from the Labian Homes development company 
purchased full-page advertisements in the Flushing Observer to announce that new bi-
level homes were available for sale in the Labian Terrace subdivision.  Homes there 
contained many modern amenities such as built-in ranges, circuit breakers, garbage 
disposals, kitchen vents, spacious closets, and ―DeLuxe‖ forced air heating.  In large, 
bold print, the Labian Terrace advertisements also reminded potential buyers that the 
subdivision had the FHA‘s full backing and that new homes in the neighborhood featured 
―All the conveniences of the Big City,‖ including city water, city sewers, school bus 
service, and paved streets.  In a matter of years, the sleepy little village of Flushing had 
become a modern, independent city in all but name.  The decision to incorporate as a 
home rule municipality was only just around the corner.
36
               
 
Modernizing Suburban Government 
Like their counterparts in Davison and other growth-friendly suburbs, village officials in 
Flushing moved relatively swiftly during the 1950s to build new infrastructure and 
urbanize services for residents and business owners.  In order to satisfy grassroots 
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demands for better services and to meet the stringent regulations of the FHA and the state 
water resources department, suburban officials in the out-county launched a number of 
major water and sewer projects during the 1950s and 1960s.  In 1956, there were nine 
public water systems operating in Genesee County.  Two years later, a third of Flint‘s 
suburbs possessed modern sanitary sewers.  By the close of the decade, suburban officials 
had made great strides towards solving the short-term water and sewer crises in the out-
county.  These solutions cost millions of dollars, however.  Between 1940 and 1956, 
government spending in the four townships surrounding Flint increased from a yearly 
average of $8,000 to more than $161,000.  New water and sewer projects, school and 
road building campaigns, and other service and infrastructural improvements accounted 
for a major portion of the increased expenditures.
37
  Still, however, Flint‘s suburbs simply 
could not accommodate all of the residential and business growth that occurred in the 
1950s.  At a 1956 meeting between local government officials, representatives of the nine 
area water agencies unanimously agreed that water shortages were certain to develop in 
the near future.  ―Our supply is adequate for today,‖ they indicated.  ―But the future 
forebodes trouble.‖  Throughout the county, private and public well operators continued 
to complain about dry wells, septic tank effluent, and salty drinking water.
38
   
Inadequate water and sewer systems were only two of the many problems that 
new residents and business owners confronted in Flint‘s postwar suburbs.  For most 
suburban families, clean water and properly functioning waste disposal systems were 
essential components of modern living.  Yet residents also desired good schools and 
roads, fire and police protection, streetlights, parks, libraries, and other amenities that 
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they had enjoyed in Flint.  These suburban taxpayers also wanted local government 
officials to enact restrictive zoning and building codes to control residential growth, 
exclude poor residents and substandard housing, and protect property values.  Between 
1946 and 1955, twenty-three of Flint‘s suburbs adopted zoning ordinances.  Suburban 
villages and cities such as Fenton, Flushing, Davison, Grand Blanc, and Mt. Morris were 
the first to adopt restrictive planning measures.  By the mid-1950s, however, rural and 
semi-rural townships throughout the county had also adopted such ordinances.  As part of 
their modernization efforts, members of the Flushing Township Board adopted a zoning 
plan in 1954.  That same year, board members enacted a restrictive building code for new 
residential developments.
39
  Under the new building and zoning codes adopted in the 
1940s and 1950s, suburban governments established minimum lot sizes and construction 
standards for residential structures.  The zoning codes in Flint and Flint Township 
established minimum lot sizes of five thousand square feet for most residential structures.  
Throughout the remainder of the county, however, minimum lot sizes were much larger.  
For instance, the 1947 zoning code for the city of Mt. Morris required lot sizes of at least 
12,075 square feet for new homes.  Residential lots in more rural areas of the out-county 
could be no smaller than twenty thousand square feet.  The building code in Flushing 
Township, to cite one example, stipulated that all new homes had to sit on lots of at least 
one hundred by two hundred feet.
40
   
Zoning codes and building regulations ultimately helped to bolster property 
values in new subdivisions while simultaneously preventing thousands of African 
                                                 
39
 Flushing Observer, December 17, 1953, January 14, 1954.  See also, Zimmer, Flint Area Study Report, 
v. 2, ch. 10. 
40
 Zimmer, Flint Area Study Report, v. 2, ch. 10. 
290 
 
Americans and poor whites from moving to the suburbs.
41
  Nevertheless, planners and 
other local government officials found it virtually impossible to control the 1950s 
building boom.  Across the county, new subdivisions and shopping centers seemed to 
sprout overnight where farms and forests had once stood.  School officials found it 
especially difficult to accommodate the growth of suburban Flint.  At the close of World 
War II, schools in the out-county were still largely rural institutions.  In 1947, there were 
ten one-room schoolhouses, twenty-eight two-room schools, and nineteen school 
buildings with three or more rooms in the twenty-six school districts that served the four 
townships surrounding Flint.  All of them, according to SSRP researcher Israel Hughes, 
―suffer from lack of that broad tax base which educators agree is necessary for good 
modern schools.‖
42
  To be sure, postwar suburban growth provided a larger tax base for 
funding suburban schools.  As well, officials in Davison and other school districts 
achieved more efficiency through consolidation and other political remedies.  Between 
1920 and 1955, a flurry of consolidations reduced the number of school districts in 
Genesee County from 137 to 36.  These consolidations allowed school officials to deliver 
more cost-efficient services to students and taxpayers.
43
  Still, though, the postwar Baby 
Boom resulted in massive enrollment increases throughout the county that overwhelmed 
teachers and school superintendents.  Although the post-World War II spike in childbirths 
increased school enrollments everywhere, suburban residents were far more likely to be 
parents than were their counterparts in Flint.  While only 10.7 percent of Flint‘s residents 
were under the age of five, nearly 15 percent of the residents in Flint‘s innermost suburbs 
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were pre-school aged.  By the mid-1950s, dozens of suburban officials throughout the 
county had declared that their schools were in crisis.
44
   
In the spring of 1958, M. D. Crouse, the superintendent of schools in Flushing, 
announced that Flushing High School was ―filled to capacity.‖  According to Principal 
Bertrand Long, the high school had actually surpassed its enrollment limit.  In the high 
school‘s home economics room, thirty-two students crowded into a space designed to 
hold only twenty people.  The study hall facilities, built to house a maximum of 140 
pupils, often contained in excess of two hundred students.  ―We cannot house adequately 
house our students now,‖ Superintendent Crouse warned.  ―We are definitely in trouble.‖  
At Flushing High School, there was only one teacher per 33.6 students.  While Flushing‘s 
schools were among the most overcrowded in the county, they were by no means unique.  
Throughout Genesee County, school buildings and classrooms were filled well beyond 
their capacities.  In the Mt. Morris and Beecher systems, for instance, the student-teacher 
ratios were 50:1 and 44:1, respectively.  On May 26, 1958, residents of the Flushing 
Community Schools district moved to resolve the crisis by voting in favor of a $1.5 
million bond proposal to construct a new high school.  During the 1950s, voters in dozens 
of suburban areas followed the same route and approved tax and bond proposals to hire 
new teachers and build new schools.  However, school officials found that new buildings 
were often full within years of opening.  In schools throughout the region, suburban 
children attended study hall in gymnasiums, took shop classes in converted coal sheds, 
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and learned to read in tents and rented banquet halls.  Surely, these schoolchildren could 
have attested to the fact that Flint‘s suburbs contained few ―bourgeois utopias.‖
45
                
During the 1950s, academics from the Social Science Research Project helped to 
document the unforeseen problems that had accompanied suburban growth and attempted 
to publicize the gravity of Flint‘s burgeoning suburban crisis.  The SSRP culminated in 
1957 with the release of the Flint Area Study Report, a comprehensive, multivolume 
assessment of suburban public opinion and the pitfalls associated with unplanned 
development in Genesee County.  The author of the Flint Area Study Report, Basil 
Zimmer, confirmed virtually all of the findings presented in the earlier reports.  Zimmer 
found that suburban residents were far less happy than most social commentators had 
presumed.  Complaints over the quality of the water supply, sewers, and schools, were 
foremost among the concerns of suburban residents.  According to Zimmer, however, 
these were only a few of the bevy of things that angered suburban homeowners.  In 1957, 
only 25 percent of suburban residents were happy with the quality of police protection in 
their neighborhoods—a surprisingly large figure in light of the fact that only four full-
time police officers serviced the four townships contiguous to Flint.  Less than half of the 
suburbanites that Zimmer and his associates polled were ―very satisfied‖ with the garbage 
disposal services offered in their communities.  Road conditions were also a source of 
discontent.  A mere 17 percent of household heads living in the urban fringe reported that 
they were ―highly satisfied‖ with their local streets and roads.  Likewise, just 12 percent 
of Zimmer‘s suburban respondents were happy with the street lighting services in their 
subdivisions.  Suburban residents were especially dissatisfied with library services and 
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the number and quality of parks and other recreational facilities available in the out-
county.  Moreover, one of every two household heads in suburban Flint believed that 
their neighborhoods lacked adequate public transportation.  Regardless of the issues in 
question, suburban residents informed Zimmer and his SSRP colleagues that they were 
displeased with the governmental services and amenities available in their communities.  
With few exceptions, these unhappy homeowners, many of whom had formerly resided 




Suburban residents‘ desires for urban services were not simply empty wishes.  In 
most instances, homeowners expressed a determination to fund new infrastructure and 
services through higher taxes.  As in most other metropolitan areas in the United States, 
the tax structure in Genesee County favored suburban taxpayers over those residing in the 
central city.  During the postwar era, local governments in the out-county received a 
significant portion of their revenues through sales tax returns from the state of Michigan.  
In Genesee County, residents living outside of Flint paid approximately 42 percent of the 
local sales tax receipts yet received nearly 50 percent of the county‘s sales tax returns.  
Because suburban areas received a disproportionately large part of their revenue from 
sales tax returns, local officials in the out-county were able to keep residential property 
taxes extremely low during the Depression and the early postwar era.  Additionally, low 
taxes in the suburbs resulted from the fact that village and township officials required 
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only minimal revenues to fund the basic services provided to suburban taxpayers.  
According to one study conducted during the mid-1950s, only 18 percent of suburban 
homeowners in Genesee County paid more than $100 per year in local property taxes.  
Even among wealthy suburban homeowners whose residences were worth more than 
$15,000, nearly 60 percent paid less than $100 each year in property taxes.
47
   
On average, suburban residents paid lower taxes than their counterparts in Flint.  
Nevertheless, assessments varied widely across the county depending upon property 
valuation policies, the number of industrial and commercial facilities in the taxing unit, 
and the services provided to residents.  Assessors in Flint taxed residential properties at a 
rate of 85.75 percent of the state‘s equalized value.  However, in Burton Township, 
which claimed a number of valuable industrial and commercial establishments, local tax 
officials could afford to assess residential properties at only 19.95 percent of their value.  
Similarly, Flint Township, which received most of its taxes from GM‘s plants on Van 
Slyke Road, assessed properties at only a fraction of their market worth.  By contrast, city 
officials in Davison, who relied almost exclusively on residential and commercial tax 
revenues to fund local schools and government, could not provide the same subsidies to 
homeowners.  In Davison, municipal authorities assessed properties at 59.1 percent of 
their value.  The higher property tax assessments in Davison reflected both the lack of 
industrial facilities in the area and the city‘s strong commitment to providing urbanized 
services in a largely residential suburb.
48
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Scholars of postwar metropolitan history often describe suburban white 
homeowners and taxes in starkly oppositional terms.
49
  However, the history of postwar 
suburban development in Genesee County severely undermines this analytical 
framework.  Beginning in the late 1940s and early 1950s, suburban officials in Genesee 
County increasingly followed the Davison and Flushing models by raising taxes and fees 
to meet the growing infrastructure and service needs of suburban homeowners.  By and 
large, suburbanites welcomed their new tax burdens.  At best, the quest for lower taxes 
played only a minor role in driving the postwar suburban migrations of white 
homeowners in Genesee County.  Once they arrived in their new subdivisions, suburban 
homeowners pressed local government officials to build new schools, sewers, and 
roads—even if that translated into a higher tax burden.  In 1948, SSRP researcher Betty 
Tableman found that less than a quarter of suburban homeowners moved to the out-
county in search of lower taxes.
50
  By 1955, that number had declined significantly.  
During the spring and summer of that year, SSRP members interviewed 670 homeowners 
in Genesee County on their attitudes towards taxes and services.  Of the suburban 
homeowners they spoke with, only 4 percent cited lower taxes among their reasons for 
moving to the suburbs.  Furthermore, nearly 70 percent of the fringe residents 
interviewed supported tax increases.  ―Contrary to popular belief,‖ Zimmer and his 
colleague Amos Hawley wrote, ―the fringe residents are much more receptive to the 
payment of higher taxes than are central city residents.‖
51
  The overwhelming support for 
higher taxes reflected the growing consensus among suburban homeowners that services 
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and infrastructure in the out-county were insufficient to meet FHA standards, public 
health mandates, and the service needs of growing families.             
 During the late 1940s and 1950s, tens of thousands of suburban residents in 
Genesee County embraced higher taxes in exchange for better schools and urban 
services.  Without hesitation, village councils, township boards, and school officials 
usually accommodated those wishes.  In 1947, Israel Hughes found that nearly half of the 
residents of suburban Genesee County paid a higher overall millage rate than citizens in 
Flint.  These higher rates derived in part from the practice of undervaluing suburban 
properties for tax purposes.  More importantly, however, suburban homeowners saw their 
millage rates and tax payments increase in the postwar decades because of special, voter-
approved levies to fund water projects, sewer systems, and new teachers and school 
facilities.
52
  Schools were paramount in shifting the suburban tax structure.  ―The school 
tax, in all areas,‖ SSRP researchers concluded, ―is the major burden placed on property 
owners since the revenue needs are much larger in respect to education, than for any 
other function of government.‖  Taxes in suburban Flint varied widely, correlating 
closely with population, the size of the tax base, the rate at which officials assessed 
properties, and the willingness of voters to endorse tax increases earmarked for schools, 
sewers, and other capital improvements.  Even within local political jurisdictions, voters 
paid differential payments that varied considerably depending upon the school district in 
which their property was located.  Regardless of the location, however, taxes rose 
dramatically in suburban Flint during the 1950s.  In a number of cases, suburban 
homeowners shouldered a significantly higher burden than city residents, primarily due to 
the cost of financing schools.  For instance, the owner of a $20,000 home in the city of 
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Flint paid a total of $195 in school and county property taxes in 1955.  In Flint, school 
taxes accounted for three-fourths of the overall $195 payment.  During the same year, 
owners of $20,000 homes in Burton Township‘s Atherton School District paid $251, of 
which 80 percent went towards the cost of operating schools.  Unlike the Carman school 
system, the nearby Dye School District of Flint Township received no taxes from GM‘s 
Van Slyke complex.  Consequently, homeowners in the Dye area who inhabited 
identically valued structures in 1955 paid $218 to fund schools and $36 in county 
property taxes, for a total tax payment of $254.  ―When services are considered,‖ Homer 
Dowdy asserted, many suburban residents ―find they‘re now paying as high taxes as their 
City friends. . . .‖  ―Their millage in some cases is just as high as in the City, although 
assessed valuations are not.‖  On a per capita basis, government in suburban Flint was 
more costly than in the central city.  Few suburban residents objected to that, however.
53
 
                                     
The Birth of Suburban Identity 
When they left Flint, most suburban migrants knew only basic facts about their new 
communities.  The most careful homebuyers no doubt conducted research on property 
values, investigated zoning restrictions, and measured the quality of a neighborhood‘s 
housing stock and utility services prior to purchasing new homes.  Other families visited 
local schools and inquired about taxes before investing their hard-earned money in new 
homes in suburban subdivisions.  For most suburban homesteaders, however, the search 
for real estate in Genesee County hinged on the quality and affordability of particular 
homes in discrete neighborhoods.  Few suburban homebuyers had either the time or the 
inclination to conduct extensive research on the governmental services available in the 
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suburbs—or, for that matter, on the broader political structures of their new cities, 
villages, and townships—before they moved.  Even fewer residents understood with any 
precision what it meant to be a resident of a place such as Flushing, Mt. Morris, or Burton 
Township.  Prior to the 1950s, prospective suburban migrants and new residents of the 
out-county had yet to form explicit identities as suburbanites.   
In the 1950s, suburban identities in Genesee County began to coalesce as 
homeowners—both on their own and collectively—worked to mitigate the unsatisfactory 
living conditions in the out-county.  After moving to their new subdivisions, most 
suburban homeowners were surprised and disappointed with the quality of suburban 
infrastructure, low property values, and the lack of urban amenities available to residents.  
Anger and frustration over substandard services and living conditions brought residents 
together politically and socially, helping to trigger a new sense of civic identity among 
suburban homeowners.  Parents who were upset over pupil overcrowding joined their 
local PTA and worked to support new taxes to fund school construction.  Homeowners 
joined neighborhood associations and block clubs in order to police their subdivisions, 
maintain racial segregation, protect property values, and exclude low-income rental units.  
Concerned residents united to urge their township supervisors to put up new streetlights, 
build water and sewer systems, and pave dirt roads.  As tax rates climbed to fund such 
improvement efforts, residents of the out-county began to see themselves and their 
communities in a different light.  The urbanization of Flint‘s suburbs spawned new forms 
of civic engagement and a new independent political consciousness among residents of 
suburban Genesee County.  The creation of water and sewer service districts, the 
establishment of school attendance boundaries, and the drive to develop infrastructure 
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helped suburban residents to attach meaning to their new status.  Moreover, these 
campaigns to urbanize the suburbs forced migrants to forge new identities as members of 
specific social and political units.   
This nascent suburban identity manifested itself in a variety of complex and often 
contradictory ways.  During the late 1940s and 1950s, suburban retailers and boosters 
across the county launched major public relations campaigns to persuade residents to 
patronize local stores instead of shopping in Flint.  In 1948, merchants in Fenton unveiled 
the new slogan, ―Buy, Build, Believe in Fenton,‖ to boost local sales and tax revenues.
54
  
A year later, the Fenton Independent published a full-page advertisement that informed 
readers, ―You get more for the dollar you spend in Fenton.‖  The advertisement offered 
seven reasons why Fenton residents should do business with local merchants.  In addition 
to pointing out that village residents could save on gasoline and parking fees by shopping 
closer to home, the advertisement appealed to the civic pride and shared financial 
interests of local community members.  ―Your money spent in Fenton provides better 
jobs for people who work in Fenton.‖  Equally important, the advertisement also 
informed readers that a healthy local economy provided many benefits to taxpayers.  
―Your money spent in Fenton comes back to you in the support of your village schools, 
your churches, your clubs . . . in fact every project that requires money and maintenance.‖  
―Increased retail business,‖ the advertisement continued, ―will either lower your 
contribution to any given Fenton project or make the project better financially.‖  The 
architects of this public relations campaign believed that Fenton residents, by shopping 
locally, strengthened the civic bonds that united residents into a coherent, distinct 
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community.  ―Beyond the money advantage,‖ the advertisement concluded, ―you have 
the satisfaction of being on the team that is Fenton.‖
55
   
 Like the grassroots agitation for new sewers and school tax levies, suburban 
shopping campaigns were essential components of community building.  As such, they 
were exceedingly common during the postwar era.  On December 4, 1952, business 
owners in Flushing announced the ―Shop Flushing First‖ initiative to lure holiday 
customers.  In a full-page advertisement that ran in the Flushing Observer, sponsors of 
this effort urged residents to ―deal with the folks you know‖ rather than the unknown 
proprietors in downtown Flint.   
Just figure the savings you make by doing your Christmas shopping with 
the local merchants in Flushing.  You save money by shopping here where 
prices are fair and the values the best. . . . You save the expense of 
gasoline and parking.  By taking advantage of the convenience of doing all 
your gift buying here in Flushing, you save time and effort also.
56
 
   
Through their participation in such campaigns, suburban shoppers no doubt gained a 
heightened sense of civic pride and a stronger emotional and financial attachment to their 
new communities.  At the same time, school levy and local consumer campaigns 
reminded suburban homeowners that their civic and financial interests were no longer 
synonymous with those of Vehicle City residents.  Indeed, community solidarity in the 
cities, villages, and townships of suburban Flint derived as much from the feeling that 
suburbanites shared a distinctive identity vis-à-vis Flint residents as it did from any 
positive sense of civic pride in new suburban communities.  Though suburbanites often 
fought among themselves about how best, or whether at all, to modernize their new 
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governments, all residents of the out-county could agree on at least one thing—by choice, 
Flint was no longer their home community.        
Many suburban residents envied Flint‘s community schools and the high-quality 
services available to Vehicle City residents.  By advocating improved schools and 
modern community water systems, suburban activists sought to replicate the services they 
had enjoyed in the city.  Yet those same individuals were vehemently opposed to 
annexation.  During their 1955 survey of Genesee County, SSRP researchers queried 
suburban residents on their feelings towards annexation, city-suburban cooperation, and 
other political solutions to the service and infrastructure crises of the out-county.  Among 
the suburban residents polled, only 9.1 percent endorsed annexation.  Only a slightly 
larger minority of suburban residents, approximately 28 percent, expressed support for 
some form of cooperative governmental arrangement between the city of Flint and the 
surrounding townships.  Talk of annexation was especially irksome to suburban residents.  
In 1957, Basil Zimmer and Amos Hawley reported the startling fact that nearly two-thirds 
of suburbanites in Genesee County would never, under any circumstance, vote for 
annexation.  In survey after survey, suburban homeowners made it clear that they wished 
to obtain city services without actually becoming part of the city of Flint.  For Zimmer 
and his colleagues, this meant that any solution to the ―fringe problem‖ would have to 
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The Battle over New Flint 
Basil Zimmer and his colleagues from the Social Science Research Project believed that 
they had an answer to suburban anger and other manifestations of unplanned 
metropolitan development.  According to Zimmer, the fringe problem derived from a 
mismatch between the limited resources of out-county governments and the increasing 
desire for urban services among suburban employers and homeowners.  Residents and 
business owners wanted better schools and roads, clean water, sanitary sewers, and 
planned industrial growth, yet their arcane township governments did not possess all of 
the taxing power required to fund such development.  ―The headless organization that law 
and tradition have made townships has bred inertia, inefficiency and inadequacy of 
services,‖ Homer Dowdy observed.
58
  Fortuitously, as Zimmer believed, the problems of 
the urban fringe dovetailed perfectly with widespread concerns in Flint over the 
suburbanization of homeowners and industry.  Although the city possessed the municipal 
services required to sustain new subdivisions, shopping centers, and industrial plants, it 
lacked the necessary land for expansion.  Undeveloped land was still plentiful in 
suburban Genesee County, however.  ―The city of Flint has the service and the Flint area 
has the space to form a perfect union for the benefit of all,‖ proponents of metropolitan 
government claimed.
59
  Seeking to unite the city and suburbs over a shared set of 
problems, Zimmer and his colleagues proposed New Flint, a plan ―that would establish a 
single governmental structure over the present and future densely settled urbanized 
area.‖
60
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Map 6.1.  Map of New Flint boundaries, 1958.  Courtesy of Flint Journal. 
 
From the outset, proponents of metropolitan government faced stiff opposition in 
industrialized suburbs.  In rapidly developing areas such as Flint Township, home of 
GM‘s $78 million complex of Chevrolet plants, anti-Flint sentiment was especially 
pronounced.  Fearing that Flint city commissioners would attempt to annex the GM 
plants on Bristol and Van Slyke Roads, which funded 80 percent of the township‘s 
Carman School District, in 1954 Flint Township Supervisor Arthur R. Markham led an 
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unsuccessful ballot initiative to incorporate the area into the city of Westhaven.
61
  The 
1954 incorporation measure, along with several additional aborted attempts, failed in 
large part because voters wished to preserve what was left of the area‘s semi-rural 
character.  As well, many Flint Township homeowners declined to support the effort 
because they feared the potentially astronomical costs associated with incorporation.  
Moreover, residents blocked the incorporation move because they concluded that city 
governments were too bureaucratic and far removed from the day-to-day concerns of 
ordinary residents.
62
  Nevertheless, Markham‘s staunch opposition to both annexation 
and metropolitan government received widespread support from taxpayers in Flint 
Township.  Seeking to preempt future drives towards suburban incorporation, advocates 
of metropolitan government sprang into action during the mid-1950s by organizing the 
Flint Area Study Group and the New Flint Planning Committee.  Following several years 
of additional research and planning, proponents of New Flint officially unveiled their 
proposal in 1957. 
 The New Flint plan sought to unite twenty-six governmental units within the 
urbanized area of Genesee County into a single city with a unified school district and a 
regional planning agency.  The proposed new city, over 162-square miles in total area, 
included the cities of Flint, Mt. Morris, and Grand Blanc, the townships of Grand Blanc, 
Genesee, and Burton, along with portions of Flint, Mt. Morris, Mundy, Vienna, and 
Thetford Townships.
63
  Well aware of suburban public opinion on annexation, advocates 
of the New Flint plan framed their proposal as neither an attempt to consolidate existing 
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governments nor a scheme to acquire new land for the city.  Rather, the New Flint 
proposal asked voters in all affected areas to create a new city altogether.  By creating a 
new and much larger city, Zimmer, Sheldon LaTourette, and the other architects of New 
Flint hoped to stimulate economic growth, modernize the county‘s infrastructure, deliver 
greater governmental efficiency, and ensure parity for all taxpayers and schoolchildren.  
―With its 26 separate governments,‖ a New Flint publication noted, ―the present Flint 
Community is like an automobile consisting of a Chevrolet engine – Cadillac body – 
Ford transmission – Buick chassis – and Chrysler wheels. . . . But, it can virtually be 
Aladdin and his magic lamp bringing PROGRESS – SECURITY – OPPORTUNITIES 
for each and every one of us!‖
64
        
Understanding the cleavages that divided urban and suburban voters, New Flint 
supporters crafted a sophisticated marketing campaign that they hoped would appeal to 
city dwellers and suburbanites alike.  For residents of industrialized suburbs such as 
Burton and Flint Townships, who most feared losing their GM plants, New Flint 
advocates promised to bring new sewers, clean water, fire and police protection, and 
paved roads.  In residential suburbs, however, where homeowners alone bore the cost of 
schools and infrastructure development, proponents of New Flint focused on education, 
offering a unified school district with equalized educational expenditures and taxes.  
―Plants now located in townships belong to all the people in the community,‖ Zimmer 
asserted at a New Flint Rally in Mt. Morris, ―not just to those who happen to live on one 
side of the road and therefore in one school district and not another.‖  Inside the city, the 
New Flint marketing campaign centered on economic growth, the recapture of ―runaway‖ 
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plants, and the preservation of urban manufacturing: ―In the NEW city of Flint there will 
be ample room and facilities to entice new industries and the expansion of present 
industries for the benefit of all,‖ New Flint supporters claimed.  ―Industrial development 
has reached its peak in the Flint area unless a more favorable atmosphere can be created.‖  
At a July 1958 rally held in Mt. Morris, New Flint supporter Lewis Shegos urged voters 
to endorse the plan out of concern for their children: ―Think about where your boy is 
going to get a job if we don‘t create the conditions for bringing in industry.‖  Moreover, 
supporters of metropolitan government argued that Flint, a city whose products helped to 
drive suburban development across the nation, had a special duty to help solve regional 
development problems.  ―It has been said . . .,‖ Dowdy wrote, ―that, since Flint has 
contributed so greatly to suburban living by helping motorize America, it has an 
obligation to contribute to the solution of suburban problems.‖
65
  New Flint boosters 
believed that they could sell their plan to virtually all of the region‘s constituencies.
66
   
 With its emphasis on governmental efficiency and economic growth, the New 
Flint plan attracted strong support from GM executives and other members of the city‘s 
pro-growth coalition.  Indeed, the leadership of the New Flint Planning Committee 
included Harding Mott, vice-president of the Mott Foundation, AC Spark Plug executive 
Joseph Anderson, ―Oz‖ Kelly of the Manufacturers Association of Flint, and local 
business managers from Consumers Power Company.  ―We need one government unit 
that should include all of Genesee County,‖ Anderson claimed.  ―Just think of all the 
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money that would save.‖
67
  Moreover, Mayor George Algoe and his colleagues on the 
Flint City Commission unanimously endorsed the measure.
68
  Wishing to create new 
jobs, Robert Carter, the regional director of the UAW, and Norm Bully, president of the 
Flint CIO, also offered their endorsement of the New Flint plan.
69
  Among black 
residents, the New Flint proposal failed to generate similar enthusiasm, however, in part 
because neither the Flint Area Study Group nor the New Flint Planning Committee had 
any black members.  The Flint NAACP and Urban League chapters took no formal 
position on the issue, and many black voters, even those who saw the promise of a larger 
new city, resented New Flint‘s designers for shutting them out of the planning process.  
Throughout the mid-1950s campaign for a new city, advocates of regional government 
consistently failed to address the special concerns of black voters.  In particular, African 
Americans in the city feared that a New Flint, significantly larger and whiter than the Old 
Flint, would undermine black political power by diminishing the black portion of the 
electorate.   
Undeterred by black ambivalence toward the new city, New Flint supporters 
aggressively canvassed white voters in the city and suburbs for their support.  In 
suburban Flint, proponents of New Flint engendered a hostile response among 
homeowners and government officials.  In the fall of 1957, shortly after the release of the 
proposal, Earl H. Swift, a county supervisor who represented the south suburb of Grand 
Blanc, expressed his opposition:  
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I‘m not for it.  I think we can run our own business without Flint coming 
in.  The only reason Flint wants Grand Blanc is because of the [GM] tank 
plant. . . . Flint‘s got to the place where they can‘t expand anymore and 
this deal is all to their advantage, not to ours.  I‘ve talked to a lot of people 
and found only one in favor of it. 
   
John R. Dickenson, a supervisor representing Flint Township, concurred with his 
colleague, claiming, ―The biggest majority out here are against it [New Flint].  They 
moved out to get away from the city as it was.‖
70
   
Swift and Dickenson were correct in anticipating the grassroots suburban 
response to New Flint.  Indeed, very few suburban residents rose in support of the plan.  
Beginning in the spring of 1958, New Flint activists circulated petitions to have the 
proposal placed on the fall ballot.  The simmering suburban opposition to New Flint 
exploded yet again in April 1958, when Carman School District Superintendent Frank 
Hartman vowed to fight against the plan.
71
  Following Hartman‘s announcement, school 
district and township officials in Grand Blanc, Burton Township, Beecher, and Flint 
Township united in quick succession against the initiative.  In order to increase support 
for the measure, Zimmer and other New Flint supporters hosted a series of meetings 
throughout the county in the spring and summer of 1958.  Much to Zimmer‘s 
consternation, thousands of suburban officials and residents attended the informational 
meetings to voice their opposition.  On April 10, at a New Flint meeting hosted by 
Sheldon LaTourette in Mt. Morris Township, an unidentified woman denounced the plan: 
―Flint doesn‘t need us and we don‘t need Flint.‖  Towards the end of the meeting, another 
unnamed skeptic invited LaTourette to visit new schools in the suburb of Beecher, home 
to GM‘s massive Ternstedt plant: ―There is not one thing in New Flint that can help us in 
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  At meeting after meeting, suburban residents from across the county turned 
out by the hundreds to condemn the creation of a new city. 
 By the summer of 1958, suburban opponents of metropolitan government had 
formed the New Flint Resistance Committee (NFRC).  Led by Louis Traycik, a resident 
of Grand Blanc, Carman Schools Superintendent Frank Hartman, and Joseph Parisi of the 
Michigan Township Association, members of the NFRC charged that New Flint, a 
scheme to steal suburban resources and ―subjugate our suburban people,‖ would only 
bring higher taxes, unmanageable government bureaucracies, and poorer schools.  ―Super 
cities,‖ NFRC petitions claimed, ―mean super tax dollars.‖
73
  Already having voted to 
fund community water systems and new school facilities, residents in Mt. Morris and 
other urbanized suburbs viewed with great skepticism any plan that threatened to raise 
additional taxes—especially when those taxes were to fund either existing or forthcoming 
services.  ―We‘ll eventually have sewers and things anyway,‖ Flint Township Supervisor 
Dickenson maintained.
74
   
Significantly, many opponents of New Flint argued that a metropolitan 
government would forever undermine their new civic identities as suburbanites.  After 
attending a March meeting in Grand Blanc, Flint Journal reporter Lou Giampetroni 
described how the development of self-conscious suburban identities was undermining 
support for New Flint: ―At the meeting there was not as much an indication of being 
‗against New Flint‘ as there was ‗for Grand Blanc.‘  Those at the meeting indicated that 
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they wanted to keep their identity as a community.‖
75
  Similarly, at an anti-New Flint 
rally held at Davison High School, Traycik argued, ―We are trying to retain local 
democracy.  If this thing goes through you‘ll lose the common touch.‖
76
  Whether they 
were pro-suburban or anti-Flint, thousands of suburban residents united around the NFRC 
to block the New Flint initiative.       
The New Flint proposal generated an especially vigorous backlash in the suburb 
of Swartz Creek.  Enraged by the plan, voters there seceded from both Flints, existing and 
proposed, by incorporating as a city.  Prior to 1958, Swartz Creek, located ten miles 
southwest of downtown Flint, was an unincorporated, predominantly residential area 
consisting of parts of Gaines, Clayton, and Flint Townships.  During the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, the Swartz Creek area was among the fastest growing residential suburbs in 
the county.  In 1957, GM provided a major boost to the local economy by opening a new 
Chevrolet parts and service plant in the area.  Fearing that members of the Flint City 
Commission would attempt to annex the new facility, residents of these three townships 
attended a series of meetings in the fall of 1957 to discuss the possibility of incorporation.  
Local residents Paul Spaniola, John Pajtas, and other supporters of incorporation moved 
quickly to mobilize concerned property owners upon learning of the New Flint proposal.  
In November 1957, one hundred residents attended a public meeting to discuss 
incorporation.  Shortly after the meeting, those who supported a new city formed the 
Swartz Creek Incorporation Study Committee.  Within weeks of the November meeting, 
members of the study committee and other supporters of incorporation were drawing 
boundaries for the new city and collecting signatures to have the measure placed on the 
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ballot.  On March 7, 1958, proponents of the new city submitted petitions for an 
incorporation election to the county clerk.  After certifying the petitions, the clerk 
scheduled an election for August 5, 1958.
77
   
Throughout the spring and summer of 1958, proponents of the home rule city of 
Swartz Creek waged vigorous campaigns both for municipal incorporation and against 
New Flint.  The editors of the Genesee County Free Press, a weekly newspaper serving 
the area, led the campaign for the new city.  In the months leading up to the election, the 
Free Press printed a series of articles detailing the many benefits of incorporation.  The 
editors maintained that incorporation would preserve the area‘s tax base and provide 
funds to pave new streets and sidewalks, build new schools, provide better police 
protection, and lure new development.  The quest for more modern, urban-style services 
played a key role in driving the Swartz Creek incorporation campaign.  Nevertheless, for 
most residents of the Swartz Creek area, the single most important issue to be resolved in 
the August election was the fate of the GM plant.  ―We must incorporate now to keep the 
tax base backing of the Chevrolet Plant in our school district,‖ members of the 
incorporation study committee urged.  In response to such pleas, New Flint boosters 
quickly pointed out that the boundaries of the new megacity included neither the 
proposed city of Swartz Creek nor GM‘s new warehouse facility.  Not convinced by such 
reassurances, incorporation activists in Swartz Creek argued that New Flint, if 
implemented, would ultimately lead to the annexation of the Chevrolet facility and the 
evisceration of the area‘s tax base.  ―If this city incorporation fails to pass, there is a 
possibility the plant will be annexed to Flint.  If this happens our backing per school child 
will DECREASE 50%.  We need this plant!  We must vote YES!‖  Fears over losing the 
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plant at some future date drove hundreds of Swartz Creek residents to the polls in the 
summer of 1958.  On August 5, Swartz Creek voters declared their independence from 
Flint by endorsing the incorporation measure.  Two days after the election, the Genesee 
County Free Press celebrated the victory and looked ahead to the city‘s future: ―There 
are bound to be problems [that] arise, and the difficulties to be surmounted should not be 
minimized but we at last have the tools to work with to solve our own problems. . . . We 
are in an enviable position as far as a tax base is concerned and by using common sense 
and making haste slowly we can start to solve our problems.‖
78
                    
The incorporation of Swartz Creek came as a stunning blow to supporters of 
regional government.  Nevertheless, because Swartz Creek was not included in the New 
Flint boundaries, the campaign for a new metropolitan polity continued.  Throughout the 
summer of 1958, New Flint supporters collected petitions from voters to have the 
initiative placed on the November ballot.  Despite strong grassroots opposition in 
suburban Genesee County, the well-funded supporters of New Flint had little difficulty 
collecting the required signatures.  In August, New Flint advocates submitted their 
petitions for certification to the Genesee County Board of Supervisors.  Led by 
Supervisor Thomas E. Bell of Mt. Morris Township, suburban opponents of New Flint 
formed a clear majority on the county board.  Fearful of losing electoral support, political 
power—and perhaps even their jobs—if New Flint became a reality, township 
representatives on the board of supervisors formed a solid block against the New Flint 
measure.  Although the board‘s legislative affairs committee had determined that the 
New Flint petitions were valid and legal, Bell nonetheless urged all suburban supervisors 
to reject the initiative.  On August 12, suburban supervisors delivered Bell a major 
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political victory by denying the New Flint petitions.  Acting against the advice of their 
own legal counsel, county supervisors, by a vote of twenty-five to thirteen, declined to 
place the New Flint proposal on the fall ballot.
79
   
Following the August vote, members of the New Flint Planning Committee filed 
an emergency appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court.  In a widely circulated press 
release, committee members urged the court to overturn the board‘s decision: ―The 
supporters of New Flint firmly believe that the people have the right to vote on this 
proposal.  They have legally petitioned the Board of Supervisors to grant them their 
rights.‖
80
  Members of the NFRC responded to the charges by invoking the constitutional 
principles protecting the rights of minorities.  ―The American concept of justice in 
government grants no given majority the power of indiscriminate transgression upon the 
rights of its ranking minorities,‖ a NFRC statement countered.
81
  After agreeing to hear 
the New Flint appeal, justices on the state supreme court hosted a hearing on September 
9.  On behalf of the county board of supervisors, attorney John G. David argued that 
consolidation, rather than incorporation, was the only legal means of forming New Flint.  
Furthermore, David reminded the justices that incorporation was legal only in 
unincorporated areas.  Because New Flint included already incorporated cities such as 
Grand Blanc and Mt. Morris, David urged the court to rule against the New Flint ballot 
initiative.   
On October 8, 1958, the justices delivered a mortal blow to the New Flint plan.  
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Harry F. Kelly, the court accepted David‘s 
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arguments on consolidation and refused to order the November election.
82
  Although 
Kelly‘s legal opinion kept alive the possibility of a new consolidation campaign, the 
October ruling marked the unofficial end of the movement for metropolitan government 
in Genesee County.  For regardless of the openings left by the court‘s decision or the 
machinations of New Flint‘s powerful devotees, suburban voters had clearly triumphed 
over GM executives, local growth boosters, and metropolitan activists by voicing their 
strong opposition to metropolitan government.  New Flint was dead, and, to many city 
boosters, Old Flint seemed to be dying. 
__________ 
 
During the postwar era, suburban homeowners and their governments in Genesee County 
underwent striking changes.  These transformations emerged from a combination of 
grassroots demands for services and the top-down policy initiatives of corporate leaders 
and elected officials.  In the 1940s and 1950s, federal and local housing and economic 
development policies exerted intense pressure on suburban officials to modernize their 
―horse and buggy‖ governments.  Simultaneously, new suburban homeowners demanded 
better, urban-style services from their local elected officials.  The urbanization of 
suburban governments helped to generate a secessionist spirit among white suburbanites 
in Genesee County.  The polarizing battles over New Flint illustrated—and, ultimately, 
widened—the growing rifts between urban and suburban voters and politicians in 
Genesee County.  In the decade following the New Flint defeat, the relationships between 
Flint and its suburbs deteriorated even further as city officials devised new strategies to 
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enlarge the city‘s boundaries, recapture suburban industry, and assemble developable 
urban land.  Those efforts centered on the Flint City Commission‘s two-pronged strategy 
to annex suburban factories and shopping centers and clear ―blighted‖ residential land in 
the city through urban renewal.  For their part, suburban officials responded to the 
prospect of annexation by rushing to incorporate into either cities or independent ―charter 
townships.‖  In the 1960s, political battles over space, jobs, and taxes produced a 
fractured metropolitan region with a rigidly segregated, rapidly deindustrializing, and 
increasingly black central city at its core.   
Secessionist political sentiment among suburban opponents of New Flint did not 
originate as a backlash against the perceived racial threats of metropolitan government.  
During the 1940s and 1950s, suburban migrants almost never cited race as one of the 
factors that informed their decisions to leave the city.  Of the city dwellers who moved to 
suburban Flint between 1945 and 1960, the overwhelming majority left behind 
neighborhoods that were still all white.  Moreover, white suburban opponents of the New 
Flint proposal seldom inserted race, at least not openly, into the political debates over 
metropolitan government.  Race did not play a central role in driving the movement to 
defeat New Flint.  Rather, the opposition to New Flint resulted from the spatial and 
political reorganization of the metropolis orchestrated by a combination of pro-growth 
federal and local development policies, corporate growth strategies, and the grassroots 
efforts of local homeowners to urbanize their local governments.  Nevertheless, this did 
not mean that suburban residents in any way supported the opening of their 
neighborhoods and communities to African-American families.  To the contrary, white 
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homeowners in suburban Flint were as committed as their counterparts in the city to 
maintaining rigid residential and school segregation.   
During the 1950s, race simmered beneath the surface of political debates on 
annexation and metropolitan government.  In the decade following the defeat of New 
Flint, the racial fears of suburban white homeowners exploded into the open, however.  
Though very few suburbanites mentioned African Americans when they denounced New 
Flint, within a few short years of its defeat white opponents of annexation were making 
open appeals to race.  What had changed?  Prior to the 1960s, the racial caste system that 
prevailed in postwar Genesee County had yet to come under sustained attack from civil 
rights activists.  Because suburbanites and proponents of New Flint were equally 
committed to maintaining racial segregation, few suburban residents perceived that 
regional government posed any threat to Jim Crow.  During the 1960s, however, black 
activists mounted a direct attack on the region‘s residential and educational color lines.  
The 1960s desegregation campaigns brought the issue of race—and the racial 
implications of whites-only suburban development—into the center of local political 
debates in both the city and the out-county.  
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Part 2: Civil Rights, Suburban Revolts, and the Roots of the Rust Belt 
 
Chapter 7 
“Our City Believes in Lily-White Neighborhoods”:  
The Campaign for Open Housing 
 
 
The spatial reorganization of metropolitan Flint engendered political upheavals both in 
the all-white suburbs and among African Americans living inside the central city.  In 
1958, suburban opponents of metropolitan government organized a successful legal and 
political movement to block the New Flint proposal.  While suburban homeowners, 
village councils, and township boards worked to consolidate their independence from 
Flint, civil rights activists in the city were preparing to launch major campaigns for open 
housing and school desegregation.  The open housing movement began quietly in the 
1940s and 1950s, exploded across the city in the 1960s, and reached a denouement in 
1967-68.  Prior to the late 1960s, fair housing activists in Flint met stiff resistance from 
local housing officials, white homeowners, and members of the Flint City Commission.  
In the summer of 1967, however, as urban riots exploded in the Vehicle City and in 
nearby Detroit, Flint activists forced reluctant city commissioners to pass a municipal fair 
housing law.  A year later, open housing supporters defended the city‘s new law in a 
hotly contested referendum campaign.  The 1968 victory made Flint voters the first in the 
nation to endorse open housing at the polls.  In the wake of the 1968 referendum, civic 
boosters, many of whom had done little to support open housing, cheered the city‘s 
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historic civil rights milestone, arguing that the new law made Flint one of the most 
progressive and ―open‖ cities in the United States.  Despite such claims, however, the 
1968 referendum did little to undermine the economic, political, and social foundations of 
the color line.  By the close of the decade, the battles over open housing had yielded a 





Postwar Politics and the Origins of Flint‘s Fair Housing Movement 
Like many politically moderate African Americans in the Vehicle city, Urban League 
officials Frank Corbett and Arthur Edmunds embraced the private market as a solution to 
the city‘s postwar Negro housing crisis.  During the 1950s, Corbett, Edmunds, and other 
Urban League officials sought to persuade developers, lenders, and realtors that 
individual black buyers as well as African-American communities were safe investments 
for the city‘s booming real estate industry.  In 1954, Corbett and Edmunds published The 
Negro Housing Market: An Untapped Resource?—a pamphlet designed to stimulate 
interest in Negro housing among builders and mortgage lenders.  Their study uncovered 
thousands of unhappy black citizens who desperately wanted, and could afford to 
purchase, new homes.  By the mid-point of the decade, there were 17,800 African 
Americans living in Flint, a figure that represented nearly 10 percent of the city‘s 
population.  The city‘s segregated black neighborhoods featured the most dilapidated and 
overcrowded housing in the region.  Among the African-American householders living in 
the city, 56 percent shared their homes with either related or unrelated individuals.  On 
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average, black-occupied homes consisted of 2.6 bedrooms, with each room housing 1.7 
persons.  Over 67 percent of the dwelling units in which African Americans resided 
contained no private bathroom.  Although two-thirds of the city‘s black families owned 
their own homes, Corbett and Edmunds nonetheless found that over 50 percent of the 
city‘s black families desired to move to a new neighborhood.  Of those who wished to 
move, over 40 percent sought to purchase a new or existing home.  Prospective black 
homebuyers, according to the Urban League‘s survey, could afford on average slightly 
more than $1,100 for a down payment on a new or existing home.  Based upon the results 
of their 1954 study, Corbett and Edmunds called for a citywide initiative to construct new 
homes for Negro purchasers.  Well aware of the entrenched barriers to federally insured 
housing, Corbett and Edmunds hoped to prevail upon local members of the private 




 Members of the city‘s housing industry reacted swiftly and harshly against the 
claims of Corbett and Edmunds.  Within weeks of the study‘s release, local builders I. A. 
MacArthur and Eino Rajala had angrily denounced the Urban League‘s findings.  
Pointing to several unsold homes that they had speculatively built in Floral Park and St. 
John, MacArthur and Rajala maintained that black buyers were simply not interested in 
purchasing new residences.  ―Negroes can go to any builder if they want a home 
constructed,‖ Rajala stated.  ―It looks like they‘re content to live under present 
circumstances.‖  In response, Corbett pointed out that the handful of new homes 
constructed by Rajala and MacArthur were all in the ghetto, most of them situated near 
older, more dilapidated structures in the segregated Floral Park and St. John districts.  
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Corbett added that many of the homes were located in a designated flood plain adjacent 
to the Flint River.  ―It all boils down to what the builder has to offer for the price he 
asks,‖ Corbett observed.  For Corbett and Edmunds, both staunch believers in the market 
imperative, the handful of homes that local builders marketed to black buyers were not 
worth the risk to their hard-earned savings.  Unwilling to lodge a structural critique of the 
home financing industry, Corbett and Edmunds failed to mention the difficulties that 
black purchasers faced in securing home loans during their debate with local builders.  
Yet black buyers—even those who had accumulated significant savings and desired to 
remain in their segregated neighborhoods—faced near insurmountable obstacles in 
obtaining financing for the purchase of new and existing homes.  For their part, 
developers such as Rajala and MacArthur interpreted the unsold homes in St. John and 
Floral Park as an indication that black citizens desired no new housing.  In reality, 
however, black citizens faced systematic barriers to both home financing and 
neighborhood choice that effectively concealed from the market a groundswell of 
African-American demand for new, better, and unrestricted housing throughout the city 
and suburbs.
3
                   
 The debate over Negro housing conditions and the potentialities of Flint‘s black 
housing market raged during the 1950s and 1960s.  A year after the 1954 dispute, the 
Flint Urban League revisited the housing shortage during a citywide conference on 
neighborhood living conditions.  Hoping to continue the debate from the previous year, 
the Urban League invited Rajala to address the conference formally.  During his 
presentation, Rajala once again denied that there was a Negro housing shortage:  
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As for Negro housing, I have a bad taste in my mouth about it.  There is 
only one reason why every Negro in the city of Flint does not have a 
house, the one reason being they do not want to buy it.  There are new 
homes that have been vacant for months, unsold.  I am sure we all know 
the reason.  The people would rather buy a larger house on Fifth or Sixth 
Street [in Floral Park], rent about two rooms to fifteen people and exploit 
the property to the last cent, taking out every penny, and not putting back a 
single cent for maintenance.   
 
Conflating need with blacks‘ ability to purchase, Rajala reaffirmed his position that there 
was no housing crisis for African Americans in Flint.
4
 
 Other speakers vehemently disagreed with Rajala‘s observations.  Following 
Rajala to the rostrum was John W. Davis, manager of the Davis Realty Company and a 
former president of the county board of real estate.  Though as a realtor Davis was an 
unlikely spokesperson for civil rights activists, he nonetheless echoed the Urban League‘s 
position.  In fact, Davis directly contradicted Rajala, arguing that there was a strong 
demand for new and used homes among the city‘s black residents.  Davis asserted that 
there were many black buyers, but that they were unable to purchase homes ―due to the 
fact that they cannot find a lending institution willing to make the loan.‖  ―Mortgage 
money for the purchase of used homes,‖ he continued, ―is practically impossible to get at 
the present time.‖  Even in the rare cases where the FHA made commitments to finance 
homes for black buyers, Davis maintained, banks often insisted upon restrictive 
conditions including higher down payments and shorter repayment schedules.  Such 
policies were prohibitive for many black buyers.  Unlike Rajala, then, who blamed black 
people themselves for poor housing, Davis suggested that local lenders played an 
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 Flint Urban League Director Rosa L. Kimp addressed the conference following 
Davis‘s remarks.  Still angered by Rajala‘s spiteful speech, Kimp delivered an emotional 
presentation.  ―We are living for the most part in compressed segregated neighborhoods 
whose boundaries are well defined,‖ Kimp charged.  ―Again I say without fear of 
contradiction that this segregated living pattern is forced!‖  Building upon Davis‘s 
critique of local bankers, Kimp indicted the entire housing industry—including federal 
officials, lenders, builders, brokers, and landlords—for the ―shameful‖ state of Negro 
housing in Flint.  Kimp, a longtime resident of the Vehicle City, also bemoaned the fact 
that white newcomers, ―come in and live anywhere they wish, with the only test being 
their ability to pay for the houses they occupy,‖ while ―Negroes who have spent all of 
their lives here and who have made and are making invaluable contributions to the 
enrichment of our city [are] being denied the opportunity to live in decent homes and 
surroundings.‖
6
           
 The Urban League‘s public relations efforts during the mid-1950s helped to bring 
the discriminatory policies of lenders, real estate brokers, and builders into the forefront 
of Flint‘s burgeoning fair housing campaign.  During the 1950s and 1960s, activists and 
ordinary black citizens alike confronted near-daily reminders that local bankers, realtors, 
builders, appraisers, landlords, and white homeowners were as committed as FHA 
officials to maintaining Jim Crow housing patterns.  By the close of the 1940s, civil 
rights activists had won important victories against racially restrictive housing covenants 
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and openly segregationist FHA policies.  Yet members of both the federal and local 
housing industries continued to uphold the color line through a variety of less explicit 
tactics that included mortgage redlining, blockbusting, and racial steering.       
 The severe postwar housing shortages that plagued African Americans in Flint 
stemmed in part from the city‘s delayed efforts to implement a public housing program.  
Unlike New York City, Detroit, Chicago, and other cities that adopted public housing in 
the 1930s, Flint did not inaugurate a public housing program until 1964, when citizen 
relocations due to urban renewal and freeway construction projects forced the city to 
provide subsidized housing for displaced persons.  Hoping to secure the long-term 
growth of the private housing industry, builders, realtors, and mortgage lenders played a 
decisive role in thwarting public housing in the Vehicle City.  During the late 1930s, and 
once again in the late 1940s, civil rights and trade union activists aggressively lobbied 
city officials for public housing.  On both occasions, the Flint City Commission 
responded to public pressure by voting to create a public housing commission.  Yet in 
each instance, builders and real estate developers launched polarizing referenda 
campaigns to block the city‘s efforts.  In 1939, and again in 1950, voters responded to the 
builders‘ claims that the city did not need federally subsidized, ―socialist‖ housing by 
voting overwhelmingly to abolish the programs.
7
  Throughout the Depression-era and 
postwar campaigns for public housing, builders such as Robert Gerholz consistently 
denied that African Americans suffered from either racial discrimination or housing 
shortages.  During the 1949-50 debate, Gerholz commended builders for meeting the 
postwar housing needs of Flint‘s growing population, claiming, ―Vacancies are beginning 
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  Similarly, Davis, when he was president of the Genesee County Real 
Estate Board, argued that public housing was unnecessary because there was still a 
surplus of low-cost, FHA-insured homes available in the suburbs.
9
  Moreover, even when 
confronted with irrefutable evidence of the city‘s housing shortages, Gerholz and other 
representatives from the building and development industries promised to redouble their 
efforts to construct low-cost housing for all of the city‘s newcomers, regardless of race.
10
  
Builders such as Gerholz believed that the market would accommodate the housing needs 
of African Americans.          
 Using a combination of private funds and federal subsidies, Gerholz and other 
developers constructed thousands of new residences in the Flint area during the housing 
boom of the 1950s and early 1960s.  Yet builders, bankers, and realtors made only a 
handful of those new homes available to African-American buyers, virtually all of them 
within the confines of Flint‘s rapidly deteriorating St. John and Floral Park 
neighborhoods.
11
  Largely excluded from both the private and federally insured home 
purchasing markets, all but a few of the city‘s black newcomers in the 1950s sought to 
acquire rental units.  However, local and federal housing policies also contributed to a 
severe crisis in the city‘s rental market, which placed an added burden on thousands of 
black home seekers.  Between 1942 and 1948, as home ownership rates in the city soared 
to nearly 80 percent, five thousand rental properties disappeared from Flint‘s housing 
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  Hoping to capitalize on the booming real estate market that the FHA and private 
banks had helped to create—and frustrated over the city commission‘s limited 
experiment with rent control—thousands of white landlords throughout the city placed 
their rental homes for sale during the 1940s and 1950s.  According to Flint CIO official 
Jake Waldo, who investigated complaints of mass evictions in 1943, landlords evicted 
between eight and twenty Negro renters per week during the war.
13
  Because of these 
evictions, housing shortages multiplied and living conditions for African Americans 
deteriorated sharply.  In the fall of 1943, the Flint Journal noted that desperate home 
seekers in St. John had converted dozens of abandoned storefronts into temporary 
shelters while hundreds of other black migrants ―doubled up‖ with friends and relatives 
in apartments.
14
   
By the close of the decade, the mismatch between the city‘s growing black 
population and the decline in rental units had provided enough of an incentive for the 
area‘s remaining landlords to subdivide single-family homes into tiny apartments.  Local 
landlords rented ―kitchenettes‖ and other small apartments for exorbitant rates.  Between 
1940 and 1950, the median monthly rent in the city increased from $25 to $47, one of the 
largest increases recorded in the United States, while the number of apartments that 
leased for less than $30 per month declined by 75 percent.  During the first half of the 
1950s, median rents in the city increased yet again, jumping to $75 per month by 1955.
15
  
Citywide, Flint‘s overall vacancy rate declined during the 1940s from 2.5 to less than 0.5 
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percent.  In the St. John and Floral Park neighborhoods, where the city‘s growing but still 
segregated black community competed for an even more limited number of overcrowded 
rental units, the vacancy rate was negligible.  ―It is next to impossible,‖ Urban League 
official Charles Eason charged in 1947, ―to find a Negro home in Flint today where there 
is not some doubling up.‖
16
  To postwar author and activist Frank Gillespie, who felt 
―fenced in‖ by Jim Crow housing, Flint seemed to be a ―city whose name is analogous to 
its character.‖
17
     
 The housing shortages and neighborhood deterioration that plagued Flint‘s 
African-American community during the 1940s worsened dramatically during the 1950s 
and early 1960s.  Between 1940 and 1955, Flint‘s African-American population tripled to 
nearly eighteen thousand.  By the close of the 1960s, the city‘s black population had 
grown to nearly thirty-five thousand.  Yet over the same period the boundaries of the 
city‘s segregated black neighborhoods remained essentially fixed, with all but a handful 
of African Americans living in St. John, Floral Park, and other increasingly overcrowded, 
segregated, and polluted neighborhoods along Saginaw Street, which formed the north-
south center line of the city.  As living conditions deteriorated in the city‘s overcrowded 
ghettoes, black activists launched a citywide campaign to draw the community‘s attention 
toward substandard housing conditions and forced segregation.  In 1952, George Friley, a 
black restaurateur from St. John, addressed members of the Exchange Club at the Durant 
Hotel.  Friley reminded club members that in spite of sharp black population increases, 
―No provision has been made for additional Negro housing.‖  ―Negroes,‖ Friley charged, 
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―can walk into any bank in town and if they‘ve got the down payment can receive 
funding for any automobile they want to buy.  But let them try to borrow money to buy a 
house.  In most cases they can‘t.‖
18
  A year after Friley made his remarks, the Flint Urban 
League‘s Arthur Edmunds issued a formal request to the Flint City Commission to 
investigate Negro housing conditions, noting that the housing shortage for black citizens 
had reached ―critical proportions‖ and that ―large numbers of families are unable to 
secure any type of adequate living quarters.‖
19
  ―Today the supply of rental housing is so 
short,‖ wrote Edmunds and Frank Corbett, ―that it is virtually impossible to rent an 
unfurnished three room apartment, even in slum areas, for less than $18.00 per week.  
Unattached single dwelling rental units are unavailable at any price.‖
20
  Alarmed by the 
burgeoning housing crisis and the chorus of black voices demanding reform, in 1954 the 
city commission complied with the Urban League‘s request by creating a fifteen-member 
housing study committee.  The commission also ordered City Fire Marshall Elwood 
Rutherford to hire two full-time employees to conduct code enforcement inspections 
throughout the city.       
 Commencing in the spring of 1954, Rutherford‘s home-to-home inspections were 
the first conducted since the city suspended its code enforcement program during the 
early years of the Great Depression.
21
  As they toured the city, Rutherford and his fellow 
inspectors recorded housing and fire code violations and substandard living conditions in 
dozens of neighborhoods.  In Floral Park, St. John, and the broader North End, however, 
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they found the most dilapidated, overcrowded, and dangerous housing stock in the city.  
In December 1954, Rutherford encountered eleven persons, including seven children, 
living in a North End basement on East Philadelphia Avenue that was accessible only by 
a trap door.
22
  That same week, inspectors visited a five-room bungalow on Elm Street 
that housed twenty-four people, including four separate families and one single adult 
male.
23
  In October 1955, city fire inspectors discovered nineteen people living in a five-
room basement apartment at 1214 Hickory Street.
24
  Several months later, Assistant Fire 
Marshall Luces visited a North End home at 814 Lomita Avenue, where he found twenty-
two persons living in a five-room house.
25
  Upon visiting such dwellings, Marshall and 
his associates issued fire and building code citations and, in extreme cases, ordered the 
eviction of persons inhabiting overcrowded, unsafe structures.  In the spring of 1954, 
Rutherford cited the owners of a property on the corner of McClellan and North Streets, 
just west of St. John and the Buick plant, for faulty wiring, improper room partitions, and 
insufficient egress routes.  Within weeks of the inspection, a fire had erupted in the home, 
leaving its fourteen occupants homeless.
26
   
Faulty wiring, leaky roofs, broken windows, and other preventable hazards were 
exceedingly common within the city‘s densely populated black neighborhoods.  So too 
were devastating fires such as the one that erupted on McClellan Street.  During the mid-
and late-1950s, members of the Flint Urban League, the NAACP, and block clubs from 
St. John and Floral Park commissioned housing surveys, chided slumlords, challenged 
city commissioners and fire inspectors to enforce the city‘s housing code, and implored 
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local builders, realtors, and lenders to jettison the racial and spatial calculus that limited 
housing options for blacks.  Nevertheless, during the 1950s Frank Corbett, Arthur 
Edmunds, and other activists who quietly pursued reform through the city‘s traditional 
political channels won few victories over Jim Crow.  In August 1956, local UAW official 
Robert Carter bemoaned the city commission‘s inattention to slumlords and the 
proliferation of poor housing.  ―They [city commissioners] have not done one single thing 
to clean up or eliminate slums in this area,‖ Carter observed.  ―They have not made one 
step toward reasonably priced rental units in this city.‖
27
  By the dawn of the 1960s, 
widespread anger over the persistence of substandard housing, residential segregation, 
and the poor public health outcomes that accompanied those conditions had erupted into 
the open, fueling a hotly contested struggle over fair housing and slum clearance that 
exposed both the depth of Flint‘s racial fault lines and the intransigence of those who led 
the city‘s private and public housing industries.                         
 The 1960s opened with the long-anticipated release of Flint‘s master plan for 
development.  Drafted by the Cincinnati firm of Ladislas Segoe and Associates, the 1960 
plan recommended complete clearance for the St. John neighborhood and a large portion 
of Floral Park.
28
  Citywide, Segoe planners found that 20 percent of Flint‘s housing was 
dilapidated; in St. John, however, that figure exceeded 60 percent.
29
  Although clear 
majorities of St. John and Floral Park residents supported the city‘s planned slum 
clearance and relocation efforts, the threat of losing precious dwelling units in Flint‘s 
already overcrowded ghettoes provoked an intensified direct action campaign for open 
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housing.  Shortly after the master plan‘s release, as the city commission moved to 
implement its North End and Floral Park clearance initiatives, members of the Flint 
NAACP and Urban League began quiet negotiations with city officials and 
representatives from the Flint Journal over the explicit racial designations used in the 
newspaper‘s real estate advertisements.  After several years of stalled negotiations, in 
1963 Flint NAACP President Richard Traylor threatened to unleash a boycott of the 
newspaper.  In April, as Traylor prepared to picket the newspaper‘s downtown 
headquarters, Journal negotiators Carl Ludington and Ed Mitchell agreed to prohibit all 
racial and religious designations from classified real estate advertisements.
30
   
Within months of their spring victory, Traylor, Edgar Holt, and other NAACP 
officials had drafted a municipal open occupancy ordinance banning racial discrimination 
in real estate sales, leasing, and financing transactions.  They submitted the proposal to 
the city commission in the fall of 1963.  On October 3, Flint‘s open housing advocates 
suffered their first of many legal and political setbacks when Michigan Attorney General 
Frank Kelley ruled that municipalities, under the state‘s new constitution, could not 
legally enact open occupancy ordinances.
31
  While open housing activists throughout the 
state worked to create legal challenges to Kelley‘s opinion, the Flint NAACP and local 
supporters of fair housing shifted their attention towards confronting racial discrimination 
in the private real estate market.  During the summer of 1964, the Evergreen Valley 
subdivision became a significant flashpoint in that struggle.   
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White Realtors, Blockbusting, and the Evergreen Valley Campaign 
Evergreen Valley sat two miles east of Floral Park on the city‘s southeastern border with 
Burton Township, bounded by Gilmartin Street, Center Road, Lippincott Boulevard, and 
Lapeer Road.  First developed in the mid-1950s as an all-white subdivision, Evergreen 
Valley was an attractive neighborhood featuring mature trees, spacious lawns, neatly 
trimmed shrubs, and approximately 525 new homes, most of them valued at between 
$15,000 and $50,000.  In July 1963, Evergreen Valley quietly received its first black 
occupant, the result of a sale brokered by African-American realtor Connie Childress.  
The following spring, however, local realtors began an aggressive and hotly contested 
campaign to bring additional black buyers to the neighborhood.  During the spring and 
summer of 1964, realtors visited homes in recently integrated blocks and aggressively 
solicited homeowners to place their properties for sale.  In Evergreen Valley, the process 
of ―blockbusting‖—whereby realtors encouraged white homeowners to flee desegregated 
neighborhoods—occurred in several stages.
32
  First, realtors identified the sections of the 
neighborhood that contained new black homeowners.  After locating the desegregated 
blocks, realtors then contacted each homeowner on the streets in question and asked them 
to place their homes for sale.  Upon gaining new listings, realtors then asked the black 
families who had recently moved in to forward along the names of interested black 
buyers.  During the summers of 1964 and 1965, realtors showed scores of homes to 
prospective black buyers but refused to show any homes to whites.  After showing homes 
to black customers, blockbusting realtors often returned to visit the white homeowners 
living nearby who had not yet placed their houses for sale, hoping that the visible 
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presence of black buyers in the neighborhood would elicit a change of heart.  Throughout 
1964 and 1965, many white homeowners in Evergreen Valley received anonymous phone 
calls urging them to sell, found leaflets left on their porches advising them of the dangers 
of integration, and suffered through numerous visits from blockbusting realtors who 
warned them that they would soon be living in a predominantly black neighborhood.
33
 
 White and black homeowners in Evergreen Valley did not accept blockbusting 
passively.  In March 1964, over 250 Evergreen Valley residents attended a meeting to 
discuss racial transitions and the preservation of property values in the neighborhood.  
Three months later, an integrated audience of nearly three hundred Evergreen Valley 
residents viewed and discussed All the Way Home, a 1957 film directed by Lee R. Bobker 
focusing on the basic unfairness of residential segregation.
34
  By the fall of 1964, 
hundreds of residents committed to remaining in their homes had formed the Evergreen 
Valley Association (EVA).
35
  With the support of white and black activists from Housing 
Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), a small direct action group devoted to fair housing, 
members of the EVA organized a campaign to halt panic selling and placed yard signs in 
front of homes throughout the neighborhood reading, ―This House Is Not for Sale – We 
Like Our Neighbors.‖  ―You can‘t shock us with a Negro anymore,‖ claimed white 
resident and EVA officer James H. Rae.  ―We can handle ourselves now.‖  In spite of 
their best efforts to halt white panic selling, however, Rae and other EVA members 
fought a losing battle in defense of residential integration and neighborhood stability.  
According to a 1966 housing opinion survey conducted by the Michigan State Highway 
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Department, residents of Genesee County, when asked to select the most important factor 
in selecting a home, chose ‗the appearance of neighborhood‖ over all other 
considerations.
36
  For hundreds of Evergreen residents, even limited integration was a 
clear signal that the neighborhood was in decline.  During the spring and summer selling 
seasons of 1964, approximately twenty additional black families moved to Evergreen 
Valley.  By June 1965, the area‘s black population had increased to 10 percent.  
Throughout the racial panic in Evergreen Valley, which stretched into the early 1970s, 
homeowner activists from the EVA waged an intense struggle to convince white 
homeowners to remain in the neighborhood.  But as in hundreds of racially transitional 
urban neighborhoods across the United States, EVA members discovered that the 
willingness of white homeowners to fight blockbusting correlated closely to their 
proximity to black neighbors.  Those living farthest from integration organized to fight 
panic selling, while homeowners living on integrated streets tended to move away in 
block-by-block fashion.
37
  In June 1965, Frederick D. Lynch, a former officer with the 
EVA, acknowledged the difficulties his group faced in persuading white homeowners to 
remain in desegregated blocks: ―Some people don‘t mind having Negroes living in the 
neighborhood, but when a colored family moves next door they get jittery.‖
38
  Racial 
integration, as an unnamed Flint activist surmised, was all too often ―the period between 
the moving in of the first Negro in a neighborhood and the exit of the last white.‖
39
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 Realtors played a decisive role in spurring racial succession in Evergreen Valley.  
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, as a growing number of African Americans 
sought out new housing options outside of St. John and Floral Park, white realtors either 
resisted or provoked residential integration based primarily upon a community‘s 
―integrity.‖
40
  In neighborhoods such as Evergreen Valley, where black homeowners had 
already moved peacefully, realtors openly marketed homes, often aggressively so, to 
African-American purchasers.  Yet in all-white neighborhoods where residents seemed to 
oppose integration, licensed brokers from the Flint Board of Real Estate worked to hold 
the color line by refusing to show homes to black buyers.  In May 1965, a white 
homeowner from Evergreen Valley identified only as Mrs. Park, informed the state civil 
rights commission of a conversation she had recently had with a blockbusting realtor 
from Robert Gerholz‘s firm.  According to Park, who lived at 1818 Valley Lane, a realtor 
from the Gerholz Realty Company contacted her in the spring of 1965 to inquire if she 
was interested in selling her home.  During the conversation, Mrs. Park asked the female 
realtor if she had a white or Negro buyer in mind.  When informed that a black buyer 
would purchase the property, Mrs. Park asked the realtor if she had considered showing 
homes to black buyers in Westgate, an all-white subdivision.  The salesperson responded 
by stating that she ―wouldn‘t dream of showing a Negro family a home in an unintegrated 
area.‖
41
   
Because local realtors targeted only a few of the city‘s neighborhoods for 
blockbusting campaigns, racial transitions in Evergreen Valley and other ―open‖ 
neighborhoods tended to occur rapidly.  In the summer of 1965, with the neighborhood 
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still solidly white and a vigorous grassroots campaign to maintain integration already 
underway, black realtor Connie Childress, who had sold the first two homes to black 
buyers in Evergreen Valley, predicted that the subdivision would soon become 
predominantly black.  ―You can only delay or stall this [racial transition] unless other 
neighborhoods in the city become open to Negroes,‖ Childress offered.  Childress‘s 
prediction turned out to be accurate.  By the close of the 1970s, the combined effects of 
blockbusting and white panic selling had produced a majority black neighborhood in 
Evergreen Valley.
42
  Over time, dozens of other ―open‖ neighborhoods followed a similar 
path from integration to resegregation.  
 The struggle to maintain racial integration in Evergreen Valley brought civil 
rights activists into direct conflict with realtors from the segregated Flint Board of Real 
Estate.  Furious over the blockbusting campaign in Evergreen Valley and the slow pace at 
which realtors opened additional segregated neighborhoods to black buyers, in October 
1965 NAACP officials launched a selective buying campaign against discriminatory 
white real estate brokers.  Led by Robert W. Rawls, chair of the NAACP‘s housing 
committee, the consumer campaign targeted brokers who ―discriminate against Negroes 
when it comes to selling them a house in a predominantly white neighborhood.‖  ―How 
does one know which white real estate broker discriminates?‖ the NAACP‘s literature 
asked.  ―The answer is: They all do.‖
43
  During the spring and summer of 1966, HOME 
and NAACP activists intensified their campaign against local realtors, organizing pickets 
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at Flint Board of Real Estate events and at subdivisions in the city and suburbs where 
realtors had discriminated against black buyers.
44
      
In support of the NAACP‘s selective buying initiative, members of HOME 
launched a test campaign to gauge the willingness of white realtors to sell homes on the 
open market.  On March 22, 1966, white homeowners Mary and Richard Hutchins met 
with realtor George Burgess, also white, from the firm of Hachtel-Pollock.  Upon 
learning that the Hutchinses wished to sell their home on an unrestricted basis, Burgess 
informed the couple that he would not accept the listing because Hachtel-Pollock had a 
strict policy against ―breaking‖ white neighborhoods.  Moreover, Burgess revealed that 
selling homes without regard to race was a clear violation of both the NAREB code of 
ethics and the policies of the Michigan Corporation and Securities Commission, the state 
agency responsible for issuing real estate licenses and regulating the conduct of brokers.  
Burgess‘s fears were justifiable.  On at least two prior occasions, the state securities 
commission had officially censured Michigan realtors for either showing or selling 
properties to Negro buyers in all-white neighborhoods.
45
  Not wishing to jeopardize his 
standing as a licensed broker, Burgess refused to sell the Hutchinses‘ home.  The day 
after the Hutchinses met with George Burgess, Annie B. Hubbard, an African-American 
purchaser, contacted an unidentified listing agent from Hachtel-Pollock regarding a home 
for sale on the city‘s northwest side.  After discussing the home‘s specifications, Hubbard 
told the realtor that she wished to tour the property.  In response to Hubbard‘s request, the 
realtor informed her that the house ―cannot be shown to colored people only white 
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  Throughout the county, white and black buyers and sellers of real estate who 
wished to open up the housing market found that local realtors and government officials 
had constructed a seemingly impermeable barrier to residential integration.  ―I do not 
know of even one white community or white section of a city,‖ state civil rights 
commissioner Burton Levy wrote, ―where a Negro citizen visiting a realtor chosen at 
random or a home advertised for sale would get the fair and equitable treatment that is 
theoretically required by law and this Commission.‖
47
               
 Unlike most victims of housing discrimination, who typically refrained from 
filing complaints, Annie Hubbard and the Hutchins family made their grievances public.  
After receiving signed statements from the Hutchinses and Hubbard, HOME President 
George F. Plum forwarded their complaints to Governor George Romney, Michigan 
Attorney General Frank Kelley, Burton I. Gordin, the executive director of the Michigan 
Civil Rights Commission, and dozens of local journalists in the city.  In his June 7 letter 
to Gordin, Plum chided state civil rights commission officials for their ―procastinatory 
[sic] and snails antics‖ in handling civil rights complaints from Flint.
48
  Hoping to deflect 
criticism of his agency, Gordin responded to the June complaints by agreeing to organize 
hearings on housing discrimination in Genesee County.  Held from November 29 through 
December 1, 1966, the Flint hearings on housing discrimination provided activists with a 
long awaited opportunity to publicize the public policies and private racial animosities 
that collectively undermined equal housing opportunity in the Vehicle City. 
 
                                                 
46
 On the Hutchins family and Annie Hubbard, see Beasley Papers, box 50, folder 29, GHCC.  On Hachtel-
Pollock, see Beasley, ―Weekly Report,‖ May 4, 1966, Beasley Papers, box 8, folder 16, GHCC. 
47
 See Burton Levy to Gordin, August 31, 1965, Beasley Papers, box 6, GHCC.  On additional complaints 
against realtors, see Ronald O. Warner Papers, box 14, 95-1.1-322, Scharchburg Archives.   
48
 George F. Plum to Gordin, June 7, 1966, Beasley Papers, box 50, folder 29, GHCC. 
338 
 
Naming Names: The 1966 Equal Housing Hearing 
The Michigan Civil Rights Commission‘s 1966 hearings were the culmination of dozens 
of postwar surveys, protests, electoral efforts, and public relations campaigns waged by 
fair housing activists in metropolitan Flint.  Civil rights reformers won an important 
political victory several weeks prior to the hearings when the Flint City Commission 
selected Floyd McCree to become mayor.  McCree was Flint‘s first black mayor and, as 
many civic boosters advertised, the first African American selected to lead a major 
American city.  Initially elected to the city commission in 1958, McCree, an employee of 
the Buick foundry who represented the Third Ward on the city‘s North End, was a strong 
advocate of municipal open housing legislation.  However, under Flint‘s municipal 
charter, which endorsed a city commission-manager form of government, city 
commissioners appointed the mayor, who could claim no more power than any other 
legislator.  Although the voters of Flint had not elected him as mayor—and though the 
mayoralty was essentially a symbolic position under the city charter—McCree‘s 
appointment nonetheless marked an important political victory for fair housing activists, 
especially those who hoped to push forward municipal open occupancy legislation.
49
   
Hoping to capitalize on the widespread media attention that surrounded McCree‘s 
appointment, supporters of fair housing used the hearings to document the ways in which 
policymakers and housing industry officials had worked together to maintain residential 
Jim Crow in Flint.  The practices of local realtors and other members of the Flint Board 
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of Real Estate came under careful scrutiny during the commission‘s deliberations.  
During his appearance in front of the commissioners, the Flint Urban League‘s executive 
director John W. Mack testified that the city of Flint, with a segregation index of over 94 
percent, was the most segregated non-southern city in the United States.  Citing census 
reports, Urban League surveys, and a well-known national study of racial demographics 
published by scholars Karl and Alma Taeuber, Mack informed the commission that 
Flint‘s African-American population, despite comprising over 20 percent of the city‘s 
total, remained confined to just twelve adjacent census tracts along the north-south and 
east-west axes of Saginaw Street and Lapeer Road.  Mack charged that members of the 
Flint Board of Real Estate had played a key role in maintaining the color line by using 
blockbusting, racial steering, and other tactics.
50
   
Commission members received a number of discrimination complaints filed 
against local realtors in advance of the hearings.  One such allegation came from Bruce 
Kelley, a white homeowner from Woodlawn Park who had filed a complaint in 1965 
against the Davis Realty Company.  During the Urban League‘s 1955 panel on Negro 
housing shortages, John W. Davis, a managing partner at Davis Realty, had spoken out 
against the redlining practices of local lenders.  Yet just a decade later Davis found that 
his firm was facing several charges of racial discrimination.  Shortly after agreeing to list 
his home with Davis Realty, Kelley charged, one of the firm‘s brokers asked him to sign 
a document stipulating that only Caucasian buyers could visit the property.  Upon 
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refusing his realtor‘s request, Kelley received word that Davis Realty was no longer 
interested in selling his home.  During his testimony, HOME President George Plum 
reinforced Kelley‘s charges, submitting seven sworn complaints against local realtors for 
refusing to list homes on the open market, ignoring non-discrimination instructions from 
home sellers, and blocking black buyers from touring homes in all-white neighborhoods.  
Plum alleged that representatives of Gerholz Realty Company were among the city‘s 
worst offenders.  While serving as real estate ―testers,‖ Plum and his wife Sandra met 
with Mrs. Jimmie Peters, a broker from the Gerholz firm.  As they toured properties for 
sale, Mrs. Peters informed the Plums that realtors from Gerholz, as a matter of official 
policy, made a point of ascertaining the racial identities of buyers before agreeing to 
show homes in white neighborhoods.  Gerholz brokers, Peters guaranteed, would never 
―break a block‖ by selling homes in all-white areas to Negroes.
51
  
According to Plum and the NAACP‘s Robert Rawls, GM‘s Argonaut Realty 
Company also played an important role in maintaining segregated real estate listings in 
the city.  Argonaut Realty did not involve itself directly in sales, but as a service to GM‘s 
leaders, the company subcontracted with local real estate firms to list homes for corporate 
executives and other supervisory employees who had transferred to other plant cities.  
Despite the repeated requests of Plum and other fair housing activists, representatives 
from Argonaut, who declined to participate in the hearing, provided listings only to eight 
licensed firms from the Flint Board of Real Estate and refused to include 
nondiscrimination clauses in their home listings.  Argonaut Realty, a GM official 
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informed Plum, would not insist upon nondiscrimination either until the United States 
Congress passed an open housing law or ―until some official body asks us to.‖  In order 
to circumvent the discriminatory policies of Argonaut, Davis Realty, and other local 
firms, Plum asserted, black buyers in Flint often had to resort to third-party purchases—
in which sympathetic white buyers bought and then immediately re-sold properties to 
black buyers—and  other forms of subterfuge.  ―In 22 years of being in the real estate 
business in Flint,‖ one Negro real estate broker added, ―I cannot remember one instance 
of a Realtor voluntarily integrating any housing.‖
52
  
 Several witnesses who testified during the 1966 hearings charged that the Flint 
Board of Real Estate was the ―principal perpetrator‖ of housing discrimination and 
segregation in the county.  During the hearings, black realtor Bertha Simms and four of 
her colleagues testified that the board systematically excluded African Americans from 
membership, denied nonwhite realtors access to the board‘s multiple listing exchange, a 
real estate database available only to board members, and levied substantial $500 fines 
against member realtors who ―broke‖ all-white neighborhoods.  By restricting its 
membership, Simms and other witnesses testified, the Flint Board of Real Estate 
concealed new home listings from black brokers, excluded nonwhites from important 
negotiations with local lenders and builders, and denied Negro ―realtists‖—who, as non-
members of the real estate board, technically could not claim the title Realtor—the 
opportunity to co-broker properties in all-white neighborhoods.  On the rare occasions 
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when black realtists secured listings in restricted, all-white areas, Simms alleged, real 
estate firms would often intervene to protect the neighborhood by purchasing and then re-
marketing properties to white buyers.  Hoping to assure impartiality, the commission 
invited officials from the Flint Board of Real Estate to provide rebuttal testimony, but 
none of its members or officers appeared.
53
  
 Builders also received a great deal of criticism during the 1966 equal housing 
hearings.  During his appearance in front of the MCRC, Plum recounted an attempt that 
he and his wife had made to conduct a third-party purchase for a Negro couple who 
sought a home in a newly developed all-white subdivision.  In their negotiations over the 
purchase, the builder informed Plum that in order to prevent the house from being re-sold 
to Negroes he would have to sign a purchase agreement giving the builder an option on 
the property should it be re-sold prior to occupancy.  Other witnesses who testified in 
front of the commission claimed that builders, like realtors, steered black clients towards 
either all-black or integrated subdivisions, ―while the white market was diverted to all-
white suburban subdivisions.‖  Confirming the charges made against local developers, 
the only builder who agreed to testify during the hearings admitted that, as a rule, 
―Builders refuse to build or sell lots to Negroes in new subdivisions.‖  ―Realtors and 
builders, regardless of what they might say,‖ one African-American witness testified, 
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―form a solid block against integration of any all-white neighborhoods or neighborhoods 
where one or two non-white families have moved in.‖
54
   
 Witnesses who testified during the 1966 hearings placed a great deal of blame on 
realtors and builders for maintaining segregated housing patterns in metropolitan Flint.  
Local policymakers, civic elites, and federal officials did not escape criticism, however.  
During his appearance before the commission, Mayor McCree testified that the city was 
woefully prepared to handle relocation efforts for black citizens slated to move due to 
freeway construction and urban renewal projects.  The city planned to relocate nearly 
three thousand predominantly poor Flint families, over half of whom were African 
American, to make way for Interstate 475, a freeway interchange in Floral Park, and an 
industrial park in the St. John neighborhood.  However, McCree testified that the Flint 
Housing Commission would have fewer than two hundred units of public housing 
available by the close of 1967.  In describing Flint‘s ―dismal low-rent housing picture,‖ 
McCree also condemned housing commission officials for selecting public housing sites 
in already segregated black neighborhoods.  Echoing McCree‘s charges, Flint Urban 
League Director John Mack claimed that the city‘s relocation office and its 
subcontractors from the Flint Board of Real Estate were steering dislocated blacks who 
were ―too rich for public housing and too poor to move where they want to move‖ to 
either all-black or racially transitional neighborhoods.
55
                                     
 Residents of St. John Street and Floral Park who testified on living conditions 
within the city‘s black ghettoes provided some of the powerful evidence collected during 
the hearings.  St. John and Floral Park had suffered from widespread public and private 
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divestment during the 1950s and 1960s and, as a result, contained some of the most 
dilapidated and overcrowded housing in the city.  Residents of St. John charged that 
unregulated industrial pollution from GM‘s Buick foundry contributed to both 
neighborhood blight and mortgage divestment on the North End.  According to Aileen 
Butler, a funeral home proprietor who appeared before the commission, the pollution 
from Buick was so intense that both the FHA and local lenders had effectively redlined 
the entire north side of the city, making it virtually impossible for black homeowners to 
secure loans for home purchases and repairs.  Moreover, residents of both neighborhoods 
charged city officials with providing inadequate trash collection, code enforcement, and 




 Joining Butler and other witnesses from the North End were Cora Hollman and 
three other black women whose families received public assistance.  Each of the women 
reported that they were unable to find standard rental housing in the city ―that is not 
overcrowded, unsafe, or unsanitary.‖  Hollman and the other women also charged that 
their landlords had refused to comply with code enforcement orders and had threatened 
eviction in response to even basic requests from tenants.  Hollman, who paid $75 per 
month in rent plus all of the utility bills for her residence at 405 Merritt Place, informed 
commissioners that her apartment had broken pipes and a blocked drain that had caused 
standing water to back up into the basement.  The landlord refused to address the 
plumbing problems, however, telling Hollman that the city would soon demolish the 
house for urban renewal.  Corroborating the testimony of Hollman and the three other 
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women, a case worker from the Genesee County Bureau of Social Aid noted that nearly 
half of the seventy families she represented lived in either condemned houses, 
overcrowded apartments, or dwellings that were ―obviously substandard, but whose 
owners will not repair them because they can easily evict the tenants and move in others.‖  
Throughout the hearings, residents of St. John and Floral Park joined fair housing 
advocates in making direct connections between racial segregation and the substandard 
living conditions that landlords made available to poor families of all racial backgrounds.  
In one case, commissioners learned about a slum landlord who had threatened to replace 
his white tenants with black occupants in retaliation for their complaints about 
substandard living conditions.  If the tenants did not cease their complaints, the landlord 
threatened, he would evict them and ―put niggers in the house,‖ because he ―could get 
more money per week out of the house if he had niggers in it anyway, and the niggers 
wouldn‘t complain because they have no place to stay.‖  The city‘s bifurcated real estate 
market not only made it difficult for African Americans to secure housing outside of the 
ghetto, but also undermined the ability of black tenants to negotiate with their landlords 
for better living conditions.
57
 
 Flint Fire Marshall Elwood H. Rutherford, who coordinated the city‘s housing 
inspection and code enforcement programs, confirmed many of the charges witnesses 
made regarding substandard housing in the inner city.  With only five full-time inspectors 
serving a city of nearly 200,000 residents, it was extremely difficult for municipal 
officials to monitor slumlords and other repeat violators of the city‘s housing ordinance.  
―Complaints show by inspection that blight is reaching into nearly every section of the 
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city,‖ Rutherford stated, ―apparently caused by a complacent public and lack of code 
enforcement.‖  Rutherford also informed the commission that there were ―outhouses 
attached to shacks, only minutes from City Hall‖ and scores of families citywide who 
lived in ―unremodeled attics and basements.‖  Between March and December 1965, 
Rutherford and his inspectors visited 1,806 dwellings, where they found nearly three 
thousand code violations including 441 malfunctioning electrical systems, 147 inadequate 
plumbing facilities, and 107 illegal heating units.  Just during February 1966, city 
inspectors unearthed six hundred housing code violations.  Despite his best efforts to 
monitor housing conditions in St. John, Floral Park, and other dilapidated neighborhoods, 
Rutherford admitted defeat during the 1966 hearings.  ―Even with 100 or 1,000 
inspectors, it would be impossible to keep up with the problem of deterioration.‖
58
 
 Though witnesses tended to focus on local actors, the FHA also received strong 
criticism from several who testified during the commission‘s fall 1966 proceedings.  One 
African-American real estate broker charged the FHA‘s Flint office with adopting a 
―lackadaisical attitude‖ towards enforcing President Kennedy‘s 1962 executive order 
mandating nondiscrimination in federal housing programs.  Black realtor Bertha Simms 
extended her colleague‘s claim, stating that the FHA and VA subcontracted only with the 
Davis and Piper real estate firms, both of which refused to ―break‖ white neighborhoods, 
to manage all FHA-owned rental and foreclosure properties in the county.  Although 
Simms and other witnesses refrained from issuing a broader structural critique of the 
federal government‘s racialized housing and neighborhood appraisal policies, their 
testimony regarding the FHA‘s marketing and management plans for foreclosed 
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properties highlighted a clear nexus between government administrators and the local 
housing officials who helped to keep the city segregated.
59
   
 The civil rights commission invited GM officials, representatives from the Mott 
Foundation, local builders and lenders, members of the Flint Board of Real Estate, and 
other civic and housing industry leaders to testify during the 1966 hearings.  Largely, 
members of the city‘s local power structure chose to abstain from the proceedings, 
however, except in a few instances where commission members solicited rebuttals to 
direct testimony.  GM official Charles Stewart Mott and Frank Manley, executive 
director of the Mott Foundation—who according to critics refused even to discuss fair 
housing legislation—reluctantly accepted the commission‘s request to rebut allegations 
that they had ―sidestepped the issue of open occupancy.‖  Manley adopted a diplomatic 
stance, arguing that the Mott Foundation, as a tax-exempt organization, could not legally 
take any position on open housing or other political questions.  Feeling more 
confrontational than his subordinate, Mott angrily denounced his critics while 
maintaining a neutral position on open housing legislation.  ―I have many friends in the 
Negro community,‖ Mott noted, ―and nobody is going to get me to take a position that 
these friends would take exception to.‖  In response, state civil rights commissioner 
William Dwyer challenged the executive to take a position in favor of open housing, 
stating,  
I think you have offended the Negro by not taking a public stand.  Even 
your mayor lives in the ghetto. . . . I can‘t understand your unwillingness 
to offend some people.  You are without a doubt the most influential 
person in Flint and to be such you must have offended some people.   
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Bristling at Dwyer‘s suggestion, Mott replied, ―That‘s too bad for you.  I don‘t have to 
convince you.‖
60
   
 The 1966 equal housing hearings encouraged fair housing activists to move 
forward with their goal of implementing a municipal open occupancy ordinance.  
Through their boycott of the commission‘s proceedings, the corporate executives, 
lenders, builders, realtors, and housing industry officials who refused to testify hoped to 
deny legitimacy to the open housing movement.  Their no-shows produced the opposite 
effect, however.  Following the fall hearings, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission 
produced a summary of the proceedings that affirmed witnesses‘ charges of racial 
discrimination and substandard housing.  Moreover, the commissioners issued a harsh 
rebuke to the civic elites who had declined to testify:  
The failure of financial, commercial, industrial and other private 
corporations and organizations to be represented at the hearing tends to 
show that that segment of the community is, at best, disinterested in the 
resolution of the problems of housing discrimination and segregation in 
the Flint area. . . . Their silence on the question of equal housing 
opportunity serves to retard progress toward its achievement. 
   
The editorial staff of the Flint Journal concurred, suggesting that the city‘s social 
conscience had ―dozed‖ during the hearings.
61
   
 
The Battle for Open Housing 
Civil rights commissioners hoped to spur the city‘s seemingly recalcitrant leadership into 
action by attaching a list of recommendations to their report on the fall hearings.  
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Significantly, the commission endorsed the Flint NAACP‘s long-standing call for a 
municipal open occupancy law, encouraging city commissioners to ―enact a 
comprehensive ordinance prohibiting discrimination in housing.‖
62
  NAACP activists 
wasted little time in returning to the Flint City Commission.  On February 13, 1967, civil 
rights activists descended upon city hall to urge commissioners to reconsider the open 
occupancy ordinance submitted by Robert Rawls in September 1966.  Reminding 
commissioners that Flint was the most segregated city in the North, HOME member 
Leroy Davis implored the commission to put the weight of law behind fair housing.  ―It is 
incumbent upon this governing body to guarantee the same rights to everyone,‖ Davis 
stated.  Speaking in opposition to the proposal, Harry M. Rapaport, executive vice-
president of the Flint Board of Real Estate, advised commissioners to reject the 
legislation, claiming that a fair housing ordinance would ―create hostility because people 
don‘t like compulsion.‖  Beyond the heated debates over the merits of the proposed 
ordinance, the February meeting also featured a dispute over the legality of municipal 
open occupancy laws.  Citing Michigan Attorney General Frank Kelley‘s 1963 ruling in 
opposition to municipal fair housing law, City Attorney Charles A. Forrest advised 
commission members that the state‘s 1963 constitution prohibited municipal legislatures 
from passing open housing legislation.  Flint‘s MCRC representative, Olive Beasley, 
contradicted Forrest‘s conclusions, informing city commissioners that other cities had 
passed similar laws and, furthermore, that Kelley had recently reversed his earlier 
decision.  Wishing to delay their votes until receiving a definitive legal opinion on the 
NAACP‘s proposed ordinance, the city commission voted to refer the bill to its 
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  On March 2, 1967, Kelley released a letter to the MCRC 
endorsing the legality of municipal open housing laws.  Based in part upon a 1965 ruling 
by Washtenaw County Circuit Court Judge James B. Breakey that upheld the legality of 
such legislation, Kelley‘s change of opinion further fueled the fair housing campaign.
64
  
City Attorney Forrest refused to acknowledge Kelley‘s new directive, however, 
maintaining, ―The attorney general can speak only though official legal opinions.‖
65
   
Already dominating the headlines of the Flint Journal, the agendas of virtually 
every city commission meeting, and dinner table conversations in homes across the city, 
the issue of fair housing had become the most volatile political issue in the city by the 
spring and summer of 1967.  Yet the city commission, much to the dismay of open 
housing activists, continued to postpone a formal vote on the proposal.  During an April 
speech to local union members, Herbert Hill, the NAACP‘s national labor secretary, 
scolded Flint activists for not forcing a vote on open occupancy.  ―Your town is a Jim 
Crow town,‖ he claimed.  ―When are you going to bust out of the ghetto?‖
66
  On July 17, 
Mrs. Marise Hadden chastised Flint‘s city commissioners for refusing to take a stand on 
open occupancy and warned them of the consequences of inaction: 
Most Negroes as well as other minority groups are concentrated in old 
inferior housing in old inferior neighborhoods.  Many of these dwellings 
are unfit for human habitation, but these citizens have little if any 
alternative and are forced to pay exorbitant rates for dilapidated, roach and 
rat infested facilities. . . . The past practices of the Federal government, the 
past and current policies and practices of real estate agencies and 
commercial home builders and the racial fears of white homeowners—
which have been exploited by the opponents of fair housing programs 
have all contributed to a situation which is a disgraceful affront to our 
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common democratic heritage. . . . We have long since learned that the 
most deadly factor mitigating against desegregation—particularly in 
housing is equivocation on the part of authority figures at the top.  Unless 
elected officials take a firm and positive stand [on open occupancy], 
dissident elements come to believe that their only rewarding means of 
protest is open violence and rebellion.  Under these circumstances, it is 
guaranteed that they are going to rebel against life in the ghetto. . . .
67
   
 
In spite of Hadden‘s warning, the commission refused to act; and within a week, her grim 
prediction had come to pass.        
In the wee hours of July 23, 1967, racial violence erupted seventy miles southeast 
of Flint in the city of Detroit.  The fighting began after police officers arrested patrons of 
an after-hours African-American drinking establishment, or ―blind pig,‖ located at 
Twelfth Street and Clairmount Avenue, but the violence quickly spread to black 
neighborhoods throughout the Motor City.  The most violent and costly racial 
conflagration in United States history, the Detroit riot of 1967 raged for five full days, 
ultimately claiming nearly fifty lives and resulting in millions of dollars in property 
damage.
68
  The violence also spread to Flint‘s North End, where angry protesters 
gathered to vent their frustrations against police brutality, housing segregation, and racial 
inequality.  On the evening of July 24, as the violence unfolded many miles to the south, 
hundreds of black protesters assembled at the corner of Leith and Saginaw Streets.  
During the night, a small number of North End rioters threw stones at cars, smashed 
windows, looted several commercial establishments, and firebombed at least seventeen 
stores and homes.  Governor George Romney declared a state of emergency in Genesee 
County the following day.  Hoping to stem the spread of violence, Romney assigned 
teams of state troopers to monitor checkpoints at the Flint city limits, prohibited the sale 
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of alcohol throughout the county, banned all non-officers from carrying firearms, and 
ordered the closing of all North End gas stations.  Mayor McCree, civil rights leaders 
from the NAACP and Urban League, and respected neighborhood activists supported the 
governor‘s declaration by maintaining an around-the-clock presence on the North End, 
walking the streets, imploring young people to return to their homes, and helping officers 
to restore order to the city.  By July 27, the North End disturbances had ended and city 
and state officials had restored a modicum of calm.
69
   
 The combined efforts of hundreds of city and state officials, police officers, civil 
rights leaders, and community activists helped to limit violence and the destruction of 
property during the 1967 Flint disorders.  Nevertheless, the restoration of calm did little 
to remedy the grievances of thousands of housing reformers and North End residents.  On 
July 27, just as city officials were declaring an end to the disturbances, nearly fifty 
activists, half of them white, attended a city commission meeting to demand a vote on 
open occupancy.  Mindful of the housing inequities that had fueled civil disorder on the 
North End, downtown merchant Sydney Melet, owner of the Vogue clothing store; Saul 
Siegel, the executive director of the Greater Flint Downtown Corporation; Harold R. 
Stine, president of the Flint Board of Education; and Olivia Maynard, secretary of the 
Democratic Party‘s State Central Committee, all joined the July 27 mobilization for fair 
housing.  The outbreak of violence and civil unrest forced all of Flint‘s civic leaders, 
many of whom had boycotted the 1966 equal housing hearings and kept quiet on open 
occupancy, to reevaluate the merits of a fair housing ordinance.  To some, including 
Melet and Siegel, the July violence demonstrated that the city had a moral and legal 
obligation to protect civil rights in the arena of housing.  For others, however, the civil 
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disorders had the opposite effect, provoking even more hostility and resentment towards 
a nondiscrimination ordinance.
70
    
 Designed to appease racial conservatives and moderates on the city commission, 
the NAACP‘s open occupancy ordinance contained several loopholes that allowed for 
housing discrimination under certain circumstances.  The ordinance would not apply to 
owners of two-unit apartments if the owner occupied one of the dwelling units, for 
instance.  Nor would the ordinance cover religious institutions or homeowners who took 
in boarders.  The bill did contain a controversial penalty clause for violators, however, 
which included punishments of up to ninety days in jail and/or a fine of up to $300.  
Already openly hostile to any nondiscrimination legislation, Second Ward Commissioner 
Carl Mason and Fourth Ward Commissioner William Polk used the penalty provision—
and the threat of a polarizing referendum campaign to repeal the law—to persuade the 
commission‘s racial moderates to oppose the NAACP‘s proposal.  On August 14, the 
commission voted five-to-three to reject the ordinance.
71
  Stung by the defeat, Mayor 
McCree obtained a ―special privilege‖ to address the commission following the vote.  
―Last November this city commission saw fit to make me mayor,‖ McCree stated, ―and 
that was fine all over the country, very wonderful.‖   
I thought here at last we have a local government willing to accept people 
on the basis of their ability and not because of race.  And I have lived with 
this and I have preached this to my community.  Tonight, however, I‘ve 
changed my mind.  I‘m not going to sit up here any longer and live an 
equal opportunity lie. 
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In a move that surprised nearly everyone in the packed city hall chambers, McCree 
protested the commission‘s decision by resigning his post as mayor.
72
 
 The defeat of the open occupancy bill and McCree‘s shocking resignation 
provoked a firestorm of controversy, protest, and recrimination.  Many civic leaders 
feared that the decision would unleash another round of disorders in the North End.  The 
day after the commission‘s vote, the Mott Foundation, without specifically endorsing 
open occupancy, issued a press release endorsing equal opportunity for all.  The editors 
of the Flint Journal went even further, endorsing open occupancy and imploring McCree 
to return to his post.
73
  On August 17, dozens of white and black elected officials and 
appointees announced that they too would resign in a collective protest against the 
commission‘s vote.  Among those who resigned were Nathaniel Turner, a member of the 
Hurley Hospital Board of Mangers, five black members of the Genesee County Board of 
Supervisors, and three representatives from the Citizens Advisory Commission on Urban 
Renewal.  On the day following the mass resignations, thirty-four supporters of open 
occupancy, most of them teenagers, organized a sleep-in demonstration on the lawn in 
front of city hall.  Led by young activist Woody Etherly, Jr., the sleep-in protesters—
carrying signs reading ―Our City Believes in Lily-White Neighborhoods‖ and ―We Don‘t 
Want Your Run-Down Property‖—vowed to camp out on the lawn of city hall until the 
commission reversed its position.
74
  Later that day, Harding Mott, by then president of his 
father‘s philanthropy, revised the foundation‘s earlier statement, expressing full support 
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for open occupancy legislation and Mayor McCree.  The political tides had begun to 
shift.
75
    
 
 
Figure 7.1.  Open housing demonstration.  Youth picketers in front of the Flint Municipal 
Center during the 1967 fair housing sleep-in.  Courtesy of Perry Archives.  
  
The fair housing protests culminated on August 20 with a massive Unity Rally 
held in front of city hall.  Fearing another outbreak of civil unrest, Governor Romney and 
Attorney General Frank Kelley attended the event, where both men expressed their 
support for the mayor and open occupancy.  In his address to the nearly five thousand 
protesters, Romney assured Flint citizens that he and the attorney general both supported 
―the elimination of discrimination and social injustice in any form,‖ while reminding city 
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commissioners that state law did not prohibit cities from passing nondiscrimination 
legislation.
76
  The largest civil rights protest in civic history, the August 20 Unity Rally 
helped to bring international attention to the struggle for open occupancy in Flint.  On 
Tuesday, August 22, the Huntley-Brinkley television news program, which aired 
nationally on NBC, devoted a full ten minutes to covering McCree‘s resignation, the 
youth sleep-in, and the explosive controversy over open occupancy.
77
  
  The summer 1967 protests forced the editorial board of the Flint Journal, several 
key downtown retailers, the presidents of the Mott Foundation and the board of 
education, and other civic leaders to throw their support behind municipal fair housing 
legislation.  On August 21, the day after the Unity Rally, the city commission held yet 
another hearing on open housing, attracting nearly seven hundred attendees; but this time 
a clear majority of the speakers endorsed the bill.  Instructing opponents of fair housing 
to ―step aside,‖ Reverend Earle R. Ramsdell, the executive director of the Greater Flint 
Council of Churches, warned, ―Flint is in danger of becoming a sick society.‖
78
  Sensing 
that the momentum had turned in their favor, supporters of open occupancy intensified 
their efforts in the weeks following the August 20 mobilization.  Inspired by the massive 
show of support for open occupancy, McCree—despite suffering from exhaustion and a 
painful ulcer that had sent him to the hospital during the previous week—rescinded his 
resignation on August 28.
79
  After returning to office, the mayor opened a series of secret 
meetings with racially moderate commissioners, hoping to gain a favorable vote on a 
modified proposal.  After a week of private negotiations, McCree had assembled a 
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majority on the commission.  In order to gain that majority, however, he agreed to several 
compromises that further weakened the ordinance.  Namely, the new open occupancy 
proposal maintained special protections for religious institutions while expanding 
exemptions to include landlords who lived in buildings with five or fewer rental units.  
Moreover, the new bill also made it illegal and punishable to file false claims of 
discrimination.
80
                    
 On Monday, October 30, after weeks of intense controversy and private 
negotiations, the Flint City Commission, in a close five-to-four vote, approved open 
occupancy legislation.
81
  Though the law was a significantly weaker version of the 
NAACP‘s original bill, the commission‘s vote nonetheless angered white homeowners 
and realtors throughout the city.  Within minutes of the law‘s passage, opponents had 
launched a petition drive to force a referendum on the issue.  Led by Gerald A. Spencer, a 
member of the John Birch Society, the Committee to Repeal Forced Housing Legislation 
united a broad coalition of homeowners, developers, realtors, and racial conservatives 
who believed that the bill threatened the rights of all property owners.
82
  Joining the 
opposition to open occupancy were at least fifty members of a local Ku Klux Klan 
chapter, who on October 14 held a small parade in downtown Flint.
83
  Under the 
guidelines established by the Flint City Charter, Spencer needed to collect a minimum of 
3,025 valid signatures from registered city voters within thirty days in order to force a 
referendum.  By November 24, Spencer and his supporters had collected nearly six 
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thousand signatures, however, more than enough to trigger a public vote on open 
occupancy.  Upon submitting the petitions to the city clerk, Spencer read a prepared 
statement to reporters that outlined his opposition to the new law.  ―The issue,‖ Spencer 
noted, is whether ―the government, right or wrong, has the power to tell a person how and 
to whom he must dispose of his property.‖  ―It appears,‖ he continued, ―that the 
advocates of forced housing will attempt to turn the citizens of Flint away from the real 
issue of ‗a man‘s home is his castle,‘ and redirect it towards racial bigotry.‖
84
      
 After certifying the signatures, Flint City Clerk Lloyd S. Hendon ordered a 
referendum election for February 20, 1968.  In response, the Flint NAACP organized a 
two-pronged campaign to protect open housing.  While coordinating a massive voter 
registration campaign throughout St. John and Floral Park, the Flint NAACP, represented 
by attorney Glen Epps, also filed suit to block the February vote.  Epps sought an 
injunction to halt the election, claiming that citizens had neither the right to discriminate 
nor the authority to vote on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
85
  
On January 24, 1968, Circuit Court Judge Anthony J. Mansour ruled against the NAACP.  
Three weeks later, on February 14, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Mansour‘s 
decision, issuing a terse ruling that stated, ―The right of referendum regularly pursued 
may not be restrained by an injunction.‖
86
  Out of legal options, members of the Flint 
NAACP, HOME, and activists from Friends of Fair Housing, an ad hoc group dedicated 
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to defending the new law, spent the remaining few days attempting to shore up voters‘ 
support for open occupancy.   
 Over forty thousand citizens turned out to cast ballots in the open housing election 
of 1968.  The election was one of the closest, most intensely debated affairs in Flint‘s 
civic history.  Only the most optimistic proponents of civil rights believed that open 
housing would survive a referendum in Flint, an intensely segregated city with an 
overwhelmingly white electorate.  Yet in a tally that surprised even Mayor McCree, who 
went to bed on February 20 believing that his side had lost, Flint citizens defeated the 
referendum initiative by a razor thin margin of thirty votes.
87
  Prior to the February 
referendum in Flint, municipal open housing elections had been held in several cities 
including Berkeley, California; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; Akron and Springfield, 
Ohio; Jackson, Michigan; and Columbia, Missouri.  In each of the elections, voters had 
rejected laws mandating nondiscrimination in housing.  The first city in the United States 
to approve open housing via popular vote, Flint once again gained national attention in 
the weeks following the election.
88
  On February 23, UAW President Walter Reuther 
hailed Flint voters for building ―one of the cornerstones upon which to build stable 
community relations, sound economic growth, a wholesome and healthful environment 
and social progress and justice.‖
89
  According to Dale Kildee, a Flint representative in the 
state legislature who did little to support the open occupancy effort, the election 
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demonstrated that ―voters can be trusted to do what is right when they are well 
informed.‖
90
                                                   
 With very few exceptions, Flint‘s political leaders—including Kildee and many 
civic boosters who took no active stance on the February referendum—embraced the 
open housing election.  They claimed it was a victory for all of Flint‘s people.  Just a year 
after voters approved open housing, Mayor Donald R. Cronin, McCree‘s successor, 
awarded a key to the city to Edwin C. ―Bill‖ Berry, the executive director of the Urban 
League of Chicago.  During his presentation, Cronin stated, ―I‘ve been asked what this 
key opens.  It doesn‘t have to open anything because everything in Flint is open to 
everyone.‖  With the passage of open housing, Cronin often boasted, Flint had become 
―the most progressive city in the country.‖  Berry was not convinced, however.  During 
his speech, the Chicagoan mocked Cronin‘s claims, noting that racism must not exist in 
Flint, ―just every place else.‖
91
   
To many African Americans in the city, especially those who examined the 
election returns, the narrow February victory seemed to be far less demonstrative than 
Cronin assumed.  In Wards 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, which housed nearly all of the city‘s black 
residents, open housing won by sizable margins.  Yet in the virtually all-white Second, 
Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Wards, voters overwhelmingly opposed the open occupancy 
ordinance.  In the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Wards, not a single precinct endorsed open 
occupancy; and citywide, voters approved open occupancy in only forty-six of Flint‘s 
122 precincts.  Without heavy black turnout in the North End, especially in the 
predominantly African-American Third Ward, where over 90 percent of voters endorsed 
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open occupancy, opponents of the ordinance would have won a decisive victory.
92
  
According to a Flint Journal editorial assessment, ―The results demonstrated . . . that the 
Negro does indeed have power at the ballot box.‖
93
  Rather than uniting the city around a 
shared commitment to fair housing and civil rights, the open housing referendum 
highlighted the depth of the city‘s racial fissures.   
Notwithstanding the claims of Mayor Cronin and other Flint boosters, the 1968 
fair housing referendum left in place a harsh landscape of Jim Crow—an intensely 
divided metropolis fragmented along racial and spatial lines.  Nevertheless, race relations 
in Genesee County had yet to reach their nadir.  During the years following the 1968 
open housing vote, struggles over school desegregation, urban renewal, white flight, 
deindustrialization, and annexation unfolded throughout the metropolitan area.  By the 
mid-1970s, the campaign for school desegregation had taken center stage in municipal 
politics, providing African-American activists with an opportunity to test just how much 
power they possessed over municipal affairs. 
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Confronting a Geographic Fiction:  
The Battle for School Desegregation 
 
 
More than two decades after the United States Supreme Court‘s landmark ruling in 
Brown v. Board of Education, the federal government discovered school segregation in 
Flint.  On August 29, 1975, federal officials from the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) charged the Flint Community Schools with operating illegally 
segregated public schools in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Outlined 
in a lengthy letter to Superintendent Peter L. Clancy, the charges documented how school 
officials and members of the Flint Board of Education had constructed and for decades 
maintained a separate but unequal, dual education system through a combination of 
discriminatory hiring and teacher assignment practices, racially biased school location 
and pupil transfer policies, and deliberately gerrymandered attendance boundaries.
1
  
Although the leadership of the Flint Board of Education vehemently denied the charges 
and openly resisted federal desegregation mandates for nearly six contentious years, 
federal reports left little room for doubt about the existence of a long and complex history 
of Jim Crow education in the Vehicle City. 
 In the area of pupil assignment, HEW officials painted a stunning portrait of 
intentional, government-sponsored segregation in the heart of the liberal urban North.  
Beginning in the mid-1930s, when small numbers of black families first moved into all-
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white attendance districts on the borders of Flint‘s overcrowded North End ghetto, the 
Flint Board of Education enforced a block-by-block attendance boundary policy that at 
times kept white and black neighbors in separate schools.  During the 1940s and 1950s, 
as the city‘s black community expanded ever so gradually into previously all-white 
neighborhoods, the school board consistently redrew attendance boundaries to maintain 
educational apartheid, literally plucking black pupils from white schools and returning 
them to segregated ―neighborhood schools.‖  Ironically, the neighborhood schools to 
which black children returned were often outside of their residential neighborhoods.  As 
the Second Great Migration intensified in the 1950s and 1960s, the board of education 
struggled to maintain its segregated schools in the face of large black enrollment 
increases and intense pressure from civil rights organizations.  Many civil rights activists 
in the Vehicle City believed that open housing would help to solve the problem of school 
segregation.  In 1968, Flint voters approved a fair housing ordinance that banned most 
forms of housing discrimination.  Nevertheless, government records confirm that a clear 
―historical pattern of racially motivated student assignment‖ continued and even thrived 
in Flint throughout the civil rights era.  During the middle decades of the twentieth 
century, with a startling degree of efficiency, Flint officials repeatedly redistricted 
schools either to reflect or at times even supersede the racial and economic geographies 
of the city‘s segregated housing market.  Through its neighborhood schools initiative, the 
board of education successfully fused state-sanctioned forms of educational and 
residential apartheid into a powerful spatial and ideological monolith that undermined 
any claims of the North‘s historic innocence in the arena of race relations.  In an era of 
widespread school desegregation in the South, northern school districts in shrinking, 
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deindustrializing cities such as Flint became the site for Jim Crow‘s most defiant and 
triumphant stand.
2
   
The Mott Foundation and the Flint Board of Education, as an extension of their 
shared philosophical vision of community education, practiced deliberate racial 
segregation until well into the 1970s.  Although liberal civil rights organizations in the 
city had long criticized the Flint Board of Education for operating unequal and segregated 
public schools, they articulated a critique of ―de facto‖ segregation that proved to be 
exculpatory for the Mott Foundation, the school board, and other local policymakers.  For 
the civil rights movement in Flint—burdened already by a dearth of financial and 
institutional resources—the liberal language of northern exceptionalism that crystallized 
false distinctions between state-sponsored segregation in the South and privatized, de 
facto segregation in the North, resulted in a delayed response to the board‘s segregationist 
practices.  Indeed, it was not until 1975, several years after public, legislative, and legal 
opinions had shifted decisively against busing and other desegregation initiatives, that 
Flint activists filed their first of two unsuccessful federal desegregation lawsuits against 
the board of education.  Those suits, though of immense symbolic value in undermining 
the legitimacy of de facto segregation, spawned only rhetorical commitments to 
desegregation among representatives of Mott Foundation and the recalcitrant board of 
education.    
In the absence of judicial remedies, civil rights activists in Flint pinned their 
hopes for school desegregation on sustained local protest and federal enforcement of the 
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1964 Civil Right Act, which arrived after much delay in 1975.  After years of inaction 
following federal investigations that commenced in the late 1960s, HEW finally ordered 
the Flint Board of Education to desegregate its schools in late 1975, sparking a citywide 
debate on race and community education.  Stretching over a ten-year period in which the 
issues of busing and school segregation exploded in Michigan and elsewhere, Flint‘s 
desegregation crisis brought the issues of race, space, class, and neighborhood into the 
forefront of local political culture.  For white opponents of the HEW mandate, who 
sought to preserve their own moral innocence by framing segregation only in private 
terms, both residential and school segregation were the colorblind outcomes of tens of 
thousands of individual, market-based housing decisions that resulted in legal forms of 
segregation.  By refusing to acknowledge the government‘s role in the maintenance of 
inequality and segregation, both in schools and in neighborhoods, white opponents of 
desegregation occupied a tenuous political position that forced them to defend their racial 
innocence and the segregated status quo only by denying the past.  Thousands of white 
families did just that, however, and crafted an incongruous defense of white racial 
privilege and homeowner prerogatives that rejected both segregation and its only 
remedies.                     
Unwilling to provide political and ideological leadership during the 1970s 
turmoil, and unable to accept the potentially devastating challenges that desegregation 
posed for community education, the Mott Foundation abruptly withdrew its support for 
the Flint schools as the desegregation crisis unfolded, leaving behind a massive funding 
shortfall and a rudderless educational power structure.  Nevertheless, the school board 
continued to champion the neighborhood schools policies that had kept pupils segregated, 
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in the end agreeing only to a weak desegregation plan that relied upon magnet schools 
and other forms of voluntary desegregation.  In a district that had already lost tens of 
thousands of white pupils to suburban systems and private schools, Flint‘s voluntary 
magnet program never overcame the legacies of spatial inequality and racial segregation 
that a powerful combination of discriminatory education, housing, and development 
policies had maintained and orchestrated for decades.     
 
―Keeping Them in Places‖: The Origins of the De Facto Critique 
By the mid-1960s, African-American parents and activists had risen formally to 
challenge the exclusionary foundations of Flint‘s community education consensus.  
Though black citizens had for at least two decades criticized the Mott Foundation‘s 
unequal allocation of resources in the community education program, not until 1964 did 
the first sustained critiques of school segregation emerge.  As in other cities throughout 
the country, African Americans in Flint expressed a profound ambivalence on the 
question of school desegregation.  For the greater part of the twentieth century, 
educational quality usually trumped racial integration as the central concern of black 
parents.
3
  In 1964, however, local activists began to articulate a critique of community 
education and neighborhood schools that implicated segregation in the unequal 
educational opportunities provided to the city‘s black citizens.   
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In February of 1964, members of the Michigan NAACP‘s statewide civil rights 
committee accepted an invitation from the Mott Foundation to visit the community 
schools of Flint.  Hoping to deflect the charges of discrimination and unequal resource 
allocation that had first emerged in the 1950s, the Mott Foundation hosted NAACP 
officials in an attempt to allay black skepticism about community education.  Prior to the 
official visit, however, members of the Flint Citizens Information Committee (FCIC), an 
ad hoc local civil rights group, circulated an open letter to the NAACP visitors.  The 
letter presented a blistering denunciation of the Mott Foundation‘s role in fusing 
inequality and segregation through community education: 
This letter comes to tell you some things before you come visit the Mott 
Foundation because you will not get the facts when you come here.  What 
you will get will be a planned ―brainwashing session‖ about what they are 
doing to help regarding race relations.  The fact is the Mott people use this 
community school as a means of segregating the Negro and ―keeping them 
in places.‖  The schools are in neighborhoods that are segregated and the 
people living there must attend that school.  This is how they keep up 
segregated schools and segregation in general.  But then they plan lots of 
programs with high sounding names for the so called ―culturally 
deprived.‖  This is their way of deceiving Negroes and other people to 
think they want to help them.  This is very phony because if they were so 
interested in helping the Negro, why don‘t they give them better jobs, then 
they won‘t be so culturally deprived. . . . The Mott people really control all 





The February letter, circulated internally within the Michigan NAACP, highlighted the 
connections between school segregation and the broader patterns of exclusion that 
separated African Americans from skilled jobs and other social opportunities.  The letter 
also offered a sharp and accurate critique of the Mott Foundation‘s disproportionate 
power in shaping public school policies.  Yet embedded within the document was a 
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contradictory statement on the nature of pupil segregation that provided both legal and 
political cover for local policymakers.  In the opening paragraph, the letter writer argued 
that the Mott Foundation used community schools ―as a means of segregating the Negro 
and ‗keeping them in places.‘‖  In the next sentence, however, the letter implicated 
―neighborhoods that are segregated,‖ a passive voice construction that avoided naming 
the private and public entities that perpetuated racial segregation in the areas of housing, 
education, and employment.   
The 1964 letter was especially revealing because it indicated how the language of 
de facto segregation shaped local analyses of the color line.  Later that year, at a 
December 9 meeting of the board of education, Robert Rawls, the chairman of the Flint 
NAACP‘s housing committee, succinctly stated the critique of de facto segregation: ―The 
housing pattern directly influences the education of our children, creating segregation 
and, therefore, inferior schools.‖
5
  As most activists understood, virtually every instance 
of segregation in Flint‘s neighborhoods and schools derived from government-sponsored 
education, housing, and urban development policies.  Yet by adopting the de facto 
framework—which described the color line in private, non-statist terms—Flint‘s liberal 
civil rights coalition provided the school board with an opportunity to evade its 
responsibility for maintaining segregation by erecting a false hierarchy that blamed Jim 
Crow schools on privately orchestrated housing segregation.  Though black parents and 
activists understood and resented the board‘s discriminatory boundary policies, the liberal 
language of de facto segregation focused on private forms of racism in the real estate 
market as the source of educational apartheid, in the process diverting attention away 
from thoroughly institutionalized forms of state-sanctioned school segregation.         
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The FCIC‘s 1964 letter reflected longstanding political and ideological 
contradictions within both American liberalism and the northern civil rights movement 
that had first emerged in the aftermath of the Brown decision.  In the wake of the court‘s 
ruling, black activists in Flint and other northern cities immediately grappled with its 
local implications.  Shortly after the justices issued their 1954 decision, the Flint Urban 
League published a commentary that illustrated the tension within civil rights discourse 
between an acknowledgement of rigid segregation locally and the belief that northern 
patterns of segregation were fundamentally distinct from those in the South.  According 
to the Urban League, the Brown ruling did not pertain to Flint schools, regardless of their 
stark patterns of school segregation: 
On the surface the [Brown] decision would have little effect on Flint since 
its schools are already integrated and have been for many years. . . . Over 
the past few years certain grade schools have progressed closer and closer 
toward being all Negro.  Is this because of segregation in the public 
schools?  No.  Will the recent decision on schools affect this situation?  
No. . . . Flint is at the top of the list noticeably in the degree of 
neighborhood segregation.  Each public school is organized to serve its 
immediate neighborhood.  As the direct result of neighborhood 
segregation, some Flint schools inevitably are segregated.
6
                 
 
School board members and Mott Foundation officials did not feel threatened by 
such critiques because they failed to address the gerrymandering of districts that had 
undermined residential desegregation.  In fact, the language of the Urban League‘s 
critical editorial differed only slightly from the defense of segregation offered by 
Superintendent William Early in 1966.  Though neither the February 1964 letter nor the 
Urban League editorial used the term ―de facto segregation,‖ both documents signaled 
liberal acceptance of an inherently limited discourse on the nature of northern 
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 William S. Price, III, ―Implications in U.S. Supreme Court Ruling on Segregation in Public Schools,‖ 
Amplifier, n.d. [ca. 1955].   
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segregation.  In Flint and elsewhere, this discourse focused on private forms of 
discrimination at the expense of a critique of the public policies that maintained Jim 
Crow schools and neighborhoods.  The language of de facto segregation possessed a 
discursive power in Flint and in other northern cities that served to delay and then deflect 
civil rights responses to government-sponsored segregation.  For the thousands of African 
Americans in the city who saw no link between integration and quality education, the de 
facto-de jure debate meant far less than the equal allocation of resources.  However, 
among integrationists and those non-aligned citizens who saw a connection between 
educational disadvantage and segregation, the de jure-de facto, public-private regional 
binary severely undermined the legal attack on segregated schools.  
In the decades following the Brown verdict, the NAACP pursued an aggressive 
national strategy to extend desegregation to school districts in the North and West.  Part 
of the NAACP‘s plan entailed drawing distinctions between legally constituted forms of 
segregation in the South and the housing-based school segregation that existed in the 
North and West.  The strategic decision to make regional distinctions was not an 
inevitable outgrowth of the Brown litigation, however.  In the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
there was a great deal of debate within civil rights organizations over the nature of 
segregation outside of the South.  In 1962, disagreements over the issue came to a head at 
a Columbia University civil rights conference, where Chicago attorney William Ming 
asserted that there was ―no such thing as de facto versus de jure segregation.‖  ―For about 
forty years,‖ Ming argued, ―the pattern of school location was attributable to school 
boards whose intent from the start was to maximize or minimize Negroes in schools in 
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every city, town, and hamlet in the land.‖
7
  On the ground, civil rights activists in New 
York City, Chicago, and scores of other cities across the country waged similar debates 
over the structure of the segregation they confronted.   
Assertions of de jure segregation in the North gained little traction within the 
leadership circles of the Urban League, the NAACP, and state civil rights commissions, 
however.  In 1964, after meeting with Flint NAACP members, June Shagaloff, then an 
assistant to NAACP Director Roy Wilkins, revealed the organization‘s analysis of 
―northern-style‖ segregation: ―What is significant, is the growing realization that even 
though problems of imbalance and de facto segregation may not be the creation of boards 
of education and administrators, they have a responsibility to try to correct them.‖
8
  
Desegregation leaders such as Kenneth Clark, Robert Carter, Shagaloff, and a host of 
national-level NAACP officials and legal advisors devised this regional strategy not 
because they were unaware of school district gerrymandering, but rather because they 
believed it would open up political if not legal space for an assault on segregated schools 
and housing in the North.
9
  Quite the opposite occurred, however.   
During the 1960s, the NAACP eschewed legal strategies in much of the North, 
preferring instead to win school desegregation through local electoral gains and political 
pressure on boards of education.
10
  In Flint and elsewhere, the local NAACP followed the 
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national pattern by foregoing legal action against the board of education, preferring 
instead to wage political battles for open housing.  As historian Matthew Lassiter has 
argued,  
The de facto framework, originally devised by civil rights leaders as a 
strategy to extend the Brown mandate beyond the South, became not only 
a legal cover for national patterns of residential segregation but also a road 
map for southern cities seeking to escape meaningful integration through 
‗northern-style‘ approaches.
11
   
 
The discourse on de facto segregation also concealed the school board‘s practices of 
racial gerrymandering that maintained the educational color line.  Imbued with the moral 
innocence bestowed upon it by its critics and defenders alike, ―northern-style‖ school 
segregation—eventually adopted by school districts across the country—proved more 
resilient and adaptive than the statutory Jim Crow formerly practiced in Dixie.       
The NAACP‘s strategy for desegregating northern schools stemmed not only 
from internal tactical and policy decisions, but also from legal limitations imposed by 
federal courts.  The NAACP experienced several important judicial defeats during the 
1960s that underscored the legal and political obstacles to northern school desegregation.  
Although the NAACP won a 1961 federal desegregation case in suburban New Rochelle, 
New York, in which the plaintiffs asserted de jure segregation in the city‘s public 
schools, a pair of 1963 federal rulings pertaining to segregated schools in Chicago and 
Gary, Indiana, effectively shielded the north‘s neighborhood schools from judicial 
challenge.
12
  In its 1963 decision in Bell v. School Board, City of Gary, Indiana, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and not legal actions were the most appropriate means for confronting northern school segregation.  
Lassiter quotes Carter as follows: ―The method of securing state policy decisions outlawing de facto 
segregation and requiring local school boards to affirmatively eliminate that segregation seems to offer a 
faster method of statewide elimination of segregated schools than the more protracted method of court 
litigation.‖        
11
 Lassiter, ―De Jure/De Facto Segregation,‖ 6.   
12
 Taylor v. New Rochelle Board of Education, 288 F.2d 600 (1961).   
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that segregation in Gary‘s neighborhood schools 
stemmed not from intentional government policies but rather from segregated housing 
patterns.
13
  By refusing to hear an appeal of the Bell decision, the United States Supreme 
Court sent a powerful message to an already reticent community of would-be litigators in 
Flint and elsewhere about the regional barriers to school desegregation in the North.   
At the local level in Flint, negative federal judicial rulings, white defenses of 
neighborhood schools, and civil rights strategies that elevated political over judicial 
remedies all collided in the 1960s, effectively reaffirming an already strong consensus 
among both whites and blacks that school segregation derived primarily from private 
discrimination in the local real estate market.  Consequently, activists in Flint and other 
northern cities shifted their attention from school segregation litigation to the open 
housing campaign.  As part of that strategy, activists brought the issue of housing 
discrimination directly to the board of education.  From 1964 to 1967, black parents and 
community members repeatedly picketed school facilities and attended school board 
meetings to insist that board members endorse the NAACP‘s open occupancy 
ordinance.
14
  In 1966, the board of education responded to this pressure campaign by 
endorsing fair housing.
15
  Though African Americans won a major victory in 1968, when 
voters approved the city‘s open occupancy law, the Mott Foundation and the board of 
education emerged from the 1960s largely unscathed.  Protected by the language of de 
facto segregation, the Flint Board of Education continued to embrace its community 
schools model throughout the 1970s.    
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The concept of de facto segregation first emerged in the 1950s within a liberal 
civil rights discourse on northern patterns of school and residential segregation.  By the 
mid-1960s, however, racial conservatives had claimed the term as their own.  For 
opponents of desegregation nationally, the de facto formulation provided discursive and 
legal space to defend segregation in the post-Brown era as an accidental outcome of 
colorblind neighborhood schools programs that segregated not by state action but by 
individual, market-based housing decisions.  In a 1970 letter to a constituent, Flint‘s 
congressional representative Donald W. Riegle, Jr., an opponent of ―forced busing,‖ 
crystallized the regional distinctions that shielded Flint from school desegregation: ―In 
dealing with segregation, a distinction has been made between de jure and de facto 
segregation.  The former means intentional segregation. . . . De facto segregation results 
from housing patterns.‖
16
  In the urban and suburban North, white parents, recalcitrant 
school boards, and other defenders of the segregated status quo seized on the de facto 
terminology to create specious distinctions between the public Jim Crow of the South and 
the private, ―hearts and minds‖ driven segregation in the North and West.  In spite of its 
original usage within the civil rights movement, the de facto defense of neighborhood 
schools and segregation became the rallying cry for northern opponents of desegregation 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  Belying its reputation for civil rights advocacy, the New York 
Times repeatedly invoked de facto segregation as a means to discredit school 
desegregation initiatives in the North.  In 1963, the Times printed an editorial defense of 
neighborhood schools and pupil segregation in New York City that anticipated the Nixon 
administration‘s later opposition to busing:  
                                                 
16




The problem of ‗desegregation‘ in New York City‘s public schools is 
entirely different from that in the South. . . . The city‘s schools have 
always been integrated. . . . If the city is now threatened with boycotts in 
protest against ‗racially imbalanced schools,‘ the root is not in any 
systematic policy of racial exclusion fostered by law or administrative 




Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the cultural, political, and legal resonance of de facto 
segregation changed dramatically, a fact that became apparent in Flint during the 1970s 
showdown over school desegregation. 
Though African-American students, parents, and civil rights activists had often 
criticized the Flint Board of Education for segregation and educational inequality during 
the 1950s and 1960s, the city‘s black community remained divided on the issue of 
integrated schools.  During the 1963-64 school year, the NAACP and the Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE) organized massive student protests against pupil segregation in 
Boston, New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, and dozens of other cities.  Culminating 
in a massive one-day student boycott in New York City that attracted 300,000 pupils, the 
1963-64 national demonstrations against school segregation in the North presented 
activists in Flint with a clear opportunity to escalate political pressure on the board of 
education.  Yet the city remained relatively quiet.  Committed foremost to protecting civil 
rights in the arena of housing, the local NAACP and Urban League chapters never 
mounted a sustained, organized, and collective offensive against Flint‘s neighborhood 
schools.  As local black writer Wylie Rogers noted retrospectively, ―We were reduced to 
individual rather than organized efforts to deal with a problem we knew existed.‖
18
  In the 
judicial arena, the 1960s saw no legal actions filed on behalf of black children against 
school segregation in Flint.  Instead, federal enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
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arrived in Flint in 1975, when the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare charged 
the Flint Board of Education with perpetuating illegal forms of discrimination and 
government-sponsored segregation.   
 
Delayed Justice 
Federal officials initiated school desegregation proceedings in Flint.  However, they did 
so with a startling degree of reluctance.  After announcing in 1967 that it planned to 
expand federal investigations of school segregation to eighty-four school districts in the 
North and West, HEW sent a team of investigators to Flint in 1968.  Their goal was to 
determine ―whether racial imbalance is the product of discrimination or of de facto 
segregation in housing.‖
19
  During their three-year investigation, HEW officials 
uncovered a long but familiar record of state-sanctioned school segregation in the Vehicle 
City that dated back to the mid-1930s.  Hoping to capitalize on the citywide civil rights 
agitation that accompanied the investigations, the Flint NAACP contemplated filing a 
desegregation lawsuit against the board of education in 1971.
20
  If it had done so, the 
local NAACP would have joined black parents and civil rights activists from the 
Michigan cities of Detroit, Pontiac, and Kalamazoo, who all won federal desegregation 
rulings in the early 1970s.  Instead, the cash- and resource-starved group negotiated a 
Faustian compromise with school board officials, agreeing to delay legal action until the 
conclusion of HEW‘s enforcement efforts and the resolution of several important federal 
desegregation cases.  In spite of its de jure findings in dozens of northern and western 
cities, HEW refused to pursue federal enforcement proceedings in Flint and forty-five 
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other school districts until a 1975 federal lawsuit by the NAACP forced the issue.  In his 
1976 ruling against the government, United States District Judge John J. Sirica 
determined that HEW had ―failed to fulfill its duties and responsibilities‖ in the North 
and West through its non-enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which mandated 
the cutoff of federal funds for school districts that maintained illegally segregated 
schools.
21
  Responding quickly to the NAACP‘s July suit, HEW released its findings 
against the Flint Public Schools just one month later, in August of 1975.  The arrival of 
the HEW report marked the official commencement of school desegregation in Flint.     
HEW concluded its Flint investigation in 1970, yet it did not issue its findings 
against the Flint Community Schools until August of 1975.  During the five intervening 
years, while African Americans in Flint awaited the release of HEW‘s report, the issue of 
school desegregation swept like wildfire across the country.  In a unanimous 1971 
decision in the closely watched Swann case, the U.S. Supreme Court sustained 
countywide busing as a remedy for school segregation in metropolitan Charlotte, North 
Carolina.
22
  Two years later, in a case that held important implications for northern school 
systems, the Supreme Court ruled in its Keyes decision that the board of education in 
Denver enforced a de jure form of segregation through the racial gerrymandering of 
attendance boundaries.
23
  With its decision in the Keyes case, the Supreme Court 
undermined the legal basis of regional distinctiveness by finding a large school system 
outside of the South guilty of de jure segregation.   
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In addition to the cases in Charlotte and Denver, lower federal courts also issued 
desegregation rulings in a number of northern cities in the early 1970s.  With its deeply 
entrenched patterns of school and residential segregation, Michigan became a key legal 
and political battleground in the nation‘s school desegregation saga.  In February 1970, 
U.S. District Court Judge Damon Keith found the nearby school district of Pontiac, 
Michigan, guilty of intentional segregation.
24
  In response to Keith‘s ruling, which 
ordered the busing of pupils to achieve racial integration, Irene McCabe and other 
suburban white residents of Oakland County organized chapters of the National Action 
Group (NAG) and Save Our Schools (SOS), white protest organizations dedicated to 
blocking school desegregation.  Activists from NAG and SOS were unsuccessful in their 
attempts to overturn Keith‘s ruling.  Still, however, the two groups attracted thousands of 
white supporters in Genesee County and other areas of southeast Michigan.  Although 
Flint had not been the subject of any school desegregation litigation, white parents and 
homeowners responded to the Pontiac ruling by forming chapters of SOS and NAG in 
metropolitan Flint.
25
  The preemptive actions of local whites in Genesee County, who 
organized against busing before the school board had even contemplated such a remedy, 
affirmed the depth of white resistance to school desegregation. 
Prior to 1971, no court had sustained cross-district metropolitan busing remedies 
for state-sanctioned school segregation in the North.
26
  In the Pontiac and Denver cases, 
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federal judges had ordered busing, but only within single school districts.  Had the Flint 
NAACP filed a desegregation suit in the early 1970s, federal courts likely would have 
acknowledged de jure segregation and ordered the Flint Board of Education to institute a 
busing program confined to the city‘s schools.  It is unlikely that such a ruling would 
have succeeded in securing stable integration, however.  Between 1950 and 1970, the 
proportion of black pupils in Flint‘s elementary schools had risen steadily from 12.6 
percent to over 42 percent.  By the time HEW issued its findings in 1975, the percentage 
of black pupils had surged to 50 percent.  In all probability, a city-only desegregation 
remedy for Flint—as in scores of other cities where courts had ordered such plans—
would have hastened white departures from the Flint Public Schools and the city itself.   
In order to obtain lasting forms of racial integration in its schools, the city of Flint 
required a cross-district desegregation plan that included the nearly all-white suburban 
districts of Genesee County.
27
  Because such a plan would have involved twenty-two 
independent school districts, proponents of integration had to rely on the courts to initiate 
metropolitan school desegregation in Genesee County.
28
  Before Flint litigants had filed 
such a suit, however, the United States Supreme Court intervened by effectively 
invalidating cross-district busing in the urban North.  In September of 1971, in the closely 
watched Bradley v. Milliken case, U.S. District Judge Stephen Roth found that 
―governmental actions and inactions at all levels, federal, state, and local‖ had 
contributed to unconstitutional forms of de jure segregation in metropolitan Detroit that 
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crossed both municipal and school district boundaries.
29
  Roth‘s ruling, which ordered the 
state to construct a desegregation plan that included over eighty school districts in 
suburban Detroit, provoked a maelstrom of suburban opposition that rippled upwards 
through white suburbia, the state legislature, the United States Congress, and the White 
House.  In the year following the Bradley decision, school desegregation emerged as 
perhaps the central political issue in southeast Michigan, fueling the growth of NAG, 
SOS, and other grassroots groups that sought to block the ―forced busing‖ of white 
children.
30
  Angry over rising crime rates, inflation, an increasingly large tax burden, 
declining living standards, and busing, white voters in both cities and suburbs moved 
sharply to the right in 1972, providing former Alabama governor and segregationist 
George C. Wallace with his margin of victory in the state‘s Democratic presidential 
primary.  Wallace carried Genesee County by a substantial majority in the 1972 Michigan 
primary election.   
The reaction to Roth‘s ruling in the judicial arena was similarly polarized.  In a 
controversial 1974 decision that had profound implications for the desegregation process 
in Genesee County, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled to overturn Roth‘s metropolitan busing 
remedy.
31
  Though it endorsed desegregation within the Detroit city limits, the Supreme 
Court‘s Milliken v. Bradley ruling all but halted the legal quest for metropolitan school 
desegregation in the North.  The Milliken decision arrived a year prior to the release of 
HEW‘s findings on the Flint Public Schools.  In the absence of metropolitan legal 
remedies, the battle over school desegregation within the city of Flint would ultimately 
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hinge on the resolution of the HEW enforcement proceedings and a last ditch attempt 
from civil rights activists to win a favorable judicial ruling. 
The federal government listed its charges against the Flint Public Schools under 
three broad and interlinked categories: discriminatory hiring and staff assignment policies 
for black teachers, unequal educational opportunities for students, and racially biased 
pupil assignment.
32
  In response to the federal charges, the Flint Board of Education 
issued an open letter to the Flint community on November 3, 1975.  Published in the Flint 
Journal, the board‘s letter signaled both its refusal to accept blame for segregation and its 
continued embrace of neighborhood schools.  Though it admitted to having a 
―preponderance of schools that are racially identifiable,‖ the board implicated segregated 
housing patterns and ―white flight‖ as the key forces contributing to pupil segregation.  
―Segregation is not the result of deliberate policies or actions of the Flint Boards of 
Education of the last several decades,‖ the letter maintained.  As it had for over a decade, 
the school board employed the de facto framework to shield itself from criticism, 
arguing, ―Segregation is basically the result of housing patterns, economic factors and 
social mores once widely accepted.‖
33
  Emboldened by the recent court rulings, the 
resistance from within the Mott Foundation and the editorial board of the Flint Journal, 
and the harsh response to busing among whites in southeastern Michigan, the board listed 
seven restrictive criteria for the development of a school desegregation plan.  Among the 
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demands were two key conditions that indicated the board‘s basic opposition to all but 
voluntary forms of integration.  First, the board insisted, ―Any plan must have the 
involvement and support of the community.‖  Perhaps more importantly, the board‘s 
letter also dictated, ―Any plan must reflect the integrity of the community education 
concept.‖  Moreover, the board refused to honor the desegregation timetable established 
by HEW.
34
  With its open letter to the Flint community, the board of education embraced 
a colorblind defense of neighborhood schools predicated upon a fundamental denial of its 
past policies.  In recognition of the board‘s recalcitrance, HEW rejected the premises of 
the open letter and forwarded the Flint case to its Office of General Counsel for the 
expedition of administrative enforcement proceedings.
35
   
 In the months following the release of the open letter, Superintendent Clancy and 
the board of education held hearings throughout the city and solicited position papers and 
other forms of input from school-community advisory councils, parent organizations, and 
other citizen groups.  The school council reports reflected the city‘s deep racial and 
spatial divisions, containing a vast array of recommendations that ranged from SOS‘s 
uncompromising defense of neighborhood schools to proposals for extensive citywide 
busing and school clustering by grade level.
36
  The Mott Foundation, which had played a 
decisive role in maintaining segregated schools in Flint, staked a rhetorical position of 
neutrality as the schools crisis unfolded, simultaneously defending neighborhood schools 
while attacking both segregation and ―forced desegregation‖ through busing or other 
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  Echoing a familiar refrain, the foundation, as it had since at least 1968, 
maintained, ―Rigidly segregated housing patterns contribute to maintaining de facto 
segregation in Flint schools.‖
38
  Superintendent Clancy, a former Mott Foundation intern, 
embraced neighborhood schools and freedom of choice desegregation as essential to 
maintaining the Mott program of community education.  For their part, Flint NAACP 
officials abandoned their earlier wait-and-see position and endorsed a metropolitan 
desegregation plan for the twenty-two school districts in Genesee County.  Nearly 
bankrupt and ―running one day at a time‖ on a sharply curtailed austerity budget, the Flint 
NAACP could not muster the financial and human resources to mount the federal lawsuit 
necessary to trigger a metropolitan plan, however.
39
   
On March 10, 1976, the Flint Board of Education released its voluntary, freedom 
of choice desegregation plan to HEW and the community at large.
40
  Implemented at the 
start of the 1976 school year, the board‘s voluntary plan had as its cornerstone a system 
of magnet and other specialty schools.  Through school closings and school boundary 
reorganizations, the plan would force approximately four thousand pupils to transfer 
schools involuntarily, most to the next closest neighborhood school.  However, the 
board‘s proposal preserved neighborhood schools for the overwhelming majority of the 
city‘s 21,607 elementary students.  If elementary students chose not to avail themselves 
of thirteen specialty schools or desegregated neighborhood schools within their junior 
high school district, then, under the board‘s plan, they could remain in the segregated 
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facilities closest to their homes.  At the junior and senior high school levels, the board‘s 
remedy was similarly flaccid.  For those students and parents who chose segregated 
neighborhood schools over magnet schools and open academies, the board would not 
impose desegregation.  In recognition of the board‘s weak desegregation initiative, 
Melvyn Brannon of the Flint Urban League remarked,  
Knowing people are resistant to change, we think 98 per cent of the people 
will exercise that first option and remain at their present school. . . . I think 
the Flint Board of Education is being terribly, terribly, optimistic in 
thinking that people will voluntarily take advantage of the options.
41
   
 
Equally unimpressed with the voluntary nature of the board‘s solution, HEW announced 
its opposition to the Flint plan in May 1976, proposing instead a limited system of 
mandatory school pairing for eight adjoining elementary districts.
42
  While continuing 
negotiations with HEW, the board nonetheless moved to implement the hotly debated 
voluntary plan in the fall of 1976.
43
   
The board of education continued to defend its neighborhood schools throughout 
the desegregation crisis.  Though white parents and civic elites embraced the board‘s 
1976 plan, it drew widespread criticism from within Flint‘s black community.  Frustrated 
by the board‘s unwillingness to force integration and HEW‘s reluctance to withdraw over 
$4 million in federal funding from the district for its noncompliance, black parents and 
members of the Flint Black Teacher‘s Caucus ultimately bypassed the local NAACP by 
pursuing legal action.  On July 20, 1976, the parents of eight public school children 
joined members of the Black Teacher‘s Caucus in filing a metropolitan desegregation 
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lawsuit against the Flint Board of Education, HEW, the state of Michigan, and twenty-
one surrounding districts in suburban Genesee County.  Unlike the HEW enforcement 
proceedings, which focused only on the Flint school district, Holman v. School District of 
the City of Flint sought to desegregate all of Genesee County‘s schools through a 
countywide desegregation plan.
44
  In light of the judicial obstacles established by the 
Supreme Court‘s Milliken ruling, the plaintiffs in Holman faced a difficult battle.  
Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a de jure finding against the school districts of Genesee 
County based upon the regional gerrymandering of districts through property transfers, 
the long standing collaboration between districts through the Genesee County Skill 
Center and other cooperative endeavors, and cross-district pupil transfer agreements that 
allowed white children from the city to transfer from the Flint Public Schools to 
segregated suburban districts.  By demonstrating that ―acts of commission and omission‖ 
spawned de jure segregation throughout Genesee County, the plaintiffs in Holman sought 
to reverse judicial trends in the post-Milliken urban North.
45
   
 To meet the restrictive judicial requirements established by the Milliken ruling, 
Flint litigants had to demonstrate that segregation resulted from the intentional and 
collaborative acts of twenty-two independent school districts.  Plaintiffs in the Holman 
case raised the issue of cross-district collaboration as a means of demonstrating the 
substantial unity among the school districts of Genesee County.  To support that claim, 
lead attorney William Waterman—who had successfully argued for school desegregation 
in Pontiac—presented evidence that suburban school children participated in Flint Public 
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School ventures through a variety of activities and programs such as Junior Achievement, 
the Youth Service Bureau, the Continuation School for Unwed Mothers, the Half Way 
House Juvenile Home, the Pineview Holding Facility, Boys Farm, Head Start, the 
Genesee Skill Center, the Genesee Vocational Educational Program, the Mott 
Community College Bilingual Program, and the College and Cultural Center.  The 
suburban defendants contested neither the issue of cross-district collaboration nor the 
existence of racial imbalances, countering instead with a defense that surfaced repeatedly 
during the proceedings.  Proving that segregated school districts collaborated on pupil 
programming was not enough, the defendants argued.  Rather, the suburban defense in 
Holman revolved around the familiar issues of segregationist intent and the damage 
caused by Jim Crow.
46
  Did suburban school districts intentionally segregate students?  If 
so, could Waterman and his legal team identify specific instances in which school board 
policies had harmed or violated the civil rights of the eight student plaintiffs?  The 
defendants maintained that if the plaintiffs could not prove specific, intentional examples 
of segregation—and if the court could not trace those acts down to the level of the eight 
child plaintiffs—then the case had no merit.            
In the area of cross-district pupil transfers, the Holman plaintiffs contended that 
school superintendents in Flint and the suburbs often conspired to allow state-financed 
pupil transfers that brought white students from racially transitional neighborhood 
schools in the city to all-white suburban districts.  The pupil transfer charges centered on 
the relationship between the Flint Public Schools and the Kearsley Community Schools, a 
predominantly working-class, all-white suburban district that sat on Flint‘s northeastern 
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border.  Through their investigations, the plaintiffs uncovered an ad hoc arrangement that 
existed between officials in the two school districts.  This interschool compact, plaintiffs 
charged, allowed hundreds of white pupils to transfer from integrated schools in Flint to 
all-white schools in the Kearsley district.   
The claim had merit.  Suffering from a severe lack of financial resources, officials 
from the tiny Kearsley system implemented an open residency policy in 1973.  This 
policy allowed cross-district pupil transfers as a means of ―filling empty chairs‖ while 
simultaneously generating pupil tuition payments and increased funds from the Michigan 
State Board of Education.  According to Kearsley‘s school superintendent Edward R. 
Hintz, the criteria for pupil transfers between Flint and Kearsley were exceedingly vague.  
―They would take our pupils if there was a special need,‖ Hintz stated, ―like a youngster 
couldn‘t get along with his peers in our school, and he wanted to go to Flint or Bentley or 
what have you because he thought he would make it there, and graduate, or we had some 
pupils or vice versa, a reciprocal type of thing.‖
47
  Though the program was nominally 
reciprocal and colorblind, Hintz and his colleagues in the Kearsley system only endorsed 
the movement of white pupils into the district.  In response, defense counselors ridiculed 
the accusations of conspiracy:  
Are Plaintiffs really alleging that 22 Boards of Education, 22 
Superintendents, the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General of 
Michigan, the State Board of Education, and the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction got together and planned to discriminate against Plaintiffs?  If 
so, it should not be asking too much for Plaintiffs to disclose what hall 
was rented for that purpose and when the convention took place.
48
   
 
Yet again, the defense argued that the existence of rigid pupil segregation was not enough 
to trigger judicial intervention.  Due to legal precedent, the plaintiffs had to prove that 
                                                 
47
 Deposition of Edward R. Hintz, July 13, 1977, Holman, v. School District of the City of Flint (1976). 
48
 Holman v. School District of the City of Flint (1976).   
388 
 
school officials in Flint, Kearsley, and other districts intended to segregate students with 
their interdistrict transfer plans.         
 On the issue of property transfers between the Flint Board of Education and 
surrounding suburban districts, the plaintiffs argued that interdistrict land and boundary 
agreements consistently brought black pupils to Flint while relinquishing white pupils to 
suburban schools.  Plaintiffs documented specific property transfers from 1955, 1962, 
1967, and 1969 between the Flint Public Schools and the Flushing, Swartz Creek, 
Carman, and Westwood Heights school districts, which ―allowed approximately several 
thousand white students . . . living in the Flint School District to attend schools in their 
[suburban] districts in order to avoid attending schools with black students.‖
49
  The 
defendants acknowledged the property transfers between districts while denying that such 
exchanges stemmed from any discriminatory or segregationist intent.  Consistently, 
defense lawyers argued that the plaintiffs had to locate—in board minutes or in other 
written records—specific instances in which local officials collaborated to practice de 
jure segregation.  In response to the broadly formulated, structural argumentation of the 
plaintiffs, suburban defendants in the Holman case employed a defense of de facto 
segregation that denied all but the most obvious, intentional, and documented acts of 
racial discrimination.     
Suffering from severe financial and resource limitations, members of the Black 
Teacher‘s Caucus tried in vain to raise funds within the black community to support the 
legal proceedings.  Because the Holman case involved so many separate school 
jurisdictions, legal research for the case was both time and cost intensive.  Not wishing to 
deplete its meager financial resources on a polarizing lawsuit that had little chance of 
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succeeding, the Flint NAACP donated only $500 to the plaintiffs.
50
  As yet an added 
impediment, school boards and superintendents from the twenty-one suburban districts 
involved consistently refused to release school board minutes and other documents 
requested by the plaintiffs.  In order to make their case, the plaintiffs required a vast array 
of materials that included attendance boundary maps, school location studies, property 
transfer documents, records pertaining to student test scores and teacher training, and the 
racial compositions for every school in the county dating back to 1940.
51
  The defense‘s 
insistence on specificity and intent forced the plaintiffs to request large quantities of data.  
Nevertheless, Stewart A. Newblatt, the presiding judge in the case, looked askance at 
Waterman‘s requests for information.  The plaintiffs, Newblatt claimed, were unfairly 
overburdening the suburban districts with too many requests for data.
52
  Surprisingly, 
then, Judge Newblatt repeatedly chastised the plaintiffs for failing to produce the specific 
documentation of de jure segregation required for a properly pled complaint.  In his 1980 
decision to dismiss the suit ―without prejudice,‖ Newblatt wrote, ―[the plaintiffs have] 
repeatedly pled broad, non-specific allegations which encompass numerous theories of 
racial discrimination.‖  ―Without indicating a position on the validity of such claims,‖ he 
added, ―the court does not believe that such a shotgun approach should be tolerated, 
particularly when plaintiffs have been afforded time and opportunities to refine their 
claims.‖
53
  Members of the Black Teacher‘s Caucus and other supporters of metropolitan 
desegregation surely noted the irony in Newblatt‘s decision to dismiss.  For the same 
judge who resisted the plaintiffs‘ attempts at discovery ultimately dismissed the case for a 
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lack of specificity.  Newblatt‘s decision to dismiss the Holman case marked the end of 
any realistic plan of school desegregation for Flint and the remainder of Genesee County.   
Judge Newblatt‘s decision, which effectively extinguished any hope for 
metropolitan desegregation, arrived four months after the final resolution of the HEW 
crisis.  As the Holman case languished in the federal judiciary, HEW and the board of 
education continued to debate the merits of voluntary desegregation.  Implemented in 
1976 over the objections of civil rights activists and HEW administrators, the board of 
education‘s freedom of choice plan failed to reduce racial segregation in the city‘s 
schools.  By 1978, 81.6 percent of Flint‘s elementary students still attended segregated 
schools while thirty of the city‘s thirty-seven elementary schools remained ―racially 
identifiable.‖  Barred by federal legislation from ordering busing to schools other than a 
child‘s neighborhood school, HEW lacked the power—and perhaps the will—to mandate 
a citywide pupil transportation plan.  Instead, HEW officials implored the board to 
submit a backup busing plan while instructing the federal Department of Justice to 
prepare legal action against the Flint Board of Education.
54
  As with HEW officials, 
investigators from the Justice Department had one overriding question, which they 
communicated directly to Olive Beasley, the Flint coordinator of the Michigan Civil 
Rights Commission, in 1978: ―Did you ever reach a determination as to whether the 
segregation [in the Flint Public Schools] was of a de facto or de jure character?‖
55
   
The board of education responded to the threat of litigation by joining the 
growing movement against busing.  The Flint Journal editorialized definitively, ―It is 
becoming apparent that extensive busing on the elementary level has failed to reduce 
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racial bias while being destructive of efforts to improve education.‖
56
  Buoyed by the 
local opposition to ―forced desegregation,‖ the board ignored HEW‘s threats of legal 
action and flatly refused its request to create a citywide busing plan.  For their part, 
hundreds of white parents, fearing that legal action was forthcoming, responded to the 
mounting conflict over desegregation by placing their homes for sale and continuing to 
withdraw their children from the city‘s public schools.  Between 1971 and 1980, the total 
elementary school enrollment in the city declined by nearly 30 percent.  Over the same 
period, the proportion of black pupils in the Flint schools increased to 59 percent.
57
   
As in other cities, the long duration of the desegregation saga in Flint served to 
increase racial segregation by intensifying the white exodus from the city and its public 
school system.  In the summer of 1978, white voters voiced their opposition to 
desegregation by rejecting a tax levy for thirty-four mills.
58
  In an election that saw voters 
split sharply along racial lines, white opponents of desegregation joined the late 1970s tax 
revolt by rejecting the board‘s appeal for additional funds.  The loss was the board‘s first 
tax defeat since 1948.
59
  The measure passed in the four wards that contained the city‘s 
heaviest black concentrations, but it lost decisively in the five wards with the largest 
white majorities.  Even the local UAW political action committee, a perennial proponent 
of public school millages, refused to endorse the school levy of 1978.
60
  Following the 
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June 12 defeat, the board of education announced that the city‘s schools would close 
indefinitely unless voters approved a second initiative on August 8, 1978.  Fearing the 
shutdown of the city‘s public schools, voters narrowly authorized the millage by a margin 
of two thousand votes.  Once again, the votes split sharply along racial lines.  Underway 
since the 1950s, the city‘s slow march towards desegregation and a permanent black 
majority significantly eroded white support for community education.
61
      
The 1978 millage elections highlighted the centrality of race in the fragile white 
consensus on neighborhood schools.  When federal intervention threatened to dismantle 
Flint‘s cherished neighborhood schools, white taxpayers responded with acts of civic 
secession that reverberated upward to shape the final resolution of the desegregation 
crisis.  Hoping to regain white taxpayers‘ support for public education, the Flint Board of 
Education resumed negotiations with HEW in the fall of 1978 with a renewed sense of 
urgency.  As it had been since 1975, the key issue in the desegregation dispute was the 
board‘s refusal to mandate or even consider involuntary busing to achieve racial balance.  
Specifically, the school board declined to design a backup busing plan to implement in 
the event that magnet schools failed to reduce segregation.  Lacking the authority to 
implement systemic desegregation, HEW officials continued to withhold funding from 
the board of education while modifying their insistence on a pupil transportation plan.     
By the close of the 1970s, only a handful of white residents in Genesee County 
endorsed school desegregation.  Even among African Americans in Flint, school 
desegregation was a controversial and divisive issue.  Ultimately, HEW responded to the 
board‘s recalcitrance and the grassroots resistance of local whites by backing away from 
its busing remedy, choosing instead to speed the resolution of the conflict by endorsing 
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the expansion of Flint‘s magnet program.  Much to the dismay of local activists from the 
NAACP and the Black Teacher‘s Caucus, the board of education and HEW signed a 
crisis-ending consent decree in the spring of 1980 that closely resembled the board‘s 
initial voluntary plan.
62
  In exchange for the school board‘s promise to expand the 
elementary school magnet program from thirteen to eighteen schools, HEW agreed to 
drop its enforcement proceedings and submitted a binding promise to the school board 
that it would not pursue any further legal action regarding desegregation.
63
  To fund the 
expansion of the city‘s magnet program, the federal government agreed to release $2.35 
million to the Flint Public Schools that it had held in escrow pending the resolution of the 
negotiations.  Although the agreement allowed the federal government to establish and 
monitor enrollment goals to measure the magnet program‘s success, the consent decree 
contained no provision for involuntary busing.  Cheering the surprising and rather 
anticlimactic end of the desegregation conflict, a Flint Journal editorial concluded, ―The 
Flint Settlement, whatever its merits and deficiencies, is based upon a realistic appraisal 
of what could be accomplished at this time.‖
64
  Among those whites who uncritically 
embraced the Mott program of community education, forced integration was never a 
realistic solution to forced segregation.  Federal approval of Flint‘s voluntary 
desegregation program signaled the triumph of the neighborhood schools that, for fifty 
years, had formed the heart of a segregated system of community education.
65
  
Following the release of the 1980 consent decree, black critics denounced the 
accord as a step backward for integration and racial equality.  In a protest in front of the 
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Flint Board of Education headquarters, picketers from the NAACP and the Black 
Teacher‘s Caucus carried signs that read, ―The Board of Education and Segregation Are 
Still Shacking Together.‖
66
  Activist Claire McClinton condemned the resolution, noting, 
―It is a segregation bid.  The students have been sold down the river.‖
67
  For those 
African-American citizens who had attended segregated schools in the city of Flint, the 
language of the consent decree was especially disheartening.  According to the 
agreement, which marked the unofficial end of federal enforcement proceedings in the 
city of Flint, the school board claimed neither legal nor historical responsibility for 
segregation in the Flint Public Schools: ―The district denies legal liability in this matter 
and maintains that it has never and does not now operate its public schools in a racially 
discriminatory manner.‖  With the stroke of a pen, the 1980 consent decree bestowed a 
moral and historical innocence upon the Mott Foundation and the Flint Board of 
Education by expunging their fifty-year record of intentional segregation.  To citizens 
such as Minnie Simpson from the Clark School district, whose neighbors attended 
different public schools, or Wesley King, the boy who studied in a coat closet at 
Homedale School, the ultimate resolution of the desegregation crisis must have seemed 
surreal.         
In the years following the conclusion of Flint‘s desegregation crisis, the Flint 
Board of Education implemented a voluntary magnet desegregation program that had 
little chance of succeeding.  Just one year after the desegregation accord, principals of 
magnet schools in black neighborhoods reported their inability to meet interracial 
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  In a move that only exacerbated the situation, the federal 
government, in 1981, cut nearly $1 million from the board of education‘s desegregation 
budget.
69
  In spite of vigorous recruiting and a board-sponsored publicity campaign 
designed to promote the social and intellectual benefits of a ―magnetized‖ education, 
white families consistently chose to remain in their neighborhood schools, enroll in 
private schools, or leave the city altogether.
70
  Between 1980 and 1992, the proportion of 
white pupils in the Flint Public Schools dropped sharply from 52.5 to 29.6 percent.  
Across the city, school principals routinely failed to meet the demographic goals 
established by the 1980 consent decree, especially in schools within black residential 
neighborhoods.  As in other cities, Flint‘s public schools experienced a rapid transition 
from segregation to resegregation.  African-American school board member Paul 
Newman conceded defeat in 1992 in a somber assessment of the desegregation process: 
―Our ability to integrate the school system as hoped is all but gone.‖
71
  In the end, 
voluntary desegregation failed in the city of Flint just at it had in scores of American 
cities.  Though it provided limited opportunities for interracial contact between small 
numbers of children, the board‘s magnet schools program never overcame the double-
edged legacy of state-sponsored segregation and private racism that had shaped the 
community schools movement since its inception.       
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The Demise of Community Education 
Flint‘s history of community education was strange indeed.  Beginning during the Great 
Depression as a class-oriented response to the specific challenges of mass migration, 
social disunity, and trade union militancy, the Mott program had evolved, by mid-
century, into a nationally recognized model for neighborhood-based education that 
sought to counter the progressive values of both the civil rights and labor movements.  
Through its vocational programs, social services, and education programming, Flint‘s 
system of community education offered an alternative to redistributive liberalism that 
foreshadowed the policies endorsed by the New Right in later decades.  As the city‘s 
black population expanded in the 1950s and beyond, Charles Stewart Mott, Frank 
Manley, and members of the board of education sought to preserve their vision of civic 
unity by maintaining rigidly segregated schools.  School segregation was not simply an 
unanticipated consequence of discriminatory housing policies in the city, however.  The 
segregation of pupils in Flint‘s public schools stemmed from both housing and the direct 
and intentional policy interventions of the Mott Foundation and the Flint Board of 
Education.  The boundary, construction, and transfer policies that served to maintain 
Flint‘s educational color line derived from a seldom articulated but deeply resonant 
consensus among whites about racial differences, the maintenance of property values, 
and the preservation of neighborhood integrity.  When civil rights activists emerged to 
challenge the exclusions that had held together Flint‘s system of community schools, the 
Mott program disintegrated, leaving in its wake a segregated and balkanized constellation 
of neighborhoods and schools.                             
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Even under a voluntary plan, desegregation severely undermined the foundations 
of community education.  The 1976-77 school year, which brought the first phase of 
desegregation to Flint, also marked the last gasp of the Mott program of community 
education.  In 1977, the struggle over Flint‘s neighborhood schools took a surprising and 
dramatic turn when the Mott Foundation ended its official sponsorship of community 
education.  On July 5, 1977, after several years of private, internal dialogue on the 
subject, the foundation announced that it had severed its formal ties to the board of 
education: ―Except for administrative support grants, all present funding of FBE [Flint 
Board of Education] programs will be phased out within at most seven years.‖  
Foundation officials maintained that the school board could still solicit funds following 
the phase out, but the announcement made clear that ―FBE and its requests will be 
considered in the same manner as other organizations and their proposals.‖
72
  Between 
1935 and 1970, the Mott Foundation donated nearly $50 million to the Flint Public 
Schools.  By the mid-1970s, it was sending approximately $5 million per year to the 
board of education.
73
  With the 1977 announcement, however, Mott officials ended their 
guaranteed financial support for the public schools of Flint.  Announced just prior to the 
beginning of the 1977-78 school year, as the board continued to wrangle with HEW over 
the issue of voluntary desegregation, the Mott Foundation‘s decision sent shockwaves 
throughout the city.  According to an April 1977 position paper authored by foundation 
trustees, the decision to cancel the forty-two-year relationship stemmed from a desire 
among foundation officials to transfer financial responsibility for community education to 
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the taxpaying public.  ―If a program is assisted by a foundation long enough for its 
constituents to determine its value to them,‖ the trustees claimed, ―the program should in 
most cases pass to them for on-going funding.‖
74
  By severing the official ties between 
the foundation and the public school system, trustees hoped to serve a larger purpose, 
though.  The decision reflected a desire among trustees ―to give FBE the freedom and 
encouragement to effect change in its program and to keep abreast of new challenges to 
an urban educational system.‖
75
  The city‘s ongoing desegregation crisis constituted the 
greatest such challenge, of course, but the Mott Foundation wanted no part of it.
76
  After 
sustaining a forty-year partnership with the board, the Mott Foundation announced the 
end of its community education initiative at the precise moment when the Flint Public 
Schools faced its largest, most intractable crisis.    
 The foundation‘s decision to cancel its partnership with the Flint Public Schools 
raises a number of questions.  Did the foundation abandon the public schools in response 
to HEW‘s tepid assault on neighborhood schools?  Was the withdrawal of financial 
support an indication of the foundation‘s opposition to desegregation?  For the thousands 
of black citizens who had criticized the Mott program for maintaining racial segregation 
and discrimination, the 1977 announcement confirmed the foundation‘s fundamental 
opposition to desegregation and basic racial fairness.  Although no direct evidence 
supports a connection between desegregation and the end of community education, the 
Mott Foundation had nonetheless played a key role in creating the artificial network of 
segregated neighborhood schools that dotted the urban landscape in Flint and hundreds of 
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other American cities.  Moreover, through their defense of neighborhood schools, 
Superintendent Clancy and other foundation officials had formed the heart of resistance 
to HEW-mandated desegregation.  If the foundation did end its community schools 
programming out of opposition to school desegregation, then it did so as an extension of 
the deep racial conservatism of Charles Stewart Mott, Frank Manley, and the local 
business leaders who governed the Mott Foundation‘s Board of Trustees.   
Though born in 1875, Mott survived until 1973.  During the last two decades of 
his life, Mott was an uncomfortable witness to the civil rights upheavals that brought Jim 
Crow to its knees in the South.  Unlike the millions of Americans who saw the civil rights 
movement in the Deep South as an inspiration, Mott viewed desegregation as a grave 
threat to a social order that he wished to preserve.  In 1956, as southern resistance to the 
Brown ruling was congealing in the U.S. Congress, Mott wrote warm letters of support to 
well known segregationists such as Senator James Eastland of Mississippi urging 
defiance.  ―I agree with all that you said, including ‗State Rights‘ and Constitution,‖ Mott 
revealed to the senator.  ―Certainly I agree with all that you said regarding the Negro 
Question.‖
77
  Like Eastland, Mott opposed the Supreme Court‘s Brown ruling, viewing it 
as an immoral and unconstitutional assault on state‘s rights and racial gradualism.
78
   
As civil rights protests intensified during the 1960s, Mott‘s defenses of 
segregation and ―law and order‖ became more pronounced, leading him to move even 
further to the right politically.  During the summer and fall of 1965, Mott exchanged 
cordial letters regarding community education with George Wallace, Alabama‘s 
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  Perhaps both Mott and Wallace understood the essential 
compatibility of segregation and community education.  As indicated by the timing of his 
correspondence with Wallace—occurring just months after Alabama state troopers had 
assaulted peaceful voting rights protestors in Selma—Mott was largely untroubled by 
open defenses of segregation and the forceful repression of dissent.  Mott avoided the 
harsh language and tactics of Wallace and other demagogues, but his personal 
commitment to segregation in Flint and elsewhere was staunch; and his support for 
neighborhood schools and community education was an outgrowth of deeply cherished 
personal beliefs on the natural hierarchies that he believed distinguished whites from 
blacks.  Like Mott, Frank Manley abhorred all but the most limited and gradual forms of 
voluntary desegregation, once stating, ―I am one of the kind that thinks that this busing is 
for the birds.‖
80
  The two men most responsible for designing Flint‘s neighborhood-based 
system of community schools sincerely believed that segregation helped to strengthen 
civic solidarity in postwar Flint.  Anything beyond voluntary, gradual desegregation—
and any proposal that undermined the city‘s cherished neighborhood schools—threatened 
to destroy the delicate social fabric that Manley and Mott had spent their lives weaving.      
Frank Manley died in 1972, just prior to Mott‘s demise in 1973.  Both men passed 
away before the commencement of school desegregation and the Mott Foundation‘s 
abandonment of its community education initiative.  However, the foundation‘s decision 
to cancel community education would have surprised neither man.  By the mid-1970s, 
black voters had elected several African-American candidates to the nine-member Flint 
Board of Education.  Though unable to shift the course of desegregation, black and white 
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critics of the Mott Foundation and Superintendent Clancy constituted a vocal and 
burgeoning minority on the school board during the late 1960s and 1970s.  In 1978, 
critics of the Mott Foundation gained enough votes on the school board to oust 
Superintendent Clancy.  The prospect of the board‘s acquiescence in ―forced 
desegregation‖ deeply disturbed both Mott and Manley because they saw segregated 
neighborhood schools as the foundation for community education.  By the mid-1970s, it 
had become clear to foundation officials that their power to shape the board‘s 
desegregation policies had waned substantially.  In light of the foundation‘s electoral 
defeats and its diminished political power, it is unlikely that the Mott Foundation‘s 
decision to withdraw funding from the board of education would have disheartened either 
man.  Manley and Mott remained committed to the notion of community education 
throughout their later years, but both men had come to a new, broader understanding of 
the city‘s problems by the early 1970s.   
Dating back to the 1930s, Manley and Mott had championed community 
education as a form of urban renewal that preserved social harmony, civic pride, and 
individual uplift through citywide educational programming.  As Mott‘s close friend 
Joseph Anderson revealed, ―He [Mott] was convinced that if we had a fine educational 
system, everything would follow.‖
81
  But the postwar suburban migrations of white 
families and downtown businesses—which hastened the city‘s long, slow journey 
towards a black majority first in the schools and later in the city at large—convinced 
Mott to reassess the limitations of a schools-based approach to urban development.  In 
order to reverse the city‘s deterioration and stem the outward migrations of the white 
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families, the Mott Foundation shifted its focus beginning in the late 1960s from schools 
to traditional urban renewal projects and other downtown-oriented development 
initiatives designed to lure businesses, industry, shoppers, tourists, and white 
homeowners back to the shrinking city.  The Mott Foundation‘s urban redevelopment 
strategies changed dramatically in the era of open housing and school desegregation.  For 
forty years, the Mott Foundation sought to renew the city by rehabilitating its people.  
With its decision to shift funding from schools to urban renewal projects, the foundation 
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Demolition Means Progress: 
Urban Renewal, Freeways, and State-Sanctioned Ghetto Formation 
 
 
On July 28, 1967, in the aftermath of major race riots in Detroit, Newark, and dozens of 
other American cities, President Lyndon B. Johnson established the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders.  Published in 1968, not long after Flint citizens had 
taken to the streets to demand fair housing and an end to police brutality, the 
commission‘s widely read ―Kerner Report‖ included a remarkably probing statement on 
the nature of racial inequality in the United States: ―What white Americans have never 
fully understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply 
implicated in the ghetto.  White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and 
white society condones it.‖
1
  With its language of racial atonement and its commitment to 
sweeping policy changes, the Kerner Report marked a watershed moment for black 
citizens and civil rights activists throughout the country.  For Whitney Young of the 
National Urban League, the report confirmed, ―The real problem [in the United States] is 
racism, the bigotry of white people.‖
2
  The Kerner Report, as Young noted, attempted to 
reframe discourses on the nation‘s deepening urban crisis by addressing the role of white 
racism in maintaining racial, spatial, and economic inequalities.   
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As shocking as the Kerner Commission‘s findings were to white racial moderates 
across the nation, they came as no surprise to thousands of black residents in Flint‘s 
condemned St. John and Floral Park neighborhoods.  Indeed, for more than a few black 
citizens of these two neighborhoods, the Kerner Report was simply too timid.  The report, 
some Flint activists charged, failed to specify the direct role of federal, state, and, most 
importantly, local policies in maintaining the nation‘s color lines.  On June 7, 1973, Olive 
Beasley of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission sent an angrily worded memorandum 
to Richard Wilberg, the director of urban renewal programs for the city of Flint.  In her 
correspondence, Beasley reflected bitterly upon the relationship between urban renewal, 
municipal policies, and ghetto formation in the Vehicle City.  Paraphrasing from the 
Kerner Report, Beasley identified Flint‘s municipal government as the primary 
gatekeeper for the city‘s segregated ghettoes: ―The City of Flint is deeply implicated in 
its ghettoes, City of Flint institutions created them; City institutions maintain them.‖
3
  
According to Beasley and other critics, ―the real problem‖ in the United States was not 
simply white racism and private bigotry, as Whitney Young had suggested, but rather 
white racism embedded within government policies.  To Beasley, the history or urban 
renewal in Flint seemed to provide an especially revealing glimpse of how private racism 
and public policies converged to redraw the color line.   
The words in Beasley‘s memorandum spoke directly to the post-World War II 
experiences of African Americans in Flint‘s Floral Park and St. John Street 
neighborhoods.  Flint‘s postwar urban renewal program ossified the city‘s already rigid 
system of residential Jim Crow.  During the 1960s and 1970s, officials from Flint‘s 
Urban Renewal and Housing Department, the Department of Community Development 
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(DCD), and other local government agencies cleared three hundred acres of commercial 
and residential land in the St. John neighborhood, relocating nearly all of its three 
thousand black residents into segregated replacement housing.  Much the same occurred 
in Floral Park, where city leaders demolished a physically deteriorated yet vibrant black 
residential enclave to make way for public housing units and a freeway interchange.  
These officials sought to create space for General Motors factory expansions, an urban 
freeway, and an industrial park.  Because the city had failed in its bid to establish New 
Flint, proponents of urban renewal argued, the demolition of ―blighted‖ neighborhoods 
was essential to creating new jobs and economic development.
4
  Yet the St. John and 
Floral Park renewal projects created few new jobs and failed to stimulate the city‘s 
beleaguered economy.  By the close of the 1970s—despite the expenditure of millions of 
dollars and the creation of countless plans and proposals by city planners, business 
executives, and local activists—the St. John and Floral Park projects had yielded a city 
that visitors and investors shunned and that perennially led the nation in unemployment. 
Plans for urban renewal and freeway construction helped to galvanize the 
movement for open occupancy in the Vehicle City.  In 1960, city officials announced 
plans to demolish homes and businesses in Floral Park and St. John.  In support of the 
redevelopment projects, executives from GM, municipal officials, and downtown 
boosters argued that urban renewal would provide the city and its residents with more 
jobs and a growth-oriented future.  Designed to lure industry, retailers, and shoppers back 
to the city, Interstate 475, the I-475/M-78 freeway interchange, and the St. John Street 
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Neighborhood Development Project (NDP) formed the heart of the city‘s sweeping urban 
renewal program.  Yet urban renewal in Flint was much more than a top-down corporate 
campaign for economic growth.  Many civil rights and neighborhood activists also 
supported the redevelopment of St. John and Floral Park, viewing urban renewal as an 
opportunity to secure new housing, desegregation, and clean air.  Nevertheless, by the 
mid-1970s, members of the city‘s pro-growth coalition had triumphed over local civil 
rights activists, ultimately presiding over a renewal program that valued short-term 
industrial growth and ghetto containment over housing equity.  Through their direct and 
decisive interventions in the I-475 and St. John renewal projects, GM and other corporate 
interests in Genesee County exercised direct state power and effectively blurred the 
boundaries between public policy and private business interests.   
During the postwar era, a combination of grassroots racism, housing and 
redevelopment initiatives, corporate investment strategies, and municipal divestment 
policies continuously recreated the ghettoes that Flint‘s municipal leaders sought to 
demolish through urban renewal and freeway construction.  By the late 1970s, officials 
directing the city‘s redevelopment program had inscribed new forms of racial and 
economic inequality onto Flint‘s increasingly deteriorated urban landscape, intensifying 
both urban poverty and African-American residential containment.  The term de facto 
segregation in no way describes the racial, spatial, and property configurations that 
emerged with Flint‘s St. John Street and Floral Park urban renewal programs.  Indeed, 
urban renewal helped to create a new political economy of race and property values that 
bolstered Jim Crow in the Vehicle City.  For residents of these two neighborhoods, 
segregation, ghettoization, and resegregation arrived from below and from above. 
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Freeways for Flint: The Highway as Assembly Line 
In the decade following the close of World War II—forty years before the series of 
automobile plant closures in Flint that inspired Michael Moore‘s 1989 documentary film, 
Roger and Me—GM executives implemented their suburban strategy in Genesee County.  
Though it would eventually shift massive amounts of Flint-based capital towards the 
Sunbelt and points southward in Latin America, GM‘s postwar capital migrations in the 
Flint area tended to travel on city-suburban axes.  During the 1940s and 1950s, as Flint‘s 
economy boomed and the company‘s local workforce climbed above eighty thousand, 
GM officials developed a suburban-centered plant construction program that generated a 
sprawling regional network of modern, single-story manufacturing and assembly plants 
surrounding the city of Flint.  Between 1940 and 1960, GM opened eight new industrial 
complexes in suburban Genesee County.  The new factories formed a circle around the 
city that stretched from the southeastern suburb of Grand Blanc, through Flint Township 
and Swartz Creek on the city‘s southwestern border, to the northern metropolitan district 
of Beecher and the eastern suburb of Burton Township.  Because New Flint‘s proponents 
failed in their quest to establish a tax-sharing metropolitan government, these capital 
migrations effectively diverted thousands of jobs and millions of dollars in tax revenues 
from the city to neighboring municipalities and townships.
5
  Making matters worse, 
postwar residential and commercial developments in the city had left the Buick, 
Chevrolet, Fisher Body, and AC Spark Plug plants with very little room for expansion.     
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In contrast to the densely arranged, inefficient, multi-story structures that lined the 
city‘s industrial corridor along the Flint River and rail lines, the new suburban plants 
constructed after World War II signaled GM‘s preference for larger factory sites, single-
story plant architecture, and freeway-centered production facilities.  Embracing an 
aesthetic ideal that celebrated the harmony between industry and suburban 
homeownership—what Robert Self describes as the industrial garden—GM consciously 
modeled its suburban plants, wherever possible, after the surrounding residential 
landscapes.
6
  According to the Detroit Free Press, ―The new plants being built today all 
over the country resemble modern country club structures, with low, sleek lines graced 
by landscaping.‖
7
  Built in 1947, the Van Slyke Road Chevrolet-Fisher Body assembly 
plant in Flint Township served as the local showcase for GM‘s embrace of freeway 
industrialism, architectural modernism, and suburban aesthetics.  Unlike the original 
Buick and Chevrolet plants in central Flint, which offered few amenities to suburban 
commuters, GM‘s Flint Township plant provided its growing cohort of suburban 
employees with convenient highway access, wide streets, and ample off-street parking. 
Express highways were the lynchpin of GM‘s postwar suburban strategy.  In 
order to link its decentralized operations throughout the Flint metropolitan region—and 
to facilitate new car shipments and parts deliveries from regional and national suppliers—
GM aggressively lobbied federal, state, and local officials for additional highway 
construction.
8
  Specifically, local GM executives desired an urban freeway running 
through the city of Flint that would connect the county‘s manufacturing, assembly, and 
supply plants both to one another and to Interstate 75, the north-south freeway that linked 
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Flint and its suburbs to Detroit, Saginaw, and the nation.  As well, local plant managers 
sought a freeway route that would directly link the Buick assembly facility on Flint‘s 
North End to the Fisher Body supply plant on the city‘s southern fringe.
9
  Buick‘s sole 
supplier of automobile bodies, the Fisher Body 1 plant on South Saginaw Street 
dispatched fleets of trucks every twenty minutes bound for the North End Buick plants, 
thereby causing major road deterioration and unrelenting traffic snarls in St. John, Oak 
Park, and other inner-city neighborhoods.
10
  As evidenced by the periodic work stoppages 
at Buick that stemmed from delayed Fisher Body deliveries, traffic congestion between 
GM facilities represented a serious threat to the orderly production and distribution of 
automobiles.   
Local GM officials believed that express highways were essential to efficient 
industrial production.  In acknowledgement of the vital role that freeways played in 
automobile production, officials from the Michigan State Highway Department (MSHD) 
and the Michigan Good Roads Federation (MGRF) joined General Motors and its local 
boosters in promoting state and federal highways as key components of what was to be 
an unbroken regional assembly line in Genesee County.  According to MSDH reports, 
Highway transportation is a vital element in the automobile production 
process.  The highway itself is as much a part of the assembly line as the 
cranes that lift motor blocks onto chassis at [Ford‘s] River Rouge [plant] 
or the conveyor belts that carry piston rings and gasoline tanks from 
stockroom to production line at Pontiac.
11
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With the construction of efficient freeways, GM executives sought to produce a radical 
new space-time matrix for industrial manufacturing and mass consumption.
12
   
GM officials and other automobile enthusiasts in the Vehicle City vigorously 
lobbied for the passage of the 1956 Federal Interstate and Defense Highway Act.
13
  With 
its guarantee of large federal subsidies for the construction of a national system of 
interstate highways, the landmark 1956 legislation received a hearty endorsement from 
the Manufacturers Association of Flint (MAF) and the Flint Industrial Executives Club 
(FIEC).  In the capital city of Lansing, freeway boosters from the MGRF heralded the 
legislation, predicting that the state‘s massive road construction program would have ―a 
more profound and generally beneficial effect upon Michigan‘s development than has 
any single force or factor in the state‘s history.‖
14
  To GM president and Flint resident 
Harlow Curtice, the expansion of smooth superhighways marked a human triumph of 
sorts over both space and time: ―Man has grown wings and flies faster than sound.  He 
travels hundreds of miles from sunup to sundown over smooth ribbons of concrete.  He 
can live in one town, work in a second and shop in a third.‖
15
   
For local plant managers and executives in Flint, the nation‘s highway program 
represented a long awaited Keynesian political intervention that promised to create new 
jobs and increase industrial efficiency while simultaneously spurring the mass 
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consumption of automobiles.  At a February 1962 meeting of the MAF, Joseph Anderson, 
the general manager of Flint‘s AC Spark Plug plant, argued for the rapid construction of 
freeways across the nation, suggesting that modern superhighways would increase GM‘s 
profits by as much as 20 percent.  As the birthplace and manufacturing headquarters of 
GM, Anderson added, ―Flint should serve as an example for the rest of the country in the 
appropriate and efficient way of handling traffic and automobiles.‖  Always concerned 
with expanding the company‘s market share, Anderson and other GM executives in Flint 
and Detroit also saw the construction of modern, efficient highways as the key to 
undermining public transit and creating a nation of automobile consumers.  At the same 
February 1962 meeting of the MAF, Guy Bates, the plant manager of the Fisher Body 
facility in Grand Blanc, endorsed highway construction as a means to increase company 
profits at the expense of urban public transportation systems.  Good roads, Bates 
suggested, weakened mass transit systems and drove automobile sales upward.
16
  In 
postwar Flint, the shift from buses to private automobile transit triggered a 62.6 percent 
decline in the city‘s mass transit ridership and a massive increase in private automobile 
consumption.
17
  Bates and other executives hoped that new freeways would help to 
continue that trend.  For their part, the county‘s new motorists viewed paved 
superhighways as a means to reduce traffic fatalities, decrease vehicle maintenance costs, 
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enhance driving pleasure, and increase the efficiency of automobile transit.  As the state‘s 
highway plans and Flint‘s pro-highway majority began to coalesce in the late 1950s, local 
GM executives and automobile enthusiasts looked to the corporation‘s future in Genesee 
County with great optimism.        
 
Crossroads: Floral Park and the Interchange 
In order to pursue its decentralized, highway- and trucking-dependent vision for 
industrial production, GM required open space for freeway rights of way and 
interchanges within Flint‘s densely packed urban core.  During the 1950s, GM‘s freeway 
dreams dovetailed almost perfectly with broader civic concerns over urban blight and 
slums in St. John and Floral Park.  Beginning in the late 1950s, GM and its supporters 
from the state highway department and the Flint City Commission waged a political 
campaign to link the city‘s industrial future to freeway and urban renewal projects that 
would raze St. John and Floral Park.  By replacing segregated black neighborhoods with 
urban freeways, an interchange, and an industrial park, GM and local planners hoped, 
quite literally, to pave the way towards civic progress, long term economic growth, 
consumer prosperity, and higher property values in the city of Flint.  In the minds of 
Flint‘s civic elites, neighborhoods such as St. John and Floral Park were the most 
significant obstacles to a stable economic future for the city.   
 On January 17, 1963, the MSHD released Freeways for Flint, a planning report 
that contained the state‘s rationale for freeway construction and its site location proposals 
for Interstate 475, M-78 (which later became Interstate 69), and their connecting 
interchange.  According to the state‘s plan, I-475, a north-south urban spur freeway, and 
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M-78, an east-west route connecting Flint with Chicago and Canada, were to intersect via 
a large interchange in the Floral Park neighborhood southeast of downtown.  With the 
interchange project, state and local officials hoped to link slum clearance with increased 
automobile production and the resurrection of the city‘s ailing downtown commercial 
core.
18
  The MSHD selected Floral Park over other possible locations for the interchange 
because of its central location near downtown retail outlets, its poor housing stock and 
relatively low property values, and its preponderance of impoverished black families.
19
  
Though many statistics supported the highway commission‘s claims of blight—and 
although many Floral Park residents suffered from intense poverty and racial 
segregation—the neighborhood maintained a level of economic diversity, community 
vitality, and historical significance that belied the MSHD‘s monolithic portrait of 
dilapidation.       
Prior to World War II, many black migrants to the Vehicle City favored Floral 
Park over St. John and the North End, due in large part to its proximity to downtown, the 
cleaner air on the south side of the city, and the neighborhood‘s great socioeconomic 
diversity.  However, during the 1940s and 1950s, when planners first contemplated a 
network of freeways for Flint, Floral Park experienced a dramatic transformation of its 
racial and class demography.  The pull of industrial jobs, economic security, and northern 
civil rights protections—along with the push factors of rural poverty and southern Jim 
Crow—combined to bring tens of thousands of southern black migrants to the Vehicle 
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City following World War II.
20
  Between 1940 and 1960, the city‘s black population 
soared from 6,559 to 34,521.
21
  When the new southern migrants arrived in Flint, they 
discovered a rigidly segregated and poorly housed city that afforded black people few 
residential options.  For Charles and Betty Hewitt, black migrants who arrived in the 
Vehicle City in 1959, Flint felt like a southern city: ―When we came to Flint in ‘59, Flint 
was a segregated town.  It was almost like a southern town.‖
22
  With a residential 
segregation index that reached 94.4 in 1960, Flint ranked as one of the most racially 
divided cities in the country—more segregated, in fact, than the cities of Atlanta, New 
York, Memphis, Chicago, New Orleans, St. Louis, Little Rock, Los Angeles, Charlotte, 
Boston, and Birmingham.
23
  In the postwar era, a combination of government-sponsored 
redlining, bank discrimination, racial steering, exclusionary zoning codes, and white 
violence channeled thousands of the city‘s new black migrants into Floral Park, St. John, 
and other formerly integrated working-class neighborhoods.   
As black migrants moved into all-white blocks in Floral Park, white families 
fought to preserve the color line before departing the neighborhood.  ―When blacks 
would move into some areas, there were some hard feelings, and some problems,‖ Billy 
Thompson remembered.  ―And, little groups would form and fight one way or the other 
about locations.  There were a few cross-burnings and things of that nature that kept you 
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  Although ruptures of racial violence were common on the city‘s south 
side, white opponents of residential integration ultimately failed to preserve the color line 
in Floral Park.  Over the course of the 1950s, residential integration triggered waves of 
white panic selling, block by block, that claimed all but a few of Floral Park‘s remaining 
white residents.  Simultaneously, as new housing options for the black middle class 
gradually opened in Sugar Hill, Elm Park, Evergreen Valley, and other subdivisions east 
of Floral Park, black professionals and shopkeepers began their own migration from the 
neighborhood.  By the end of the 1950s, Floral Park had lost much of its racial and 
economic diversity, and its once stable housing stock began to show signs of significant 
deterioration.
25
            
Between 1950 and 1960, the white population of Floral Park and the surrounding 
areas of census tract nine declined from 2,057 to 148, while the area‘s black population 
doubled to 4,001.  For the thousands of white and middle-class black families who 
departed Floral Park in the 1950s, the decision to leave their homes, churches, and 
schools was complicated and fraught with many conflicting emotions.  Racial fears 
undoubtedly played a key role in driving the white exodus from Floral Park; but race was 
only one factor in a broader constellation of forces that drove decisions to relocate.  The 
quest for cheap land, open space, modern housing, home ownership, and, to be sure, 
widespread support for racial segregation among whites—and the desire for class 
segregation among blacks—all contributed to the racial and economic transformation of 
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Floral Park.  Taking advantage of federal mortgage subsidies for new and existing 
housing on Flint‘s suburban fringe and in the surrounding suburbs of Genesee County, 
white families virtually disappeared from Floral Park by the close of the 1950s, leaving 
behind scores of abandoned homes and shops.  For black professionals, by contrast, the 
road out of Floral Park was difficult and circuitous.  Until well into the 1960s, black 
homebuyers found it nearly impossible to obtain FHA mortgages.  Still, however, 
hundreds of middle-class African-American families left Floral Park during the postwar 
era in search of newer housing in more economically and culturally homogeneous 
neighborhoods.             
By 1960, Floral Park‘s black majority stood at over 96 percent, the highest in the 
city.  Though it included many homes in excellent repair, Floral Park‘s housing stock 
suffered from high rates of dilapidation and overcrowding.  In 1960, federal census 
officials categorized 28 percent of the area‘s homes as dilapidated or deteriorating, a 
figure that nearly doubled citywide averages.  The median value of housing in Floral 
Park, at $8,900 per home, was significantly lower than the $11,500 recorded for the city 
as a whole.  As in St. John, many families in the neighborhood suffered from poverty, 
unemployment, crime, and poor health.  The average family income in Floral Park, which 
totaled $5,167 per year in 1960, was nearly 20 percent lower than in the rest of the city.  
With nearly a third of its residents under the age of nine, and an exceptionally high 
number of households headed by single mothers, Floral Park‘s poverty hit women and 
children with a special intensity.
26
  In the 1950s and 1960s, city planners and state 
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highway officials marshaled these bits of census data and other statistical portraits to 
justify the Floral Park location for the freeway interchange.   
Whites and blacks who advocated a Floral Park interchange hoped to score a civic 
victory against concentrated poverty and segregation while simultaneously improving the 
city‘s industrial and retail climate.  In the Flint of the 1950s, especially in neighborhoods 
such as Floral Park, the future-oriented politics of industrial growth and consumer 
prosperity seemed to march in lock step with the struggle for housing equity and racial 
fairness.  Indeed, many residents of Floral Park in the 1950s and 1960s looked to both 
civil rights activism and the interchange as remedies for poor housing and racial 
segregation.  For thousands of south side residents, the city‘s freeway plans constituted 
an opportunity to seek better housing, home ownership, and upward social mobility.   
For the twenty years that passed between the release of the MSHD‘s freeway plan 
and the conclusion of interstate construction, Floral Park residents and activists mobilized 
with great urgency to incorporate desegregation and fair housing into the city‘s 
transportation initiatives.  The battles over Floral Park redevelopment did not receive the 
same attention as other local struggles that unfolded over urban renewal, however.  
Although the south side freeway interchange sparked major civil rights battles and 
intense racial and class contestation—and though the interchange was a centerpiece in the 
city‘s redevelopment initiatives—political debates over urban renewal in the North End 
tended to subsume those that erupted in Floral Park.  Because of St. John‘s proximity to 
―The Buick,‖ Flint‘s single-largest employer, slum clearance and industrial expansion on 
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the North End affected tens of thousands of families throughout metropolitan Flint, even 
those living far away from the neighborhood.  By the dawn of the 1960s, the North End‘s 
St. John Street Neighborhood Development Project had emerged as the political epicenter 
in the municipal campaign for urban renewal.                                      
 
Urban Islands, Industrial Mountains, and Fordist Rain: St. John Street 
GM‘s postwar suburban building strategy provoked a great deal of consternation among 
some city officials and civic boosters.  During the early 1950s, when city officials first 
raised concerns over the suburbanization of industry, GM plant managers pointed to 
Flint‘s acute land shortages and poor transportation infrastructure.  In particular, GM 
executives highlighted Flint‘s North End, where unregulated building had left homes and 
industrial facilities far too close together.  Dilapidated North End housing, a 1963 study 
noted, served as ―a deterrent to natural industrial development,‖ and detracted from the 
city‘s prized image.
27
  For GM executives, slum clearance in the North End promised to 
free up valuable land for an urban freeway and the expansion of its Buick facilities.  Like 
their counterparts in Floral Park, thousands of black families in St. John viewed urban 
renewal as an opportunity to obtain new housing in more desirable sections of the city.  
During the 1950s and 1960s, an extremely fragile interracial, cross-class coalition for St. 
John and Floral Park renewal emerged.  Black activists joined that coalition for renewal 
as part of the broader movement for open housing that was simultaneously taking shape 
in the city.  
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Map 9.1.  Flint‘s North End.  A 1966 map of Flint‘s north side featuring GM‘s Buick 
Motor division, the St. John Street neighborhood (directly east of the Buick Motor 
plants), and the city‘s near northeast side (directly east of St. John and the Flint River).  
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad tracks, Garfield Avenue, and the Flint River formed 
the boundary of St. John.  In 1960, African Americans comprised 95 percent of St. John‘s 
population.  In the neighborhoods south of Whaley Park (and east of the river), whites 
represented more than 99 percent of the population until well into the 1970s.  Courtesy of 
American Automobile Association (AAA) of Michigan. 
 
By the end of the 1950s, St. John had become, ironically, the most blighted and 
coveted residential neighborhood in the city.  Home to the world headquarters of Buick, 
St. John was unquestionably the most economically valuable section of Flint.  However, 
the residents of St. John and the broader North End were among the poorest, most ill-
housed citizens in the Vehicle City.  Furthermore, after Floral Park, St. John contained 
the second-highest percentage of African Americans in the city.  As in Floral Park, a 
combination of FHA mortgage subsidies, class tensions, and white racial antipathies 
helped to transform the North End‘s social geography during the 1940s and 1950s.  In 
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1940, St. John Street had a white majority of 60 percent, composed primarily of southern 
and eastern European immigrants.  Between 1940 and 1950, however, the number of 
black households in St. John nearly tripled.  By 1950, the percentage of blacks in the area 
had more than doubled to 85 percent.  Over the same duration, the neighborhood‘s white 
population declined by approximately 75 percent.  At mid-century, the neighborhood 
contained 4,593 black residents and a white minority of 872.  A decade later, when the 
city launched its freeway and urban renewal programs, African Americans comprised 
over 95 percent of St. John‘s residents.
28
   
As black job seekers from the South arrived in St. John, shopkeepers, white 
homeowners, and black professionals departed by the thousands.  They left behind scores 
of boarded-up homes and businesses and a decidedly poorer, more segregated, and 
homogeneous North End.  To Michael Evanoff, a white resident who departed St. John 
after World War II, it seemed as though ―the community was virtually taken over by 
black people.‖  ―With the population becoming disproportionately black,‖ he claimed, 
―there followed friction and misunderstanding between the races . . . [and] eventually 
practically all of those who could move out of the area did so, both white and black.‖
29
  
Although whites in St. John opposed the neighborhood‘s black residents with near 
unanimity, many middle-class black property owners also looked askance at their new 
neighbors.  Ruth Owens Buckner, an African-American resident of the south side, 
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painted an especially harsh portrait of black southerners in St. John: ―The doors [of St. 
John houses] were standing wide open, flies were going in and out and the men sitting 
around drinking.  Lots of those who came didn‘t have good morals so that carried on 
through the years.  [Despite] people there who were good, more were bad.‖
30
  In the eyes 
of thousands of white families from St. John—and, indeed, among many middle-class 
black professionals—the Second Great Migration unleashed an unwelcome invasion of 
unrefined African-American job seekers who threatened property values, public safety, 
and civic morality.        
The outward migrations of whites and middle-class property owners created both 
hardships and opportunities for St. John‘s African-American householders.  Despite 
widespread private capital divestment, bank discrimination, redlining, and racially 
motivated panic selling, postwar St. John was still the undisputed commercial and 
residential capital of Black Flint.  With the Columbia Theater, the St. John Community 
Center, the nearby Berston Field House, and a host of black-owned clubs, shops, and 
restaurants, St. John was the focal point of the city‘s segregated public sphere.  ―It was 
like being in a city of its own,‖ remembered former resident James Blakely.  ―Everything 
that blacks needed it was right in that area. . . . You didn‘t have to go out of that quarter 
even on weekends.‖
31
  Housing a diverse mix of factory workers, domestics, small 
business owners, and professionals, the St. John Street community of the postwar decades 
was socioeconomically diverse.
32
  ―Black people had their businesses, they had their 
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restaurants, they had their nightclubs,‖ remembered Woody Etherly.  ―It was all right 
there in that community.‖
33
  Although in 1960 its median housing value of $7,600 ranked 
among the lowest in the city, St. John was still predominantly a neighborhood of 
homeowners, many of whom found stable employment as custodians and foundry 
workers at the nearby Buick plants.
34
   
Notwithstanding its economic diversity and vibrancy, St. John consistently ranked 
as the most impoverished, dangerous, overcrowded, and polluted section of the city.  St. 
John had the dreadful distinction of containing Flint‘s largest rat population, and its 
housing stock—consisting primarily of aging, wood-framed structures—was severely 
deteriorated.  According to the authors of a housing survey published in 1960, nearly 90 
percent of the homes in the St. John district had ―major deficiencies,‖ while 
approximately 40 percent of its dwellings were dilapidated beyond repair.
35
  In 1969, 
when the median yearly family income for Genesee County stood at $9,200, the figure 
for St. John was only $3,900.
36
  For the black families that sought to leave St. John, a 
harsh mix of government-sanctioned housing discrimination, redlining, racial violence, 
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and poverty severely circumscribed relocation options.  Noted one resident in 1963, ―I 
loathe where I live, but I‘m trapped.‖
37
  
        
 
Figure 9.1.  St. John Street.  A 1971 photograph of a smokestack from the Buick foundry, 
with the partially cleared St. John neighborhood and the Flint River in the background.  
SOURCE: Flint Journal, January 25, 1971.  Photograph by Bill Gallagher.  Courtesy of 
Flint Journal 
 
Residents of St. John Street had many reasons to feel trapped.  Because of its 
proximity to the massive complex of Buick factories, the St. John area received very little 
sunlight on most days.  When sunlight did arrive over the towering multi-story plants, it 
had to pierce through dense clouds of soot and ash that emanated from Buick‘s smoke-
belching foundry.  At the state civil rights commission‘s 1966 equal housing hearings in 
Flint, Ailene Butler, owner of the North End‘s Butler Funeral Home, painted a grim 
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meteorological portrait of life in St. John: ―When we get a good sun-shiny day down 
there, we‘re lucky.‖
38
  Unlike municipal officials in Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and other cities 
who enforced strict smoke abatement programs during the 1940s and 1950s, members of 
the Flint City Commission‘s Air and Water Pollution Committee generally abstained 
from regulating industrial pollutants until state and federal officials in the 1970s forced 
them to do so.
39
  In a 1971 editorial published in the Flint Spokesman, a weekly African-
American newspaper, neighborhood activist Charles Winfrey described how the Buick 
foundry produced ―billows of smoke which emit soot like rain‖ over the St. John 
neighborhood.
40
  On good days, when the factories hummed and the prevailing winds 
sent Buick smoke elsewhere, St. John residents could look beyond neighborhood 
deterioration and take pride in their homes, shops, schools, and churches.  On the worst 
of days, though, when clouds of toxicity hung like a pall over the neighborhood, St. John 
was insufferable.       
As much as any other factor, Buick pollution drove black demands for North End 
renewal.  In St. John, Oak Park, Martin-Jefferson, and other north side neighborhoods 
surrounding the plants, industrial pollutants peeled paint from homes and cars, covered 
windows and windshields, soiled clothing and outdoor pets, and caused innumerable 
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respiratory ailments and cancers among residents.
41
  According to city health inspectors, 
St. John residents suffered the city‘s highest rates of asthma, infant mortality, and lung 
and throat cancer.  During her 1966 testimony, Butler spoke at length about her personal 
experiences with cancerous pollution on the North End: 
I lived in that area [St. John] practically all my life.  Two months ago I had 
to have something removed from my throat and it was cancerous.  My late 
husband Robinson, the funeral director, died with cancer of his throat.  
There is a heavy smog caused by the Buick factory which has been in 
existence for about eighteen years.  The houses in this district are eaten up 
by a very heavy deposit, something like rust.  If you paint your house, 
within six months after, it is covered with this heavy deposit.  If you do 
not have a garage in this area and buy a car, the insurance is higher 
because of these deposits.  We owned white Cadillacs, and within three or 
four months they‘d have this heavy deposit—it looked like little 
gold…and it‘s very hard.  You can hardly get it off your car.  You can 
imagine what we go through down there breathing when this exists on just 
material things.
42
              
 
In 1963, the authors of a neighborhood survey concluded, ―The core section of St. John‘s 
is an unfit environment for human habitation.‖
43
  Unwilling to regulate the emissions of 
GM, city commissioners and corporate officials presided over near-constant showers of 
smoke, soot, and ash that irritated lungs and depressed real estate values in the North 
End.  In the late 1950s, the onset of urban renewal inaugurated another, more intense 
cycle of neighborhood deterioration that lasted until the St. John clearance project‘s 
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Razing Ghettoes and Raising Revenue: Assembling Flint‘s Urban Renewal Coalition 
Historians have often interpreted urban renewal and other postwar city rebuilding 
initiatives as manifestations of federal officials‘ embrace of ―growth liberalism.‖  With 
regard to urban matters, this term refers generally to a political philosophy of massive 
government intervention into the economic affairs of cities.  Specifically, growth liberals 
during the New Deal and postwar eras advocated a set of ―pump-priming‖ stimulus 
programs designed to expand metropolitan economies by subsidizing industrial and 
commercial growth and mass consumption.  Though growth liberalism has proven to be 
an incisive framework for understanding the motivations that drove economic 
policymaking at the federal level, it is much less useful in explaining the complexities of 
local urban development politics in the postwar era.  In Flint and other cities, the 
coalition for urban renewal was so vast, and so fractured by divergent political and 
economic interests, that growth liberalism falters as a comprehensive analytical 
framework.  Indeed, scholars‘ use of the growth liberal framework in narrating the 
history of urban renewal has effectively silenced the historical voices of thousands of 
black activists in Flint and other cities who fought from within pro-growth coalitions to 
make redevelopment compatible with civil rights objectives.
44
   
The government policies that produced Interstate 475, the Floral Park interchange, 
and the St. John Street urban renewal project grew out of a fragile, bipartisan coalition 
that united growth-minded Democrats and pro-business Republicans with racial 
integrationists, local trade union leaders, and black community activists.  To be sure, 
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Flint‘s urban renewal and freeway plans drew support from a familiar cast of civic and 
corporate growth boosters.  Local GM officials, Saginaw Street retailers, and Flint city 
commissioners applauded the passage of the United States Housing Act of 1949.  With its 
promise of large federal subsidies for the municipal assault on urban blight, the landmark 
federal legislation, later amended in 1954, received a hearty endorsement from city 
planners, inner-city developers, and all who viewed St. John as a barrier to economic 
development and a burden to city taxpayers.  However, demands for urban renewal also 
emerged organically from within the black communities of St. John and Floral Park as 
part of a broader struggle for civil rights, clean air, and fair housing.  Between the late 
1950s and the early 1970s, civil rights and neighborhood activists in the Vehicle City 
sought and fought to link the city‘s slum clearance and urban development plans with a 
frontal attack on industrial pollution, neighborhood deterioration, and residential 
segregation.
45
   
Support for I-475 and St. John Street redevelopment crossed racial, class, and 
partisan divides in Genesee County.  The movement for renewal united a vast yet 
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unstable coalition that included representatives from GM, the UAW, the Mott 
Foundation, the Flint Chamber of Commerce, the editorial board of the Flint Journal, the 
real estate and development industries, the NAACP and Urban League, and frustrated 
black residents from the North End and Floral Park.  Power relations within Flint‘s urban 
renewal coalition were profoundly asymmetrical, however.  Represented locally by the 
Flint Industrial Executives Club, the Manufacturers Association of Flint, and the General 
Motors Plant City Committee, GM dominated Flint‘s highway and urban renewal 
coalitions.  Though vocal in their demands for relocation, black residents of the St. John 
Street and Floral Park neighborhoods were the least powerful and the most institutionally 
disconnected proponents of slum clearance and relocation.  Comprising less than 15 
percent of the city‘s total 1960 population, African Americans, even those who viewed 
urban freeways and slum clearance with skepticism, had few options but to try to obtain 
racial fairness from inside of the city‘s urban renewal coalition.           
Flint‘s fragile coalition for renewal and freeways united corporate executives, 
growth-minded city commissioners, and civil rights activists, who all embraced—for 
widely divergent reasons—the state‘s power to remake urban residential, commercial, 
and industrial geographies.  By 1960, the city‘s pro-urban renewal movement had 
congealed around four major issues.  First, the freeway, interchange, and neighborhood 
clearance projects promised to expedite the flow of traffic to and from the region‘s auto 
plants, thereby increasing industrial efficiency and reducing commuting time for workers.  
In a 1962 speech on the benefits of routing I-475 through the North End, Oz Kelly, a 
former mayor and executive director of the MAF, admitted that local manufacturers 
supported redevelopment primarily as a means to stimulate economic growth: ―The 
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[freeway] route was designed to accommodate industry, the employees and the traffic 
generated by them.‖
46
  Second, advocates of interstate construction such as Richard 
Tavis, the executive director of the Greater Flint Downtown Corporation, argued that the 
freeway would spur downtown commerce and tourism by linking the city‘s cultural and 
central business districts to the booming residential developments in suburban Genesee 
County.  Without freeways and slum clearance, Tavis warned in a 1962 speech to MAF 
members, the city‘s already ailing downtown core faced ―economic strangulation.‖
47
  
Third, local developers, trade union leaders, and civic boosters saw urban redevelopment 
as a means to combat blight while fostering economic expansion and industrial growth in 
the central city.  By replacing the St. John Street and Floral Park communities with an 
industrial park, a freeway and interchange, and an expanded Buick facility, municipal 
officials sought to spur job growth and increase the city‘s tax base by luring investors 
back to the city.  Moreover, cost-conscious city officials hoped to use urban renewal to 
lure tax-generating industries to St. John and other North End neighborhoods that 
contributed the least in local property taxes.  According to city manager (and future MAF 
spokesperson) Thomas Kay, the demolition of homes in St. John would eliminate tax and 
service gaps in the city and increase property values in the economically depressed North 
End.  For those in Flint who subscribed to the gospel of economic growth, jumpstarting 
the economy and increasing the city‘s tax base were the ultimate aims of urban 
redevelopment.   
Men such as Oz Kelly and Thomas Kay never invited St. John and Floral Park 
residents to speak to the MAF or other powerful organizations about their vision for 
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development.  Indeed, ordinary citizens found it exceedingly difficult to convene with 
city planners and corporate officials regarding North End and south side redevelopment 
plans.  Nevertheless, the city‘s coalition for renewal was too broad and diverse to unite 
under the single aim of growth.  Although growth advocates from GM, the MAF, and city 
hall loomed large in Flint‘s redevelopment coalition, black community activists and 
opponents of racial segregation also supported this vast program of demolition and 
redevelopment.  In fact, the final rationale for renewal came from civil rights activists and 
residents of St. John and Floral Park, who saw clearance as an opportunity to combat 
segregation, poor housing, and the city‘s growing public health crisis on the North End.   
 
―The Death of Hypocrisy‖: Urban Renewal, City Services, and Civil Rights 
Scholars have tended to frame urban renewal and civil rights in starkly antithetical terms.  
Yet for a time during the 1950s and early 1960s, thousands of African Americans in 
segregated, impoverished neighborhoods such as St. John and Floral Park looked to 
redevelopment with a sense of guarded optimism.  In fact, by clear majorities, residents 
of Floral Park and the St. John Street area supported neighborhood clearance and 
relocation.  Though many residents felt a special attachment to their homes, churches, 
and businesses, the pollution, crime, high rents, and deteriorated housing in St. John and 
Floral Park were simply too much to bear for a large majority of residents.
48
  During a 
1964 meeting on housing segregation in Flint, St. John resident Lillian Huddleston 
explained why she and other North Enders supported redevelopment: ―We feel as if we 
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were sewed up in a pocket, and we need Urban Renewal.‖
49
  For their part, liberal trade 
unionists and white integrationists also endorsed the call for urban renewal.  In 1957, an 
editorialist for the Flint Weekly Review, the city‘s leading left-labor newspaper, argued, 
The real social need in Flint is to raze the ghettoes, so that all of us can 
become more honest men.  Until we do, none of us dare speak of the 
brotherhood of men.  Neither should we throw stones at the Deep South, 
until we, ourselves, have removed ourselves from the segregated glass 




During the 1950s and 1960s, the Flint chapters of the Urban League and the 
NAACP, along with dozens of African-American block clubs and thousands of ordinary 
black citizens, united in support of urban redevelopment.  In 1955, Arthur Edmonds, the 
executive director of the Flint Urban League, issued a formal statement asking city 
leaders to ―embark immediately on city-wide programs of slum clearance and urban 
redevelopment, using federal assistance to do so.‖
51
  The following year, Urban League 
and NAACP members joined St. John and Floral Park residents in delivering three 
petitions for slum clearance to the Flint City Commission.  Citing the adverse effects of 
pollution, crime, overcrowding, and poor housing, petitioners asked the city to ―secure 
immediately federal aid for slum clearance, urban redevelopment, and standard rental 
housing.‖
52
  ―Flint badly needs programs of urban renewal, slum clearance and public 
housing,‖ a 1957 Urban League editorial added.
53
  Well aware of the racism embedded 
within the city‘s home mortgage market, petitioning residents urged city commissioners 
and private developers to focus on providing safe and affordable rental housing.  
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Activists understood that in order to secure federal funds, municipal officials had to 
demonstrate that they could provide standard relocation housing to all persons displaced 
by government action.  Because Flint‘s citywide vacancy rate hovered below 2 percent, 
city leaders had to develop thousands of low-income housing units as a prerequisite to the 
receipt of federal renewal funds.  The severe housing shortages in the city threatened to 
delay plans for Floral Park and St. John redevelopment.
54
   
Beyond calling for more affordable housing, St. John and Floral Park residents 
also demanded better housing and improved city services.  In 1958 and 1959, St. John 
and Floral Park residents presented additional petitions for renewal to the city 
commission and organized a series of public protests to demand improved municipal 
services for their segregated neighborhoods.  To demonstrate their commitment to quality 
city services and North End redevelopment, residents of Floral Park and St. John 
attended virtually every meeting of the city commission during the 1950s and 1960s.  At 
these meetings, local activists such as Ailene Butler, Howard Simpson, Fred Dent, and 
Olive Beasley repeatedly charged commissioners with neglecting black neighborhoods.  
Though black citizens brought a wide range of issues to the attention of city 
commissioners, civil rights protests often centered on racial inequities in the city‘s street 
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cleaning, public safety, road paving, housing code enforcement, snow removal, garbage 
collection, pollution abatement, and street lighting programs.  At a city commission 
meeting held on March 23, 1959, for instance, Charles Murphy reported that the city had 
abandoned its street cleaning program on Fifth Street in the northernmost section of 
Floral Park.  According to Murphy, who moved to Floral Park in 1955, the city had 
neglected to clean Fifth Street for over two years, leaving the street littered with piles of 
rubbish and layers of caked-on grime.
55
  Failure to deliver city services, protesters such as 
Murphy asserted, contributed greatly to housing deterioration, neighborhood blight, and 
private divestment from the city‘s all-black and racially transitional neighborhoods.          
On the North End, the city‘s failure to combat police brutality and vice provoked 
sustained protests during the late 1950s and 1960s.  Often outnumbering black protests 
against poor housing and industrial pollution, complaints against the Flint Police 
Department and its vice squad unit spiked dramatically beginning in the late 1950s.  On 
scores of occasions, black protestors attended city commission meetings to demand better 
police protection, especially for black women on the North End.  Because the vice squad 
only rarely arrested white addicts and johns, white men seeking drugs and black 
prostitutes cruised the red light districts on Michigan Avenue, St. John Street, and 
Industrial Avenue with near impunity during the 1950s and 1960s.  Often propositioning 
or harassing unsuspecting women who walked the streets, white johns and racial voyeurs 
provoked community outrage and spawned widespread demands for better police 
protection on the North End.  At the commission‘s meeting on August 8, 1955, St. John 
resident Roger Lewis reported that white johns from outside of the neighborhood had 
become so aggressive that ―women can‘t stand by their own fences or in their own yards 
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without someone making vile remarks to them.‖
56
  Without white johns, addicts, and 
suburban thrill seekers, North End activists maintained, the city‘s growing vice problem 
would virtually disappear.      
White johns, drug users, and street criminals were only three among many sources 
of anxiety for black pedestrians in St. John.  Charges of police brutality against both 
uniformed and plainclothes vice squad officers were exceedingly common on the North 
End during the era of urban renewal.
57
  In September of 1958, police-community tensions 
in St. John exploded when two unidentified plainclothes police officers publicly assaulted 
and then arrested an unarmed black girl returning home from choir practice.  Operating 
under the incorrect assumption that she was a prostitute, the two officers ―manhandled 
and injured‖ the young women and several members of her family in front of a group of 
onlookers.  Outraged by the assault, black protestors from across the city packed city 
commission meetings and picketed the Flint Municipal Center for four consecutive weeks 
during the fall.
58
  On October 7, the protests reached a climax when the NAACP and a 
group of black ministers staged a mock funeral service for the ―death of hypocrisy, bad 
faith, and police brutality.‖  After a formal church service in front of city hall, the 
NAACP‘s funeral procession marched north to the Flint River, where protestors 
ceremoniously dumped a casket into the water.  Throughout the 1958 protests, residents 
from St. John and Floral Park challenged commissioners to provide equal police 
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protection, respect civil rights, and deliver fair and equitable municipal services to all of 
the city‘s neighborhoods.   
General Motors executives and downtown boosters did not simply impose Flint‘s 
urban renewal program upon unwilling African-American communities.  To the contrary, 
demands for urban renewal in the St. John and Floral Park neighborhoods were an 
integral part of the broader black freedom struggle in Flint.  Many residents of St. John 
and Floral Park saw urban renewal as equal parts threat and promise.
59
  Fearing the worst 
outcomes of redevelopment—resegregation, poor housing, and inadequate city services—
black activists joined the city‘s redevelopment coalition in order to shape its priorities.  
Indeed, civil rights and neighborhood activists such as Charles Murphy and Roger Lewis 
did not wait for city officials to deliver North End renewal.  Rather, they coupled their 
relocation demands with a grassroots campaign for improved housing and a more 
equitable distribution of city services.   
 
―Assigning the Blight Tag‖: Planning for Ghettoes 
Planning for Flint‘s urban freeway and the St. John renewal project began in earnest in 
the late 1950s, when city commissioners hired Ladislas Segoe to create Flint‘s master 
plan.  Segoe‘s plan recommended complete demolition and redevelopment for all of St. 
John and a portion of Floral Park.  Segoe and his associates proposed replacing ―low-
value housing‖ in St. John and Floral Park with an expanded Buick facility, a Class A 
industrial park in St. John, a freeway exit ramp in Floral Park, and a north-south route for 
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Interstate 475 that would serve the central business district, the college and cultural 
facilities east of downtown, and nearly all of the region‘s auto plants.  With its proposal 
to raze a section of Floral Park and the entire St. John neighborhood, Flint‘s master plan 
endorsed a massive reordering of the city‘s spatial and racial geographies.
60
   
In 1960, when the city‘s freeway and urban renewal plans first emerged, Flint 
contained a white majority of 83 percent.  Yet among the approximately three thousand 
families slated for relocation due to freeway construction, 60 percent were African 
American.  Of the 1,193 St. John families that would have to move, the proportion of 
African Americans was nearly 100 percent.  The families designated for relocation under 
the Segoe plan were disproportionately black, poor, and elderly, with approximately 85 
percent of affected families earning less than $6,000 per year, one-third on public aid, 
over one-half qualifying for public housing, and one-fourth senior citizens.
61
  In St. John, 
which the Segoe plan slated as the city‘s top renewal priority, relocation presented 
extremely difficult challenges.  According to one survey, nearly 60 percent of the St. 
John families designated for displacement had either ―severe or multiple impediments to 
relocation‖ that derived primarily from poverty, old age, and racial discrimination.
62
  In 
spite of the difficulties they faced, a large majority of St. John and Floral Park residents 
still expressed a preference for relocation, which in turn fueled civil rights concerns over 
resegregation.  ―The trick [with relocation],‖ noted the MCRC‘s Beasley, ―is to prevent a 
new ghetto emerging.‖
63
  African-American renewers in Floral Park and St. John hoped 
                                                 
60
 Segoe and Associates, Comprehensive Master Plan.  For more on Segoe‘s career as a professional 
planner, see David J. Edelman and David J. Allor, ―Ladislas Segoe and the Emergence of the Professional 
Planning Consultant,‖ Journal of Planning History 2:1 (February 2003): 47-78. 
61
 In 1966, city officials estimated that 89 percent of the structures in the neighborhood were ―substandard.‖  
See Wilhelm, ―St. John Area Again Being Eyed for Renewal,‖ Flint Journal, December 11, 1966.     
62
 Social Planning Associates, Diagnostic Survey.     
63
 Beasley to Brendan Sexton, August 3, 1965, Beasley Papers, box 1, GHCC.  
437 
 
that the relocation program, in conjunction with the fair housing campaign, held the 
potential to reduce residential segregation while substantially upgrading the housing 
options available to black families.  As city commissioners debated the master plan‘s 
recommendations, black activists competed from within the city‘s urban renewal 
coalition to challenge the vision of urban renewal advocated by GM and downtown 
developers.  
General Motors and the city‘s downtown development coalition played a key role 
in shaping the planning priorities of Flint‘s urban renewal and freeway programs.  
Following the release of the 1960 master plan, GM, the MAF, the Mott Foundation, and a 
host of additional corporate sponsors commissioned two studies of Flint—conducted by 
the Urban Land Institute (ULI) and the National Association of Real Estate Boards 
(NAREB)—to assess the state of the city and its urban development needs.
64
  Both 
studies endorsed the construction of a north-south freeway as the centerpiece of a pro-
growth development agenda.  This agenda tied the city‘s economic future to increased 
industrial output, commercial and tourist development along the riverfront downtown, 
and a massive land reclamation plan designed to increase the city‘s tax base through a 
combination of slum clearance and neighborhood conservation.  In describing the 
economic and civic benefits of urban renewal, the ULI and NAREB reports employed a 
colorblind discourse that avoided explicit references to race while framing slum clearance 
programs as remedies for the city‘s ―diseased core,‖ and ―the sea of ugliness‖ in Flint‘s 
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  ―We seem determined in this town to destroy the beautiful,‖ complained one 
ULI investigator.  ―It is just incomprehensible that people who design beautiful 
automobiles, for instance, who are so design conscious in one area, can be so neglectful 
about the city around them.‖
66
  
In their 1963 study, Flint Faces the Future, NAREB surveyors insisted that Flint 
urgently needed urban redevelopment projects in order to reduce municipal expenses in 
the city‘s segregated core.  The NAREB study invoked the language of pathology, 
describing Flint‘s black neighborhoods as avaricious, crime and disease infested spaces 
that were ―devouring public funds at a rate eight times their tax contribution.‖
67
  Several 
years later, in an article that focused on life in the Cornelia Street section of the north 
side, Flint Journal reporter Jana Bommersback moved beyond the ULI and NAREB 
metaphors by attaching unpleasant anthropomorphic characteristics to the physical spaces 
of the North End, ―where even the heavy smell of frying chicken or fish is overpowered 
by the strongest odor of the ghetto – the smell of decay.‖
68
  If, as the city‘s planning 
establishment believed, blight, crime, and poverty were social pathogens, then urban 
renewal was the only appropriate ―treatment‖ for the diseased North End. 
The NAREB and ULI surveys of Flint championed urban renewal as a means to 
increase economic growth, municipal revenue, and consumer prosperity.  Meeting the 
industrial needs of General Motors was of paramount importance to the NAREB and ULI 
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investigators.  ―The job facing Flint‘s planners and community leaders,‖ the ULI report 
concluded, ―is [to] take care of existing industry by providing the facilities, utilities, 
services, and expansion opportunities that are being offered by communities across the 
country to attract new industry.‖
69
  Combating Flint‘s rigid patterns of racial segregation, 
as ULI co-investigator Charles Fleetwood acknowledged, was not the primary aim of GM 
officials and downtown-oriented urban renewers.  When asked during a 1967 hearing by 
an anonymous Flint resident how urban renewal could thwart ―white flight‖ and promote 
integration, Fleetwood issued a response that jarred black proponents of redevelopment: 
―If you want a truly integrated nation, you have to raise the standards of these [black] 
people.  That will be a long, laborious effort.‖
70
  Though the ULI and NAREB reports 
tended to employ only coded and indirect references to race, their ambivalent and at 
times oppositional stances towards racial integration were unmistakable to black 
observers in St. John and Floral Park.  For Flint‘s most prominent freeway and renewal 
boosters, the twelve neighboring census tracts that formed the heart of Black Flint 
represented a weighty tax burden for the entire city.  In order to reverse neighborhood 
decline, NAREB joined the ULI, the state highway department, the Mott Foundation, and 
General Motors in recommending complete clearance and redevelopment for Flint‘s most 
concentrated black enclaves.   
Debates over freeway routing and the location of the interchange developed 
almost immediately following the release of the 1960 master plan.  According to the 
Segoe plan, I-475 was to begin at I-75—near GM‘s Fisher Body facility in Grand 
Blanc—and follow a northeasterly route until crossing the proposed M-78 highway via a 
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large interchange located in an all-white, working-class section of Burton Township, 
three miles south of Floral Park.
71
  After the Burton Township interchange, the freeway 
was to move northward toward the Fisher Body 1 plant on Flint‘s south side, and then on 
toward downtown, serving the central business district via a Floral Park exit ramp.  From 
the Floral Park exit, Segoe‘s freeway meandered northward just east of the downtown 
commercial district towards the massive Buick manufacturing and assembly complex on 
the North End.  Upon passing through the St. John Street neighborhood—the site for the 
proposed industrial park—the freeway continued its northerly course towards the suburb 
of Beecher, home of the GM-Ternstedt plant.  After departing the nominally integrated, 
working-class suburb of Beecher, the proposed freeway turned westward before reuniting 
with I-75, which bypassed the city of Flint to the west.  The 16.8-mile freeway, the M-78 
interchange, and the St. John Neighborhood Development Project quickly became the 
focal points of a broad and hotly contested urban redevelopment program.
72
 
The Flint City Planning Commission officially adopted the Segoe plan in January 
1961.  The freeway, interchange, and urban clearance program that ultimately followed 
did not reflect the master plan‘s recommendations, however.  Shortly after the release of 
the Segoe plan, officials from the state highway department challenged the city‘s 
proposed interchange and highway routes.  Specifically, state planners opposed the 
routing for M-78 and the I-475 interchange in Burton Township.  The Segoe plan had 
envisioned M-78 as a suburban-oriented southern bypass for east-west traffic through 
metropolitan Flint.  Consequently, the 1960 plan called for a Burton Township 
interchange with I-475, which would have spared Floral Park from complete clearance.  
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Citing a variety of considerations that included property acquisition costs, the industrial 
and commercial needs of the region‘s GM plants and downtown retailers—as well as 
traffic studies which questioned the need for an east-west bypass route—MSHD officials 
instead proposed a less costly, more northerly and urban route for M-78 that served 
downtown Flint with a Floral Park interchange.
73
  In February 1962, GM and the MAF 
endorsed the state‘s routing recommendations over those included in the master plan.
74
    
Before submitting their revised plan to the Flint City Planning Commission, state 
planners conducted extensive studies to determine the impact of the new freeway and 
interchange locations on four local recreational areas: the Swartz Creek Valley Park, the 
Happy Hollow Nature Area, the Winter Sports Area, and Pierce Park.  The state 
conducted the studies in response to protests from an all-white coalition of west side 
homeowners, golfers, environmentalists, and recreation enthusiasts who saw M-78 as a 
threat to the Swartz Creek Golf Course and other popular recreation areas.  After 
determining that the new routes would not detrimentally affect these recreation areas, 
MSHD planners officially endorsed the new Floral Park interchange site in January of 
1961.  Throughout its early 1960s deliberations on the new interchange site, state 
highway commissioners avoided specific mention of Floral Park and did not publicly 
address the racial and class composition of the neighborhood.  Moreover, the MSHD 
proposed the Floral Park interchange without releasing any in-depth studies of the 
neighborhood it proposed to clear.  Instead, state highway officials employed a colorblind 
cost and benefits discourse to lobby city planners for the new Floral Park interchange 
                                                 
73
 Michigan State Highway Department, Freeways for Flint, 8-24.  On the discrepancies between the 
master plan and the MSHD freeway routing recommendations, see ―A Report to the Flint City Commission 
on Proposed Expressway Construction,‖ n.d., City Manager Files.   
74
 Manufacturers Association of Flint minutes, February 7, 1962.  See also, ―Manufacturers‘ Association 
Clarifies Stand on City X-Ways,‖ Flint Journal, November 28, 1962.   
442 
 
site.  Specifically, they based their proposal on the neighborhood‘s low property values, 
its proximity to downtown, its compatibility with the city‘s code enforcement and slum 
clearance objectives, and, perhaps most importantly, the lower cost of the new 
interchange:   
Freeways require land upon which to be built.  The tax loss incurred as a 
result of their construction has to be balanced against the gains which will 
be achieved. . . . Freeway construction as carried out by the Michigan 
State Highway Department has been coordinated where possible with 
other programs aimed at the solution of urban problems – urban renewal, 
central business district revitalization, etc.  In Flint, the location of the I-
475 interchange in an area designated for urban rehabilitation is an 
example of such coordination.
75
                  
       
Within weeks of the Segoe plan‘s release, the state highway department had risen 
formally to challenge the suburban orientation of the city‘s planned road system.  The 
state‘s freeway planners redesigned the I-475 interchange not only to minimize costs and 
expedite traffic, but also to conform to a much broader civic campaign to combat 
suburbanization by recapturing white migrants and motorists, luring new industry, 
removing black residents from the inner city, and revitalizing the city‘s commercial 
core.
76
   
On January 17, 1961, representatives of the state highway department met with 
members of the city planning commission to lobby for the Floral Park interchange.  The 
commissioners voted to endorse the master plan after a week of deliberation while 
reserving the right to alter its recommendations for interchange locations and freeway 
routing.  ―In adopting the major street plan,‖ the commission asserted, ―it is not intended 
to limit the location of relocated M-21/78 and I-475 to the specific route designated on 
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said [master] plan. . . . This planning commission recognizes that the location of these 
routes is tentative at present and that some adjustment or change may be necessary in the 
plans for these routes.‖
77
  Two years later, the MSHD released Freeways for Flint, which 
contained the state‘s formal routing recommendations.  Embracing the freeway proposal 
as a potential boon to economic growth, the MSHD‘s 1963 plan also contained a warning 
for any who might oppose freeway construction: ―There is, of course, another alternative 
– and that would be to do nothing.  To accept this alternative would be to insure that the 
growth predicted in Flint‘s master plan would never take place.‖
78
  MSHD commissioner 
John Mackie directed the city commission to move rapidly on the state‘s new plan.  In 
January 1963, Mackie proposed a strict thirty-day limit for the city commission to discuss 
the revised freeway routes, promising to divert Flint‘s freeway funds elsewhere if the city 
did not abide by his timetable: ―If we do not receive concurrence within 30 days,‖ 
Mackie warned, ―then the people who are now assigned to the Flint [freeway] study will 
be put to work on other urban freeway projects, and the funds allocated for the Flint 
freeway system will be used elsewhere.‖
79
  Upon learning of Mackie‘s ultimatum, the 
city commission moved immediately to endorse the state‘s revised plans for I-475, M-78, 
and the Floral Park interchange.     
In adopting the state‘s freeway and interchange plans, the Flint City Commission 
signaled its desire to incorporate transportation planning into the city‘s long-delayed 
program of urban renewal.  While MSHD planners were readying new interchange and 
freeway plans, the city commission voted in July 1962 to adopt a three-thousand-acre 
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urban renewal plan that consisted of seven project areas within the city.  According to 
federal officials, Flint was the last city of its size in the entire Great Lakes region to 
commence with urban renewal and public housing programs.
80
  Eager to move forward 
with the projects, the city commission selected retired suburban developer Charles 
Richert to direct Flint‘s urban renewal efforts.  Submitted to the federal Housing and 
Home Financing Agency in February 1964, the city commission‘s General Neighborhood 
Renewal Plan for the Municipal Center (GNRP) codified the link between transportation 
planning, downtown revitalization, and the ongoing battle to reclaim black residential 
spaces for more efficient commercial and industrial purposes.  Upon receiving the city‘s 
GNRP, federal officials noted that Flint‘s urban renewal program was one of the largest 
and most ambitious ever attempted in a city of its size.  Massive though it was, Richert‘s 
initial urban renewal plan made no mention of St. John and the North End, however.
81
  
Though city commissioners and civic elites had eyed the North End for redevelopment 
dating back to the early 1950s, the 1964 GNRP covered only the central business district, 
the Floral Park interchange, and several neighborhoods adjacent to downtown.  The 
release of the GNRP marked the first in a series of delays and defeats that stalled black 
attempts to win clean air and housing equity for North Enders.               
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According to the NAREB and ULI studies and, more importantly, the city‘s 
master plan, the St. John project was the city‘s top redevelopment priority.
82
  
Nevertheless, Richert and his successor Leo Wilensky elected to eschew those 
recommendations, proceeding instead with urban renewal initiatives in the downtown 
commercial district and the middle-class, nearly all-white enclave of Central Park.  When 
criticized by black residents seeking relocation from the North End, Wilensky and other 
officials from Flint‘s Urban Renewal and Housing Department and the Department of 
Community Development defended their decision by pointing to a lack of available 
replacement housing, cash shortages, and federal legal constraints pertaining to urban 
renewal finance.   
An immediate and seemingly insurmountable impediment to urban renewal in St. 
John stemmed from the lack of affordable replacement housing in the city.  Local 
officials had to present a ―workable‖ plan for eradicating blight and rehousing displaced 
persons prior to obtaining federal approval for renewal projects.  In the Central Park and 
downtown renewal districts, the city‘s plans called for widespread housing rehabilitation 
and only limited clearance and relocation.  For St. John, by contrast, Richert and 
Wilensky had planned for complete clearance and the relocation of over three thousand 
predominantly poor black citizens.  With no public housing program and an 
extraordinarily tight, racially segmented housing market, city leaders could not pursue St. 
John redevelopment until they had put in place a feasible plan for housing displaced 
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  Providing affordable replacement housing was no small challenge in the 
Flint of the 1960s.  According to Flint Fire Marshall Elwood Rutherford, the city‘s chief 
code enforcement officer, safe and affordable rental units in the city were almost 
impossible to locate in the 1960s.  ―Our records indicate virtually no rental vacancies or 
residential housing that will pass code standards,‖ Rutherford admitted.
84
  From the 
outset, the St. John project faced serious obstacles and major delays that would only 
multiply during the 1960s. 
A related impediment to urban renewal in St. John stemmed from the federal 
government‘s complicated urban renewal finance policies.  Under the guidelines 
established by the United States Housing Act of 1954, the federal government financed 
two-thirds of the cost of approved neighborhood development projects, leaving cities to 
fund the remaining one-third share.  In order to finance their portion of development 
costs, municipalities could either pay in cash or employ ―non-cash credits.‖  To apply 
these credits, city officials had to demonstrate municipal investment equal to the local 
share of redevelopment costs in the neighborhoods slated for urban renewal.  According 
to federal guidelines, local investments for roads, schools, flood control projects, sewers, 
and other public improvements all qualified as non-cash urban renewal credits.  In 
Central Park and the downtown business district, the city had invested substantially 
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during the postwar decades, providing sufficient credits to finance the two urban renewal 
projects—which consisted mostly of spot clearance and neighborhood conservation—
without any additional cash outlays.  During the 1950s, however, city officials had never 
benefitted St. John, Oak Park, Martin-Jefferson, and other North End neighborhoods 
slated for renewal with such spending.  Because city commissioners had invested so little 
in the North End‘s infrastructure, they could not fund the city‘s share of redevelopment 
costs there with non-cash investment credits.  Instead, the city had to raise its portion of 




 By the mid-1960s, the city of Flint faced a very dire economic crisis that 
threatened the future of its nascent urban renewal program.  Like other cities, Flint relied 
almost exclusively upon property taxes to fund virtually all of its municipal expenditures.  
Yet Flint‘s outdated system of property tax limitation, a holdover from the Depression 
era, capped property tax rates at ten mills on all state equalized property valuations.  
According to one 1961 study of property tax rates in Michigan, Flint had the lowest rates 
in the state.
86
  The city charter‘s limitation on property taxes made it exceedingly difficult 
for municipal agencies to provide adequate city services to Flint‘s growing postwar 
population.  The situation reached crisis stage at the precise moment when the city was 
preparing its expansive urban renewal plans.  In response to the burgeoning fiscal crisis, 
the city commission proposed to revise the city charter by implementing a 1 percent 
income tax for all Flint residents and a one-half percent earnings tax on all non-residents 
working in the city.  Beyond funding additional city services and a wage increase for 
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municipal employees, revenue from the city‘s income tax was to provide a $17 million, 
―pay as you go‖ capital improvement budget designed to generate the necessary credits to 
fund urban renewal and freeway construction projects citywide.  In June of 1963, voters 
rejected the charter revisions and income tax in a polarizing referendum.  Facing a 
massive tax and services gap, the city commission cut nearly $10 million from the city 
budget for the 1964 fiscal year.
87
  Without an income tax or some other source of new 
revenue, the city‘s plans for North End clearance could not move forward.   
As the city‘s economic crisis worsened in the wake of the June election defeat, the 
city commission voted again in December 1963 to implement an income tax.  In response 
to the December action, anti-tax protesters—who received strong support from trade 
union members and the Flint AFL-CIO Council—launched a legal challenge, demanding 
that the commission either cancel the tax or submit it to a popular vote.  After receiving a 
favorable circuit court ruling on the challenge, opponents of the tax won an opportunity 
to vote on the issue in September 1964.  In order to ensure citizen approval for the new 
income tax, the commission endorsed a series of compromises intended to assuage voters.  
City commissioners promised to enact a three-mill reduction in local property taxes if 
voters approved the income tax.  On September 1, 1964, voters, by a two-to-one margin, 
endorsed the commission‘s proposal.  Though the new income tax enabled the city to 
escape its immediate fiscal crisis, the property tax reduction severely undermined the 
city‘s attempt to raise money for the St. John redevelopment project.
88
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Federal finance strictures, municipal revenue shortfalls, and housing shortages all 
played a major role in the delay of the St. John project.  Nevertheless, the colorblind 
dialogue on taxes and municipal resources masked a very real fear among city officials 
that white, working-class taxpayers—who formed a clear majority in the city—would 
revolt against massive government expenditures on the North End, especially those funds 
designed to disperse the city‘s segregated black population.  According to the Flint 
Renewal and Housing Department‘s annual report for 1965, ―The City did not have the 
cash nor was it willing to spend large amounts of money on a program [in the North End] 
that is very complex and controversial.‖
89
  Unable and somewhat unwilling to generate 
the public funding necessary to commence with North End renewal, the city turned 
toward the private sector to implement the St. John redevelopment project.   
General Motors, the Mott Foundation, and other private entities were not passive 
actors in Flint‘s urban renewal and freeway programs.  To the contrary, Harding Mott, 
Homer Dowdy, and Thomas Jean of the Mott Foundation, Oz Kelly of the MAF, and 
local GM executives such as George Elges, Joseph Anderson, and Ronald Warner all 
participated directly in the planning and implementation of Flint‘s redevelopment 
initiatives.  GM officials rarely spoke publicly about the city‘s freeway and urban 
renewal programs, however.  Instead, GM executives pursued their North End 
development interests quietly through their representatives within the MAF, the Mott 
Foundation, and the Genesee Community Development Conference (GCDC).  A private 
housing and renewal agency funded and organized by the Mott Foundation, the MAF, 
and General Motors, the GCDC, under the leadership of Homer Dowdy and Thomas 
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Jean, sought to speed relocation and reduce the need for public housing by subsidizing 
the construction of low-income replacement housing units.  ―Our first proposal to the 
City of Flint,‖ Ronald Warner of the GCDC revealed, ―was designed to eliminate further 
City ownership and construction of public housing.‖
90
  The GCDC conducted urban 
renewal surveys of the St. John neighborhood and managed much of the city‘s relocation 
program for displaced persons.  Beyond collaborating with officials from General 
Motors, the MAF, the GCDC, and the city commission, the Mott Foundation played a 
major independent role in promoting and implementing Flint‘s freeway and urban 
renewal programs through direct cash grants to the city‘s urban renewal department and 
by operating ―community relocation sub-stations‖ in eleven of the city‘s public schools.
91
  
Through their direct and decisive involvement in the creation and implementation of 
urban renewal policies, corporate leaders in Flint and Genesee County served as powerful 
arms of local government.  In 1966, urban renewal official Leo Wilensky acknowledged 
the extent to which corporate economic interests shaped the city‘s redevelopment agenda: 
―Urban Renewal itself is big business.‖
92
      
The stalled St. John project officially commenced in September 1967, when the 
GCDC, with support from the St. John Community Council, conducted a ―diagnostic 
survey‖ of the neighborhood.  After completing and publishing the survey, the GCDC 
and the MAF collaborated with Social Planning Associates (SPA), a Chicago firm, to 
produce the urban renewal plan for St. John.
93
  The GCDC and SPA reports concurred 
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with all previous urban renewal surveys in recommending complete clearance of the area.  
Following the release of the St. John surveys, the city commission, the Flint Department 
of Community Development, and a broad array of community organizations moved yet 
again to secure public financing for the city‘s portion of North End renewal costs.   
In 1968, the city commission launched a $5 million bond initiative to raise money 
for urban redevelopment in St. John and the neighboring enclave of Oak Park.  In 
advance of the April 7, 1969 bond election, the city‘s urban renewal coalition rallied 
behind the Citizens‘ Committee in Support of the Oak Park Bond Issue, an ad hoc 
organization that advocated the passage of the measure.
94
  Co-chaired by Saul Seigel, the 
executive director of the Greater Flint Downtown Corporation, and Edgar Holt, president 
of the Flint NAACP, the pro-bond committee formally united the city‘s vast and diverse 
urban renewal coalition.  In the weeks leading up to the referendum, supporters of the St. 
John and Oak Park renewal projects launched a massive publicity campaign that drew 
financial and political support from the most powerful institutions in the city.  The list of 
organizations that endorsed the bond measure included the MAF, the Mott Foundation, 
GM, the UAW, the Flint Chamber of Commerce, the Flint Journal, the Urban League of 
Flint, the Flint NAACP, the Executive Committees of the Genesee County Democratic 
and Republican Parties, the Flint Board of Education, and the Greater Flint Downtown 
Corporation.  Supporters of North End redevelopment, mindful of the anti-tax sentiment 
that had stalled the city income tax in 1963, consistently reminded voters throughout the 
spring of 1969 that the urban renewal bond—which the city commission planned to repay 
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through already existing municipal revenue streams—would generate no new taxes for 
property owners.  Referring to April 7 as Flint‘s ―Day of Decision,‖ the Citizen‘s 
Committee in Support of the Oak Park Bond Issue framed the bond initiative as a 
referendum on Flint‘s future:  
A ‗YES‘ VOTE ON THE OAK PARK BOND ISSUE MEANS 
PROGRESS, GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, PROSPERITY, A MORE 
SAFE AND HEALTHY CITY, A BETTER PLACE FOR CHILDREN 
TO GROW UP, INCREASED OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL OUR 
CITIZENS.  A ‗no‘ vote means a dismal future, turning our backs on 
progress and opportunity – continued spread of blight, indifference, 
apathy, and hopelessness.
95
     
 
Voters defeated the bonding proposal in a landslide.  By an overwhelming three-
to-one ratio, voters signaled their opposition to the prospects of new taxes and North End 
renewal by rejecting the bond.
96
  In spite of the organizational strength of the city‘s urban 
renewal coalition, the measure never really had much chance of passing.  Crucially, only 
property owners in the city of Flint were eligible to vote in the April special bond 
election, a stipulation that effectively disfranchised over half of the city‘s black 
community and all of its renters.  The issue failed also because it galvanized thousands of 
property owners and working-class white voters who feared higher taxes, corporate-
sponsored property seizures, and racial integration.  Chaired by Saul Shur, a Flint 
Township resident who owned property on the North End, the Committee to Save Our 
Homes (CSOH) led the fight against funding redevelopment.  Despite facing serious 
financial and public relations obstacles, Shur and the CSOH successfully mobilized white 
property owners from across the city, many of whom owned lucrative rental properties in 
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the North End, to defeat the April referendum.  Throughout the spring of 1969, the CSOH 
described the urban renewal bond issue as a case of ―David vs. Goliath,‖ a grassroots, 
populist battle against a land-grabbing, tax-increasing, corporate boondoggle for General 
Motors.  Though both the pro- and anti-bond campaigns avoided open discussions of 
race, the CSOH successfully tapped into a potent combination of working-class economic 
frustration and white racial fear in generating opposition to the referendum.  In an 
especially revealing leaflet that illustrated how race, class, and property ownership 
intersected in the April elections, the CSOH asked, in large, bold print, ―2,764 
FAMILIES TO BE RE-LOCATED?  WHERE WILL THEY GO?  DON’T HURT 
POOR PEOPLE!‖
97
   
Many opponents of the bond issue undoubtedly had a genuine desire to keep their 
homes and rental properties in the North End; and many more surely resented the very 
real prospect of paying higher taxes to fund GM‘s expansion.  Still, however, race played 
a central role in the 1969 election.  Thousands of voters who opposed the 1969 bond 
referendum did so out of a desire to preserve segregation by maintaining the North End‘s 
rigidly demarcated ghettoes.  Outraged by the subtle racial appeals embedded within the 
anti-tax, anti-renewal campaign, African-American city commissioner Fred Tucker, who 
represented the North End‘s Fifth Ward, lambasted CSOH supporters for believing that 
―2700 of them [displaced African Americans] are going to move into your nice 
neighborhoods and drive your property values down, ruin your schools, start houses of 
prostitution and gambling joints, and marry your daughters.‖  ―Those of you who feel you 
will escape by running to suburbia, beware,‖ Tucker continued, ―because some of us are 
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going out there too, and blight recognizes no border lines.‖
98
  The once vague prospect of 
North End renewal, made more real by the April election, generated passionate responses 
on both sides of the color line.  Among African Americans trapped in the North End, 
urban renewal seemed to offer a long-awaited chance to weaken the walls that 
surrounded the ghetto.  For thousands of property-owning white voters who mobilized 
against the bond issue, North End renewal was a non-starter for that very same reason.                                           
 By the close of the 1960s, the St. John urban renewal project faced an uncertain 
future.  After waiting ten years for the commencement of property acquisition, North 
Enders increasingly viewed the city‘s promises of relocation with skepticism.  Looking 
ahead towards a bleak future in St. John, North End resident and activist Fred Dent 
contemplated what life would be like in a neighborhood surrounded by inhospitable and 
seemingly insurmountable spatial barriers: ―We‘ve already got a dirty river on one side 
and a dirty factory on the other.  The expressway will be another barrier.‖
99
  Even though 
the city remained officially committed to clearing the neighborhood, municipal funding 
shortfalls, federal urban development cutbacks, white mobilizations against renewal, 
inadequate replacement housing, and spiraling rates of inflation combined to extend the 
city‘s timetable for property acquisition and relocation.  Furthermore, delays in the 
Interstate 475 project only exacerbated matters for North End residents seeking to 
relocate.    
 According to the state highway department‘s original plans, Interstate 475 was to 
open in 1972.  Between 1968 and 1974, the MSHD pushed back the I-475 completion 
date on five different occasions, however.  Insufficient relocation housing, poor 
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construction weather, spiraling inflation that drove up construction costs, a series of 
strikes in the construction industry, a long dispute over the project‘s Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS), and federal transportation cuts to fund the Vietnam War all 
served to delay the project during the 1960s and 1970s.  In December 1966, property 
acquisition for both M-78 and I-475 virtually halted after the federal government 
announced a $47 million, war-related cut to the state‘s freeway construction budget.  One 
year later, the state announced a three-year delay due to inflation and soaring construction 
costs.  Beyond the budgetary and housing shortfalls that delayed the I-475 project, state 
and federal investigations into the environmental impacts of the roadway on several 
neighborhoods and parks halted North End property acquisition and construction between 
1972 and 1976.  By 1974, the state had completed only the southern and northern 
portions of I-475, leaving open the 5.5-mile, central city section of the freeway that was 
to serve downtown, Buick, and the St. John Industrial Park.
100
  Frustrated by the delays, 
residents from Central Park and other predominantly white neighborhoods near 
downtown joined North Enders in pressing the city to accelerate its property acquisition 
and construction programs.  In an angry March 1974 letter to the Flint Journal, Sonny 
Calvo, president of the Central Park Property Owners Association, spoke for downtown 
merchants and thousands of central Flint residents from both sides of the color line in 
denouncing the I-475 delays: ―All we are asking—and we don‘t have to be engineers to 
do that—is for those boobs [from the MSHD] to link up the two ends [of the freeway] 
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  The stalled progress of I-475 infuriated downtown business 
owners, GM, St. John residents, and tens of thousands of angry motorists; but the delays 
in the I-475 and St. John renewal projects created special hardships for the black 
residents of the North End.  To many of those still stranded in St. John after fifteen years 
of renewal promises, the city‘s inability to relocate residents seemed almost willful.  
Reflecting back upon the delays, Flint‘s second African-American mayor, James Sharp, 
issued a harsh denunciation of the city‘s property acquisition program: ―The city 
designated those urban renewal areas.  And they did so, I believe, with full knowledge 
that they would never ever buy them out.‖
102
  Already simmering, the deep practical 
contradictions between the politics of growth and the aims of local residents for improved 
housing and city services came to a head during the battles over the delay of the St. John 
and I-475 projects.   
Financial assistance from GM could have significantly expedited the I-475 and St. 
John projects.  Yet when pressed by city officials to donate cash for the clearance and 
relocation efforts, GM refused.
103
  Dating back to the 1950s, GM had advocated for slum 
clearance in the St. John neighborhood.  Specifically, the automaker wished to acquire 
approximately eighty acres of St. John Street land to construct factory expansions, 
employee parking lots, rail-loading facilities, and a coal-fired power plant.  Through 
privately orchestrated purchase agreements with North End property owners, GM 
acquired most of the land it needed before the city had moved to assemble land for the St. 
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John Industrial Park.  With its short-term property acquisition agenda seemingly 
complete, the company refused to bankroll the St. John and I-475 projects, preferring 
instead to fund the GCDC‘s private housing and renewal efforts while waiting for 
municipal action in St. John.  Lacking the necessary cash and public housing capacity, 
the city delayed St. John property acquisitions until 1970.
104
     
While city commissioners pursued their more limited urban renewal plans in other 
sections of the city and searched for the will to raise funds and construct replacement 
housing for North End redevelopment, the massive St. John Street renewal project—
along with large tracts of the St. John portion of Interstate 475—languished for a decade 
without any property acquisitions.  During that time, GM executives and city 
commissioners presided over the almost complete destruction of the North End‘s housing 
stock and property values.  In their 1963 report, Flint Faces the Future, NAREB officials 
had issued a stern warning to city officials that the premature announcement of clearance 
plans could trigger the spread of blight in neighborhoods designated for redevelopment.  
The key to mitigating neighborhood deterioration, NAREB representatives maintained, 
was to establish small project areas and minimize the time between the planning and 
implementation phases of urban renewal: 
To designate more than a thousand acres in the heart of Flint for renewal 
treatment at a future date that is only vaguely defined serves to put the 
blight tag on a major section of the community.  The result of such action 
in other cities has been that owners defer maintenance, cancel plans for 
new construction, and put off improvements because of uncertainty over 
what will happen to their property.  In other words, the designation of an 
area long prior to treatment can serve merely to render more difficult the 
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According to William Dolben, a member of the NAREB study team, the city‘s urban 
renewal plan virtually guaranteed the spread of blight on the North End: ―What are these 
people [in condemned neighborhoods] going to do?  Nothing.  They will let their 
properties deteriorate.‖
106
  As early as 1963, then, planners had warned city officials of 
the dangers associated with urban renewal delays.  Despite the warning, however, city 
commissioners and officials from the DCD and the housing and urban renewal 
departments did nothing to block the spread of blight in the North End.  Indeed, 
municipal divestment policies generated new, more intense forms of blight in the North 
End. 
       
―The City of Flint Is Stopping Every Thing except Decay‖:  
State Action and Ghetto Formation  
 
The St. John and I-475 projects never met the expectations of civil rights activists.  In 
fact, at virtually every stage of its development, the North End‘s freeway and renewal 
programs intensified black poverty and the already entrenched racial and spatial 
boundaries between black and white residential districts.  Although the city had first 
announced its freeway and North End renewal plans in 1958, it was not until 1970 that 
the city had produced the finances and the public housing necessary to gain federal 
approval for St. John Street redevelopment.  Already well worn by the late 1950s, the St. 
John Street of the 1970s was among the most polluted and unlivable residential 
neighborhoods in the nation.
107
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The Interstate 475 and St. John property acquisition and relocation processes 
consisted of five stages: appraisal, negotiation, relocation counseling, and new home 
inspections, all of which preceded the final movement of families.  Beginning in January 
1965—and continuing through the early 1970s in St. John—officials from the urban 
renewal department, the DCD, and the Michigan State Highway Department assigned 
white appraisers and realtors from the segregated Flint Board of Real Estate to conduct 
property appraisals throughout the city.  Over the protestations of black property owners 
in the St. John and Floral Park districts, appraisers calculated reimbursements not based 
upon the actual relocation costs for families, but rather by assigning ―fair market values‖ 
to properties.  Because of that policy, appraisers judged the overall condition of the 
neighborhood in assaying the value of individual homes and businesses.  In assessing a 
property‘s market value, appraisers considered the number of abandoned and boarded-up 
structures nearby, the quality of the neighborhood‘s schools, and other factors beyond the 
control of individual property owners.  As a Flint Urban League member noted in a 
position paper on urban renewal, ―If the appraiser notes that many detrimental conditions 
exist within the neighborhood, the value of that property is automatically decreased.‖
108
  
The policy of assigning fair market values to condemned structures penalized 
homeowners and shopkeepers—many of whom had invested substantially in their 
properties—for the larger processes of divestment from St. John and Floral Park.
109
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When assaying the market value of homes and businesses, urban renewal 
appraisers relied heavily upon external appearances.  In the North End, appraisers often 
conducted assessments based solely on exterior-only, drive-by ―windshield surveys,‖ a 
practice that also penalized St. John property owners.
110
  Already stretched financially by 
high-interest land contract payments—and largely excluded from the home improvement 
loan market—black property owners in Floral Park and St. John tended to invest in basic, 
structural repairs at the expense of aesthetics and curbside appeal.
111
  As Detroit planner 
William Walsh noted in a 1967 study of black homeowners in Flint, exterior inspections 
of North End properties exaggerated the extent of structural blight, further depressing 
appraisal values:  
The last improvement is the exterior improvement which is the most 
apparent to the general market.  This is of critical importance since it is the 
market perception of the area which affects the supply and demand and 
finally price.  We have a situation then in which properties in the area are 
declining in value because they are being negatively perceived by the 
market while virtually all of the people are making major expenditures to 
improve the homes.  The result is that physical improvement is not really 
economically feasible, and as this becomes recognized the residents stop 
putting money into the area.  They lose confidence and the cancer of urban 




When black property owners challenged the city‘s appraisal program, municipal 
officials generally responded unsympathetically.  After receiving petitions from a large 
delegation of south side residents in the spring of 1966, city manager Thomas Kay denied 
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the role of municipal policies in driving down property values, asserting instead, ―Low 
property values for some properties are the result of injudicious purchases of property at 
inflated prices by the owners.‖
113
  In February 1969, six hundred North Enders descended 
on city hall to protest against urban renewal appraisals.  In an impassioned plea to Kay 
and city commissioners, Fred Dent, a spokesman for the St. John Citizens for 
Improvement Association (SJCIA), addressed the fundamental inequities of fair market 
appraisals: ―The majority [of North End residents] have kept their homes up despite the 
difficulty imposed by the damaging smoke from the Buick plant, and now they are being 
asked to start anew.‖  ―If they must do so,‖ he continued, ―they should receive enough 
money to buy another decent home in a convenient location.‖
114
  While still expressing a 
preference for relocation, leaders from the NAACP, the SJCIA, North End block clubs, 
and hundreds of ordinary citizens fought from within the urban renewal coalition to 
secure equitable property acquisition and relocation policies.    
Municipal divestment policies, the withdrawal of private capital, and unregulated 
industrial pollution all helped to sustain blight in Floral Park and St. John.  Yet in a sad 
irony, appraisers overlooked the city‘s role in depreciating property values.  Though the 
withdrawal of city services contributed to the spread of blight in many neighborhoods 
across the city, St. John experienced an especially harsh form of municipal divestment.  
Starting with the release of the 1960 master plan until the end of North End property 
acquisition in 1977, a combination of corporate and municipal policies contributed to the 
rapid deterioration of St. John.  Because the master plan had prescribed complete 
clearance for the neighborhood, city commissioners had sharply curtailed housing code 
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enforcement, waste collection, and other city services for its residents, avoiding all but 
the most basic maintenance expenditures.
115
  Moreover, the city refused to grant 
construction permits to St. John residents who wished to upgrade their properties.  In 
November 1965, city commission members formalized their St. John divestment policy 
by passing a unanimous resolution instructing residents ―not to spend large amounts of 
money in rehabilitation of their properties, but only those repairs necessary for ordinary 
maintenance.‖
116
  Sagging roofs, boarded-over windows, and trash-littered streets on the 
North End were not simply the results of neighborhood racial transitions, nor were they 
the cumulative outcomes of thousands of individual decisions made by neglectful renters, 
exploitive slumlords, and cash-strapped homeowners.  In fact, municipal policies played 
a decisive role in the spread of blight on the North End.  ―Rather than renewing the 
[North End] area,‖ a Flint Urban League member asserted, ―it appears that the city of 
Flint is stopping every thing except decay.‖
117
             
Already reluctant to invest in black neighborhoods, local bankers responded to the 
city commission‘s 1965 decree by refusing to finance even basic repairs for homes in St. 
John.  As one anonymous resident noted, ―We are faced with a situation where you can 
borrow money for a Cadillac but you can‘t get it to fix up homes.‖
118
  In her emotionally 
charged testimony during the 1966 equal housing hearings, future city commissioner 
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Ailene Butler expanded the Cadillac critique by describing the relationship between 
urban renewal, bank policies, and racially segmented housing markets in a town that 
seemed to prioritize car sales over all else: 
The banks will not loan to the residents money to repair homes, although 
they will loan them money to buy cars. . . . They give four or five 
thousand dollars to buy any kind of car they want, but they will not let the 
people in this area borrow money to do any work on their homes. . . . Most 
of these people are retirees of Buick and cannot purchase property 
elsewhere, or people who could only move by selling their property.  The 
property down there has—there‘s no market value at all.
119
   
  
Following the 1965 moratorium on home repair, homeowners and shopkeepers 
throughout the North End reported receiving notification that insurance companies had 
simply cancelled their policies.
120
  Fearful of investing even moderate sums of money in 
condemned properties, homeowners and shopkeepers in the St. John area had little choice 
but to allow their properties to deteriorate.  ―The incentive to fix up the house is gone,‖ 
one anonymous St. John resident acknowledged.
121
   
Industrial pollution and municipal divestment policies severely undermined the 
entire North End housing market during the long era of urban renewal.  By the early 
1970s, the situation had become especially acute in St. John.  Just between 1972 and 
1973, housing values in the city as a whole declined by over 10 percent, a drop fueled in 
large part by the collapse of the North End real estate market.
122
  In a 1973 
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communication to U.S. Senator Donald Riegle, Olive Beasley described how government 
policies had devastated the North End:  
Promises made up to ten years ago for urban renewal have affected blacks.  
Citizens have been waiting up to ten years, unable to make changes in 
their homes, get building permits or improve their living conditions.  The 
promised extensive rehabilitation of homes, even just to bring them up to 
code, has been stopped.  Property values do not remain constant.  Here, 
the U.S. government actions over the past years and the current delay, will 
further reduce minority property values.
123
      
    
―How can I put more money in here when everything around me is getting worse?‖ a 
frustrated business owner demanded to know.
124
   
On December 22, 1970, the Flint Department of Community Development‘s Real 
Estate Division purchased its first property in the St. John neighborhood, a home at 1335 
Rhode Island Avenue.  After receiving a check for $7,000, the homeowner, Mrs. Beneva 
Smith, a seventy-five-year old, relocated to the Flint Housing Commission‘s Centerview 
Apartments.
125
  By 1977, when the city concluded property acquisition in St. John, 
hundreds of black families had followed Smith‘s path from homeownership to public 
housing.  Low property appraisals also made it difficult for small business owners in St. 
John—including many white proprietors—to relocate to other sections of the city.  In 
many instances, businesses simply closed for good following property acquisition.  ―I‘m 
52 years old,‖ asserted Joe‘s Tavern owner Walter Christich, ―and right at the stage 
where there‘s no sense in going into debt.  My building is [owned] free and clear and I‘m 
being put out.‖
126
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Homeowners and shopkeepers in the North End often reported appraisals for their 
properties that matched those assigned to vacant parcels in white neighborhoods.
127
  
According to DCD reports from the early 1970s, property acquisition payments in St. 
John averaged less than $8,000 per home; yet citywide, the median cost of private 
replacement housing was $14,600 in 1970.
128
  As Riegle noted, the urban renewal 
appraisal and property acquisition processes made it virtually impossible for St. John 
residents to secure adequate replacement housing: ―Because of the undesirable conditions 
for residential living, the appraised value of these parcels is not very high.  Particularly 
when it is necessary to convert this appraised value into safe and sanitary housing in 
some other location.  It is virtually impossible.‖
129
  Years later, one anonymous Flint 
resident recalled the barriers that African Americans confronted in relocating:  
Well, I guess they [the city] didn‘t give a lot of money, and for the money 
that many of the residents were given, it couldn‘t relocate them to other 
areas of Flint and because of the segregation that money wouldn‘t be a 
down payment and get them across Saginaw [Street].  So a lot of those 
families relocated to where their money would take them.‖
130
 
   
For a large portion of residents in the St. John and Floral Park neighborhoods, many of 
them homeowners, public housing was the only available option. 
After turning over their properties, displaced families faced the difficult prospect 
of finding new housing through either the private real estate market or some form of 
federally subsidized housing.  In April 1966, the Department of Community 
Development, the state highway department, and the GCDC opened the Central 
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Relocation Office, a public-private collaboration to assist displaced families in obtaining 
replacement housing.  Overwhelmed by the magnitude of the property acquisition, 
clearance, and construction projects, the DCD and the MSHD sub-contracted with the 
Mott Foundation and the GCDC to oversee virtually all aspects of the relocation 
program.
131
  Only a small minority of white families sought assistance from the Central 
Relocation Office.  Taking advantage of FHA-backed mortgages, the overwhelming 
majority of white families displaced by I-475 relocated to segregated private housing in 
suburban Flint, predominantly in the high-growth sections of southern Genesee 
County.
132
  For displaced African-American families, especially the poor, the highly 
segmented housing market in Genesee County was, to quote the Mott Foundation‘s 
Thomas Jean, who also directed the Central Relocation Office, simply ―vicious.‖
133
  
Aware of widespread white opposition to integrated relocation housing, representatives 
from the GCDC and the Central Relocation Office consistently avoided the issue of 
resegregation, however, preferring instead to manage relocation ―with the hope that the 
question of integrated housing would best be solved without focusing on the question.‖
134
         
In the private housing market, interested black homebuyers faced extraordinary 
difficulties in finding standard housing through local realtors.  Long a foe of local civil 
rights forces, the Flint Board of Realtors—which, on a limited, voluntary basis supplied 
the Central Relocation Office with home listings from its multiple listing exchange—
refused to show black realtors and purchasers its homes for sale in white residential 
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districts.  In a 1966 memorandum to the state civil rights commission, relocation officials 
indicated that the Flint Board of Realtors only provided home listings in ―predominantly 
Negro or integrated neighborhoods‖ for African Americans displaced by the freeway.
135
  
A year later, the MCRC acknowledged that the policies of the Flint Board of Realtors and 
local developers made it extremely difficult for black families to secure replacement 
housing:  
The Commission notes that segregated housing patterns appear controlled 
and maintained by builders and members of the Flint Board of Realtors 
who refuse to show or sell properties in white areas to Negroes, whether 
so instructed by clients or not; decline to service open-occupancy listings 
and deny Negro real estate brokers membership in the organization itself 
and its subsidiary shared-listing system.
136
   
 
If black buyers managed to circumvent the Flint Board of Realtors by discovering 
homes through third-party showings or other means, they still faced enormous difficulties 
in obtaining either traditional bank mortgages or federally insured financing.
137
  
Commenting on the discrimination that she and her family faced in attempting to 
relocate, Mrs. Robert R. Turpin of the Flint Human Rights Commission issued an 
especially poignant critique of the less than free market for local real estate: 
Our one great desire and hope has been to approach a realtor or an owner 
with the same sense of dignity as any other citizen and to bargain for the 
purchase of a home in the normal channels of business, but this privilege, I 
regret to say, has been denied us, despite the fact that we have lived in 
Flint for nearly 26 years and have endeavored through all these years, to 
be reputable citizens.  Just in recent months, since it was suggested that we 
keep a record of the refusals we have met, at least eight real estate agents 
have denied us the privilege to buy, and most of these have refused to 
grant us even a chance to inspect the home they advertised for sale.
138
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Though made aware of the housing situation in Flint by the state civil rights commission, 
the Flint city attorney‘s office did not enforce the city‘s 1968 fair housing ordinance on 
behalf of displaced families.  Moreover, federal officials from the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) declined to enforce the provisions of the federal Fair 
Housing Act of 1968, which illegalized the refusal to sell, rent, or finance dwellings 
based on race.  In a remarkable forfeiture of authority, Chantland Wysor, an official from 
HUD‘s regional office in Chicago, informed the Michigan Civil Rights Commission that 
HUD had reassigned its civil rights enforcement officers in both Flint and Saginaw to 
other cities: ―Flint-Saginaw will have to struggle along without my help. . . . I would 
suggest that you ignore everything I have said and do your eagle-eyed best to watch our 
programs yourself.‖
139
     
The private acts of racist white homeowners and unscrupulous realtors 
contributed greatly to the hardening of Flint‘s color line.  Yet the local implementation of 
public redevelopment policies also sustained racial segregation.  Because of state action 
(and inaction), thousands of residents in Floral Park and St. John were unable to create 
wealth through property ownership.  Unlike the Turpins, who possessed the financial 
means to purchase new housing in the exclusive Woodlawn Park district, well over half 
of the displaced families in the city required public housing to meet their relocation 
needs.  In order to accommodate the nearly fifteen hundred indigent families displaced by 
the I-475 and St. John projects, city commissioners created the Flint Housing 
Commission (FHC) in 1964.
140
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Initially, FHC members planned to construct five hundred public housing units, 
all of them within the segregated black neighborhoods surrounding the Floral Park 
interchange.
141
  Citing the high cost of land acquisition in other areas, the FHC refused to 
consider public housing developments in or near the all-white neighborhoods on the 
city‘s far west and south sides.
142
  Yet after significant pressure from Beasley, the 
MCRC, the NAACP, and local fair housing activists, the city‘s public housing 
commissioners abandoned their original plan.
143
  Instead, they designed a site plan for 
family housing that culminated in one project in Floral Park (Howard Estates), another in 
the equally segregated Gracelawn Cemetery neighborhood to the west of Buick (Aldridge 
Place), two additional complexes in isolated, largely unsettled areas on the city‘s urban 
fringe (Atherton East and River Park), and 183 units of scattered site housing, almost all 
of which were within all-black or racially transitional neighborhoods.  At the Floral Park 
and Gracelawn Cemetery sites, the commissioners ensured segregation by locating public 
housing within already segregated black neighborhoods, a traditional practice employed 
by housing authorities in Chicago, New York City, and elsewhere.
144
  Yet with the two 
site locations on the urban fringe, FHC policies created islands of segregated housing on 
                                                 
141
 The city‘s initial 1964 GNRP also endorsed this proposal to construct public housing units in the Floral 
Park neighborhood.  See City Planning Associates, General Neighborhood Renewal Plan.  In 1966, FHC 
director Thomas Yeotis acknowledged that the housing commission intended to build all of its first five 
hundred units in predominantly Negro areas.  See J. Ferris, ―Staff Report and Recommendations,‖ 3.    
142
 J. Ferris, ―Staff Report and Recommendations,‖ 17.  In order to obtain federal approval for its public 
housing sites, the city had to keep land acquisition costs to less than $3,000 per unit.  See Memorandum, 
Beasley to J. Rose, April 10, 1967, Beasley Papers, box 22, folder 17, GHCC.    
143
 On the disputes over public housing sites, see J. Ferris, ―Staff Report and Recommendations‖; 
Memorandum, Beasley to J. Rose; ―Statement of Claim,‖ February 23, 1966, Beasley Papers, box 10, 
folder 45, GHCC; Memorandum, Beasley to A. Johnson, May 24, 1966, Beasley Papers, box 10, folder 45, 
GHCC; and Beasley, ―Weekly Report from Flint,‖ April 27, 1968, Beasley Papers, box 8, folder 18, 
GHCC.  
144




the city‘s most isolated, sparsely populated borders.
145
  Pointing to the cost effectiveness 
of its sites, the massive housing shortages created by the construction of I-475 and the 
clearing of St. John Street, and the grassroots opposition of homeowners in already 
developed white residential districts, the Flint Housing Commission defended its site 
decisions with a colorblind defense of a race-conscious strategy.
146
   
Dating back to 1962, when members of the Flint City Planning Commission first 
entertained a motion to rezone land at the intersection of Twelfth Street and Lapeer Road 
for ―Negro apartments,‖ urban renewal and freeway relocation officials sought to develop 
segregated, medium-density public housing for displaced black families.
147
  The freeway 
and urban renewal relocation program brought this plan to fruition.  In 1977, when 
property acquisition concluded in St. John, the FHC conducted a census of public 
housing developments.  During that year, the ninety-six-unit Howard Estates project in 
Floral Park housed only one white family.  In the River Park project—built in a wooded, 
largely unsettled area on the city‘s northern border with Mt. Morris Township—FHC 
surveyors counted only eleven white families living in the 151-unit complex.  When it 
opened in the spring of 1967, the Atherton East project—located in a sparsely inhabited 
district on Flint‘s southeast side—contained 188 families, 141 of which were African 
American.  According to the FHC‘s report, the population of Atherton East included 
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seven hundred children.  To accommodate the arrival of so many school-aged children, 
the Flint Board of Education opened the East Atherton School in 1967.  Later renamed 
Manley School in honor of Frank Manley, the founder of community education, the new 
school sat immediately adjacent to the public housing complex.  By the end of the 1960s, 
East Atherton was one of the most racially segregated and economically homogeneous 
elementary schools in the entire region.
148
  When confronted by civil rights activists who 
objected to the site locations and racial composition of Flint‘s public housing 
developments, urban renewal director Leo Wilensky stated, ―If I am worried about 
whether segregation will re-occur in these projects, it will paralyze our present efforts to 
relocate.‖  Without hesitation, Wilensky, his successor Richard Wilberg, and other city 
officials defended their policies by using a language of colorblindness that only thinly 
concealed the color-conscious strategies of the urban renewal department, the FHC, and 
the board of education.
149
   
Facing both long waiting lists for public housing and private housing shortages 
that drove vacancy rates down to less than 2 percent citywide, families in the path of the 
freeway could not mount an effective opposition to the FHC‘s site plans.  By the mid-
1970s, even freeway proponents from the partially cleared St. John district, fearful of 
finding no replacement housing at all, filed several unsuccessful lawsuits to halt the city‘s 
freeway and renewal programs.  In 1974, Howard Simpson, president of the St. John 
Council, lamented, ―We regret our antiprogressive posture in this attempt to save an area 
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that, frankly, is not worth saving.  But this is the only neighborhood we have.‖
150
  
Ultimately, all but a few black families in the path of the freeway moved to either 
segregated public housing or segregated private housing on the borders of Flint‘s 
demolished ghettoes.  Only a handful of the five hundred black families who owned 
property in St. John prior to 1960 could afford to purchase homes in their new 
neighborhoods.
151
   
For the families who lost their homeowner status through urban renewal and 
freeway construction, the apparent triumph of municipal growth liberalism came at a 
great cost.  As GM president Harlow Curtice had noted back in 1957, however, ―the price 
of progress is always trouble.‖
152
  By the 1980s, the Interstate 475 and St. John projects 
once supported by black residents came to represent two of the most crushing blows 
suffered by Flint‘s civil rights activists.  Reflecting back upon the history of slum 
clearance, fair housing activist Woody Etherly, who went on to become a city 
commissioner during the St. John saga, expressed profound regret for his initial support 
of urban renewal and freeways: ―That‘s one of my greatest disappointments in life . . . not 
having a true understanding of what the country was doing when they did the urban 
renewal or when they do expressways.‖  ―If you go to any community as you travel,‖ he 
added despondently, ―you will always find an expressway coming down in the heart of 
the black community.‖
153
  ―People just don‘t matter,‖ Olive Beasley concluded, ―if those 
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who call the shots want an expressway.‖
154
  Beasley‘s words surely carried a special 
resonance for those who had firsthand experience with the St. John renewal program.    
Despite initial support for slum clearance among black citizens and civil rights 
activists, the I-475 and St. John renewal projects ultimately intensified black poverty and 
residential segregation.  The new social geographies that emerged as a direct result of 
Flint‘s urban renewal and freeway programs were not cases of de facto segregation.  
Rather, urban renewal and freeway construction produced a policy-driven web of Jim 
Crow development in Genesee County that helped to make metropolitan Flint one of the 
most racially segregated, economically polarized, and spatially divided regions in the 
United States.
155
  At every stage of the urban renewal process, a potent combination of 
public and private policies shaped the contours of the local housing market.  Unregulated 
pollution, discriminatory appraisal and reimbursement policies, racial steering by realtors 
and relocation officials, segregated public housing complexes, local and federal non-
enforcement of civil rights laws, and widespread white violence in transitional 
neighborhoods combined to maintain state-sanctioned residential apartheid in the Vehicle 
City.  Nearly all instances of ―urban blight‖ and de facto segregation confronted by the 
civil rights movement in Flint had their roots in government policies. 
In 1973, when Olive Beasley lambasted Richard Wilberg, she had come to the 
realization that urban renewal in the Vehicle City was really a program of ―Negro 
Removal‖—an insidious plan to expand Flint‘s commercial, industrial, and tourist 
economies by removing black residents from valuable inner-city land.  Looking back 
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upon the history of urban renewal, urban historians have generally reinforced Beasley‘s 
conclusions, arguing that growth hungry municipal officials used urban clearance 
projects to remove African Americans from the inner city, spur economic development, 
and make downtown commercial districts more appealing to white investors and 
suburban shoppers.  By the close of the 1970s, activists such as Beasley could accurately 
characterize the St. John renewal project as an especially outrageous example of Negro 
removal and black residential containment.  Yet it was not always clear to civil rights 
activists or the residents of St. John who had initially supported redevelopment that urban 
renewal would generate such poor outcomes.  
 
Demolition Means Progress 
The economic growth that urban renewal boosters predicted would accompany I-475, the 
Floral Park interchange, and the St. John Industrial Park projects never materialized.  At a 
combined cost of more than $130 million, the freeway and the industrial park created few 
new jobs and generated only short-term private investment in Flint‘s manufacturing and 
commercial sectors.  Moreover, as in other cities, the freeway and clearance projects 
removed hundreds of acres of taxable properties and facilitated the suburban migrations 
of both corporate capital and tens of thousands of white taxpayers.
156
  For those who 
remained in the neighborhoods bordering the St. John and Floral Park clearance zones, 
the freeway and interchange undermined commerce and pedestrian traffic, inhibited 
movement between neighborhoods, and exerted a negative influence on long-established 
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community ties.  ―The expressway has eliminated a lot of homes, and it has eliminated a 
lot of the community spirit,‖ observed Angela Sawyer.
157
  
Residents of St. John and Floral Park were not the only Flint citizens who felt 
victimized by the city‘s urban renewal and freeway construction programs, however.  By 
the end of the 1970s, the city had removed over three thousand African Americans from 
the deteriorating residential neighborhoods surrounding downtown, relocating them in 
most instances to segregated public housing, racially transitional neighborhoods on the 
northwest and southeast sides, and isolated areas on the city‘s urban fringe.  By funneling 
St. John and Floral Park residents to recently integrated areas, the city‘s relocation 
program triggered waves of panic selling in formerly all-white neighborhoods.  
Throughout the city and its innermost suburbs, white homeowners charged resettlement 
officials from the Flint Board of Realtors, the Genesee Community Development 
Conference, and the Central Relocation Office with promoting racial transitions in their 
neighborhoods.  As black families arrived in Flint Park, Civic Park, and other previously 
segregated areas, racial conflicts, blockbusting, and white panic selling increased 
dramatically.
158
  By the mid-1970s, racially motivated panic selling and white property 
abandonment had escalated to the point that the city commission entertained legislation to 
ban the use of ―For Sale‖ signs throughout the city.  On Flint‘s northwest side, the city‘s 
policy of racial steering drove white panic selling and severely undermined civil rights 
efforts to link urban redevelopment with residential desegregation.  White flight, as many 
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of these activists would soon discover, was as much a consequence of public policies as it 
was a reflection of private racism.
159
 
On the North End, where the St. John Street neighborhood once stood, the 
freeway and urban renewal projects culminated in the opening of the St. John Industrial 
Park, a $30.5 million project that planners predicted would create 3,600 new jobs.
160
  In 
the end, however, the industrial park produced only five hundred new positions to replace 
the tens of thousands of local manufacturing jobs lost during the postwar era.  Although 
the city had spent millions of dollars to acquire and clear properties in St. John, weak 
demand for urban renewal land sent North End real estate prices tumbling following the 
conclusion of clearance.  For the leaders of GM‘s Buick division, who had aggressively 
promoted the north-south freeway dating back to the 1950s, the completion of I-475 in 
1981 brought more efficient and timely deliveries from the Fisher Body supply plant.  
Yet those deliveries ended abruptly when GM shuttered the Fisher Body 1 facility in 
1987.  Ironically, the same freeway that GM workers and plant managers had demanded 
in the 1950s and 1960s actually hastened the demise of the city‘s historic Fisher Body 1 
plant, the birthplace of the 1936-37 Flint sit-down strikes.
161
    
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, GM officials developed a ―just-in-time‖ 
strategy for producing and assembling automobiles.  The just-in-time policy was a 
trucking and freeway dependent production arrangement modeled after the kan-ban 
system used in the Japanese auto industry.  According to the kan-ban method, 
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manufacturing efficiency and higher per-unit profits depended upon smaller workforces, 
increased automation, decreased production time, and, crucially, spatially integrated 
manufacturing and assembly plants.
162
  In order to reduce the high storage costs, 
damaged inventory, and production errors that accompanied the stockpiling of parts from 
suppliers, GM officials transformed the North End Buick plants and a portion of the St. 
John Industrial Park into Buick City, a centralized manufacturing and assembly complex 
that opened in 1985.  Unlike GM‘s postwar suburban strategy, which required the 
centrifugal movement of capital, the just-in-time production model depended on the 
recentralization of production on Flint‘s North End.  Consequently, GM shifted the 
stamping and body welding operations for Buick cars, previously completed at the Fisher 
1 plant on Flint‘s south side, to the Buick City complex on the North End.  The opening 
of Buick City, made possible only by the completion of I-475, rendered Fisher Body 1 
obsolete.  In 1987, GM closed the south side facility permanently, laying off 3,200 
workers.
163
   
In the absence of stockpiled supplies and parts, timely production at Buick City 
hinged on a constant stream of components delivered via interstate highways.  Initially, 
Buick City‘s designers envisioned a North End complex that resembled Ford‘s massive 
River Rouge plant.  ―Our plan,‖ revealed GM vice president Lloyd Reuss, ―is to return to 
the original 1930s concept of what was then also called Buick City - a totally integrated 
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plant with steel entering one door and a car coming out the other end.‖
164
  Wherever 
possible, Buick City officials thus sought to lure suppliers to the vicinity of the St. John 
Industrial Park.  Though several supply firms did in fact purchase land adjacent to Buick 
City, they created few new jobs.  In a sad twist of fate, the freeway itself undermined 
GM‘s plans to recentralize production on the North End.  Citing the efficiency of Flint‘s 
interstate highway system, all but a handful of Buick‘s suppliers declined relocation 
proposals from GM and the city of Flint.  Why relocate to Flint, many suppliers asked, 
when the freeways made the city so accessible? 
 
 
Figure 9.2.  ―Demolition Means Progress.‖  A photograph of a sign hanging in front of 
GM‘s demolished Buick City facility in Flint‘s North End.  Photograph by Andrew R. 
Highsmith, 2005. 
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Though General Motors invested $300 million in its Buick City project, its 
existence was short lived.  In 1986, just one year after Buick City opened, GM laid off 
thirteen hundred Buick workers.
165
  In November 1997, after years of declining sales, 
GM officials announced plans to close Buick City altogether, citing consumer 
preferences for large trucks and sport utility vehicles over the large sedans produced by 
Buick.
166
  Although still open for business, the industrial park‘s vacancy rate skyrocketed 
following the Buick announcement.  Shortly after the plant closed in the summer of 1999, 
GM executives announced plans to raze the empty plants that had once employed more 
than twenty thousand local workers.  On the fences surrounding the 235-acre complex, 
workers from MCM Management Corporation, an industrial services firm hired to 
demolish the plants, attached signs that read, ―Demolition Means Progress.‖  The city 
could not move forward economically, these signs suggested, until the old plants were 
destroyed.  From their segregated public housing units far away from the ruins of their 
old neighborhoods, former residents of Floral Park and St. John Street surely noted the 
irony.    
During the 1950s and 1960s, members of Flint‘s urban renewal and freeway 
coalition united around the broad principle that economic growth, consumer prosperity, 
social fairness, and civic progress depended upon the destruction of slums.  Though they 
had once looked to redevelopment with a sense of hope, residents of St. John and Floral 
Park ultimately lost in their struggle to obtain racial, spatial, and economic equity through 
urban renewal.  Between the late 1950s and the late 1970s, General Motors executives 
                                                 
165
 ―New G.M. Layoffs Announced,‖ New York Times, November 9, 1986. 
166
 On Buick‘s declining sales in the 1970s, see ―Buick Sales in ‘74 Lowest since 1962,‖ Flint Journal, 
January 7, 1975.  Also, see Kenneth Bradsher, ―G.M. to Close Car Factory, Delivering Big Blow to Flint,‖ 
New York Times, November 22, 1997.    
480 
 
and Flint‘s political leaders first annihilated and then erased the St. John and Floral Park 
neighborhoods, replacing them with a freeway, an interchange, an industrial park, 
parking lots, a power plant, and weed-covered vacant land.  For the thousands of African 
Americans who had attempted to shape the course of Flint‘s urban renewal program, I-
475, the St. John Industrial Park, the empty factories, and the city‘s new segregated 
public housing complexes stood as monuments of defeat.   
Interstate 475, the St. John Industrial Park—and later the concrete and steel ruins 
at Fisher Body 1 and Buick City—were the spatial and architectural manifestations of a 
principle that economist Joseph Schumpeter referred to in 1942 as the creative 
destruction of capitalism, the process through which new capitalist innovation destroys 
outdated, unprofitable economic structures.
167
  In Flint, the creative destruction of 
capitalism required more direction than the invisible hand of the market could provide.  
Indeed, the twenty-year process of creative destruction, which substituted a freeway and 
factories for ―slums‖ in St. John Street and Floral Park, depended on government 
intervention.  Throughout the long era of urban renewal, public policies actively shaped 
market conditions and guided the path of creative destruction through Floral Park, St. 
John, and, decades later, Buick City.  Ultimately, these interventions generated new 
spatial and racial configurations in Genesee County that signaled the arrival of the three 
most salient features of Flint‘s gathering urban crisis: deindustrialization, 
hypersegregation, and urban sprawl.  In Flint, urban renewal, ghetto formation and re-
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formation, suburbanization, and deindustrialization were all linked processes.  Interstate 
475, the Floral Park interchange, and the St. John Neighborhood Development Project 
helped to create a new political economy of Jim Crow.                  
Olive Beasley never shied away from fighting against such developments.  In 
1976, three years after she had charged Flint‘s municipal government with maintaining 
segregated ghettoes, Beasley authored another blistering memorandum regarding North 
End redevelopment.  Reflecting back on the creative destruction of St. John, Beasley 
wrote, ―The whole history of urban renewal since [the] 1949 Housing Act and its 
subsequent amendments has resulted in a history of black removal from low income 
substandard housing in areas that are eventually redeveloped for higher income 
residents.‖
168
  Throughout the St. John and Floral Park renewal processes, a powerful mix 
of heartfelt prejudices and public policies converged to limit the housing options of 
African Americans.  Locally implemented housing and urban development programs 
played a pivotal role in driving neighborhood deterioration, falling property values, and 
racial segregation in the Vehicle City and other northern metropolises.  For those reasons, 
historians should heed Beasley‘s words and consider abandoning the use of the term de 
facto segregation to describe the color line in cities such as Flint.  Instead, scholars might 
consider analyzing de facto segregation as a cultural artifact—a historically constructed 
discourse of power that has upheld false notions of northern racial innocence by 
obscuring the state‘s role in maintaining national forms of Jim Crow.
169
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White Flight and Beyond: 
Residential Jim Crow in the Era of Open Housing 
 
 
Racial integration proved to be an elusive goal for Mrs. Rosaline Brown, an African-
American mother who lived in northwest Flint.  On May 11, 1975, the Flint Journal 
published an article by Michael J. Riha detailing Brown‘s unsuccessful quest to find 
integrated housing in the Vehicle City.  In 1973, Brown, a homemaker, her two young 
daughters, Timeka and Danielle, and her husband Gary, a journeyman sheet metal 
worker, moved into a home on Greenlawn Drive in the nearly all-white Manley Village 
section of Flint‘s northwest side.  A passionate integrationist, Brown hoped that her move 
to Manley Village would break down racial barriers by demonstrating that white and 
black families could live together harmoniously.  More importantly, though, Brown 
embraced the move as an opportunity to teach her daughters how to appreciate diversity 
and interact effectively with white people.  ―I wanted to bring up my kids in an interracial 
setting,‖ she stated.  ―I had all of these beautiful ideas.  I felt that the only way to improve 
this world is to get to know people as persons.‖  Most of Rosaline Brown‘s white 
neighbors held a less sanguine view of integration, however.                    
 The Brown family‘s experiment in integrated living was brief.  Just after the 
Browns arrived in Manley Village, real estate agents began an aggressive, door-to-door 
campaign to convince white homeowners to sell their properties to black buyers.  ―They 
were knocking on doors, leaving their cards and telephoning,‖ Brown recalled.  A careful 
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observer of her neighborhood, Brown could not remember a single white buyer visiting 
homes for sale on her street.  By the spring of 1975, all but four of Brown‘s twenty-four 
white neighbors on Greenlawn Drive had sold their homes and moved away, many of 
them to segregated suburbs in the surrounding areas of Genesee County.  ―I could sit here 
and look up the street and see nothing but for sale signs,‖ Brown reported.  On several 
occasions, Brown‘s white neighbors informed her personally of their plans to sell.  Often 
during these awkward encounters, Brown sensed that her departing neighbors wanted her 
to say something to assuage their guilt for leaving.  Deeply hurt and insulted by the 
implications of white panic selling, Brown refused to placate her fleeing neighbors, 
however.  ―There‘s nothing I can say to ease your conscience,‖ she usually told them.  
―That‘s between you and your God.‖
1
 
 On May 15, 1975, four days after printing the article about the Browns, the Flint 
Journal ran a follow-up story about racial transitions in Manley Village.  This time, 
though, Riha approached the issue from the vantage point of Mrs. Patricia Montpas, a 
white mother of four who hoped to sell her house.  Montpas and her husband Michael, a 
GM factory worker, had lived in their Manley Village residence for ten years.  They had 
purchased their home in 1965 with a low mortgage interest rate of approximately 5 
percent.  Although by 1975 mortgage rates had nearly doubled to 9 percent, the 
Montpases still hoped to sell their home and relocate.  Like hundreds of white 
homeowners who departed Manley Village and other northwest Flint neighborhoods in 
the 1970s, Patricia Montpas cited increased crime, inferior schools, deteriorating home 
maintenance, and declining property values as her primary reasons for wanting to move.  
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―It‘s just starting to be overwhelming,‖ she claimed, ―where I‘m afraid to let my kids out 
of my sight.‖                     
 Leaving Manley Village was an expensive proposition for the Montpas family.  
By choosing to exchange a 5 percent home loan for a new mortgage at 9 percent interest, 
the Montpases paid a heavy premium for their decision to sell.  Yet the cost of flight was 
well worth it for the Montpases and thousands of other white families who left Flint 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  Echoing Rosaline Brown, Patricia Montpas claimed that 
unscrupulous realtors, white and black, fueled white panic selling and declining property 
values in Manley Village.  On one occasion, Montpas met with a black realtor who 
advised her to sell her house immediately.  ―If you don‘t want to lose everything, you‘d 
better get out as fast as you can,‖ she remembered the realtor stating.  ―You know, the 
only thing moving in here is black trash.‖  Montpas did not specifically mention Rosaline 
Brown during her interview with Riha.  Nevertheless, she went to great lengths to explain 
the very real fears about property values and public safety that drove her from Manley 
Village.  ―The number of rowdy, unsupervised youths walking the streets has increased. . 
. . It‘s not imaginary.‖
2
   
Like the Brown family and their white neighbors on Greenlawn Drive, the 
Montpases felt a strong personal compulsion to seek out a new neighborhood during the 
1970s.  By acquiring new homes, both Patricia Montpas and Rosaline Brown sought to 
purchase safety and security for their families, better schools for their children, and a 
wealth-creating investment in real estate.  Moreover, both families looked to the local 
housing market to provide access to the neighborhoods, schools, and lifestyles that they 
cherished.  Manley Village no longer felt like home to Patricia Montpas because, in her 
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view, residential integration brought higher crime rates and deteriorating property values.  
To Rosaline Brown, Manley Village was appealing precisely because of its racial 
diversity.  While the local housing market afforded the Montpases the option of 
relocating to a more racially homogeneous and perhaps safer neighborhood, the white 
exodus from Manley Village left Rosaline Brown wondering whether she could ever 
purchase residential integration in the Vehicle City.   
 For many scholars and social commentators, the narrative embedded within the 
Flint Journal series on Manley Village is a familiar saga of ―white flight.‖  In White 
Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism, historian Kevin Kruse contends 
that the mass migration of whites away from desegregated neighborhoods and schools 
constituted one of the most significant spatial and political migrations in American 
history.  ―Ultimately,‖ Kruse argues, ―the mass migration of whites from cities to the 
suburbs proved to be the most successful segregationist response to the moral demands of 
the civil rights movement. . . .‖
3
  Patricia Montpas denied selling her home solely because 
of the changing racial composition of Manley Village, yet she acknowledged that race 
had played a role in her decision to leave.  In northwest Flint, as in thousands of urban 
neighborhoods across the United States, racial fears, both real and imagined, figured 
prominently in the suburban migrations of white homeowners, especially among whites 
who lived in rapidly integrating neighborhoods such as Manley Village.   
White flight was a potent, very real phenomenon that had far-reaching 
consequences in cities such as Flint.  Racial panic selling helped to denude St. John and 
Floral Park of their white residents during the 1940s and 1950s.  In the 1960s, white 
flight hit Evergreen Valley and other neighborhoods in the city.  By the 1970s, whites in 
                                                 
3
 Kruse, White Flight, 8.  
486 
 
northwest Flint were fleeing their black neighbors in Manley Village and other newly 
integrated subdivisions.  Nevertheless, white flight—either as analytical framework, 
postwar metaphor, or academic shorthand—conceals as much as it reveals about quests to 
revitalize the city and, moreover, the broad constellation of public and private forces that 
drove both racial segregation and racial succession in the schools and neighborhoods of 
Flint and other urban centers.
4
   
During the 1960s and 1970s, urban renewers and neighborhood activists did not 
abandon the Vehicle City.  Instead, they proposed competing visions for a new and better 
Flint.  After the New Flint defeat, downtown retailers and GM executives worked to build 
a new urban freeway, an industrial park, and a commuter-oriented downtown.  In the 
neighborhoods, residents such as Rosaline Brown tried to stem white flight and stabilize 
property values.  Ultimately, those efforts failed to halt the federally financed tide of 
suburbanization that enabled Patricia Montpas and thousands of other white homeowners 
to leave the city.  Nevertheless, the history of downtown and neighborhood renewal 
campaigns highlight attempts to retake and remake urban space during an era of broad 
and complex demographic transformations.  The multiplicity of forces that combined to 
reorder Flint‘s mid- twentieth-century racial geography simply cannot fit under the 
narrow rubric of white flight or any other single causal narrative of urban spatial and 
demographic change.                   
Residential Jim Crow outlasted the major policy reforms of the civil rights and 
Great Society eras.  In Flint, the state of Michigan, and in the nation as a whole, 1968 was 
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a momentous year for the fair housing movement.  Two months after Flint‘s historic open 
housing vote, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which 
prohibited many forms of housing discrimination.  Shortly thereafter, Governor George 
Romney of Michigan followed suit, signing a tough open housing bill.  By the summer of 
1968, African Americans in Flint could cite three separate pieces of legislation that 
prohibited racial discrimination in housing.  The combined weight of local, state, and 
federal laws did little to combat the discriminatory practices of federal housing 
administrators, white homeowners, realtors, lenders, and builders, however.  During the 
1970s, as thousands of black families sought out new housing opportunities outside of the 
inner city, the color line shifted towards Flint‘s northwest and southeast sides and the 
inner-ring suburb of Beecher.  By limiting the housing options of black families from St. 
John and Floral Park, the city‘s urban renewal relocation and subsidized housing 
programs contributed to residential resegregation while helping to trigger white flight 
from racially transitional neighborhoods.  As well, mortgage redlining continued to play a 
role in maintaining Jim Crow in Flint‘s neighborhoods.  Although Washington legislators 
formally embraced open housing with the passage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, the FHA 
and the federal department of Housing and Urban Development continued to bolster 
residential segregation during the 1970s through the Section 235 and 236 subsidized 
housing programs.  The concentration of federally subsidized housing in northwest Flint 
and suburban Beecher undermined neighborhood stabilization campaigns and helped to 





Jim Crow in an Open City  
The city of Flint and other major American cities experienced rapid racial and 
demographic transitions during the long postwar era.  Between 1950 and 1970, as 
thousands of white families sought out new homes in suburban Genesee County, the 
city‘s white population declined from 149,100 to 138,065, a drop of 7.4 percent.  Over 
the same duration, Flint‘s black population increased by over 286 percent, rising from 
14,043 to 54,237.
5
  In the 1960s, the combined effects of racial segregation, black 
population increases, neighborhood overcrowding, and plans for urban renewal in St. 
John and Floral Park helped to fuel the movement for open housing in the Vehicle City.  
By the close of the decade, thousands of African Americans from St. John and Floral 
Park were testing the city‘s commitment to open housing by seeking out homes and 
apartments in newer, less crowded, and more integrated sections of the city.  With few 
exceptions, however, Flint‘s open occupancy law and the overlapping state and federal 
protections did little to combat discriminatory housing practices.       
 During the 1970s, neighborhood battles over race and real estate intensified in the 
Vehicle City.  As they had in the postwar era, local lenders, builders, white homeowners, 
and brokers from the Flint Board of Real Estate played an important role in directing the 
spatial growth of the city‘s black population through redlining, racial steering, 
blockbusting, and other illegal and quasi-legal practices.  Emanating primarily from St. 
John in the North End and Floral Park on the south side, the geographic expansion of the 
city‘s two primary black enclaves tended to occur in a rather linear, block-by-block, 
neighborhood-by-neighborhood progression.  On the south side of the city, migrants from 
Floral Park tended to move along an easterly axis towards Lapeer Park, Evergreen 
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Valley, and points eastward.  In the North End, where racial transitions were more rapid 
and widespread, black population expansion during the 1960s and 1970s followed a 
northwesterly route towards Flint Park, Civic Park, Manley Village, Forest Park, and 
other neighborhoods west of Saginaw and Detroit Streets.
6
  Although St. John was closest 
to the all-white northeast side neighborhoods that surrounded Kearsley and Whaley 
Parks, only a small number of black families relocated east of the Flint River in the 
1970s.  African-American home seekers expressed a preference for the west side 
primarily because of the east side‘s reputation for racial violence and the extreme 
opposition to integration that had emerged from Kearsley and Whaley Parks during the 
open housing fight of 1967-68.  As a rule, in fact, African Americans avoided seeking 
new housing east of the Flint River until the early 1980s.  As well, most Flint realtors 
actively upheld the Flint River color line by refusing to show northeast side properties to 
black buyers.  ―We have a hard-core real estate board in this town that is very powerful,‖ 
explained Leo Greene, director of Flint‘s Human Relations Commission.  ―It is hard to 
penetrate their policy of exclusion from certain white areas.‖
7
   
As in Evergreen Valley, racial transitions on the northwest and southeast sides 
during the late 1960s and 1970s typically began with the arrival of one or more black 
renters or homeowners.  Many of these black pioneers acquired their properties either 
through sympathetic brokers or via clandestine third-party purchases.  Upon occupying 
their new homes, black residents of previously all-white blocks often faced hostility from 
neighbors.  In May 1967, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Bell, an African-American couple with 
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several children, purchased a home at 3521 Sterling Street in a nearly all-white northwest 
side neighborhood close to Forest Park.  The Bells were the second black family to 
acquire property on Sterling Street, following Mr. and Mrs. Roosevelt Powell.  Shortly 
after moving into their home, the Powells, who described their white neighbors as 
―totally aloof,‖ discovered that vandals had tied their front door shut and piled discarded 
Christmas trees on their front lawn.  Opponents of integration intensified their campaign 
upon learning of the Bell family‘s purchase.  On May 14, 1967, unidentified vandals 
spread toilet paper around the lawn and smeared butter, mustard, catsup, eggs, red 
pepper, and shaving cream over the windows and doors of the Bells‘ new home.  Such 
acts of violence and vandalism were commonplace in Flint during the civil rights era.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, Olive Beasley and other members of the Michigan Civil 
Rights Commission fielded scores of complaints against similar forms of racial 
harassment.
8
    
In most cases, acts of racial violence and vandalism directed against black 
homeowners quickly subsided.  Rather than fight their new neighbors, most white 
homeowners on integrated blocks, at least for a time, worked to defend their property 
values and the stability of their neighborhoods while adopting a ―wait-and-see‖ attitude 
toward their plans.  In January 1968, just a few weeks prior to the open housing 
referendum, Flint Journal reporter Allan Wilhelm described the anxiety felt by white 
homeowners on Flint‘s northwest side as they watched and waited for their 
neighborhoods to change:  
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Watching moves of Negro families into previously all-white 
neighborhoods is akin to being a spectator at a gigantic human chess 
game.  Earlier moves are studied with an eye to predicting the next. . . . 
For an increasing number of white families, the day is arriving when it is 
no longer a matter of watching and waiting in apprehension.  There‘s a 
Negro on the block. 
   
―I‘m staying,‖ a white homeowner on the northwest side told Wilhelm, ―but I sure don‘t 
want to be the last white family on the block.‖
9
 
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, activists and black homeowners on the 
northwest side and in other recently desegregated neighborhoods worked to dispel the 
notion that integration caused neighborhood deterioration and declining property 
values.
10
  On many occasions, white homeowners on integrated blocks quickly 
discovered that their new black neighbors were genuinely committed to maintaining their 
properties.  In the winter of 1968, a white homeowner who lived near Forest Park 
described some of the home improvements a new black neighbor of his had undertaken: 
―This guy had someone come in and prune the bushes and clean the lawn.  He built a new 
garage and put up aluminum siding.  It‘s almost a showcase.‖  Confirming that this was 
not an isolated case, the white resident revealed, ―This has happened more than once in 
our area.‖
11
  By repairing roofs, building new garages, seeding lawns, and planting 
flowers, many black homeowners in northwest Flint and other contested areas of the city 
sought to increase their property values and maintain the excellent quality of life that had 
initially attracted them to their new neighborhoods.  For their part, most white 
homeowners did not immediately flee desegregated areas, maintaining a strong 
preference for remaining in their homes.  According to a 1973 study conducted by Flint‘s 
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Human Relations Commission, for instance, more than 85 percent of the city‘s 
homeowners expressed a desire to remain in their present homes.
12
   
Though integration often provoked hostility and misunderstandings, not all white 
families actively opposed residential desegregation.  In some instances, white families 
even welcomed their new black neighbors.  In 1972, the Flint Journal published a series 
of articles on whites and blacks who coexisted peacefully.  In one such article, entitled 
―Harmony Street,‖ Edith Sellars described the interracial experiences of Robert Craig and 
his family, who lived on an integrated south side block on East Seventh Street.  
According to Robert Craig‘s son Mark, who acknowledged that desegregation at times 
brought conflict, living in an integrated neighborhood was both exciting and enriching: 
―There‘s always something to do – sports, parties, fights, dances – lump it all together 
into one big ball of fun.  They call me honkey and I call them nigger, but they know I‘m 
their blue-eyed soul brother.‖
13
  In another article on race relations, Sellars featured Mr. 
and Mrs. Michael DeVantier, a white couple who had specifically sought out housing in 
an integrated northwest side neighborhood near North Saginaw Street.  Although the 
DeVantiers—who had adopted a black child—found no companies willing to sell them a 
homeowner‘s insurance policy and struggled to afford their expensive theft insurance 
premiums, they nonetheless maintained an abiding faith in the cause of racial integration.  
―We would never live in an all-white neighborhood,‖ Mrs. DeVantier promised.
14
  
During the late 1960s and 1970s, thousands of Flint families like the DeVantiers and the 
Craigs, either by choice or through circumstance, found themselves living in integrated 
neighborhoods, and many of them vowed to remain in their homes in spite of changing 
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racial demographics.  Old attitudes and perceptions about race and property did not die 
easily, however.  In spite of their best efforts, most black renters and homeowners in 
newly desegregated neighborhoods, even those who had upgraded their properties, found 
it difficult to combat the notion that integration triggered higher crime rates, declining 
schools, and deteriorating property values.  By the early 1970s, those fears, whether real 
or imagined, had erupted into widespread white panic selling on the city‘s northwest side.                                    
 Blockbusting and white panic selling hit the neighborhoods of northwest Flint 
harder than any other section of the city.  As they had in Evergreen Valley, realtors 
played a prominent role in spurring racial transitions there.  During the 1960s, 
desegregation triggered a sustained and especially intense blockbusting campaign in 
northwest Flint that reached as far west as DuPont Street and the Flint Park 
neighborhood.  By the close of the decade, African Americans, once prohibited from 
living west of Saginaw Street, comprised a majority in many sections of Flint Park.  
Noted one white resident who moved away from Flint Park in 1972, ―I guess if I had to 
call it anything I‘d say it felt like we were invaded.‖
15
  Cognizant of the speed with which 
Flint Park transitioned to a black majority, white homeowners living to the north and 
west of that area vowed to fight blockbusting if and when it arrived in their 
neighborhoods.  In the spring of 1973, that fight erupted when blockbusting realtors 
began targeting homes near Flint‘s suburban borders with Mt. Morris and Flint 
Townships. 
 During the spring of 1973, blockbusting realtors aggressively targeted white 
homeowners in the neighborhoods bordering Flint Park.  On March 26, Leo Macksood, a 
white homeowner and future school board member who lived at 1909 West Genesee 
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Street near the city‘s western border, attended a meeting of the recently renamed Flint 
City Council to protest the actions of local realtors.  Macksood told council members that 
realtors had contacted him at least four times in the past ten days to ask if he wanted to 
sell his home.  Assuring city council members that this activity was widespread, 
Macksood said, ―I could have brought the whole neighborhood and they would have said 
the same thing.‖  At least three of Macksood‘s neighbors quickly put their homes up for 
sale in response to the March blockbusting campaign.  Acknowledging that the new for 
sale signs had caused him to consider selling his own house, Macksood revealed, ―You 
get the feeling that somebody knows something you don‘t, and begin to think you better 
sell.‖  During the March 16 council meeting, Macksood‘s testimony received an 
important endorsement from Joseph Conroy, one of only a small number of local realtors 
committed to open housing.  Conroy, who lived just a mile away from Macksood, 
confirmed that blockbusting realtors had targeted his neighborhood as well and were 
using racial appeals to ―create turmoil‖ on the northwest side.
16
  A week after Macksood 
and Conroy testified, Robert W. Busha, the executive vice president of the Flint Board of 
Real Estate, visited city hall to rebut the charges of blockbusting.  According to Busha, 
who acknowledged receiving several complaints of blockbusting, the intense real estate 
activity on the northwest side was neither illegal nor a violation of the board‘s code of 
ethics.  It was perfectly legal, Busha explained to council members, for realtors to call 
homeowners, blanket neighborhoods with leaflets, and for brokers to go door-to-door 
soliciting home sales.  Moreover, Busha denied that member realtors had made racial 
appeals during their encounters with white homeowners on the northwest side.  Any 
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panic selling that was occurring on the northwest side, Busha claimed, resulted solely 
from the unprovoked racial fears of white homeowners.
17
 
 Busha‘s testimony did not sway white residents from the northwest side.  During 
the spring and summer of 1973, homeowners organized dozens of block clubs and 
neighborhood associations to stem the tide of panic selling while simultaneously working 
on legislation designed to halt blockbusting.  In June, property owners from the northwest 
side asked the Flint City Council to pass legislation banning nearly all real estate signs 
from single-family homes.  The proposed legislation, modeled after a similar ban enacted 
in the city of Saginaw, immediately provoked criticism from both opponents and 
supporters of open occupancy.  Speaking on behalf of realtors and property owners, 
Busha denounced the bill as a violation of free enterprise and the free speech rights of 
homeowners and real estate brokers.  In addition, Busha joined Olive Beasley and other 
civil rights activists in claiming that the proposed ban on signs would make it easier for 
realtors and homeowners to discriminate against black buyers.  ―Without the safeguard of 
a ‗for sale‘ sign,‖ Busha argued, ―the unscrupulous real estate sales person can deny the 
prospective minority buyer the opportunity to inspect and purchase in any 
neighborhood.‖  Sensing the potentially negative political and legal ramifications of the 
proposed ban, city council members voted to table the proposed bill on June 19.
18
                 
 The city council‘s decision to table the sign ordinance did not deter anxious 
homeowners on the northwest side.  Following the defeat, Macksood, Conroy, and other 
homeowner activists returned to their neighborhoods to resume the grassroots campaigns 
against blockbusting and white panic selling.  Their efforts centered on the organization 
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of block clubs and neighborhood associations.  During the late 1960s and 1970s, 
neighborhood activists in the city of Flint organized approximately 250 active block 
clubs.
19
  Though they proliferated throughout the city, block clubs were most common in 
the racially transitional neighborhoods of Flint‘s north and northwest sides.  Pitting 
―those who care against those who don‘t,‖ the Flint Journal claimed, block clubs 
engaged in hundreds of neighborhood improvement projects.  Among their many 
campaigns, neighborhood associations and block clubs organized clean-up drives, home 
repair projects, and community watch patrols.
20
  As diverse as the neighborhoods and 
residents they served, the agendas of block clubs reflected the grassroots concerns of 
residents.  Some groups such as the Nosy Neighbors Block Club, which operated in the 
nearly all-white Glendale Hills neighborhood on Flint‘s west side, focused almost 
exclusively on crime and neighborhood watch activities.
21
  Other groups, however, 
engaged in more explicitly political activities by organizing protests against slum lords, 
pressing city officials to improve municipal services, and challenging builders to erect 
safer homes.  In 1972, for instance, black homeowners from Whittlesey Street on the 
city‘s south side organized a block club to protest against a building contractor who was 
constructing a substandard FHA-insured home.
22
  Equally political, the North Cook 
Block Club, which began serving north side residents in 1972, negotiated with 
shopkeepers for lower prices, pressed city council members to allocate rehabilitation 
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funds for dilapidated homes, and converted an abandoned home into a community 
center.
23
   
 Block club activists on the northwest side of the city focused most of their 
energies on combating blockbusting and white flight.  By 1976, white panic selling had 
swept across huge swaths of northwest Flint and was approaching the Anderson School 
neighborhood on the city‘s far western edge.  Like their counterparts in Flint Park and 
other racially transitional neighborhoods, residents of the Anderson School area 
identified scores of examples of blockbusting that had piqued the racial fears of white 
homeowners.  Reporting on one episode, homeowner activist Thomas Kayser informed 
newspaper reporters that a realtor, after selling a home to a black buyer, sent notes to 
neighbors asking them to welcome the new resident.  Kayser told journalists that the note 
―also requested that if anyone thought of selling now or in the future, to please contact 
the real estate agent.‖  In response to such claims of blockbusting, residents from the 
Anderson School district waged an active campaign to stabilize the neighborhood.  In 
November 1976, Kayser and other concerned residents announced a campaign to place 
signs on front doors reading, ―We‘re Staying.‖
24
  Designed to assuage the fears of white 
homeowners and instill neighborhood pride, the signs went up in front of hundreds of 
homes on the northwest side in 1976 and 1977.  Over time, however, white homeowners 
replaced those signs with the for sale signs which they had previously denounced.         
 Like the earlier efforts of homeowners in Evergreen Valley, the 1970s campaigns 
for racial stability on the northwest side and in other transitional neighborhoods in the 
city did not succeed.  Between 1970 and 1980, Flint‘s white population declined sharply, 
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from 138,065 to 89,470, while the city‘s black population increased from 54,237 to 
66,164.  By the close of the decade, white flight and black population increases had 
combined to produce a city that was over 40 percent African American.
25
  On the 
northwest and southeast sides, areas that saw the largest black population increases, the 
demographic transformations were dramatic.  Just between 1970 and 1975, the black 
population in census tract forty-two, which included the city‘s far northwest corner, 
increased from 13 to 71 percent.  Over the same period, the black population of tract two 
on the city‘s northern border with Mt. Morris Township increased from 48 to 81 percent.  
Across the northwest side of the city, virtually every neighborhood posted similar figures.  
On Flint‘s southeast side, in the neighborhoods stretching east from Floral Park, white 
flight was equally intense.  In tract forty-five, for instance, the African-American 
proportion of the population increased from 33 to 78 percent between 1970 and 1975.
26
  
Desperate to escape their changing neighborhoods, many white homeowners moved 
away before they could sell their houses, leaving behind thousands of empty structures.  
By 1979, nearly 10 percent of Flint homes were unoccupied.  In some areas of the 
northwest side, vacancy rates surpassed 20 percent.
27
  To Jack Litzenberg, the director of 
community development programs in the city of Flint, it seemed as though whites had 
simply abandoned the city: ―While nearly everyone who is able flees the city, we are left 
with the poor, the elderly, blacks, and other minorities.  We have 85 percent of the 
assisted housing in the county within Flint.  We are your Ellis Island.  We have been 
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  During the course of the decade, dozens of neighborhoods once off limits 
to African Americans shifted from segregation to resegregation with only limited periods 
of racial integration.  The for sale signs, empty homes, boarded-up stores, and waist-high 
lawns that departing whites left behind were the semiotic manifestations of what was 
perhaps the most significant social movement and spatial migration in the city‘s history.       
The process of white flight, which claimed nearly all of Rosaline Brown‘s 
neighbors in Manley Village, angered homeowners and renters on both sides of the color 
line.  As she looked out at the for sale signs that sprouted all around her home, Brown felt 
insulted that so many neighbors feared her presence.  Equally upset, many whites in 
racially transitional neighborhoods were angry at what seemed to them like an invasion 
of African-American home seekers.  In July 1968, an anonymous white author composed 
a letter to Flint NAACP President Edgar Holt regarding the large number of black 
families seeking housing on the northwest side.  ―Why is it there is so much talk about 
the G[h]etto?‖ the author asked.   
Still the Colored people make it a point to flock into one neighborhood.  
They have a right to go any where they please – I am white and have no 
objection to a Colored neighbor (some of my nicest friends are Colored) 
but I do not like the idea of living in a ‗G[h]etto.‘  Must they all live in the 
same block?
29
   
 
Clearly frustrated, the letter writer wondered why African Americans, in a city covered 
by so many fair housing statutes, continued to segregate themselves by race.   
With neither a name nor a return address posted on the July correspondence, Holt 
never replied to the letter.  But had he decided to do so, he may have delved into the long, 
complex history of the color line in twentieth-century Flint.  Holt could have pointed to 
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the racially restrictive covenants that once excluded African Americans from white 
neighborhoods; the discriminatory practices of builders, lenders, realtors, and white 
homeowners that limited choices for black home seekers; the public policies that helped 
to build ghettoes in St. John and Floral Park; or the racial violence that helped to enforce 
the color line during the pre- and post-World War II eras.  The NAACP official might 
also have reminded the letter writer that federal housing policies mandated residential 
segregation during the middle decades of the twentieth century.  Holt‘s imaginary reply 
need not have been entirely historical, however.  Indeed, Holt could have pointed out that 
both private discrimination and state-sanctioned forms of residential segregation persisted 
even after the passage of open occupancy ordinances.  As much as the individual 
preferences of black home seekers, the discriminatory policies and practices of white 
homeowners, realtors, lenders, builders, and government housing administrators reduced 
the housing options of African Americans until well into the post-civil rights era.       
 Historical monographs focusing on housing discrimination in postwar America 
tend to begin in the mid-1930s, usually with the 1934 establishment of the Federal 
Housing Administration, and end at some point in the 1960s, often with the urban riots of 
the mid-1960s or the passage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act.
30
  Those chronological 
bookends have provided a useful framework for understanding the public-private 
partnerships that shaped and re-shaped the residential color line after World War II.  
However, even a cursory examination of evidence from Flint suggests the need to re-
think the standard chronological frame used to narrate the history of postwar housing 
discrimination.  By 1968, a combination of federal, state, and local laws had prohibited 
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most forms of housing discrimination in Flint.  In spite of such legal protections, 
however, the practices of redlining, blockbusting, and racial steering continued into the 
1970s, 1980s, and beyond.  As well, federal housing administrators who served the Flint 
region continued to orchestrate housing segregation until well into the 1970s.  By taking 
a longer historical view, it becomes possible to understand why, in many instances, white 
flight and racial resegregation did not reach their peak until the 1970s. 
 In the spring of 1976, at around the same time that west side homeowner‘s were 
planning their ―We‘re Staying‖ campaign against blockbusting, the Flint City Council 
held several hearings on mortgage redlining.  On April 14, city council members heard 
testimony from local lenders and insurers who verified, ―Conventional or privately 
insured loans are not readily available in many areas of Flint.‖  According to Dennis S. 
Simms, a representative of Guardian Mortgage Company, by the mid-1970s, the city 
contained only a handful of ―prime‖ residential areas—all of which were all white or 
nearly so—where homebuyers could obtain conventional bank mortgages.  The rest of 
the city‘s neighborhoods, labeled ―declining‖ by Simms and other local lenders, were 
ineligible for conventional loans.  Explaining these restrictive policies, James B. Murray, 
president of Mid-Michigan Mortgage Investment Company, informed council members 
that banks often suffered financial losses when borrowers defaulted on loans in declining 
areas.  ―In a declining area,‖ Murray revealed, ―it may well be impossible to get enough 
[in sale prices] for a property to cover the loan.  Therefore, the bank or lending agency 
takes the loss.‖  Local lenders also informed council members that the rules governing 
the secondary mortgage market further contributed to redlining in the city of Flint.  
Because officers from the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Mortgage 
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Guarantee Investment Corporation, and other buyers on the secondary mortgage market 
were reluctant to purchase mortgages on homes in racially unstable or declining areas, 
several witnesses testified, lenders were discouraged from issuing loans in all but the 
most exclusive of the city‘s neighborhoods.  In virtually every instance, those highly 
rated neighborhoods also coincided with the sections of the city where African 
Americans were least numerous.
31
                
 Ten days after holding its first hearings on redlining, the Flint City Council 
deliberated on the subject once again.  On April 26, council members heard from open 
housing activists and community members who had firsthand experience with redlining.  
Morris Branch informed the council that Citizens Commercial and Savings Bank, a Flint-
based firm, had rejected his application for a loan to purchase property at 1364 St. John 
Street.  The bank denied the $4,000 loan because the building received a low appraisal 
value of $7,000, due primarily to its location in a declining North End neighborhood.  
Even though the property appraised for a higher amount than Branch had requested in his 
loan application, the bank denied the mortgage because of its location.  In support of 
Branch‘s testimony, the Flint Urban League‘s executive director Melvyn Brannon 
charged that loan officers judged loan applications based largely upon the neighborhoods 
in which properties were located.  If appraisers found poor schools, abandoned homes, a 
―change in user group,‖ or poor city services in a neighborhood, then they lowered the 
appraisal value of properties in the vicinity.  Because many local banks had established a 
$15,000 minimum for mortgages, whole sections of the city with low property values 
were effectively excluded from conventional home financing.  Elton Smith, another 
witness who testified during the April hearings, informed council members that Citizens 
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Bank had denied a mortgage to a person who sought to purchase his home at 3580 Rue 
Foret because the home was within six blocks of a boarded-up property.  The 
combination of low appraisal values for structures in declining neighborhoods and 
mortgage minimums, Brannon and others asserted, played a decisive role in lenders‘ 
decisions to reject loan applications for properties in both integrated and predominantly 
African-American neighborhoods.
32
      
Following the spring hearings, Flint Mayor James W. Rutherford appointed a 
special task force to study mortgage redlining.  Released in May 1977 after an eight-
month investigation, the task force‘s report found that redlining still plagued inner-city 
neighborhoods in Flint.  Task force members reviewed bank records for 1975 and found 
that local lending institutions issued 2,195 mortgages during the year, only 252 of which 
were for properties in the city of Flint.  The remaining 1,943 mortgages were for 
properties in suburban Genesee County.  Of the $45.1 million that local banks loaned for 
properties in 1975, only 10 percent benefited purchasers in the city.  ―After careful 
analysis of individual testimony and emperical [sic] evidence,‖ the report stated, ―the 
Task Force is convinced that mortgage disinvestment is occurring in Flint.‖  Redlining 
and bank divestment were especially intense in the North End and other predominantly 
African-American sections of the city.  Beyond rewarding white suburban buyers over 
African Americans living in the city, mortgage redlining also produced a ripple effect that 
shaped broader patterns of divestment from the inner city.  During their investigation, 
task force members spoke with independent insurance agents operating in the city, who 
confirmed that at least half of the insurance firms in Flint refused to underwrite homes in 
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  ―When redlining begins, insurance becomes difficult to obtain and 
neighborhood businesses begin to leave,‖ an Urban League report stated.  ―Absentee 
landlords, apathetic to begin with, cannot obtain home improvement loans and thus let 
their houses fall into disrepair and ruin.‖
34
  Redlining, the task force concluded, was only 
one component in a broader constellation of forces that sustained racial segregation and 
urban divestment.                            
 
Bringing Back the State:  
Federal Policies and Segregated Housing in the Post-Civil Rights Era  
 
Members of the mayor‘s redlining and disinvestment task force unequivocally confirmed 
that racial discrimination in the private housing market persisted into the 1970s.  Among 
open housing activists, however, the task force‘s report provoked a broader discussion on 
the remaining barriers to desegregation and housing equity in the Vehicle City.  On 
March 9, 1977, state civil rights officer Olive Beasley criticized members of the mayor‘s 
task force for focusing too narrowly on redlining and other forms of lending 
discrimination.  ―My concern about the whole redlining issue,‖ Beasley wrote,  
is that the focus is too narrow and relates only to practices of banks and 
other financial institutions which albeit they are primary factors represent 
only part of the problem that has to be addressed.  Unless we look at the 
picture of total disinvestment in neighborhoods by both the public and 
private sectors we are addressing only part of the problem.   
 
Housing discrimination, racial segregation, white flight, and divestment from inner-city 
neighborhoods stemmed not just from the practices of private corporations, Beasley 
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argued, but also from the housing and neighborhood development programs implemented 
by federal and local officials.
35
       
 Beasley was correct.  Dating back to the mid-1930s, redlining was only one 
among a host of private and state-sanctioned housing policies that upheld the residential 
color line in metropolitan areas.  State-sanctioned housing segregation in the Flint area 
did not end in 1968 with the passage of local, state, and federal open housing laws.  Nor 
did it cease in 1970, when former Michigan governor and Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development George Romney pledged to combat FHA-sponsored racial 
segregation through the suburbanization of federally subsidized housing units.
36
  Though 
Beasley did not mention any specific government programs in her letter, memories of the 
1970s clashes over Section 235 and 236 housing in Flint surely informed her critique of 
the mayor‘s task force.        
 The architects of Sections 235 and 236 of the 1968 Housing and Urban 
Development Act hoped to restore racial and spatial equity to federally sponsored 
housing initiatives.  The Section 236 program provided mortgage interest subsidies to 
property owners, builders, and developers who offered affordable rental housing to 
qualified low-income tenants.  Under Section 235, the United States Congress authorized 
the expenditure of over $5 billion to spur the development of nearly two million new and 
rehabilitated housing units for purchase by poor families.  Specifically, Section 235 
offered mortgage insurance to private lenders and developers who either rehabilitated 
existing homes or constructed new low-cost homes to sell to poor buyers.  In addition, the 
program helped to defray the housing expenses of poor families by providing direct 
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mortgage subsidy payments to lenders who backed low-cost housing.  Supporters of the 
235 and 236 programs sought to combat segregation and assure equity in the private 
housing industry by subsidizing home ownership and affordable rental housing for 
African Americans and the poor and by inducing lenders and builders to develop low-
cost housing in both central cities and suburban areas.
37
  The goal of these massive 
programs was to open up new housing opportunities for the poor throughout metropolitan 
areas.               
 In Genesee County, the Section 235 and 236 programs did not live up to the high 
expectations of their framers.  For private builders and lenders, Sections 235 and 236 
arrived at an especially opportune time when rising interest rates and tightening mortgage 
markets had combined to depress new home construction.
38
  Eager to acquire any 
business, local builders began taking advantage of the new federal subsidies almost 
immediately, especially those offered under the Section 235 program.  Between 1968 and 
1970, builders erected approximately 1,250 Section 235 homes in the Flint area.  By 
1974, nearly fifteen hundred poor and working-class families in Genesee County had 
acquired Section 235 homes, most of them of new construction.
39
  With freeway 
construction and urban renewal initiatives in Floral Park and St. John claiming thousands 
of affordable housing units in the inner city, municipal officials and members of the Flint 
Housing Commission welcomed the addition of new low-cost homes and apartment 
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rentals for the poor.  Members of the FHC hoped that the Section 235 program would 
provide a path to home ownership for poor renters and, in the process, reduce long 
waiting lists for public housing.  The FHC did not maintain a comprehensive record of 
move-outs, but available evidence nonetheless suggests that many public housing tenants 
took advantage of the Section 235 and 236 programs.  Just during 1971, for instance, 
seventy-two families moved out of the Atherton East public housing complex into new 
Section 235 homes.  Countywide, according to a 1974 study, one in four occupants of 
Section 235 housing had lived in public housing prior to acquiring their new homes.
40
   
Many public housing tenants initially embraced the Section 235 program, hoping 
that it would provide an opportunity for a fresh start in a new, trouble-free home.  For 
hundreds of families, quite the opposite occurred, however.  From the outset, critics of 
the Section 235 program assailed federal officials and participating developers for their 
failure to adhere to local building codes, zoning regulations, and architectural standards.  
In March 1970, city commissioners Floyd McCree and Fred Tucker claimed that builders 
were erecting 235 homes on lots smaller than the city-mandated minimum of five 
thousand square feet.
41
  Other critics charged builders with failing to adhere to the 
architectural guidelines mandated by the Section 235 program.  The legislation required 
builders to avoid monotony by constructing homes of varying styles, but many builders 
simply ignored the rule.  In one especially egregious instance, a Section 235 builder in 
suburban Flint constructed over two dozen virtually identical homes on a single street.
42
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The refusal of builders to comply with local building and zoning regulations provoked 
widespread anger among city and suburban legislators, many of whom charged that the 
Section 235 program was operating in open violation of local housing laws.  By far, 
however, the largest number of complaints regarding the Section 235 program came from 
those who occupied the new homes and their surrounding neighbors. 
 Virtually all of the purchasers of Section 235 housing in Genesee County found 
flaws, many of them major, in their new homes.  In May 1970, city commissioner 
Karbowski complained about newly constructed 235 homes in the racially transitional 
Evergreen Valley neighborhood.  Claiming that developers there were constructing 
―$6,000 homes and charging $19,000 for them,‖ Karbowski challenged federal officials 
to visit his ward ―to see what type of junk is being built.‖
43
  Two months later, city 
commissioners received specific complaints about a 235 home at 2006 Whittlesey Street 
in Evergreen Valley.  The home, according to Karbowski and others who had inspected 
it, had many flaws including insufficient egress routes, poor windows, faulty and unsafe 
wiring, and two major leaks.  The construction was so poor, Karbowski claimed, ―An 
eight-year old child could knock out the sanitary pipes in the bathroom.‖
44
  On July 23, 
Flint Urban League member Willie Wheaton delivered a lengthy complaint to the city 
commission regarding fourteen newly constructed 235 homes on Chambers Street near 
Evergreen Valley.  According to Wheaton, who had interviewed the homeowners, several 
of the fourteen homes had major leaks and faulty driveways.  Hoping to take advantage 
of the one-year warranties that covered all Section 235 homes, residents of Chambers 
Street complained to the builder, but they received no response.  Part of the problem, 
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Wheaton reported, stemmed from the fact that Citizens Bank and other local lenders who 
issued mortgages on Section 235 homes did not require inspections prior to the 
occupancy of newly built units.
45
  The Section 235 program got its name, many critics 
joked, because the homes, new or not, were worth only $235.
46
  
 Federal audits and local investigations supported the claims made by critics of the 
Section 235 program in Flint.  In December 1971, HUD officials released the results of a 
national audit of Section 235 housing.  Based upon a detailed survey of homes in fifty-
two sample cities, the federal audit revealed that 25 percent of newly constructed Section 
235 units and 34.5 percent of existing units covered under the program suffered from 
faulty construction.  To the great dismay of Secretary Romney and other proponents of 
the program, HUD surveyors discovered overhead lights without light switches, cracked 
walls, inoperable heating units, loose windows, roof leaks, sagging ceilings, and a host of 
additional problems—some minor, others severe—in both existing and newly constructed 
235 homes.  ―We concluded,‖ the auditors wrote, ―that many of these [Section 235] 
houses contained easily observable but unreported deficiencies that seriously affected 
safety, health, and/or livability.‖
47
                                                                  
  A 1974 survey of subsidized housing sponsored by the Genesee County 
Metropolitan Planning Commission (GCMPC) painted an even bleaker portrait of the 
Section 235 program.  According to the 1974 study, 91 percent of the Section 235 
homeowners in Genesee County complained of problems with their homes.  Of the 133 
homeowners surveyed for the report, 83 percent reported construction-related defects 
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while two-thirds of the respondents cited plumbing problems.  In spite of the widespread 
complaints, however, the study found that builders had repaired the homes of only 19 
percent of the owners surveyed.  Forced to absorb the repair costs themselves, many 
owners of Section 235 homes succumbed to bankruptcy and lost their homes to 
foreclosure during the economic recessions of the 1970s.  Between 1969 and 1973, 
foreclosure rates in the county increased by 184 percent, due in part to the rash of 
mortgage defaults from Section 235 homeowners.  By March 1974, more than one in four 
of the Section 235 homeowners in Genesee County had ceased making payments on their 
homes.
48
                     
 The Section 235 experiment ended badly for hundreds of Genesee County 
families.  After exhausting their meager savings, many of the homeowners defaulted on 
their payments and returned to the public housing complexes they had only recently left.  
In 1973, under heavy criticism from municipal officials and homeowners across the 
nation, HUD suspended the controversial program.  Bitterness over the 235 program 
lingered long after its demise, however.  For thousands of its participants nationwide, the 
Section 235 program was a reminder that the federal government had still not committed 
itself to providing adequate housing for the poor.  Even more inflammatory, however, 
were the charges that the Section 235 program marked yet another example of 
government-subsidized racial segregation.           
Opponents of Section 235 housing in Genesee County maintained that the 
program intensified both white flight and racial resegregation.  In particular, critics 
argued that lax federal oversight allowed builders to concentrate 235 homes in already 
segregated black neighborhoods and in racially transitional areas of Flint and its 
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innermost suburbs.  The Genesee County Metropolitan Planning Commission‘s 1974 
survey of subsidized housing found that 875 of the 1,387 Section 235 dwelling units in 
the county were located in the city of Flint.  Within the city, Section 235 homes were 
heavily concentrated in the racially transitional neighborhoods of the northwest and 
southeast sides.  The construction of federally subsidized housing in racially transitional 
neighborhoods only fueled white panic selling and the suburban migration of white 
homeowners.  Describing the situation in Flint Park and other northwest side 
neighborhoods, white homeowner Ben Wisniewski, an employee of the city‘s 
Department of Community Development, blamed the 235 homes for intensifying white 
panic selling:  
They [Section 235 homes] were junk.  The houses were cheap and put up 
quickly.  They didn‘t look as nice as the other houses and then you had 
people moving in that weren‘t prepared to own their own home.  They 
didn‘t have the resources to keep them up. . . . Within a very short time, 
the properties fell into disrepair.  The grass wasn‘t cut, things like the 
screen doors would get broke[n] and just left that way. . . . If you lived 
next door to that you moved out.   
 
―I don‘t think it was totally a black-white thing,‖ added Bill Haley, a white resident of 
Flint Park.  ―For some people, sure.  But a lot of people were just worried about their 
investment.‖
49
  Hundreds of homeowners in Flint Park, Evergreen Valley, and other 
transitional neighborhoods responded to plans for 235 housing just as they had to 
blockbusting and racial steering: by fighting to protect their investments.  When that 
failed to stop the influx of subsidized housing, they placed their homes for sale and 
moved away.  
The framers of Section 235 intended for the program to disperse subsidized 
housing units throughout metropolitan areas.  In support of that aim, officials from the 
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FHA and HUD adopted an ―informal guideline‖ to secure ―widespread geographical 
distribution of subsidized housing units‖ in metropolitan areas such as Genesee County.
50
  
As with the construction standards and architectural guidelines, however, federal officials 
failed to enforce the geographic distribution aims of the Section 235 program.  By an 
overwhelming margin, the city of Flint received the largest portion of Section 235 homes 
in Genesee County.  Nearly two-thirds of the county‘s 1,387 Section 235 units were 
inside the city.  The remaining 512 units were located in suburban Genesee County, but 
they too were concentrated in small geographic clusters.  Of the 512 subsidized units in 
Flint‘s suburbs, 67 percent were located just across the city‘s northern border in Mt. 
Morris and Genesee Townships.  Within Mt. Morris and Genesee Townships, virtually all 
of the Section 235 units were in the racially integrated Beecher Metropolitan District, a 
small, unincorporated, working-class community that occupied five square miles of land 
just beyond Flint‘s northern city limits.  As in northwest Flint, the concentration of 
Section 235 homes in Beecher triggered angry conflicts, blockbusting campaigns, and 
widespread white panic selling that quickly transformed the racial geography of the 
inner-ring suburb.  Unlike the neighborhood battles that unfolded simultaneously within 
the city, however, the 1970s battles over the desegregation of Beecher gained attention 
from federal officials in Washington and media outlets throughout the nation.     
 
―A Chunk of Transplanted City‖: Beecher and the Suburbanization of the Color Line              
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, tiny Beecher, Michigan, became a national focal 
point in the debate over race and residence in suburban America.  Bounded by Carpenter 
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Road, Dort Highway, Stanley Road, and Clio Road, Beecher was (and remains) an 
unincorporated metropolitan utilities and school district lying just to the north of Flint‘s 
city limits—an urban-suburban ―no man‘s land‖ superimposed on portions of Mt. Morris 
and Genesee Townships.  Prior to the construction of Section 235 and 236 units, Beecher 
was one of the only integrated communities in suburban Flint.  Among its 25,000 mostly 
working-class residents were approximately 7,500 African Americans and 17,500 whites, 
many of whom worked at the nearby GM Ternstedt division plant.  Virtually 
indistinguishable from the racially transitional northwest Flint neighborhoods that formed 
its southern border, the Beecher district, in the words of Flint Journal reporter Gene 
Merzejewski, was neither city nor suburb, but rather ―a chunk of transplanted city‖ in the 
otherwise lily-white Genesee County suburbs.
51
  Like northwest Flint, Beecher received 
thousands of new black residents during the 1960s and early 1970s, many of them 
arriving from public housing projects and the partially demolished St. John and Floral 
Park neighborhoods in the city.  Hundreds of Beecher‘s black migrants moved into 
Section 235 and 236 homes and apartments, which first sprouted in Beecher in the late 
1960s.  In defiance of the federal government‘s informal guidelines on geographic 
distribution, local FHA representative Thomas Hutchinson initially contracted with 
builders to construct 716 subsidized homes and apartment units in Beecher, more than he 
allocated to all other Flint suburbs combined.  For the nearly all-white suburb of Swartz 
Creek, by comparison, Hutchinson approved only six subsidized units.  Moreover, in the 
nearby Flushing and Clayton Township areas, also all white, Hutchinson approved no 
subsidized housing at all.  Despite containing only 5 percent of the county‘s overall 
                                                 
51




population, Beecher received 25 percent of the subsidized units that Hutchinson 
contracted for in Genesee County.
52
   
The controversy over the concentration of subsidized housing in Beecher closely 
resembled the battles over race and residence that unfolded within transitional 
neighborhoods inside the city of Flint.  Opponents of the 235 and 236 programs in 
Beecher argued that the geographic concentration of poor people and shoddily 
constructed subsidized housing in the district contributed to neighborhood blight, white 
flight, and racial succession.  As in northwest Flint, builders tended to concentrate 
Beecher‘s 235 and 236 units in small, clearly defined areas.  Of the over seven hundred 
235 and 236 units that Hutchinson initially authorized for Beecher, 564 were located 
within the western half of the district.  As well, only fifty-five of the Section 235 units 
were located on ―scattered‖ sites within the area.  In several instances, unscrupulous 
builders carved out new dirt roads in west Beecher, along which they erected dozens of 
architecturally indistinguishable 235 homes.  On West Afaf Street, for instance, builders 
constructed thirty similar Section 235 homes, while West Genesee Street received a 
dozen virtually identical structures.  Likewise, of the three Section 236 apartment 
complexes erected in Beecher, all were located within a three-block radius.
53
  ―It‘s what I 
call federally-aided ghetto creation,‖ noted Mt. Morris Township supervisor and Section 
235 critic Donald J. Krapohl.
54
   
Beyond fielding criticism over the concentration of subsidized housing in west 
Beecher, local and federal officials also received a large number of complaints regarding 
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the poor quality and architectural monotony of Section 235 homes.  ―Many of the 
complaints,‖ a 1971 report revealed, ―involved the lack of storm doors, screens, lawns, 
and in some instances, paved streets and roads.‖
55
  Because federal officials imposed a 
strict price ceiling on 235 homes—ultimately capped at $21,000 for three-bedroom units 
and $24,000 for four-bedroom houses—builders often failed to install eavestroughing and 
driveways, left lawns unseeded, ignored serious construction flaws, and otherwise cut 
corners in their attempts to maximize profits from the new units.  Even Genesee 
Community Development Conference official Thomas H. Jean, a strong proponent of the 
initiative, acknowledged that builders erected ―some very questionable housing under this 
program.‖  ―We had some units built, for instance, that crowded a four-bedroom home 
into well less than 1,000 square feet.  We had some units put up with inadequate 
driveways, no sodding, and things that this community should not be very proud of.‖
56
  
Noting that ―a typical floor plan crowded four bedrooms into 984 square feet,‖ a 1970 
GCDC report admitted, ―In short, much of the criticism of the [235] program is valid as it 
refers to quality of construction.‖
57
   
Like their counterparts in Flint, residents of Beecher‘s 235 homes and the owners 
of neighboring properties protested to local and federal officials about the poor quality of 
the new units.  ―We were promised quality homes for low-income people, but all we 
received was an overpriced home of inferior quality,‖ complained Mrs. Vernon Dean, a 
resident of a 235 unit on Afaf Street.
58
  Though the legislation that created the 235 and 
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236 programs required federal officials to inspect and approve each unit before 
occupancy, the Flint office of the FHA conducted only cursory inspections of new and 
used structures and seldom required builders to repair flawed or unfinished dwellings.  
Local lenders skipped inspections altogether.  Following a September 1972 tour of 
Beecher, Donald Riegle, who at the time was the district‘s congressional representative, 
informed local reporters that Flint‘s FHA office had received three hundred complaints 
regarding substandard 235 units.  ―All 300,‖ Riegle declared, ―received little or no action 
by the Flint [FHA] office.‖
59
  Unable to afford the repairs to their new units, many 
residents defaulted on their house payments and forfeited their homes within months of 
occupancy.  As Section 235 homeowners abandoned their substandard units, Beecher‘s 
home foreclosure and vacancy rates skyrocketed.  According to a 1971 report on 
subsidized housing in Genesee County, lenders reported that delinquencies and 
foreclosures on Section 235 units ―were running three to four times‖ the average rates in 
the Flint metropolitan area.
60
  By October 1971, at least 25 percent of the two hundred 
abandoned homes in Beecher were less than a year old.
61
  Not all of the abandoned 
homes were left behind by bankrupt 235 residents, however.              
During his 1972 tour of Beecher, Riegle also met with Mt. Morris Township 
officials, members of an anti-235 group called the Citizen‘s Consumer Council, and 
dozens of angry Beecher residents who resented the encroachment of substandard 
housing and poor people in the community.  On Spring Valley Drive, Riegle viewed an 
attractive, conventionally financed home that had depreciated in value from $36,000 to 
$23,000 solely because of neighboring 235 units.  The presence of 235 and 236 housing 
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projects angered homeowners throughout Beecher and Mt. Morris Township, many of 
whom blamed the rash of subsidized housing construction and the influx of impoverished 
residents for declining property values and the district‘s severely overburdened schools.  
Section 235 families, many critics of the program correctly asserted, were poorer, paid 
less in property taxes, and had more children than most other households in the 
community.  Approximately 50 percent of the purchasers of Section 235 homes in 
Beecher received public assistance.
62
  Moreover, the Section 235 and 236 programs 
generated large enrollment increases in the district‘s schools.  According to a 1971 
survey, the families who purchased Section 235 housing in Beecher had, on average, 3.6 
children per family, far more than the district average of two children per household.  
Between 1966 and 1969, the overall enrollment in the Beecher public schools remained 
stable at approximately 6,500 pupils.  In 1970, however, the school system‘s enrollment 
jumped to 6,879, an increase that stemmed primarily from the construction of new 235 
and 236 units.
63
  By 1971, Beecher‘s school superintendent Randall Coates had reported 
an increase of over a thousand pupils, a large majority of whom resided in federally 
subsidized dwellings.  Of the new pupils moving into the Beecher school district, 70 
percent were from families that received public assistance.
64
  At Zink Elementary School, 
which served a large number of children from subsidized housing developments, the 
proportion of poor students rose from 8 to 28 percent just between 1970 and 1971.  Over 
the same duration, increased enrollments forced Zink‘s administrators to open up three 
new classrooms in the basement of the school.                             
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 Critics of the Section 235 and 236 programs in Beecher tended to frame their 
opposition to subsidized housing in economic terms.  Frustrated homeowners blamed the 
235 program and occupants of subsidized housing, white and black, for driving down 
property values and overburdening the district‘s schools with impoverished children.  
Beyond economic considerations, however, racial fears also played a prominent role in 
driving white opposition to subsidized housing in Beecher.  Approximately 50 percent of 
the occupants of 235 and 236 housing in Beecher were African American.  Though half 
of the new occupants of subsidized housing in Beecher were white, the concentration of 
235 and 236 units in west Beecher caused several schools and neighborhoods there to 
―tip‖ towards black majorities.  At Zink Elementary School, for instance, the percentage 
of black pupils rose from 49 to 56 percent just between 1970 and 1971.  During the four 
years that preceded the arrival of subsidized housing, the Beecher school system had 
maintained a stable racial mix of pupils: 70 percent white and 30 percent black.  By the 
early 1970s, however, the combination of black in-migration and white flight had pushed 
several schools and neighborhoods past the racial tipping point.  ―We had one of the 
model integrated school systems in Michigan,‖ Superintendent Coates complained, ―and 
now it is being ruined.‖
65
                      
As the subsidized homes and apartments went up and hundreds of new African-
American families began arriving in Beecher, racial conflicts flared in the district‘s 
schools and neighborhoods.  During the early 1970s, the construction of 235 and 236 
units fueled widespread blockbusting, white panic selling, and numerous instances of 
racial violence throughout Beecher and Mt. Morris Township.  Along with the 
demographic transitions set in motion by the new subsidized units, real estate agencies 
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further stoked racial animosities and white panic selling by participating in blockbusting 
campaigns and otherwise funneling black homebuyers towards Beecher.
66
  Angered by 
the influx of black residents, some white residents responded violently to the integration 
of their neighborhoods.  On July 17, 1971, Mr. and Mrs. Clarence Hall, a black couple 
who resided at G-1139 West Genesee Avenue in Beecher, reported that Ku Klux Klan 
members had burned a cross in front of their home.  In a note left behind, the cross 
burners warned, ―Niggers get out while you still can.‖
67
   
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, cross burnings and other forms of racial 
violence intended to thwart residential integration and the spread of subsidized housing 
erupted periodically in the neighborhoods of Beecher.  Disputes over race and space 
tended to be most intense in the Beecher schools, however.  According to Anthony Bell, a 
black student at Beecher High School, African-American pupils in Beecher faced 
―constant provocation‖ from their white peers.  The first major conflicts in the Beecher 
schools exploded in the spring of 1969.  During the week of April 13, 1969—shortly after 
the one-year anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King‘s assassination—several major 
brawls between white and black pupils broke out at Beecher High School.  On April 16, 
school administrators called in officers from the Genesee County Sheriff‘s Department 
and the Mt. Morris Township Police Department to quell a ―major confrontation‖ 
between white and black students.
68
   
The fighting that occurred at Beecher High School was an extension of the battles 
over race and space that were simultaneously unfolding in the district‘s neighborhoods.  
Just prior to the April disturbances, the Mt. Morris Township board had moved to block 
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the construction of additional subsidized housing units.  On April 4, at a meeting attended 
by over a hundred angry residents, the township board approved a one-year moratorium 
on residential building designed to halt the construction of additional subsidized housing 
in the Beecher district.
69
  Just over a week later, as the racial tension mounted at Beecher 
High School, the board reaffirmed its position in front of a packed audience of two 
hundred predominantly white homeowners.  Accusing builders of ―consolidating the 
[subsidized] homes in one specific area,‖ one supporter of the ban urged developers ―to 
spread them out‖ evenly across the county.
70
  The April moratorium gained support from 
Superintendent Coates and other school officials, who complained that nearly a thousand 
new low-income students had inundated the district.  Beyond contributing to school 
overcrowding, Coates argued, the 235 and 236 programs were fueling white flight and 
the quick transition from ―integration to disintegration‖ in the district‘s schools.  Shortly 
after the township board‘s vote, lawyers representing the A&E Building Company and 
Deventeen Investors Company, firms that had contracted to build an FHA-backed Section 
236 apartment complex in the township, filed suit to end the building ban.  On July 13, 
Genesee County Circuit Judge Phillip C. Elliott overturned the moratorium, ruling that 
the ban unfairly restricted private enterprise and that members of the township board did 
not have the authority to suspend building because of fears over white flight, high school 
taxes, and classroom shortages.
71
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In the aftermath of Elliott‘s July ruling, Beecher school officials hurriedly began 
preparations for the 1970-71 academic year.  To accommodate the approximately one 
thousand new students they expected to enroll in the fall, school board members and 
Superintendent Coates devised a plan for half-day school sessions and sought out new 
classroom space in church basements.
72
  Hoping to quell the racial disturbances that had 
flared during the previous spring, the board also hired Paul Cabell, the first African-
American administrator in the district, to serve as assistant principal at Beecher High 
School.  Principal Robert Towns assigned Cabell the difficult task of handling student 
discipline and managing race relations between white and black pupils.  Cabell‘s hiring 
was part of a larger strategy devised by Beecher and Mt. Morris Township officials to 
restore racial calm while simultaneously working to curtail subsidized housing and white 
flight from the district.  Ultimately, the challenge of maintaining racial peace at Beecher 
High School would push Cabell past his emotional breaking point.        
As Beecher school board members searched for ways to accommodate new pupils 
and keep the peace, members of the Mt. Morris Township Board continued their quest to 
halt the construction of additional subsidized homes.  Township supervisor Krapohl and 
school superintendent Coates implored HUD and FHA administrators to conduct an 
investigation into the concentration of subsidized housing in Beecher.  In February 1971, 
after receiving numerous complaints from officials in Beecher and Flint, Representative 
Riegle, and other critics of subsidized housing, HUD suspended its 235 and 236 
programs in the Beecher area pending the results of a complete investigation.
73
  Upon 
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learning of the situation that had developed in Beecher, HUD official Eugene A. 
Gulledge demanded to know why local officials in Flint had not adhered to the federal 
government‘s ―informal‖ goal of dispersing subsidized housing.
74
  Released in May 
1971, the results of the HUD investigation confirmed nearly all of the charges made by 
critics of the 235 and 236 programs in Beecher.  In particular, the HUD report affirmed 
Krapohl‘s and Coates‘s complaints that builders had saturated Beecher with more than its 
fair share of subsidized units.  Moreover, the report acknowledged that many of the 235 
and 236 units in the district were poorly constructed and architecturally monotonous and 
that the federal government‘s subsidized housing efforts in Genesee County threatened to 
create newly resegregated ghettoes in Beecher.  According to this candid report, many 
other areas of the county could have received subsidized housing, ―but HUD did not 
attempt to direct locations of building activities.‖  Beyond accepting responsibility for the 
situation in Beecher, HUD officials also blamed Thomas Hutchinson and the FHA‘s Flint 
office for the concentration of subsidized housing in Beecher.  ―There was apparently 
very little, if any, discussion between the Flint [FHA] service office supervisory staff and 
builders and community interests regarding fund allocations, site allocations and 
community problems,‖ the authors of the report charged.  Even after receiving numerous 
complaints from Beecher officials and occupants of 235 and 236 units, the Flint FHA 
office did not attempt to address construction flaws and the charges that government 
housing programs were fueling racial transitions.
75
           
 In a May 25, 1971 letter to Superintendent Coates, Secretary Romney admitted 
that poor federal oversight had contributed to the turmoil in Beecher.  Romney also 
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informed Coates that William C. Whitbeck, the director of HUD‘s regional office in 
Detroit, had ―already put a stop on additional funding of Section 235/236 units in the 
Beecher District.‖
76
  While this was welcome news to many frustrated homeowners, 
Romney‘s decision to cancel the 235 and 236 programs in Beecher did not end the racial 
conflagrations.  Blockbusting, white panic selling, property abandonment, and racial 
confrontations continued unabated in the years following the cancellation of the 235 and 
236 programs.  At Beecher High School, racial tensions erupted yet again during the 
1971-72 academic year.  By February 1972, as one journalist wrote, ―Something akin to 
anarchy prevailed at Beecher High. . . . Fires were set, windows were broken, youngsters 
were beaten and hundreds of students refused to attend class choosing instead to loiter in 
the hallways.‖  Ultimately, it took two dozen police officers in full riot gear to end the 
February disturbances.
77
   
Hired to curb the interracial brawling that had plagued Beecher High School 
dating back to the late 1960s, Paul Cabell tried to serve as an intermediary between the 
warring factions of white and black students.  While performing in that capacity, Cabell 
drew harsh criticism from both sides of the color line.  Militant black students referred to 
Cabell as an ―Uncle Tom,‖ maintaining that he favored whites and was insensitive to the 
grievances of Beecher‘s growing black minority.  Cabell suffered the wrath of white 
students, too, who believed that he was partial to black members of the student body.  
Paul Cabell, Life magazine journalist Loudon Wainwright wrote, was ―the man in the 
middle‖ at Beecher High School, surrounded on all sides by racial hatred.  ―He was the 
middle man suspended between both groups,‖ noted black student Donnie Odom.  ―The 
                                                 
76
 Romney to Coates, 1. 
77
 H. Ford, ―Paul Cabell: A Man in the Middle,‖ Flint Voice, June 3, 1982. 
524 
 
black students called him ‗Tom‘ and the white students called him ‗nigger.‘  No one was 
on his side.‖
78
   
A steadfast integrationist, Cabell initially embraced his appointment at Beecher 
High School as an opportunity to improve race relations.  Yet the seemingly ceaseless 
racial turmoil in the community and at the school quickly destroyed his optimism.  
Depressed by his inability to pacify the student body, Cabell sat down in his Flint home 
to write two notes—one for his wife Carlitta, and another ―For Beecher.‖  In these final 
messages, written on the morning of February 24, 1972, Cabell admitted defeat in his 
quest to remedy the ―unsolvable problem‖ of racism.  Cabell also declared that the 
experience in Beecher had driven him to despair, forcing him ―to totter precariously on 
the fine line between two cultures.‖  ―For what do I isolate myself in the middle, never 
right, always wrong?‖ Cabell asked.  In a direct appeal to racists and ―hotheads‖ on both 
sides of the color line, Cabell insisted, ―It is for you that I die.‖
79
  After finishing the 
notes, Cabell committed suicide with a shotgun.    
Paul Cabell did not die in vain.  In the weeks following his death, calm prevailed 
at Beecher High School.  Yet Cabell‘s suicide did little to stabilize the community and 
stem the outward flow of whites from the Beecher district.  Between 1972 and 1977, the 
proportion of black students at Beecher High School doubled, rising to 70 percent.  By 
the early 1980s, blacks held a clear majority in both the schools and neighborhoods of 
Beecher and the district‘s housing stock, hit hard by property abandonment and poor 
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upkeep, was among the most dilapidated in the county.
80
  Throughout the 1970s crisis in 
north suburban Flint, local and national observers speculated as to why Beecher, and not 
other suburbs, had received so many units of low-cost government housing.  Why 
Beecher?  Perhaps more importantly, why not Fenton, Flushing, or other all-white 
suburbs that gained few, if any, subsidized units?  As the controversy over the Section 
235 and 236 programs unfolded in Beecher, community members offered conflicting 
answers to those questions.   
For defenders of the 235 and 236 programs, the market was the key factor driving 
the locations of subsidized housing units in Genesee County.  Developers and local FHA 
official Thomas Hutchinson argued that the demand for low-cost housing in Beecher was 
greater than in other suburban areas.  In defense of his decision to allocate so many 
subsidized units to Beecher, Hutchinson told a journalist from the Washington Post, ―Our 
deal, as far as I can see, is this: is there a market?‖
81
  Clearly, there was a market for low-
cost in homes in Beecher.  In areas such as Beecher, where Hutchinson identified a 
demand for affordable housing, the FHA gave builders the freedom to select appropriate 
sites for subsidized units.  Moreover, Hutchinson allowed builders to self-regulate 
construction standards.  In their defense, builders pointed out that a variety of additional 
factors drove construction decisions.  Specifically, developers asserted that the federal 
requirement that all subsidized units have access to public utilities influenced their 
decision to construct 235 and 236 units in Beecher.  Though unincorporated, Beecher 
provided its residents with water and sewer service and thus met one of the federal 
government‘s key financing requirements.  ―If someone can tell me where I can get 
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financing,‖ offered James Walker, a builder of subsidized units in Beecher, ―I‘d be happy 
to build elsewhere.‖
82
  The federal government‘s requirement that subsidized housing 
units have access to public water and sewer services surely placed limits on the potential 
locations for 235 and 236 housing projects.  Yet Beecher was not the only suburban area 
that had access to such utilities.  During the 1950s and 1960s, suburbs such as Flushing, 
which received no 235 and 236 units, built modern sewer and water systems.  How, then, 
could local officials account for the discrepancies? 
Although builders rarely addressed the racial, economic, and political factors that 
drove site decisions for 235 and 236 homes, they played a major role in determining 
which suburbs did and did not receive subsidized units.  Investigators from HUD blamed 
unscrupulous builders and the Flint FHA office for saturating Beecher with substandard 
homes and more than its fair share of subsidized housing.  Though not the only factor that 
influenced construction in the district, race played an important role in the site location 
decisions of local builders.  According to at least one investigation, builders concentrated 
Section 235 and 236 units in Beecher because ―the area was already integrated, a water 
and sewer system existed, and vacant lots were relatively inexpensive.‖  Furthermore, 
builders of subsidized housing preferred Beecher to other areas of the county because Mt. 
Morris Township had only minimal building and home inspection regulations, which 
helped to keep construction costs below federally mandated price ceilings.
83
  During a 
1972 speech to county planners, township supervisor Krapohl admitted that Beecher had 
a ―very inadequate‖ zoning ordinance and no controls whatsoever on subdivision 
development.  ―Many lots were plotted in the 1920s with the 40‘ and 60‘ frontage, 
                                                 
82
 Flint Journal, April 7, 12, 1970.  
83
 ―Report to Joint Economic Committee,‖ 6. 
527 
 
unpaved streets and very few sidewalks,‖ Krapohl revealed.  ―With this situation existing, 
the builders with commitments from the local HUD office had a field day.‖
84
  Because 
Beecher was already integrated, provided public utilities, and had weak construction and 
zoning standards, builders effectively colonized the area with poor housing and hundreds 
of impoverished black families.  ―This district has been the victim of what I call neo-
colonialism,‖ charged Ira Rutherford, a black official in the Beecher school district.
85
  
Just as realtors had done for decades, builders of federally subsidized housing during the 
1960s and 1970s identified northwest Flint and Beecher as black expansion zones.  By 
funneling poor and African-American residents to black expansion zones such as 
Beecher, builders, local and federal officials, and other participants in the Section 235 
and 236 programs helped to spread the city‘s growing urban crisis into suburban Genesee 
County.  But the color line would spread only so far.              
Paul Cabell‘s suicide and the racial controversy over subsidized housing in 
Beecher received a great deal of attention from both federal administrators and national 
media outlets.
86
  For some observers, the transformation of Beecher revealed a 
frightening glimpse of the shape of things to come in suburbia.  Among suburbs in 
Genesee County, the situation in Beecher was somewhat exceptional, however.  By the 
close of the 1970s, African Americans in Genesee County had broken the color lines that 
formerly surrounded St. John Street and Floral Park.  Yet with few exceptions, the color 
line remained intact in suburban Flint throughout the remainder of the century.  During 
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the two decades following the defeat of the New Flint plan, suburban officials and white 
homeowners consolidated their independence from the city and worked to harden the 
color line through a combination of restrictive zoning and land use plans, municipal 
incorporation initiatives, and other political means.  During the era of suburban secession, 
public and private housing and metropolitan development policies helped to insulate most 
of Flint‘s suburbs from the racial integration that occurred in Beecher.  Indeed, the racial 
conflicts that led to Paul Cabell‘s demise could have occurred in few suburban areas but 




Cities with Walls:  
Race, Class, and the Death of Metropolitan Solutions 
 
 
Paul Cabell‘s suicide and the Beecher desegregation crisis reminded many observers that 
suburbs were not immune from the racial and economic changes occurring in central 
cities.  By the early 1970s, Beecher and scores of other inner-ring American suburbs had 
made quick transitions from integration to resegregation.  Reeling from the cumulative 
effects of intense neighborhood conflicts, home foreclosures, racial panic selling, 
property abandonment, and private divestment, suburbs such as Beecher in no way 
resembled the homogeneous and prosperous suburban places portrayed in postwar 
cultural texts.  In many ways, Beecher was far from unique.  During the postwar and civil 
rights eras, Beecher and most other Flint suburbs were places of great socioeconomic, 
ethnic, and political diversity.  Like Beecher, many jurisdictions in the out-county 
contained poor and working-class residents, substandard housing units, overcrowded 
schools, and foreclosed properties.  In order to explain developments such as these, 
historians will need to develop a more complex suburban typology that accounts for the 
economic, racial, and spatial diversity of America‘s suburbs.  Nevertheless, the racial 
transitions that occurred in Beecher set the area apart from much of the rest of the county.  
With only a few exceptions, the color line would hold in the remainder of Genesee 
through the close of the millennium.      
530 
 
In the 1930s and 1940s, private citizens and government officials excluded black 
citizens from suburban areas through restrictive housing covenants, violence, redlining, 
and other private and state-sanctioned measures.  After World War II, white 
homeowners, federal housing administrators, members of the private housing industry, 
and suburban elected officials upheld residential segregation through a variety of old and 
new means.  Racial violence, real estate discrimination, and redlining continued to limit 
the options of black home seekers during the postwar era.  However, during the 1950s 
and 1960s, white homeowners and policymakers in the out-county devised a number of 
new legal and political strategies to assert their independence from Flint and defend the 
racial homogeneity of their suburbs.  In Genesee County, suburban governments enacted 
restrictive zoning and building codes, exclusionary land use plans, and sought to 
incorporate their suburbs in order to modernize living conditions, maintain property 
values, and, in some instances, hold the color line.  In a number of cases, suburban 
officials also devised restrictive land use regulations to exclude poor whites and defend 
the class homogeneity of their communities.  During the political battles over New Flint, 
white homeowners in the out-county framed their opposition to the city in colorblind 
economic terms.  By the mid-1960s, however, civil rights activists had directly 
challenged the foundations of the suburban color line, bringing racial issues to the center 
of suburban land use battles.    
White homeowners‘ opposition to residential integration in suburban Genesee 
County was part of a larger postwar revolt against annexation and metropolitan 
government that gained momentum during the late 1950s conflict over New Flint.  
Following the defeat of the New Flint plan, elected officials in the Vehicle City, with the 
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full backing of GM executives, moved to annex suburban factories and shopping centers.  
In response, voters in the out-county launched several successful incorporation drives 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  The incorporation of Flint‘s inner-ring suburbs left the city 
landlocked, surrounded by hostile suburban governments, and far removed from the 
county‘s remaining industrial and commercial establishments.  With no room to grow and 
very little land left to develop, Flint, even with its many functioning auto plants, faced a 
series of economic crises beginning during the 1970s and 1980s that only the most 
pessimistic of forecasters could have envisioned.  Yet the city and its residents would 
face those crises alone.  
 
The Suburban Defense of the Color Line 
In Places of Their Own: African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century, 
historian Andrew Wiese documents the long and largely untold history of black 
suburbanization in the United States.  At the end of the 1930s, more than a million black 
Americans lived in suburban areas.  Between 1940 and 2000, that number grew to nearly 
twelve million.  According to Wiese, black suburbanization constituted ―one of the most 
important demographic movements in the twentieth-century United States.‖  In spite of 
this impressive growth, though, Wiese found that scholars have essentially ignored the 
black presence in suburbia.  Historians, he argued, have focused too narrowly on the 
suburbs inhabited by wealthy and middle-class whites and have ignored the racial 
diversity of suburban spaces.  ―The truth is,‖ Wiese charged, ―historians have done a 
better job excluding African Americans from the suburbs than even white suburbanites.‖
1
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 Wiese‘s critique is difficult to dispute.  Since at least the nineteenth century, small 
numbers of African Americans in Genesee County have lived outside of the Flint city 
limits, many of them on small plots in the wooded, semi-rural areas south of Floral Park 
and Thread Lake on the city‘s southern border.  During the twentieth century, those 
numbers increased as the city grew and attained industrial prominence.  However, black 
suburbanization in Genesee County has always been extremely limited in scope and 
confined to discrete areas within the region.  In 1940, only 109 African Americans, out of 
a total metropolitan population of over a quarter million, lived in suburban Flint.  During 
the 1940s, Flint‘s suburbs added just forty-five additional black residents.  At mid-
century, the 154 African Americans living outside the city comprised only 0.2 percent of 
the population of suburban Flint.  By 1970, the number of black suburbanites in the Flint 
area had increased to slightly over six thousand.  In the 1970s, the African-American 
population of suburban Genesee County doubled to over twelve thousand.  Still, the 
African-American proportion of Flint‘s suburban population remained under 5 percent 
until well into the 1980s.  Furthermore, of the 12,680 African Americans who lived in 
suburban Flint in 1980, almost all resided in the Beecher district or in the four inner-ring 
suburban townships surrounding the city.  With only a few exceptions, the rest of the 
county was (and remains) virtually all white.  Although it is certainly true that historians 
have unfairly excluded African Americans from the history of suburbia, it is doubtful that 
they have done so with any more efficiency than white suburbanites in Genesee County.
2
 
The post-World War II black freedom struggle in Genesee County was deeply 
rooted in city politics and battles over urban space.  The 1960s campaigns against 
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housing discrimination in Genesee County centered on neighborhood battles inside the 
city and the quest to obtain a municipal open occupancy ordinance in Flint.  Nevertheless, 
the color line in suburban Flint also came under attack during the course of the decade.  
Black homebuyers and renters faced many obstacles in their attempts to secure housing in 
suburban Genesee County.  As in Flint, redlining, racial steering, white violence, and 
other forms of state-sanctioned and private real estate discrimination made it difficult for 
black buyers to circumvent the color line.  If black homesteaders managed to acquire 
properties outside of the city, they still faced stiff resistance from suburban whites.   
Though most suburban residents abhorred racial terrorism, acts of white violence 
were nonetheless common in the out-county.  In 1964, an African-American teacher 
named Jerry M. Beaty and two black friends moved into a home in the all-white Candy 
Lane Estates subdivision in Mt. Morris Township.  Shortly after the move, neighborhood 
residents attacked Beaty and his housemates in an episode that local journalists referred 
to as the ―Candy Lane Affair.‖  According to a Flint Journal report, ―An explosive 
situation developed as irate whites gathered around the house.  Windows were broken 
and imprecations shouted.  Once, an effigy was left hanging from the porch.‖  For four 
consecutive days during the Candy Lane Affair, white mobs repeatedly harassed and 
threatened Beaty and his friends.  After four difficult months in his new home, Beaty 
moved away from the violence in Candy Lane.
3
   
That same year, racial violence broke out again in Mt. Morris Township when Mr. 
and Mrs. Willie Mosley moved into a home in the Julianna subdivision.  Hoping to run 
the Mosleys out of the neighborhood, white vandals broke the windows of their house 
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and threatened the couple.
4
  In 1966, violence against African Americans erupted in the 
Ottawa Hills subdivision of south suburban Grand Blanc.  In September of that year, the 
Matthews family acquired a newly built home in the neighborhood through a third-party 
purchase arranged by white buyers.  In response, an angry group of whites picketed the 
property and harassed the black homeowners.  Enraged by the Matthews‘s deceitful act, 
the developer who had built the house enlisted the support of black realtist Connie 
Childress, who offered to buy back the home and re-sell it to whites.  When that plan 
failed, the builder threatened Mrs. Matthews, telling her ―she would be sorry she had 
moved in‖ to Ottawa Hills.  The 1966 episode was not an isolated incident in an 
otherwise peaceful neighborhood.  Several years after the Matthews family reported 
being harassed, violence flared again in Ottawa Hills against other black families who 
had moved to the subdivision.  In 1974, a group of white youths ―terrorized several black 
families in that neighborhood by throwing rocks through windows, painting obscenities 
on garage doors and erecting flaming crosses.‖
5
            
 In conjunction with the already rigid structural and policy barriers to open 
housing, acts of violence and harassment helped to keep the postwar color line in tact 
throughout most of suburban Flint.  With the exceptions of Beecher, Mt. Morris 
Township, and several other well-defined areas of the out-county, Genesee County 
remained virtually all white throughout the civil rights era.
6
  This occurred in spite of the 
repeated efforts of activists to desegregate suburban neighborhoods.  In November 1965, 
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Bill Hawkins, a member of the board of directors from Housing Opportunities Made 
Equal, announced that his group was going to launch a new campaign of racial 
―scatterization‖ in Genesee County.  Hawkins and his HOME associates sought to 
achieve scatterization in stages.  In the first phase of the plan, HOME activists hoped to 
achieve a modicum of integration by assisting up to thirty middle-class black families 
who wished to move from the city to the suburbs.  By helping a small number of test 
families desegregate suburban Flint, Hawkins wanted to demonstrate that integration was 
not a detriment to property values.  Ultimately, though, the goal of scatterization was to 
―make bigoted realtors, builders, and home owners change their policies to ones that are 
more morally and philosophically American.‖
7
   
Even though the plan was modest in scope, it generated strong opposition among 
suburban whites.  Several months after Hawkins‘s announcement, realtors from the 
Hachtel-Pollock firm turned away a black female purchaser who sought to buy a home in 
Davison Township, telling her that they were unable to show or sell homes in the area to 
Negroes.  HOME members responded by picketing in front of the Belle Meade 
subdivision in Davison Township, where Hachtel-Pollock had a large number of listings.  
On Sunday, March 27, an interracial group of thirty protesters assembled for six hours in 
front of Belle Meade, carrying signs reading, ―Someone Must Be The First To Sell To 
Negroes‖ and ―Realtors—Segregators.‖  In the weeks that followed, HOME members 
returned to the subdivision for several additional protests.
8
   
The spring demonstrations took township officials and realtors from Hachtel-
Pollock by complete surprise and created quite a stir among local homeowners and 
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brokers.  Within weeks, however, the Davison Township Board had come up with a plan 
to block future mobilizations.  On May 9, board members adopted a parade ordinance 
requiring all persons who wanted to march, picket, demonstrate, or gather in public to 
obtain a permit from the township.  Furthermore, the ordinance stipulated, ―No person 
shall intentionally lay down, stand, sit, or loiter in any public street, highway or sidewalk 
so as to interfere with the regular flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic. . . .‖  Violators of 
the parade ordinance faced punishments of up to ninety days in jail and/or fines of up to 
$100.  By design, the Davison Township law was exceedingly vague, making no specific 
mention of civil rights protesters.  Hoping to cloak the law in the language of 
colorblindness and civic order, board members instructed Davison Township Attorney 
William R. McTaggart, who authored the ordinance, to conceal the specific aims of the 
legislation.  ―I don‘t know if I properly camouflaged it,‖ McTaggart later admitted.  
Apparently, he did.  During their public deliberations on the matter, board members 
spoke only in abstract terms about the reasons for the vaguely worded ordinance.  Many 
realtors did not appreciate the board members‘ subtlety, however.  During the May 9 
board meeting, local realtors repeatedly pressed Davison Township Supervisor Walter 
Kingsley to explain whether the new law would end the picketing at Belle Meade.  In 
response to the realtors‘ persistent questioning, Kingsley reluctantly acknowledged that 
the board had designed the parade ordinance to prohibit civil rights protests in the 
township.
9
  Though the ordinance infuriated Hawkins and other HOME members, many 
of whom pledged to defy the new law, the open housing demonstrations in Davison 
Township ended rather abruptly soon after the board passed the ordinance.  Rather than 
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face fines and jail time, HOME members sought out new opportunities in more 
hospitable areas.  Those would be extremely difficult to find, though.   
Like Supervisor Kingsley in Davison Township, most suburban whites in 
Genesee County preferred not to discuss the issues of race and open housing.  By the 
mid-1960s, however, civil rights activists had made it impossible for suburban officials 
and homeowners to ignore the barriers to residential integration.  During the 1966 equal 
housing hearings in Flint, state civil rights commissioners solicited testimony from 
Harold A. Draper, Jr., the chairperson of the Legislature Committee of the Genesee 
County Board of Supervisors.  Specifically, the commissioners wanted to know why only 
two suburban census tracts in the entire county contained black populations in excess of 2 
percent.  In response, Draper readily acknowledged, ―Equal housing opportunities do not 
today exist in Genesee County.‖  ―Let it be admitted,‖ he added, ―that the negro would 
not be welcomed by the vast majority of the residents of our all white residential areas.‖  
At first glance, these seemed to be remarkable concessions from a suburban official.  Yet 
Draper and his colleagues from the board of supervisors claimed no responsibility for the 
rigid segregation that existed in Flint‘s suburbs.  Articulating a classic defense of de facto 
housing segregation, Draper pointed to personal choice and economic factors as the key 
barriers to integrated housing.  ―The slow movement of our non-white population to the 
county is a matter of economics,‖ he argued.  ―The vast majority of our negro population 
cannot afford the cost of purchasing new homes in our county developments.  Their 
present income, savings, and non-discriminatory credit limitations limits the price they 
may pay for a new home.‖  In the minds of Draper and many white suburbanites, 
segregation seemed to derive from a combination of personal factors—―partly through 
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fear, partly because they [Negroes] know they would not be wanted, and partly because 
they like to live with their own friends.‖  Because segregation was essentially a private 
matter, Draper maintained, ―The Board of Supervisors do[es] not have any legal power to 
act as to legislation.‖
10
                   
 Draper‘s testimony did not sway members of the Michigan Civil Rights 
Commission.  Following the hearings, the commissioners recommended that all local 
governments in the county approve open occupancy ordinances.  Within a year of the 
hearings, legislators in the already integrated cities of Flint and Mt. Morris had complied 
with the MCRC‘s recommendations by enacting fair housing laws.
11
  However, city, 
township, and village officials in the remainder of the county resisted the commission‘s 
proposal.  Emboldened by the fair housing campaign that was unfolding in the city, small 
numbers of suburban civil rights activists began to press their local governments to 
endorse open occupancy during the late 1960s.  In September 1967, a young suburban 
activist named John C. McGarry urged members of the Fenton City Council to pass an 
open housing law.  In an open letter to the community published in the Fenton 
Independent, McGarry referred to his hometown as a ―white sanctuary,‖ pointing out ―the 
well-known fact that there is not a single negro living in Fenton nor has there ever been 
one living here.‖  ―An open housing ordinance in Fenton,‖ McGarry argued, ―would 
show to interested negroes . . . that Fenton is officially willing to welcome them into our 
community.‖  Directly challenging government officials such as Draper, who had argued 
that open housing was not a problem in Genesee County, McGarry offered, ―If citizens . . 
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. are correct in their contention that no problem of housing discrimination exists in 
Fenton, the effect of an open occupancy ordinance would only be symbolic, since there 
would never be any need to enforce it.‖
12
   
The response to McGarry‘s call for municipal fair housing legislation in Fenton 
was harsh.  On November 16, the Independent printed an editorial opposing open 
occupancy.  ―We do not feel that Fenton requires local open occupancy legislation,‖ the 
editors wrote.  ―There is just no need for it here.  Sure, we have no negroes living here, 
but there is nothing to stop them from coming if they want.‖
13
  Undeterred by the 
editorial, McGarry brought his open housing idea directly to the Fenton City Council in 
April 1968.  Council members declined to consider any such ordinance, however, telling 
McGarry that impending federal civil rights legislation would ultimately supersede local 
fair housing laws.  In addition, at least one council member reminded McGarry that 
residents of the all-white community were adamantly opposed to integration.  Out of 
respect for public opinion, the council member explained, Fenton City Council members 
would not implement an open housing policy.
14
   
The Fenton City Council correctly gauged the public‘s opposition to open 
housing.  McGarry‘s open housing proposals piqued the sensibilities of thousands of 
white homeowners in the south suburbs.  According to white resident Robert Weishaupt, 
who authored an angry letter to the local newspaper in opposition to McGarry‘s plan, 
open housing was a clear violation of the human and property rights of homeowners.  ―As 
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do most open housing advocates,‖ he wrote, ―John [McGarry] fails to understand that as 
government gains control over property it also gains control over those who depend on 
that property.  Therefore property rights are human rights.‖
15
  Following the April city 
council meeting, reporters from the Independent surveyed local residents on the proposed 
measure.  ―I have lived here for 24 years and I have never heard of anyone being kept out 
of the city for any reason,‖ observed white resident Harold J. Butcher.  ―Fenton has 
always been an open city and anyone can live here.‖  Mrs. Richard Thenhaus concurred, 
stating, ―Anyone who wants to can live here.‖  For Richard Rynearson, the issue was 
simple: ―We don‘t have a written ordinance to keep anyone out, so why do we need an 
ordinance to let anyone in?‖
16
 
 Fenton residents were not alone in their opposition to open occupancy.  During 
the late 1960s and 1970s, civil rights protesters in Genesee County and the nation at large 
forced suburban residents to address the persistence of the color line.  White suburbanites 
held a range of views on racial integration.  Like John McGarry, a few suburbanites 
embraced integration and open housing reform.  By contrast, Robert Weishaupt and many 
others actively resisted civil rights legislation, viewing desegregation as a grave threat to 
white property rights and neighborhood stability.  Though opinions on open housing and 
integration varied widely in the Flint metropolitan area, Genesee County had more than 
its share of racial extremists, some of whom occupied positions of authority in suburban 
government.  In the fall of 1971, Burton Township Supervisor Joseph E. Uvick and his 
wife Constance, both of whom were white, found themselves embroiled in a major 
scandal when they refused to sell a piece of property to Mr. and Mrs. Nelson R. Kirkland, 
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a black couple.  The saga began when the Kirklands, who lived in Flint‘s racially 
transitional Evergreen Valley neighborhood, approached a realtor regarding a $10,000 lot 
that the Uvicks wanted to sell in Burton Township.  Hoping to expedite the deal, the 
Kirklands deposited the full asking price in cash with the Uvicks‘ realtor.  After learning 
that the buyers were black, the Uvicks, who happened to live next door to the vacant lot 
in question, refused to sell the land.  On September 10, Joseph Uvick informed the 
Kirklands personally that he would not sell, claiming that his wife ―was opposed to 
selling the property to blacks and had threatened to leave him if he consummated the 
sale.‖  In response, the Kirklands filed a claim with the Michigan Civil Rights 
Commission.  After several months of investigation, the commissioners ruled against the 
Uvicks and ordered them to sell the property to the Kirklands.  The commissioners also 
directed the Uvicks to pay $1,000 to the victims in order to compensate them for the 
humiliating experience.
17
  Although the Kirklands ultimately triumphed over the Uvicks, 
victories such as theirs were extremely rare in Genesee County, where most acts of 
discrimination went unpunished.  Yet such stark defenses of the color line were common 
in suburban Flint during the 1960s and 1970s.  Several years after the Uvicks lost their 
case, Flint Journal reporter Ed Conway authored a story that focused on white responses 
to integration in Burton.  ―There are no black people around this neighborhood at all,‖ 
one resident of South Burton revealed.  ―There aren‘t many blacks in south Burton 
because none are welcome.‖  ―What do I like about Burton?‖ another citizen asked.  
―There‘s no niggers here.‖
18
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African Americans who searched for housing in suburban Flint found many such 
examples of virulent racism.  Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of white 
suburbanites rejected harsh appeals to race, preferring instead to claim a tenuous middle 
ground between calls for fair housing and open defenses of segregation.  Most suburban 
moderates in Genesee County approached the issue of race abstractly and avoided 
speaking directly about the barriers to open housing in their own communities.  As well, 
racial moderates in the out-county tended to frame the urban crisis and the color line as 
inner-city problems that individual citizens could address through personal acts of 
kindness rather than structural, legal, or political reforms.  On April 10, 1968—as urban 
riots were exploding in response to Dr. Martin Luther King‘s assassination—the Davison 
Index ran its first ever editorial on racial prejudice.  Aware of the significance of the 
occasion, the editors began the column by explaining the omission.  ―Since Davison has 
experienced no overt acts of racial prejudice, we have seen fit to avoid mention of it,‖ 
they wrote.  Although the editors maintained their historical innocence, they still felt 
compelled to address the ―holocaust of terror‖ that was occurring in America‘s cities.  
The editors urged Davison residents not ―to generalize and castigate the whole race for 
what a segment of the radical Negro minority have done to our nation.‖  Rather, the 
editorialists encouraged local residents to get to know Negroes personally.  ―We wonder 
how many Davison residents have actually had any kind of contact with a Negro; social, 
business, school, spiritual, recreational?  There is an old adage that says that ‗we fear that 
which we do not know.‘‖  ―We would suggest,‖ the editorial continued, ―that each white 
person seek out a Negro person to befriend.  BEFRIEND, in any context that is required.  
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Materially, if necessary; spiritually if the need arises; counsel with him if he requests it.  
But, BE a friend.‖
19
   
Like thousands of other racially moderate suburbanites in Genesee County, the 
editors of the Index viewed segregation as a matter of the heart.  Segregated schools and 
neighborhoods, they believed, stemmed from personal prejudices, racial 
misunderstandings, and moral shortcomings rather than public policies and 
discriminatory housing markets.  Suburban governments, according to this formulation, 
were thus innocent of any wrongdoing even if the stain of prejudice tainted individual 
white souls.  Following this logic, most suburban racial moderates stopped short of 
endorsing open occupancy laws in their own communities.  Instead, they proposed a 
program of racial gradualism that hinged on convincing whites to accept African 
Americans as equals.  In truth, however, segregation in the out-county, as it did in many 
parts of the city, derived from both personal beliefs and voter-approved public policies.  
By 1973, when voters and school board members in the City of Flags faced down a 
proposal for open housing, this had become readily apparent.   
In June 1972, an eighteen-year-old activist and future filmmaker named Michael 
Moore won a seat on the Davison Board of Education.  At the time of the election, 
Moore, a well-known figure in the small city of Davison, was the youngest person ever to 
win an elective office in Michigan.  By the early 1970s, he had already developed a 
strong reputation for left-wing activism.  As a student at Davison High School, Moore 
often battled with teachers and administrators over issues relating to curriculum, free 
speech, civil rights, and school discipline.  Although many adults in the community 
vigorously opposed Moore‘s insurgent candidacy, newly enfranchised eighteen-year-old 
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voters—who had won the right to vote in 1971 with the passage of the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment—turned out in droves to support his school board campaign.  In the end, 
Moore easily outpolled all of his competitors during the 1972 race.
20
   
Not long after taking office, the young activist asked school board members to 
endorse a proposal welcoming African Americans and other minority groups to the city 
of Davison.  Moore‘s proposal read,  
Now, Therefore, be it resolved that the Davison Board of Education 
publicly invites and encourages all members of racial, ethnic, and religious 
minorities to come and reside in the Davison area and enhance the 
learning and living environment of the school district and help our 
students learn the true meaning of brotherhood. 
   
The proposal elicited an angry response from local taxpayers and school board members, 
many of whom viewed Moore‘s move as a crass and divisive publicity stunt.  ―The 
welcome signs are out and always have been,‖ noted Charles N. Mitchell, an opponent of 
the resolution.  ―At the rate we taxpayers have had to build new schools to accommodate 
those who have found our city and school system so attractive I do not feel it is necessary 
to have anyone go on record as extending a welcoming hand to anyone.‖  On December 
3, 1973, Moore‘s colleagues on the school board unanimously rejected the proposal.  
Moreover, within weeks of the December vote, residents of Davison had launched a 
campaign to remove the young iconoclast from office.  Though he ultimately survived the 
recall effort, Moore lost his 1976 re-election bid in a landslide.  In Davison—as Moore 
learned the hard way—residents and officials rejected fair housing proposals out of 
hand.
21
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 Most city, village, and township governments in Genesee County actively resisted 
both grassroots and policy-driven efforts to desegregate suburban neighborhoods and 
schools.  In Davison Township, the board‘s 1966 anti-picketing ordinance was an 
especially transparent attempt to halt the open housing movement; and so too were the 
efforts to remove Michael Moore from the Davison Board of Education.  Such clear 
examples were far from rare.  Nevertheless, opponents of desegregation seldom spoke 
openly about their racial animosities.  Instead, racial fears percolated beneath the surface 
of local political debates.  During the late 1960s and early 1970s, battles over site 
locations for Section 235 and 236 units and other forms of subsidized housing provoked 
intense, racially inflected hostility from suburban homeowners and officials.  As 
suburban residents and policymakers watched and read about the racial transitions 
occurring in Beecher and Mt. Morris Township, many vowed to resist subsidized housing 
units in their communities.  In April 1970, the editors of the Fenton Independent 
denounced a plan to build Section 235 units in their city, warning that subsidized housing 
would create ―a slum area.‖
22
  That same year, 150 residents in Davison Township 
organized against a developer‘s proposal to build a complex of low-cost townhomes.  
―What will it [the complex] be like 10 years from now?‖ one concerned resident 
demanded to know.
23
  The following year, residents of the city of Davison mobilized 
after hearing a rumor that a builder planned to erect a Section 236 apartment complex.  
Although the rumor turned out to be untrue, the Davison City Council responded 
immediately and decisively by implementing the most restrictive zoning and building 
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ordinance in the county.  Under normal circumstances, the Davison City Council only 
voted on ordinances after a ten-day waiting period.  In this case, however, Mayor Judson 
S. Davis ordered an immediate vote on the building and zoning code, claiming that the 
rumored project constituted a ―danger to the health, safety and welfare of the Davison 
community.‖  Concurring with Mayor Davis‘s opinion, city council members 
immediately enacted new zoning and building guidelines.  Davison‘s 1971 code—
designed specifically to restrict the construction of homes and rental units for low-income 
families—required developers to allocate at least 5,500 square feet of land for each three-
bedroom apartment erected in the city.  The law prohibited developers from building any 
more than 8.5 apartment units on each acre of land.  Moreover, to block the construction 
of freestanding Section 235 houses, the Davison ordinance mandated that all single-
family homes have a minimum of 1,096 square feet of living space on the ground floor.
24
   
Two years after Davison legislators enacted their restrictive zoning and building 
code, members of the Grand Blanc Township Board passed their own multiple-family 
housing ordinance.  Only slightly more lenient than the Davison law, the Grand Blanc 
Township code allowed a maximum of 9.3 apartments per acre.  In 1973, board members 
in Vienna and Mundy Townships joined the movement against subsidized housing by 
voting to raise the minimum size requirements for new homes.  Because the Section 235 
and 236 programs required builders to abide by strict pricing guidelines, codes such as 
those passed in Davison and Grand Blanc Township effectively banned all low-cost, 
government-subsidized housing units.  Indeed, most builders found that it was impossible 
to construct low-cost homes and rental units under the new codes.  Over time, other 
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In addition to passing zoning and building codes, suburban officials resisted 
subsidized housing and the incursion of African Americans by establishing prohibitive 
utility and service regulations.  Even in cases where developers of Section 235 and 236 
units could meet suburban building and density requirements, they found it extremely 
difficult to obtain water and sewer services.  In 1970, an anonymous elected official in 
Genesee County described how local utility departments in the suburbs harassed builders 
who developed low-cost housing:  
A contractor of ours will call up and say it‘s going to cost $5,000 to run 
water to five houses.  I get on the phone and call township officials.  After 
several minutes of conversation they finally get around to asking who is 
going to move into the houses.  I tell them, ‗He‘s a factory worker, has 




   
When suburban officials suspected that African Americans would move into subsidized 
units, they often increased the hookup charges and fees or threatened to deny service.  By 
establishing restrictive lot and home size requirements and making utility costs 
prohibitively high for builders, suburban officials hoped to resist federal and local efforts 
to sprinkle ―fair share‖ subsidized housing throughout the out-county.  The results were 
impressive.  According to one 1974 survey, fewer than two hundred of the nearly fifteen 
hundred Section 235 units that builders constructed in Genesee County were located 
outside of Beecher and Flint.
27
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 The Section 235 and 236 programs generated great hostility among white 
suburbanites.  However, most suburban residents loathed traditional public housing even 
more.  During the 1960s and 1970s debates over urban renewal and freeway construction 
in Flint, civil rights activists from St. John Street and Floral Park fought a losing battle to 
have public housing units dispersed throughout the region.  Although activists and 
displaced families demanded fair share public housing, the Flint city attorney‘s office, 
citing federal HUD regulations, repeatedly determined that the Flint Housing 
Commission could neither own nor lease public housing units outside of the city.  
Consequently, all of the public housing complexes operated by the FHC—which, by 
1970, included 755 units—were located inside of the city limits.
28
   
During the early 1970s, as the St. John clearance project unfolded, activists and 
regional planning advocates mobilized again to disperse public housing throughout the 
county.  In December 1972, members of the Genesee County Metropolitan Planning 
Commission drafted a series of policy papers on the status of public housing in the out-
county.  Not surprisingly, the authors of these studies, Harold Black and Aaron 
Blumberg, determined that Flint‘s suburbs had less than their share of low-income 
housing.  In order to disperse low-income residents throughout the county, Black and 
Blumberg supported the creation of a countywide public housing commission.  They 
proposed that the commission oversee the construction of fifteen thousand units of 
subsidized housing spread evenly across the region.  Mindful of what was occurring in 
Beecher, Black and Blumberg attempted to reassure suburban officials that ―a planned 
allocation [of subsidized and public housing] will prevent any one community from 
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having its facilities swamped by a sudden and uncontrolled influx of units.‖  
Furthermore, they suggested that the racial fights and property abandonment that had 
occurred in Flint and Beecher would remain isolated if every county government received 
some units of subsidized housing.
29
   
On September 6, 1973, a subcommittee of the GCMPC endorsed Black‘s and 
Blumberg‘s proposal for a county public housing commission.  Hoping to preempt 
suburban opposition to the plan, Thomas H. Haga, the director of planning for the 
GCMPC, pledged that the proposed commission would not build any public housing 
units in the out-county without first gaining the approval of local officials.  Still, 
however, Flint Township Commissioner Russell P. Zaccaria and other suburban 
representatives on the Genesee County Board of Commissioners immediately denounced 
the idea.  ―This was told us [before] in Flint Township,‖ Zaccaria claimed, ―but the 236 
program was shoved down our throats.‖
30
  In the weeks following the release of the 
GCMPC‘s proposal, county commissioners and township boards moved quickly to 
exclude public housing from their communities.  Officials in south suburban Grand Blanc 
Township were among the first to act.  In March 1973, while GCMPC members were still 
deliberating on the issue, Grand Blanc Township Treasurer John Hrinevich devised a 
plan to block subsidized housing units.  Hrinevich proposed that the board establish a 
minimum lot size of twelve thousand square feet for single-family homes to ensure that 
no detached, subsidized houses went up in the township.  ―One thing that leads to inner-
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city type areas of subsidized housing are small lots,‖ he warned.  After unanimously 
endorsing Hrinevich‘s proposal, board members directed the Grand Blanc Township 
Planning Commission to prepare a new building code.
31
  The following year, as the 
GCMPC moved forward with its controversial plans, members of the Grand Blanc 
Township Board voted unanimously to create their own public housing authority.  By 
forming the Grand Blanc Housing Commission, board members hoped to establish their 
legal authority over the county in all matters pertaining to subsidized housing.  According 
to Grand Blanc Township Attorney Lyndon Lattie, who drafted the ordinance and several 
others like it, the creation of a local housing authority in no way meant that public 
housing was in the works.  To the contrary, Lattie argued that the establishment of the 
commission allowed local officials to preserve ―a maximum amount of local autonomy‖ 
in deciding whether (or not) to construct public housing units.
32
 
 The GCMPC‘s plan to create a countywide public housing commission set off a 
chain reaction of defensive political moves in suburban Genesee County.  Like their 
counterparts in Grand Blanc Township, suburban legislators throughout the county voted 
to establish local public housing commissions in order to obtain veto power over the 
proposed county authority.  In July 1974, board members in Mundy, Gaines, and 
Argentine Townships voted to establish public housing authorities.
33
  Later that year, 
Lattie helped members of the Davison Township Board draft their own public housing 
ordinance.  As he had in Grand Blanc Township, Lattie informed board members that the 
only way to stop the county from building subsidized units in their community was to 
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establish a local public housing commission.  ―Without a local commission,‖ Lattie 
pointed out, ―the county could determine when, where and how public housing came into 
the township and the Township Board would have no control over it.‖  In October, 
Davison Township officials followed Lattie‘s advice and voted to create a public housing 
commission.  Throughout the 1972-74 controversy, GCMPC planners consistently 
reminded suburban officials that they would not seek to build public housing units 
without first gaining consent from local officials.  However, township board members 
took little comfort in such reassurances.  Instead, legislators in the cities, villages, and 
townships surrounding Flint—all of them determined to prevent the ―Beecherization‖ of 
their communities—preemptively blocked public housing before the GCMPC had even 
formed a regional housing authority.  Sensing the depth of the opposition to their plan, 
GCMPC officials ultimately abandoned their effort to create a regional public housing 
authority.  The GCMPC‘s decision to drop the proposal for a countywide commission 
ensured that all of the county‘s public housing complexes—and almost all of the region‘s 
subsidized housing units—would remain in the city of Flint.
34
    
 Across the county during the 1970s, suburban planners and legislators 
successfully resisted plans for fair share subsidized housing.  According to a 1980 survey 
of subsidized housing in the Flint metropolitan area, fourteen of the eighteen townships in 
Genesee County contained no government-subsidized rental units at all.  Only five of the 
twelve incorporated cities and villages in the out-county had any subsidized rentals.  
Moreover, of the 1,735 subsidized rental units in total that were located in suburban Flint, 
almost all were restricted to elderly occupants.  As of 1980, in fact, there were only 391 
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subsidized rental units specifically reserved for low-income families in the whole of 
suburban Genesee County, almost all of which were in or near the Beecher area.
35
   
 By the close of the century, the racial landscape of private and public housing had 
changed very little.  In 1997, Michigan State University geographer Joe T. Darden and 
Joshua Bagakas published a report on the impediments to fair housing in Genesee 
County.  Like so many of their predecessors, Darden and Bagakas found that African 
Americans were severely underrepresented in every area of the county except Beecher, 
Mt. Morris Township, and the city of Flint.  At century‘s end, this study argued, white 
racism, restrictive zoning and building codes, and real estate discrimination continued to 
play a major role in limiting the housing options of all African Americans, regardless of 
their class status.  ―Black socioeconomic mobility,‖ Darden and Bagakas found, ―does 
not guarantee freedom of spatial mobility.‖  As well, the authors determined that the 
restrictions on subsidized housing in the out-county helped to sustain rigid patterns of 
racial and class segregation.  Of the twelve public housing sites that existed in Genesee 
County in 1997, all were inside of Flint‘s municipal borders.  Because black people were 
overrepresented in virtually all of Flint‘s public housing complexes, the exclusionary 
policies of suburban governments had a disproportionate racial effect.
36
   
Darden and Bagakas marshaled an impressive array of statistics to support their 
claims of housing discrimination in Genesee County.  Yet their findings only echoed the 
complaints that civil rights activists in Flint and elsewhere had been lodging for decades.  
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In December 1974, Vernon E. Jordan, the executive director of the National Urban 
League, wrote a syndicated op-ed column on suburban discrimination that ran in the Flint 
Journal and scores of other newspapers throughout the United States.  Entitled ―Behind 
Suburbia‘s Barricades, Where Few Blacks Are Allowed,‖ Jordan‘s editorial provided 
historical context for the growing divide between majority-black cities and all-white 
suburbs: ―There are two basic reasons why blacks did not join the movement to the 
suburbs—past and present racial discrimination in housing, and the suburbs‘ intentional 
lack of housing opportunities for lower income families.‖  ―Suburban governments,‖ he 
charged, ―erect barricades behind which few blacks are allowed.  Their zoning laws make 
it impossible to build on smaller lots or to build apartment housing.‖  Although Jordan 
focused on the racial barriers to black suburbanization, he concluded the editorial by 
expanding his critique of suburban exclusion.  ―The vicious cycle of housing 
discrimination and denial to equal housing opportunities has to be broken,‖ he warned, 
―before the country is permanently locked into rigid class and racial segregation.‖  By 
invoking class, Jordan pointed to the broader array of economic barriers that suburban 
governments had constructed during the second half of the twentieth century to exclude 
poor people.  Indeed, as Jordan noted, many of the obstacles that suburban governments 
erected to prevent African Americans from moving to the suburbs also severely restricted 
the housing opportunities available to poor and working-class whites.
37
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Suburban Land Use Planning and the Defense of Class Privilege                   
During the postwar era, elected officials in suburban Genesee County received an 
extraordinary amount of pressure to urbanize government services and utilities in the out-
county.  Hoping to increase living standards and property values, ordinary homeowners, 
out-county employers, FHA underwriters, mortgage lenders, and state health inspectors 
alike pressed suburban policymakers to deliver more and better amenities to taxpayers.  
In the three decades following World War II, suburban officials in Genesee County 
worked aggressively to meet these demands for urban services by raising taxes and 
allocating millions of dollars for new schools and roads, modern water and sewer 
systems, and other infrastructural and service-related improvements.  As well, cities, 
villages, and townships in the out-county adopted strict new zoning and building codes to 
preserve racial segregation, manage growth, and protect property values.  In exchange for 
these commitments, local mortgage lenders and FHA officials gradually shifted their 
investment strategy from all-white neighborhoods in the city to segregated subdivisions 
in the suburbs.   
By the end of the 1950s, residential building in the city of Flint had slowed 
dramatically.  During the 1960s, new residential construction in the city all but halted.  
Between 1960 and 1968, the city of Flint lost an average of sixty-nine dwelling units per 
year—due in large part to property abandonment, the decline in new home construction, 
and urban renewal.  In the suburbs, however, the building boom had only just begun.  
Though city-suburban construction imbalances were common in most metropolitan areas, 
they were especially stark in Genesee County.  From 1964 to 1966, the number of new 
building permits generated each year for private residential construction in Flint dropped 
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from 1,084 to 742.  Over the same period, the number of permits issued in the out-county 
increased from 2,247 to 2,877.  By the mid 1960s, then, builders were erecting nearly 
four times as many homes each year in the suburbs as they were in the Flint.  In 1966, 
new housing starts just in Flint Township exceeded those in Flint by over a hundred.  The 
building mismatch between Flint and Flint Township reflected broader trends of 
residential decentralization that were occurring simultaneously throughout the county.  
During the 1960s, the urbanized townships surrounding Flint added an average of 244.8 
new housing units per year while the freefall in Flint housing starts continued unabated.
38
   
 Regardless of the decade in question, the fastest growing cities, villages, and 
townships in Flint‘s postwar suburbs were usually those that offered public water, sewers, 
zoning, and other urban-style amenities.  Whether in the 1940s or the 1960s, new 
building activity correlated closely with the opening of new roads, school construction, 
the modernization of utility services, and the establishment of land use plans.  
Nevertheless, the new residential developments of the 1960s and 1970s differed in many 
important respects from their mid-century antecedents.  Specifically, the 1960s and 1970s 
witnessed a sharp rise in the construction of low-cost mobile homes and multiple-family 
housing—structures with three or more dwelling units—in both cities and suburbs.  
During the immediate postwar era, builders in the Flint metropolitan area erected only a 
handful of multiple-family housing units.  Prior to 1960, multiple-family units comprised 
less than 1 percent of the dwellings constructed in suburban Flint.  In the 1960s, however, 
the desires of home seekers began to change.  Though most homebuyers in Genesee 
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County continued to prefer stand-alone houses to multiple-family arrangements, 
increasing numbers of residents in the 1960s and 1970s chose lower-cost mobile homes, 
condominiums, apartments, and townhomes over single-family detached structures.  In 
February 1970, planners from the Genesee County Metropolitan Planning Commission 
detected this market shift, noting, ―multiple-family structures are increasing at a much 
faster rate than are single-family dwellings.‖
39
  Between 1960 and 1970, multiple-family 
housing units in Genesee County increased by 43 percent while the number of mobile 
home units doubled.  By 1970, trailers and multiple-family units accounted for almost 20 
percent of the dwellings in the county.  Among the citizens who sought out these types of 
housing arrangements were thousands of whites who desperately wanted to leave the city 
but could not afford to purchase detached homes.  During the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the shift toward mobile homes and ―multiples‖ intensified as economic stagflation pushed 
the cost of single-family units beyond the reach of most ordinary autoworkers.  In 1966, 
conventional mortgage lenders in Genesee County typically required a 10 percent down 
payment and offered loans at 8 percent interest.  Over the next four years, local interest 
rates surged past 10 percent.  In order to qualify for lower interest rates, lenders required 
homebuyers to make down payments of up to 25 percent.  For many prospective 
homeowners, rising down payments and interest rates made the cost of a traditional home 
prohibitive.  Still eager to leave Flint, though, thousands of working-class whites in the 
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1960s and 1970s chose to trade their single-family homes in the city for smaller, cheaper, 
and more densely settled communities in the suburbs.
40
  
 The growth in mobile home parks and multiple-family housing in suburban Flint 
unleashed a wave of polarizing land use battles during the 1960s and 1970s.  Race, as it 
did during the conflicts over public housing, often played a prominent role in suburban 
land use disputes.  However, contestation over trailer parks, townhomes, and apartment 
complexes often brought whites of different class backgrounds into conflict with one 
another.  Determined to preserve the social and economic integrity of their schools and 
neighborhoods, many suburban homeowners and legislators resisted the construction of 
affordable housing even when builders and realtors marketed those units exclusively to 
whites.
41
   
The case of Fenton Township is instructive.  During the 1950s and 1960s, intense 
battles over trailer parks and taxes erupted in that far south suburb.  In the summer of 
1955, a developer announced plans to construct a sixty-unit trailer park in the Lake 
Fenton section of the township.  In response, homeowners and members of the Lake 
Fenton Board of Education urged policymakers in the township to deny the developer‘s 
building permit and re-zoning requests.  While many homeowners objected to the 
development due to concerns about property values, school officials opposed to the 
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project because they feared enrollment increases.  On January 18, 1956, Harry S. 
Newcombe, the president of the school board in Lake Fenton, denounced the plan on 
behalf of the entire board of education.  In a letter to the Fenton Township Zoning Board, 
Newcombe argued that trailer parks did not generate sufficient tax revenues to fund the 
enrollment increases they caused.  Because state law in Michigan allowed trailer park 
owners and residents to pay less in taxes than the owners of single-family homes, 
Newcombe and the other school board members maintained, ―…we wish to go on the 
official records of the Zoning Board as being unanimously opposed to the granting of any 
permit for the construction and operation of additional trailer parks in this school 
district.‖
42
  Categorically, then, Newcombe and his colleagues objected to all trailer park 
facilities.   
 Prior to the mid-1960s, Newcombe and other opponents of trailer parks won few 
victories in Fenton Township.  Committed above all else to stimulating new residential 
development—even when it arrived in the form of low-cost mobile homes—members of 
the Fenton Township Board endorsed the 1955 trailer park rezoning proposal.  In 1962, 
the township board authorized an additional request to build a trailer park near Loon 
Lake.
43
  These new developments infuriated many homeowners and education officials.  
By the mid-1960s, opponents of trailer parks had won a majority of seats on the township 
board.  In 1967, the anti-mobile home faction approved a stringent trailer park licensing 
and inspection ordinance.  Among other things, the law required trailer park proprietors 
to obtain annual licenses from the township.  In order to gain and renew their licenses, 
park owners and residents had to submit to at least two formal inspections each year.  The 
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law also stipulated that individual mobile home lots could be no smaller than four 
thousand square feet with at least ten feet separating each unit.  Furthermore, the 
ordinance established that two-person units had to contain at least 250 square feet of 
―habitable space‖ and that each additional occupant beyond two required no less than a 
hundred square feet of extra living area.  Effectively, then, the trailer ordinance 
established limits on family size.  The intent of the new law, the Independent noted, was 
to prohibit all but the most ―ultra-modern‖ and exclusive trailer parks.  This was 
important, a 1968 Independent editorial suggested, because traditional trailer parks 
tended to attract disengaged, transient citizens, ―the very type of people . . . who seldom 
participate in community affairs.‖  Although most residents of the township agreed that 
the board should regulate trailer parks, some community members viewed the new 
ordinance as unfair.  According to John Mehall, the owner of the Lake Ponemah Mobile 
Home Resort, the ordinance‘s minimum space requirements limited reproductive freedom 
and were a form of class discrimination.  ―You cannot limit the number of children a 
couple can have in a mobile home,‖ he argued, ―without limiting the number of children 
a couple can have in a home in a subdivision.‖  If residents of single-family homes did 
not have to limit the size of their families, Mehall and other critics of the law charged, 
then neither should the occupants of trailer parks.
44
   
 The year after the Fenton Township Board passed its trailer ordinance, class 
tensions over land use erupted again in the community.  In the spring of 1967, local 
landowner Alton B. Lifsey asked the township planning commission to rezone his 
property on North Fenton Road so that he could develop the area‘s first ―deluxe multiple 
housing development.‖  Anticipating that some homeowners and school officials would 
                                                 
44
 Fenton Independent, January 27, February 17, 1966, May 30, 1968.  
560 
 
oppose the project, Lifsey assured commission members that larger families with school-
aged children would not move into the complex.  In order to minimize occupancy, Lifsey 
promised to restrict the development to apartments with no more than one or two 
bedrooms.  Furthermore, he informed the commissioners that the rents he planned to 
charge would be ―high enough to keep down larger families.‖  By describing the project 
as ―deluxe,‖ the developer also made a subtler point about the class backgrounds of the 
renters he sought.  In spite of Lifsey‘s reassurances, several residents who lived near the 
proposed development raised objections.  While some neighbors were skeptical about 
―Lifsey‘s plan for birth control,‖ others argued that the apartments would lower the 
property values of nearby single-family homes.  As well, some critics of the proposal 
suggested that a decision to approve Lifsey‘s project would only encourage developers of 
less desirable, low-cost apartments to submit their own rezoning requests.  Over the 
objections of these residents, however, the planning commission voted to approve 
Lifsey‘s request.  Soon after that, Fenton Township had its first deluxe apartments.
45
   
 The 1966-67 debates over trailer parks and luxury apartments in Fenton Township 
reveal a great deal about the politics of land use in the out-county.  Like their 
counterparts in Fenton Township, most suburban officials did not reflexively oppose 
trailer parks and multiple-family housing units.  Indeed, city, village, and township 
governments approved a record number of such projects during the 1960s and 1970s.  In 
order to obtain government approval, however, developers had to convince local 
authorities that their projects would be a boon to the local economy.  In most cases, this 
entailed demonstrating that proposed developments would exclude poor and working-
class renters with children, even if those families were white.  Such class-based 
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restrictions deeply offended affordable housing developers and the thousands of working-
class families who wanted to buy or rent low-cost housing in the suburbs.  By the end of 
the 1960s, the strong market demand for affordable suburban housing had collided head-
on with grassroots mandates for race- and class-restrictive zoning in the out-county, 
setting the stage for major land use battles in Flint‘s suburbs. 
 In February 1967, a fierce debate over zoning and mobile homes broke out in the 
far southeastern suburb of Atlas Township.  The conflict began in response to a rezoning 
request submitted by Wilfred O. Dunkel and Jacob Kremski, representatives of 
Champion Home Builders.  Dunkel and Kremski wanted to construct a six hundred-unit 
trailer park on 360 acres of land near the village of Goodrich.  Prior to doing so, however, 
they needed members of the Atlas Township Zoning Board to rezone the land for 
commercial use.  During the zoning board‘s February 8 meeting, over sixty residents of 
the primarily rural community spoke out against the $2 million project.  As in Fenton 
Township, homeowners and school officials led the opposition.  According to one critic 
who spoke at the meeting, ―More people in a community means more problems – not 
more blessings.‖  Speaking on behalf of the Goodrich Board of Education, Mrs. Janet F. 
Hempton claimed that the school system could not accommodate any new pupils.  ―We 
don‘t have enough classrooms right now,‖ she maintained.  For his part, Dunkel went to 
surprising lengths to assuage Hempton‘s concerns about increased student enrollment.  
Early in the meeting, Dunkel informed audience members that he and other trailer park 
owners had an ―unwritten law‖ of not allowing any families with more than three 
children.  Later on, though, Dunkel revised his statement, promising that he would 
―guarantee there won‘t be more than one [child] in four [trailers].‖  Not convinced by 
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Dunkel‘s promises, most residents indicated that they would continue to fight the project.  
On March 29, 1967, the township zoning board unanimously rejected the rezoning 
petition.  In explaining their vote, board members claimed that the township had neither 
the infrastructure nor the school facilities to accommodate a ―trailer city.‖
46
 
Suburban officials often relied on public opinion when they ruled on zoning 
disputes over trailer parks and multiple-family housing.  In September 1967, fifty 
concerned homeowners from Burton Township attended a meeting of the Burton 
Township Zoning Board to denounce developer Leonard Chandler‘s plan to build a four-
unit apartment building on Adams Road.  Although all in attendance agreed that the four 
one-bedroom apartments would not contribute to school overcrowding, the homeowners 
charged that the project would undermine property values.  In addition, most in 
attendance believed that approving Chandler‘s project would ―open the area to other 
apartment dwellings, with no guarantee as to the quality of construction.‖  Moved by the 
opposition, board members Homer Berry, John Turner, and Leslie Alward asked the 
audience to demonstrate, by a show of hands, their feelings towards the project.  After all 
in attendance voted nay, members of the board summarily rejected Chandler‘s request.
47
             
On several occasions during the late 1960s, suburban zoning boards ignored 
public opposition and voted to support low-cost housing developments.  In response, 
homeowner activists organized petition drives and referenda campaigns.  On November 
11, 1968, the Fenton Township Planning Commission, over the objections of seventy 
homeowners, voted to endorse a rezoning request for a proposed trailer park on North 
Road.  In their defense, the commissioners argued that the site was already zoned for 
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such use and that the land in question was far away from residential developments.  At 
the same meeting, the commissioners also declined to reject a rezoning request for an 
apartment complex, choosing instead to study the issue further.  Outraged by the 
commissioners‘ decisions, dozens of local homeowners organized a referendum 
campaign to halt the two developments.  On November 13, nearly fifty ―irate, indignant 
residents‖ attended a public meeting held by the Fenton Township Board to protest the 
planning commission‘s actions.  Speaking on behalf of homeowners from the Alpine 
Shores subdivision, David Wright predicted,  
As long as most of the people living in the township object, there will be 
no multiple dwellings.  We feel it is not necessary to have them as long as 
we have good quality homes for a tax base.  By going for multiple homes 
or mobile home parks, we will lose that [individ]uality. 
   
―We are against it [rezoning] now and will be against it two years from now,‖ another 
homeowner added.  ―We don‘t care how the area is redeveloped, just as long as it is not 
with multiple dwellings.‖  Impressed by the public show of force, the township board 
voted unanimously to reject the rezoning request for the multiple-family apartments.  
While homeowners applauded the decision to reject multiples, many of these activists 
vowed to continue their campaign until the township board overruled the commission‘s 
favorable ruling on the trailer park.  In opposition to the mobile home project, 
homeowners argued that the new units would overburden the township‘s sewer system 
and school facilities.  In an editorial entitled ―Any Place Else but Here,‖ the Independent 
denounced both existing and proposed trailer parks in or even near Fenton Township, 
claiming, ―It should just about be apparent by now that Fenton, Fenton Township and 
Tyrone Township do not want any more trailer parks.‖  ―Are you prepared to raise your 
taxes for operational costs while these freeloaders [in trailer parks] ride along?‖ resident 
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James Smeets asked.  On February 12, 1969, the Fenton Township Board bowed to the 
public pressure and voted to deny the rezoning request.
48
 
 In July 1968, an equally heated dispute over zoning for trailers and apartments 
exploded in the nearby suburb of Davison.  The row began on July 20, when Reverend 
Ronald J. Button and his son Robert asked the Davison Zoning Board of Appeals to 
rezone thirty-four acres of swampland on the city‘s outskirts from residential to 
commercial.  The two men hoped to build an apartment complex and a ―200-unit prestige 
mobile home development‖ on the vacant property.  Anticipating resistance to the 
project, the Buttons worked hard to satisfy the fears of community members.  In order to 
alleviate concerns about density, sanitation, and blight, the developers offered to plant 
trees and grass, pledged to lease spaces only to upstanding permanent residents, and 
promised to subdivide the property into larger, more expensive lots.  Before announcing 
their intentions, the developers also gained approval for the $1 million project from 90 
percent of the residents who owned property nearby.  Still, though, citizens of Davison 
responded negatively to the Buttons‘ plans.  On August 9, a hundred residents asked the 
zoning board to deny the Buttons‘ request.  Jim Butler, a spokesperson for the opposition, 
charged that the development ―would destroy the flavor of the city‖ and that trailer parks 
were ―noisy, unsightly, [and] filled with transients who have no civic pride.‖  ―Cities are 
made up of homes,‖ he continued.  ―If I had wanted to live next to a trailer park, I would 
have moved near one.‖
49
   
 After deliberating on the issue, members of the zoning board agreed to endorse 
the project, arguing that the swampy land was not suitable for any other purpose.  On 
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October 14, the Davison City Council formally approved the project.  In response, the 
homeowners began collecting signatures to force a referendum on the issue.  Although 
opponents of the project easily obtained the 265 signatures required to trigger a citywide 
vote, the Buttons stalled their efforts by filing a lawsuit to block the referendum.  After 
several months of legal battles, the dispute ended when the Buttons won a favorable 
ruling against the referendum.  Ultimately, after a divisive campaign that raged for nearly 
a year, the Buttons triumphed in their efforts to build low-cost multiple-unit housing in 
Davison.  Their development opened without fanfare in 1970.
50
 
 Although the Buttons won their dispute in Davison, the victory was a mixed 
blessing for those who supported affordable housing construction in the suburbs.  
Following the battle in Davison, homeowners in the out-county repeatedly used the threat 
of referenda and other grassroots protest strategies to block a number of affordable 
housing projects.  For their part, suburban planners and legislators codified the popular 
resistance to low-cost housing by enacting strict building and zoning regulations.  In July 
1969, the Grand Blanc City Council passed a restrictive zoning ordinance to limit the 
construction of apartments and townhouses.  The Grand Blanc law mandated that 
developers could build no more than thirteen units of housing per acre.  According to 
local builder Dale Hicks and other critics of the legislation, the new density law 
effectively prohibited all but the most costly multiple-family complexes in the city.
51
  
Moreover, even if developers could satisfy Grand Blanc‘s rigid density requirements, the 
city council provided voters with a measure of veto power over all rezoning matters.  
Before rezoning any land in Grand Blanc, city council members, as a matter of official 
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policy, first surveyed all landowners living within three hundred yards of the property in 
question.  If 20 percent of the property owners objected in writing to the proposal, then 
rezoning required a two-thirds supermajority vote from the city council.  In April 1970, 
thirty-five homeowners exercised their veto power by protesting a rezoning request 
submitted by developer Richard Bechtel.  Bechtel, the president of Bechtel Construction 
Company, had requested the rezoning in order to build sixteen two-bedroom apartments 
and nine townhouses.  After hearing from the homeowners, the lone supporter of the 
project on the Grand Blanc City Council could not muster the requisite two-thirds 
majority needed to approve the project.
52
        
 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, hardly a month went by without major 
confrontations erupting over land use restrictions in suburban Genesee County.  When 
they learned of plans to develop apartments, trailer parks, and townhouses in their 
communities, suburban homeowner activists turned out in droves to express their 
opposition.  In December 1969, residents of Burton Township mobilized a successful 
campaign to block a mobile home park in their community.
53
  That same month, 
homeowners in Davison Township defeated a rezoning proposal for mobile homes in a 
referendum.
54
  The following year, Burton taxpayers helped to nix five separate proposals 
to build trailer parks in the township.
55
  By the spring of 1970, the fight over multiples 
had exploded again in the Davison area.  In May, homeowners in Davison Township 
formed the Concerned Residents of Davison Township to block an FHA-backed 
condominium complex.  As in other similar cases, the company that wanted to build the 
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condominiums, Pulte Homes, required a zoning change from residential to commercial in 
order to move forward with the plan.  In a full-page advertisement that ran in the Davison 
Index, the homeowner group denounced the rezoning proposal, claiming, ―The structures 
will be of the four-family FHA low-cost type.‖  ―Should this thrust be approved,‖ the 
homeowners charged, ―expert observers believe that property values in the vicinity could 
drop, traffic hazards would increase and general crowding problems would result.‖
56
  
Members of the Concerned Residents of Davison Township were especially displeased 
that buyers of the planned condominiums would only need to pay a small down payment 
of $950 to purchase units.  With such low down payments, the residents charged, the 
complex would invariably attract poor people to the township.  In defense of the project, 
Supervisor Kingsley and others argued that the condominiums would yield increased tax 
revenues.  Moreover, Kingsley pointed out that FHA closing costs would double the 
initial payments that buyers would have to make and that monthly maintenance and 
association fees would further increase the financial obligations of purchasers.  The 
monthly fees and the requirement of a $2,000 initial payment, supporters of the project 
maintained, ―would preclude having a low-cost settlement.‖  Persuaded by Kingsley‘s 
arguments, members of the Davison Township Board approved the rezoning proposal.
57
  
The board‘s decision enraged hundreds of homeowners.  Within a month of the vote, 
members of the Concerned Residents of Davison Township had collected nearly a 
thousand signatures in opposition to the project, more than enough to force a referendum.  
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 Suburban voters were not always successful in blocking apartment complexes and 
other forms of low-cost housing.  In January 1970, homeowners in the north suburban 
city of Clio submitted referendum petitions to block the construction of a $1.8 million 
156-unit apartment and townhouse complex.  As in virtually every other such case, the 
opponents of the rental complex argued that it would depress property values and cause 
school overcrowding.  For their part, the developers insisted that the project would 
increase tax revenues and stimulate economic growth in the city.  Furthermore, they 
contended that the project would not adversely affect property values due to its location 
near the city limits.  Although the homeowners won their campaign to have an election 
on the issue, they ultimately lost their bid to block the project.  On August 4, 1970, voters 
in Clio, in the city‘s first ever referendum election, endorsed the multiple-family rental 
project by a slim thirty-vote margin.  In the Clio case, voters endorsed the project because 
they desired new tax revenues to support the city‘s government and schools.  Moreover, 
they rejected the idea that a rental complex on the city‘s border would depress property 
values in the remainder of the community.
59
                          
The Clio case was not an isolated example.  As interest rates soared and the cost 
of housing increased during the 1970s, multiple-family units continued to grow in 
popularity.  Supporters of such housing countered their homeowner opponents with 
evidence that apartment complexes produced 3.6 times as much in taxes per acre as 
single-family homes.  Moreover, they maintained that in virtually every instance 
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municipal service costs for multiples were lower than for detached houses.
60
  In some 
cases, suburban planners and legislators accepted the pro-growth arguments of 
developers and backed requests to build multiple-family housing.  At times, even 
homeowners—especially those living farthest from proposed new developments—
accepted the construction of townhomes and apartments as a necessary compromise to 
achieve economic growth.  Nevertheless, the vast majority of homeowners in Genesee 
County agreed that there should be strict limitations on the type of multiple-family 
housing allowed in their communities.  Proposals to build ―deluxe‖ apartments and 
condominiums for middle-class and professional whites without children encountered far 
less resistance than developments that promised to attract African Americans, working-
class families, and the poor.   
Responding to the increased demand for affordable suburban housing, developers 
in the out-county rushed to build thousands of low-cost dwelling units during the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Racial succession in Flint and Beecher, rising home mortgage interest rates, 
and the economic slowdown of the 1970s all converged to fuel the expanding market for 
suburban trailers and multiples.  Urban racial panics helped to drive tens of thousands of 
white homeowners from the city to the suburbs, but economic factors severely limited the 
options available to fleeing whites.  Under these conditions, suburban officials found 
themselves inundated with thousands of new building permit applications and rezoning 
requests for apartments, townhomes, and trailer parks.  To suburban officials in Clio and 
elsewhere, the boom in multiples seemed to be the wave of the future.  In their attempts 
to lure new development and higher tax revenues, some out-county policymakers 
endorsed the construction of multiples, especially when those developments catered to 
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professional whites without children.  If homeowners wanted new roads, schools, and 
sewers, these pro-growth suburbanites argued, then they would have to approve at least 
some units of affordable housing or expect significantly higher taxes.  During a 1970 
rezoning fight in the Davison area, Davison Township Attorney William McTaggart—
who had authored the 1966 anti-picketing ordinance—made the case for accepting new 
development.  ―We cannot duck the responsibility of doing something to alleviate the tax 
situation.  It can only be done by rezoning to attract tax dollars into the community. . . . 
The township board is trying to regulate property use for orderly growth.‖  ―It‘s not right 
for the township board to be subjected to referendum after referendum,‖ he continued, 
―when it is only trying to do a service to the community.‖
61
             
Ever cognizant of the racial situation unfolding in Beecher, realtors, developers, 
and pro-growth suburban officials sought to restrict most new developments to white 
buyers and renters.  Nevertheless, homeowner activists revolted against virtually every 
attempt to build high- and medium-density housing complexes in their communities.  
Although suburban opponents of trailer parks and multiple-family housing were not 
always successful in blocking new developments, they accumulated an impressive 
number of victories during the 1960s and 1970s.  Still, Genesee County had become one 
of the trailer park capitals of Michigan by 1970.  During that year, there were 3,674 
mobile home units in the county as a whole, most of them located in trailer courts and 
parks.  However, 80 percent of those units were concentrated in Flint and the urbanized 
townships closest to the city.  Of the thirty-two cities, villages, and townships in the 
county as a whole, nineteen had no mobile home parks at all.  Similarly, most units of 
multiple-family housing in Genesee County were located in tiny geographic clusters.  In 
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1970, planners from the Genesee County Metropolitan Planning Commission counted 
9,786 units of multiple-family housing in the region, 6,825 of which were in the central 
city.  Nearly two-thirds of the multiples located outside of the city of Flint were in the 
urbanized areas of Flint Township and the city of Grand Blanc.  Moreover, thirteen of the 
thirty-two governmental units in the county contained no units of multiple-family 
housing.  Responding to the complaints of homeowners, suburban planners and 
legislators in these thirteen areas resisted the spread of multiples by establishing 
restrictive land use policies.  When suburban policymakers voted to allow the 
construction of low-cost housing, they made sure to restrict it to small, discrete tracts of 
land.  As of 1970, in fact, government planners had zoned only 803 of the 405,367 acres 
of land in Genesee County for either mobile homes or multiples.  By 1975, builders had 
erected an additional 7,179 multiple-family dwellings, some of them in suburban areas 
that had previously blocked affordable housing.  Still, though, nearly 70 percent of the 
units constructed between 1970 and 1975 were located either in Flint or in urbanized 
areas near the city limits.
62
                                     
During the 1960s and 1970s conflicts over multiples, the specter of the racial and 
economic transitions occurring in Flint and Beecher loomed large in the minds of 
suburban homeowners.  However, suburban activists only rarely made direct references 
to race and class when they organized against affordable housing.  One exception to this 
rule occurred in 1972, when the racial and class anxieties of suburban white homeowners 
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exploded into the open during a fight over a low-cost housing development in the 
southwestern suburb of Gaines Township.  The conflict began when builders from the 
Starline Construction Company received the township board‘s approval to construct a 
230-unit subdivision of low-cost homes just west of Swartz Creek.  In order to make the 
homes more affordable, Starline decided to build the houses on small lots with frontages 
of sixty feet and worked out an arrangement with the Farmers Home finance company to 
offer the homes for sale with no down payments.  When homeowners learned about these 
terms, they mobilized in opposition.  During a July meeting of the Gaines Township 
Board, forty residents shouted down E. Manuel Sarko, a representative from Starline.  
―Let‘s face it!  He‘s building a ghetto!‖ one resident screamed.  ―We had to have a 
$2,000 down-payment when we moved into our home,‖ said another resident.  ―These 
people consider this cheap rent, and when they get a chance, they move out and leave the 
place to go to ruin.‖  ―You don‘t upgrade farmland by putting little boxes on it,‖ shouted 
another resident.  ―Take your little boxes somewhere else.  We don‘t want them.‖  If 
people wanted to live in ―little boxes,‖ some in the group charged, then they should go to 
Flint or Beecher, where ―there were plenty of these types of homes being abandoned . . . 
every day.‖
63
   
 Unlike homeowners in most suburban areas, the residents of Gaines Township 
were not successful in blocking the construction of low-cost housing.  Nevertheless, their 
fight is worth noting because it illustrates a broader set of concerns that motivated 
suburban activists during the 1960s and 1970s.  Suburban homeowners, along with many 
of their elected representatives, fought to defeat low-cost residential developments 
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because they accepted what thirty years of federal and local policies had taught them 
about property values.  Specifically, they believed that low-rent housing attracted low-
rent individuals—the sort of people who had helped to destroy neighborhoods, property 
values, and community integrity in Flint and Beecher.  For many white homeowners, 
then, the struggle against low-cost housing was part of the broader campaign for 
independence from Flint and its problems.  For that reason, suburban homeowners and 
policymakers fought just as hard to oppose annexation and metropolitan government as 
they did to block trailer parks and apartment complexes.  Indeed, in the minds of 
suburban homeowner activists, these struggles were the same.              
 
The Life and Death of Annexation 
Like urban centers across the United States, the city of Flint grew tremendously during 
the first half of the twentieth century.  By the mid-1950s, Flint could claim nearly 
200,000 residents.  Yet the city‘s boundaries failed to keep pace with its meteoric 
population growth.  Between 1920 and 1960, the city‘s total geographic area remained 
fixed at just under thirty square miles.  By contrast, the booming Sunbelt city of Houston 
contained over three hundred square miles of territory in 1960.  A combination of 
restrictive state laws governing urban spatial growth, liberal municipal incorporation 
statutes, and suburban hostility to annexation helped to keep Flint‘s boundaries in place 
during the postwar decades.  Unlike state legislators in Texas, North Carolina, and other 
Sunbelt states who endorsed liberal postwar annexation policies, lawmakers in Michigan 
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drafted a legal code that made it virtually impossible for cities such as Flint to expand 
their boundaries.
64
   
Michigan‘s relatively lenient municipal incorporation statutes played a key role in 
halting the geographic expansion of Flint, Detroit, and other central cities.  Under 
Michigan law, unincorporated territories seeking to become home rule cities had to 
contain at least two thousand residents and have a minimum population density of five 
hundred people per square mile.  If any unincorporated geographic entity met those basic 
requirements, then residents favoring incorporation had to collect signatures from 1 
percent of the area‘s duly registered landowners.  After gathering support from the 
required number of qualified citizens, supporters of incorporation next forwarded the 
petitions to the county clerk, who held the power to order an election.  If the clerk 
approved the petitions and scheduled an election, then incorporation required the support 
of a simple majority of qualified voters.  Upon winning an election, proponents of 
incorporation then drafted a city charter, which also required voters‘ approval.  Once 
incorporated, new cities could levy higher taxes, provide municipal services, and block 
all annexation attempts from adjoining municipalities.
65
   
During the 1958 battles over New Flint, citizens in the southwestern suburb of 
Swartz Creek voted to incorporate to protect their Chevrolet warehouse from future 
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annexation.  In September 1959, Swartz Creek voters officially endorsed a new city 
charter.  By the early 1960s, voters in several additional suburban areas had followed 
suit.  In April 1963, the citizens of Fenton and Flushing approved incorporation 
proposals.  Often, these incorporation elections hinged on local debates over utilities, 
services, and campaigns to secure new FHA-backed investment.  In order to gain better 
services and modernize living standards, proponents of incorporation argued, townships 
and villages had to become home rule cities.  Such was the case in Flushing, where 
supporters of incorporation purchased full-page newspaper advertisements asking voters 
to choose incorporation to ―END SEPTIC TANKS‖ and ―PLUG UP THE WELLS – 
GET PURE CITY WATER – QUALIFY FOR LOW-COST FHA LOANS ON 
MORTGAGES.‖
66
  Voters in these elections also knew that incorporation would forever 
protect their new investments from the prospect of annexation.           
Beyond Michigan‘s liberal municipal incorporation legislation, restrictive state 
laws governing annexation also limited the power of city officials who wished to acquire 
suburban land.  As with incorporation, annexation attempts in Michigan began with a 
petitioning process that required signatures from 1 percent of the qualified property 
owners in the combined areas affected by the proposed boundary changes.  Once they 
collected the signatures, supporters of annexation forwarded petitions to the county board 
of supervisors.  If members of the county board could certify the authenticity of the 
petitions, then they ordered an annexation election.  In order to achieve annexation, a 
majority of voters in both the city and the township in question—counted separately—
had to endorse the plan.  By requiring separate majorities in both the city and suburbs, 
                                                 
66
 Flushing Observer, March 28, April 4, 1963; Fenton Independent, April 4, 1963; and Gail R. Light, 
―Areas Outside Flint Can Expect More Growth in ‗70s,‖ Flint Journal, December 31, 1969. 
576 
 
state law effectively provided suburban residents with veto power over annexation 
attempts.  In September 1961, voters in Flint Township demonstrated their electoral 
power by voting three-to-one against a proposed annexation to the city of Flint.
67
  
Although GM executives had offered their ―wholehearted endorsement‖ of the plan to 
annex the entire township—and though votes in favor of annexation far exceeded those 
against—the legal requirement of a separate majority in Flint Township proved 
decisive.
68
  Annexation would have to come by other means.         
Enlightened by the New Flint and Flint Township annexation defeats, Vehicle 
City officials altered their expansion strategy in the early 1960s.  Specifically, they 
moved to circumvent their suburban opponents by ―strip‖ annexing factories, shopping 
malls, and other uninhabited or sparsely populated lands.  Regarding the annexation of 
uninhabited areas contiguous to the city—namely factories and shopping centers—state 
law in Michigan required only a simple majority of voters in the city and affected 
suburban areas, counted together.  This loophole provided legal space for city officials to 
prepare annexation petitions for several major industrial and commercial facilities that 
ringed the city‘s border.  On November 14, 1961, City Manager Thomas Kay filed four 
separate petitions to annex 5,422 acres of predominantly industrial and commercial 
property in parts of Flint, Mt. Morris, Genesee, and Burton Townships.  Specifically, Kay 
sought the four GM plants on Van Slyke and Bristol Roads, the Ternstedt division facility 
in suburban Beecher, Bishop Airport, the South Flint Plaza, the Northwest Shopping 
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Center, and a large residential area north of the city that city leaders had slated for 
commercial and industrial redevelopment.
69
   
As with the New Flint proposal, the November 1961 annexation petitions received 
strong public support from the Mott Foundation, the UAW, the Chamber of Commerce, 
GM, and other members of the city‘s pro-growth coalition.
70
  In August 1961, the plant 
managers of GM‘s four Flint Township facilities publicly announced their support for 
annexation to Flint.
71
  During a 1961 address, AC Spark Plug executive Joseph Anderson 
pointed out that Flint had no more room available for industrial development and that 
annexation would make the entire area more attractive to GM and other employers: ―The 
expansion of General Motors in the Flint area during the past 10 to 20 years has been 
possible because GM officials of Flint have been able to point out to other corporation 
officials that ‗Flint solves its problems.‘‖  ―If a community holds a plant in a small area,‖ 
Anderson warned, ―industrial development will be cut off.‖  ―GM can‘t afford to go into 
an area that‘s going to do that sort of thing.‖
72
  Harding Mott, Charles Stewart‘s son, 
echoed Anderson‘s claims, noting, ―Without approval of these annexation proposals, 
Flint will be in a poor competitive position to attract new or expanded industry.‖  ―The 
future of the entire county,‖ he added, ―could be strangled by holding Flint‘s city-limits 
where they stand today.‖
73
  Yet again, GM officials worked to solidify their metropolitan 
growth strategy by expanding the city‘s boundaries.   
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Under the leadership of Thomas Kay, Second Ward Commissioner James H. 
Darby, and Flint Mayor Charles A. Mobley, city commissioners unanimously endorsed 
the 1962 campaign.  If the annexation bid failed, Mobley predicted, then all of the four 
townships surrounding the city would attempt to incorporate.  Like the city‘s automobile 
executives, Mayor Mobley believed that suburban incorporation ―would strangle 
prospects for growth and prosperity‖ in the landlocked city.
74
  For his part, City Manager 
Kay urged voters to support annexation by invoking images of arcane historical cities 
surrounded by walls and other barriers: ―History books have stories and pictures of cities 
with walls and, in American history, there were forts.  The walls and forts fell as we 
became more civilized.‖
75
  By employing the metaphor of the walled city, Kay hoped to 
appeal to a shared sense of purpose among city and suburban residents.   
In spite of Kay‘s hopes, the 1961 and 1962 annexation battles demonstrated that 
clear majorities of township officials and suburban residents embraced the political and 
spatial barriers that separated Flint from its neighbors.  The opposition to the 1962 
annexation attempt brought together many of the same activists who had opposed New 
Flint in 1958.  During the fall and winter of 1961, residents formed anti-annexation 
committees in each of the four townships surrounding the city.  Predictably, opposition to 
the annexation drive was strongest in Flint Township, which stood to lose four GM plants 
and slightly less than two-thirds of its overall tax base of $112 million.  Under the 
leadership of Flint Township Supervisor Raymond Flavin and other suburban 
supervisors, members of the various anti-annexation committees throughout the county 
waged a spirited campaign to block Flint‘s attempt to ―steal‖ suburban properties.  
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―When Russia can‘t get what it wants by negotiation,‖ Flavin charged, ―they go out and 
take it.‖  ―This is exactly what Flint is doing.‖
76
  In an attempt to rally parents from the 
Carman School District, Flavin repeatedly charged that the annexation would undermine 
the educational opportunities of suburban children.  On December 28, 1961, after an 
unsuccessful attempt to block the annexation election, Flavin bemoaned the city‘s attack 
on equal educational opportunities: ―Flint Township is being crucified. . . . The people of 
my township have worked hard to give their children an education.  Now you are trying 
to take the opportunity for education away from these poor children.‖  Many suburban 
voters believed that strip annexation—pitting greedy and powerful urban machines 
against innocent suburban families—made a mockery of the cherished American values 
of hard work and fair play.   
Race also played an important role in the 1962 annexation saga.  Many suburban 
activists perceived annexation as a grave racial threat.  Though they framed their 
opposition to Flint within the values of the American Creed, some suburban residents 
feared that annexation—like subsidized housing—would generate an influx of black 
families to their neighborhoods.  In March 1961, Lawrence B. Rice, the chairperson of 
the Carman School District Citizens Advisory Committee, offered a critique of 
annexation that appealed to the racial anxieties of Flint Township residents.  In Flint 
Township, Rice claimed, ―you can walk down any street and you don‘t see any bars, any 
dives, and juke joints.‖
77
       
Not surprisingly, Flint officials triumphed in the 1962 annexation battle.  On 
February 27, voters in Flint overwhelmed their suburban opponents at the polls.  Needing 
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to gain only a majority of votes in the city and suburbs, counted together, the city easily 
won the annexation elections for the four Flint Township plants, Bishop Airport, the 
Northwest Shopping Center, and the South Flint Plaza.  The victory was a pyrrhic one, 
however.  In Beecher and Mt. Morris Township, voters successfully blocked the city‘s 
attempt to annex GM‘s Ternstedt facility and a parcel of sparsely inhabited residential 
land.  In total, the 1962 annexation campaign yielded the city 1,370 acres of land and 
increased the total assessed valuation of properties in Flint by over $70 million.  
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the election, opponents of annexation in Flint and Mt. 
Morris Townships waged a successful counterattack against the city.  Shortly after the 
1962 vote, members of the Genesee County Board of Education determined that all 
school taxes paid by Flint‘s newly acquired factories and shopping centers would 
continue to fund the Carman and Westwood Heights School Districts.  Lawyers 
representing the Flint Board of Education fought the board‘s ruling in court, but to no 
avail.
78
  In addition to losing the school taxes generated by the newly acquired properties, 
the city also suffered a major blow to its public image during the 1962 annexation battle.  
Just a few weeks prior to the February elections, Spencer Carpenter, the chairperson of 
the Flint Township Anti-Annexation Committee, voiced the frustrations of thousands of 
suburban residents in announcing that he planned to sever all ties with the city of Flint.  
―If this is the way the city of Flint handles its matters,‖ Carpenter threatened, ―I don‘t 
want to ever be a part of Flint.‖  ―In fact, I‘m ashamed to write Flint as a return address 
on postcards I send out.‖
79
  Though Flint won an important victory in 1962, suburban 
bitterness over the annexation would linger for decades.    
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 During the 1960s and 1970s, Flint officials continued their attempts to strip annex 
properties on the city‘s borders.  In 1964, City Manager Kay filed a second round of 
petitions to annex GM‘s Ternstedt facility and a parcel of residential land in Genesee 
Township.  As in 1962, however, the legal requirement of a separate majority in 
populated areas allowed suburban voters to defeat the measure.  Unsatisfied with their 
victory, residents of Beecher waged a spirited but unsuccessful campaign for municipal 
incorporation in 1967.  Following suit, members of anti-annexation committees in Flint 
and Mt. Morris Townships also sought to block further annexation attempts through 
incorporation.  Although each of the three efforts went down to defeat, the 1960‘s drives 
for suburban incorporation demonstrated that suburban officials and homeowners were 
prepared not only to block annexation at the polls, but also to preempt future attempts by 
seeking incorporation.  By the end of the 1960s, the movement for suburban secession in 
Genesee County was already well underway.                
Suburban opposition to annexation did not deter city officials in Flint.  Because 
the four townships surrounding Flint remained unincorporated, Thomas Kay and other 
municipal officials remained hopeful that they could annex factories, shopping centers, 
and unoccupied land on the city‘s urban fringe.  On June 12 1969, Flint Journal reporter 
Lawrence R. Gustin leaked a report that Kay and others were ―actively considering‖ a 
plan to annex a section of Burton Township that included the Eastland Mall and a portion 
of GM‘s AC Spark Plug complex.  In addition to the Burton Township sites, Gustin also 
revealed that Flint sought to acquire a 115-acre parcel of vacant land in Genesee 
Township, which city officials hoped to develop as a horseracing track.
80
  Although 
Gustin‘s report was speculative in nature, it nonetheless triggered an immediate response 
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from officials in Burton Township.  Hoping to forestall a surprise annexation bid, 
officials in Burton Township had already collected the required number of signatures to 
force an incorporation vote long before the June 12 announcement.  Following the 
publication of Gustin‘s article, Burton Township Supervisor Uvick immediately rushed 
the petitions to Lansing, filing incorporation papers with the newly formed State 
Boundary Commission (SBC) on the evening of June 12.
81
  Within hours of reading 
Gustin‘s report, Uvick had preempted his rivals in Flint.
82
  By June 14, officials from 
Genesee and Flint Townships had also filed petitions for incorporation, all while City 
Manager Thomas Kay struggled to organize an annexation campaign within the city.
83
                         
 In December 1969, at a boundary commission hearing held at Atherton High 
School, well over five hundred suburban residents—a majority of them from Burton 
Township—showed up to demand incorporation.  According to newspaper reports, the 
crowd was so large that ―when the meeting opened at 7:30, cars were lined up a half mile 
north of the school, unable to get into the parking lot.‖  During the meeting, boundary 
commissioners listened to dozens of pleas from residents who wanted to incorporate.  
Raymond Brown, a resident of Burton Township, maintained that incorporation was the 
only way to stop Flint‘s ruinous annexation bid.  ―If we lose a large portion of our tax 
base we must cease to operate as we are used to doing,‖ he claimed.  ―Strip annexation 
will leave us as orphans—country cousins.  We want to be a man—a city.‖
84
  After 
                                                 
81
 On the formation of the State Boundary Commission, see Maureen J. Pan, Annexation Practices in 
Michigan: The City Perspective (Ann Arbor: Michigan Municipal League, 1988), 5-6. 
82
 Roger Van Noord, ―Burton Officials Rush to Lansing; Seek City Status,‖ Flint Journal, June 13, 1969. 
83
 Backus, ―Genesee Township Seeks City Status,‖ Flint Journal, June 14, 1969; Daniel L. Dolan, ―Flint 
Township Files Incorporation Petition,‖ Flint Journal, June 16, 1969.  For analysis of the incorporation 
petitions, see VerBurg, Snyder, Alchin, et al., Report to the Michigan State Boundary Commission; and 
Dolan, ―MSU Unit Reports on Area Annexation,‖ Flint Journal, March 8, 1970.   
84
 Pete Stevens, ―Burton‘s Drive Makes Impression,‖ Davison Index, December 10, 1969.  See also, 
Davison Index, November 26, 1969, April 29, 1970. 
583 
 
reviewing the petitions and hearing from concerned taxpayers, members of the SBC 
ordered incorporation elections in Flint, Burton, and Genesee Townships.
85
   
On April 13, 1971, voters in Flint and Genesee Townships rejected incorporation 
proposals.  Fearing the possibility of huge tax increases, homeowners blocked the 
Genesee Township incorporation.  Although the threat of losing manufacturing plants and 
developable land drove a substantial number of Genesee Township voters to support the 
proposed change, the measure nonetheless failed in a close race.  In Flint Township, 
where the 1971 effort was solely a defensive maneuver to  block future annexation 
attempts, voters also feared the high service costs that might accompany incorporation.  
Opponents of incorporation in Flint Township—many of whom had already voted to fund 
sewer lines, roads, schools, and water service—despised the prospect of new taxes as 
much as they loathed losing property to the city of Flint.  Consequently, the incorporation 
measure lost there by a two-to-one ratio.  However, in the crucial election in Burton 
Township, home of the Eastland Mall and part of GM‘s sprawling AC Spark Plug 
facility, voters strongly endorsed Uvick‘s plan to incorporate.  In an aggressive 
campaign, Uvick and members of the Burton Citizens Committee pitted themselves as 
underdogs against land-grabbing politicians in Flint.  ―We will be gambling with our tax 
base if we don‘t do something about incorporation,‖ Uvick reminded voters.  Fearful of 
losing the township‘s two largest taxpayers, voters—even those who had a strong 
emotional attachments to the old Burton Township—responded by choosing 
incorporation.  Although only Burton Township voters endorsed incorporation, the 1971 
elections still left the city of Flint in a precarious position.  According to Patrick Martin, 
the city‘s coordinator of economic development, Flint no longer possessed the land 
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necessary to lure new investment.  ―If any large manufacturer wanted 100 acres,‖ he 
claimed, ―we couldn‘t begin to accommodate it.‖  Without room to grow, Martin and 
others believed, the city faced a dark future.
86
 
The incorporation of Burton was a major setback to Flint‘s civic and industrial 
leaders.  Even though three of the four townships surrounding the city remained 
unincorporated in the aftermath of the 1971 elections, voters in those areas had made it 
clear that they were staunchly opposed to surrendering even vacant parcels of land to the 
city.  Consequently, most members of the city‘s political establishment interpreted the 
Burton incorporation vote as a signal that the era of annexations had officially ended.  For 
six years after the 1971 defeat, Flint City Council members carefully avoided discussing 
the issue of annexation in their public meetings.  However, the campaign to expand 
Flint‘s boundaries and tax base was not yet over.  On January 23, 1978, in a surprise 
move that shocked observers in the city and the county, Flint City Council member 
Michael McManaman—with support from two-thirds of his legislative colleagues and 
Mayor James W. Rutherford—launched one final annexation drive.  The 1978 plan 
included nineteen separate proposals to annex 3,500 acres of vacant land, commercial 
properties, and industrial establishments in Flint, Mt. Morris, and Mundy Townships.  
McManaman‘s proposal also included a bid to annex the Genesee Valley Shopping 
Center in Flint Township, the most valuable commercial development in the region.  
Shrewdly, McManaman and Flint City Attorney Richard Figura carefully divided the 
nineteen parcels of land such that none contained more than a hundred residents.  They 
did this to avoid a popular vote, knowing that the State Boundary Commission, under 
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Michigan‘s recently revised annexation code, possessed the authority to approve strip 
annexations without elections in areas containing fewer than a hundred residents.  
Anticipating suburban hostility to the proposal, McManaman preemptively defended the 
move, arguing, ―We did what we felt was our obligation to do.  We saw the opportunity 
to help the City of Flint‘s economy and we took it.  If we didn‘t, I think we wouldn‘t be 
upholding our oath of office.  We‘re supposed to do all we can as councilmen to serve the 
city.‖  ―Cities have to grow,‖ former Flint City Manager Thomas Kay added, ―and 
townships are the only places they can do it.‖
87
     
 Within hours of the announcement, homeowners and elected officials in Mundy, 
Mt. Morris, and Flint Townships were busy coordinating their responses.  While Mt 
Morris Township Supervisor Donald Krapohl was confident that the boundary 
commission would summarily reject the petitions, he nonetheless threatened to fight the 
annexation bid ―all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court if necessary.‖  Flint Township 
Supervisor Raymond Flavin—ever mindful of losing the Genesee Valley Shopping 
Center—exploded in anger when he heard about the proposal.  Perhaps remembering his 
inability to block the 1962 annexation of the township‘s GM plants, he exclaimed, 
―Though shalt not steal.‖  ―You don‘t just rob people.  We‘ll show Flint exactly how low 
they are.‖  Because Flint Township stood to lose 75 percent of its tax base if the 
annexation succeeded—significantly more than the other two townships involved—the 
reaction there was especially hostile.  On January 25, in a joint statement released to the 
media, Flavin, Flint Township Secretary Beverly Hunt, and Richard Wood, the 
township‘s treasurer, pledged to ―fight this land grab effort with every fiber of our 
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being.‖  Equally upset, Mundy Township Supervisor Edward Morey vowed to ―fight 
hard‖ to stop Flint‘s expansion efforts.  On February 7, Flavin and other suburban 
policymakers unveiled a four-pronged strategy to resist the annexation effort.  The plan 
included making a strong case against annexation to the State Boundary Commission, 
convincing state legislators to pass a new anti-annexation law, assembling a legal team to 
challenge Flint‘s plan in court, and waging a retributive campaign to end cooperative 
political endeavors with the city of Flint.  At the grassroots level, suburban activists 
organized Citizens to Stop Strip Annexation, wrote dozens of letters to local newspapers, 
and set up a booth at the Genesee Valley Shopping Center to collect petitions against the 
plan.  Although suburbanites often disagreed with one another over land use questions, 
almost all agreed that Flint politicians were trying to commit an act of theft.
88
      
 After receiving McManaman‘s proposal, state boundary commissioners agreed to 
hold a series of hearings in the summer of 1978.  As local officials prepared for the 
impending battles, they carefully monitored the situation in Lansing, where state 
legislators from rural and suburban areas had already moved to block Flint‘s annexation 
bid and other similar proposals statewide.  The legislative efforts against Flint‘s 
expansion plan centered on Michigan House Bill 4030, a proposal designed to protect 
specially designated ―charter townships‖ from hostile annexations.  Under the terms of 
the bill—introduced by state representative Thomas H. Brown, a Democrat representing 
the Detroit suburb of Westland—legislative bodies in ―general law‖ townships could 
protect themselves from annexation by declaring themselves charter townships.  In order 
to obtain charters from the state of Michigan—which provided townships with legal 
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powers similar to those of incorporated cities—general law townships had to meet basic 
tax base, population, and public service criteria.  If suburban areas met the state‘s 
guidelines—as all of the three Flint suburbs in question did—then township boards could 
approve the status change by legislative action.  Upon learning of Brown‘s proposal, 
officials in Mundy, Flint, and Mt. Morris Townships immediately announced their intent 
to obtain charters.  In April, state legislators approved the new charter township law, 
which Governor William Milliken then promptly signed.  By June 15, the legislative 
boards in Flint and Mundy Townships had approved new charters.  Shortly thereafter, 
members of the Mt. Morris Township Board endorsed their new charter.  Meanwhile, in 
what amounted to a chain reaction, township boards in unaffected areas such as Genesee 
Township and Grand Blanc Township launched charter campaigns of their own.
89
    
In spite of the townships‘ ongoing legal status changes, the SBC moved ahead 
with its already scheduled deliberations.  On May 31, the SBC rejected five of Flint‘s 
annexation petitions, including the crucial bid to acquire the Genesee Valley Shopping 
Center.  According to several commissioners who ruled against the city, the petitions 
were ―sloppy,‖ poorly drawn, and full of major legal errors.  Though depressed by the 
ruling, city leaders pledged to press on with the remaining petitions.  At the next SBC 
hearing, held in July, Mayor Rutherford and other Flint officials argued that annexation 
was essential to luring new development back to the city.  Just in the 1970s, they argued, 
Flint had lost at least three hundred businesses to neighboring suburbs, primarily because 
the city lacked space to accommodate corporate expansions.  ―Flint needs to grow,‖ 
Rutherford stated.  ―Flint‘s like a boy too big for his britches.  The city is going to run out 
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of room pretty soon.‖  After pointing out that only 8 percent of the city‘s land was 
suitable for new development, Flint planner Dennis Larkin also endorsed the annexation 
petition, claiming, ―Annexation would provide the city with additional tax base which the 
city has lost to the townships over the years.‖  In opposition to Flint‘s petitions, Flint 
Township Supervisor Flavin and the township‘s attorney, John Etter, argued that the 
annexation blitz was a blatant and illegal land grab.  If city officials wished to lure new 
development, the suburban critics charged, then they should clear more land in the city.  
In addition, Etter maintained that it would be unjust for the SBC to allow the annexation 
after Flint Township had already spent millions of dollars constructing new sewer lines 
and water mains.  Most significantly, however, Flavin, Etter, and others argued that the 
annexation was no longer legal in light of the passage of House Bill 4030 and the 
townships‘ decisions to establish new charters.
90
 
 Ultimately, the SBC denied virtually all of Flint‘s requests for land.  On October 
17, the commissioners ruled that the Flint Township petitions were invalid due to the new 
charter township law.  The following May, after several months of appeals and intense 
legal and political maneuvering, the commissioners issued another judgment against the 
city.  In the May decision, the SBC rejected all of the petitions for Flint and Mundy 
Townships, once again citing the charter township legislation.  The commissioners did 
not throw out the Mt. Morris Township petitions because officials there had not obtained 
a charter prior to June 15, 1978, the deadline for receiving full protection under 
amendments to House Bill 4030.  However, after determining that the Mt. Morris 
Township Board had adequately serviced the land in dispute, the SBC rejected those 
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petitions as well.  In response to the SBC‘s anti-annexation rulings, Supervisor Flavin 
and other opponents of the annexation bid rejoiced.  Repeating the phrase he had first 




Suburban officials in the out-county reacted exuberantly to the SBC‘s ruling 
against Flint.  Flavin and his colleagues were especially pleased with the decision 
because they understood that it marked the end of the annexation era in Genesee County.  
The incorporation of Burton and the establishment of charter townships in the out-county 
left Flint without any additional room for expansion.  Moreover, bitterness over the land 
disputes severely undermined the already strained ties between Flint and its suburban 
neighbors.  In response to the annexation drive, county commissioners and township 
board members throughout the county voted to end most cooperative ventures with the 
city.  By August 1978, for instance, the Region 5 Planning and Development 
Commission—a countywide land use agency—had lost nine of its ten member townships 
in response to the annexation fight.  In 1981, legislative boards in the townships of 
Davison, Fenton, Mt. Morris, and several other out-county jurisdictions voted to cancel 
public bus routes between the city and suburbs.
92
  As Flint Journal reporter David G. 
Graham noted during the 1978-79 disputes, ―the era of cooperation . . . between the city 
and the out-county appears to be over.‖
93
  In the end, the 1960s and 1970s disputes over 
annexation yielded a deeply divided region with a landlocked, shrinking city at its core.  
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For Mayor Rutherford and other Flint boosters, the SBC‘s decision could not have come 
at a more inopportune time.  Indeed, just as the commissioners were assaying the merits 
of the annexation proposals, the nation‘s economy was sinking into another deep 
recession that would wreak havoc in the Vehicle City.  Surrounded by a wall of hostile 
suburbs, the city of Flint faced the economic crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s in 




“The Fall of Flint”: 
Decline and Renewal in the Post-Vehicle City 
 
 
The deindustrialization of Flint occurred in waves.  During the 1940s and 1950s, GM 
executives and downtown business owners implemented their suburban investment 
strategies by building new plants and retail outlets near recently opened freeways and 
booming all-white subdivisions outside of the city.  In 1958, members of the Vehicle 
City‘s pro-growth coalition devised New Flint in an attempt to recapture those 
developments.  When that plan failed on the shoals of a new suburban independence 
movement, the city‘s political leaders looked to annexation and urban renewal to stave 
off economic decline.  By the close of the 1970s, municipal officials had cleared 
hundreds of acres of residential land for industrial and commercial redevelopment, strip 
annexed a number of valuable suburban businesses, and constructed a new urban freeway 
and interchange, all in their attempts to lure white homeowners, tourists, jobs, and 
investors back to Flint.  As well, city council members offered GM new tax abatements 
and other incentives to keep production facilities open.  Still, municipal officials could 
not persuade the automotive giant and other local employers to maintain their Flint 
operations.   
The nation‘s post-World War II economic boom ended with the twin energy 
crises and ―stagflation‖ of the 1970s.  GM responded to the economic slowdowns of the 
1970s by implementing a harsh austerity program that devastated Flint‘s already ailing 
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economy.  Between 1971 and 1991, the company surrendered approximately 30 percent 
of its share of the domestic automobile market, cut its workforce in the United States by 
50 percent, and closed dozens of plants nationwide.  Although automobile industry 
layoffs and plant closures created economic turmoil in many areas of the country, the city 
of Flint, with its strong trade unions, high wages, and obsolete industrial infrastructure, 
bore the brunt of GM‘s North American restructuring initiatives.  During the 1970s and 
1980s, the corporation slashed nearly forty thousand local jobs and reinvested heavily in 
new automated facilities in the Sunbelt and abroad.  These long-distance capital 
migrations, which created spatial mismatches that even car-owning commuters could not 
overcome, led to an even greater human exodus from Flint.  Between 1974 and 1982, 
Flint‘s population declined by a staggering 20 percent.  Mortgage defaults and property 
abandonment reached all-time highs during this period.
1
      
In spite of the devastation caused by job losses and home foreclosures, Flint‘s 
municipal leaders continued in their efforts to revivify the city.  Initially, their urban 
renewal program revolved around the plan to replace St. John and Floral Park with 
Interstate 475, the downtown freeway interchange, the North End industrial park, and 
Buick City.  By the 1980s, however, the locus of the revitalization campaign had shifted 
toward the downtown business district.  As the industrial crisis intensified, city council 
members and downtown boosters designed a series of proposals to remake Flint into a 
center for research and a first-class tourism and shopping destination.  These efforts 
resulted in a flurry of new developments that included an automotive theme park, a 
shopping center, a high-rise office building, a waterfront ―festival marketplace,‖ a luxury 
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hotel, and a branch campus of a major university, all located in or near the heart of the 
downtown business district.  Within a few short years, though, most of these 
developments had fallen into bankruptcy.  At century‘s end, they stood as vacant 
reminders of the city‘s failed experiment with urban renewal. 
 
Rust Belt 
The flight of jobs and industry from the Vehicle City reached unprecedented proportions 
during the 1970s.  The decade began on a sour note for city officials and tens of 
thousands of area workers.  In September 1970, the UAW launched a grueling sixty-
seven-day nationwide strike against GM.  Though the strike ultimately resolved little, it 
cost local workers millions of dollars in lost wages and caused unemployment rates in the 
city to jump to nearly 50 percent.
2
  That same year, the Genesee Valley Shopping Center 
opened in Flint Township.  Executives from Sears-Roebuck, J. C. Penney, Hudson‘s, and 
Montgomery Ward promptly relocated their downtown stores to the new mall on Miller 
Road.  Shortly thereafter, Smith-Bridgman, the Vogue, Woolworth, and several other 
downtown retail shops closed permanently.  At around the same time, the famed Durant 
Hotel on Saginaw Street shut its doors as well, another casualty of the downtown 
business district‘s long, painful decline.  Between 1967 and 1972, the new mall helped to 
depress sales in the central business district by 32 percent.
3
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The real shock arrived the following year, though.  The energy crisis of 1973-74 
dealt a severe blow to the area‘s economy.  Throughout most of 1973, GM sales were 
strong.  Overall, the company‘s dealers sold 6,512,000 vehicles during the year, breaking 
all previous records.  On October 17, 1973, however, members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced an oil embargo against the United 
States and other nations that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War.  The OPEC action 
helped to deplete the nation‘s oil supply, caused fuel prices to soar, and drove consumer 
interest in smaller, energy-efficient Japanese cars to historic highs.  With only a few 
compact vehicles in their lineups, American automakers suffered severe sales declines 
during the energy crisis.  Between 1973 and 1975, domestic car and truck sales dropped 
from 12.6 million to 9.3 million units.
4
  Sales at General Motors decreased by 23 percent 
in 1974 alone.  During the first quarter of 1975, purchases of GM‘s cars and trucks fell to 
a thirty-year low.  In their 1975 annual report to stockholders, the company‘s directors 
painted a bleak picture of the business climate:  
Most people in the American automobile industry had never experienced 
anything quite like the beginning of 1975.  Inventories of unsold cars were 
alarmingly high, production was sharply curtailed, two of every five 
hourly automobile workers were laid off, consumer confidence was never 
lower, and in showrooms across the country shoppers were few—and 




The economic recession that began in 1973 seemed more like a depression to 
residents of Flint, Detroit, and other vehicle manufacturing centers.  In December 1973, 
Buick General Manager George Elges reported that his division would lay off 5,675 
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employees, including the entire second shift of assembly workers.
6
  Two months later, 
GM officials announced an additional round of layoffs affecting over fifteen thousand 
workers at the Buick and Fisher Body 1 plants.
7
  By the close of 1974, GM‘s area 
workforce had dropped from its postwar high of over eighty thousand to only sixty-six 
thousand.
8
  Within the city, joblessness reached a peak in 1975, when Flint‘s 
unemployment rate ranged between 15 and 20 percent.
9
  Among young African 
Americans, the unemployment rate during that year approached 50 percent.  ―It is 
painfully obvious,‖ civil rights activist Wylie Rogers noted, ―that our community sits 
squarely in the teeth of the storm.‖
10
  Several years later, the NAACP‘s former labor 
secretary Herbert Hill amplified Rogers‘s claims, stating, ―It is evident that a permanent 
black underclass has developed, that virtually an entire second generation of ghetto youth 
will never enter the labor force.‖
11
  Although many of Flint‘s suburbs continued to 
experience modest economic growth during this period, African-American workers found 
it extremely difficult to secure employment outside of the city.  ―Black kids are hemmed 
in,‖ Flint NAACP official Floyd Clack explained.  ―If they can‘t find a job in Flint, they 
are out of luck.  There is no way they can go out to Grand Blanc, Flushing or Davison 
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and find a job like white kids can.  Racism is too deep in those areas and it just isn‘t 
going to happen.‖
12
      
 
 GM Employees  GM Employees 
1946 42,600 1966 76,700 
1947 50,900 1967 72,600 
1948 48,700 1968 74,900 
1949 54,900 1969 76,700 
1950 63,700 1970 60,500 
1951 57,800 1971 69,500 
1952 53,400 1972 68,900 
1953 67,300 1973 73,900 
1954 72,900 1974 63,200 
1955 82,200 1975 59,600 
1956 74,400 1976 67,300 
1957 70,400 1977 73,600 
1958 56,600 1978 76,900 
1959 59,300 1979 76,000 
1960 65,500 1980 62,600 
1961 60,900 1981 65,700 
1962 66,500 1982 55,400 
1963 68,100 1983 58,000 
1964 67,300 1984 61,900 
1965 75,900 1985 62,600 
 
Table 12.1.  Average General Motors employment in Genesee County, 1946-1985.  SOURCE: 
Thomas R. Hammer, Evaluation of Development Potentials for Metropolitan Flint, Michigan 
(Evanston: Northwestern University-CUED Institute, 1986), 2.    
 
Michigan suffered enormous economic losses during the 1970s and 1980s.  
Within the state, the cities of Flint and Detroit were among the hardest hit by the crisis.  
In 1974, state legislators in Lansing passed Public Act 198 (PA 198) in order to generate 
new corporate investment in depressed urban areas.  The new law granted municipal 
officials the authority to reduce tax burdens on industry.  Specifically, this legislation 
gave city governments the power to abate up to 50 percent of a corporation‘s property 
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taxes for as many as twelve years on newly constructed industrial facilities.  For the 
rehabilitation of outdated and ―obsolete‖ plants, employers could receive property tax 
abatements of up to 100 percent.
13
   
PA 198 had an immediate yet unforeseen impact on local economies in Michigan.  
From 1974 to 1983, municipal governments statewide granted 3,228 industrial tax 
abatements worth an average of $2.2 million per firm.  GM executives filed a flurry of 
abatement requests for each of their plants in Genesee County shortly after the new law 
passed.  Desperate to stimulate new investment, members of the Flint City Council 
approved all of the company‘s proposals.  Following suit, officials in Swartz Creek, 
Genesee Township, and Burton also granted abatements to GM.  By 1983, the Flint City 
Council had authorized fourteen abatements for the automaker on over $400 million 
worth of local properties.  When calculated on a per capita basis, the value of these 
abatements totaled $2,937 for every resident of Flint.  In 1978, former city manager 
Thomas Kay, by then a spokesperson for the Manufacturers Association of Flint, 
defended the council‘s actions, declaring, ―GM is Flint‘s best citizen and deserves every 
break they can legally get.‖
14
   
Most city council members held a similar philosophy.  By 1993, the city had 
granted thirty-seven of these tax cuts to General Motors.
15
  Still, many Flint residents 
vehemently disagreed with the council‘s decisions.  Critics of the abatements argued that 
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tax breaks for corporations did little to create new jobs and further impoverished the city 
during an already tumultuous economic period.  Although tax reductions were not the 
sole source of Flint‘s declining economic standing, they nonetheless played a major role 
in depleting the municipal treasury.  In 1973, the city of Flint received over $44 million 
in revenue.  By 1978, municipal receipts had fallen to slightly under $40 million even 
though that was a peak year for GM sales and employment.
16
  During a March 1986 
meeting of the Flint City Council, former Davison school board member Michael Moore 
denounced the abatement program: ―GM has absolutely no plan to not only create jobs 
here in the City, they plan to eliminate jobs.  Why do you keep giving them little presents 
as they continue to pull jobs out of the City?‖
17
  ―This old friend [GM],‖ wrote corporate 
critic Barry Wolf, ―has used the city the way a pimp uses a whore.‖
18
   
PA 198 required abatement recipients to invest in their local economies by 
erecting new buildings, rehabilitating old ones, or purchasing new equipment.  Yet the 
law did not stipulate that these employers had to create new jobs.  In fact, as Moore 
asserted in 1986, the wave of abatements issued during the 1970s and 1980s coincided 
with a net loss of nearly fifteen thousand local positions at GM.  By the close of the 
1970s, a potent combination of GM layoffs, tax abatements, federal spending cuts, and 
runaway inflation had helped to create a severe fiscal crisis at city hall.  In 1980, Mayor 
James Rutherford announced that the city had a $17 million deficit.  To solve the budget 
mess, Rutherford authorized drastic cuts in city services that included a switch from 
weekly to bi-monthly trash collection.  As the garbage piled up all over the city, Flint‘s 
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rat population exploded.  In 1986, officials from the Genesee County Health Department 
revealed that there were more rats than people living in the city.
19
  Despite these 
developments, Mayor Rutherford and others at city hall remained committed to ―supply-
side‖ municipal economics, arguing that the tax cuts would at least preserve existing jobs.  
As well, supporters of the abatements hoped to send a powerful message to corporate 
leaders that local officials could offer benefits to industry that rivaled the subsidies 
available in the Sunbelt.  Speaking on GM‘s behalf, Phillip Hoffman, a manager of the 
company‘s local tax projects, informed city council members that abatements would help 
executives determine where to build future plants.  ―If there is a tax incentive available,‖ 
Hoffman told council members in January 1979, ―that will enter into the annual operation 
costs of any new project and would be added to the bottom line.‖
20
  Statements such as 
these sounded like blackmail to GM‘s critics. 
 Ultimately, tax breaks for General Motors did little to halt the outward flow of 
jobs from Flint.  After suffering devastating market losses in 1974, GM sales and profits 
rebounded dramatically between 1975 and the first half of 1979.  The company‘s 
worldwide sales increased to 9.5 million units in 1978 while its local employment roll 
rose to seventy-eight thousand.
21
  Flush with optimism, Buick‘s general manager George 
Elges offered a bold statement in 1977 on Flint‘s place in the automaker‘s future: 
―Without question, Flint is the largest and most diversified supplier city in the entire GM 
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pipeline and now fits into the overall corporation pattern in a more solid and secure 
manner than it ever did before.‖
22
   
Elges was no prophet, however.  Just two years later, the combined effect of high 
interest rates, inflation, and a second worldwide energy crisis helped to drive the nation‘s 
economy into yet another grueling recession.  In 1980, GM‘s sales declined by 17 percent 
and the corporation lost $762.5 million, its first annual loss since 1921.  By the end of the 
year, executives in Detroit had cut the company‘s domestic workforce from 468,000 to 
376,000.
23
  The 1980 austerity measures were just the beginning, though.  The following 
year, Roger B. Smith, GM‘s chief executive, vowed to cut ―megajobs‖ and make his 
company a ―leaner, tougher, and better corporation.‖
24
  In his quest to make GM tougher, 
Smith oversaw the investment of over $80 billion worldwide on new automated factories, 
product redesign, and plant modernization.  To make the company leaner, however, he 






Over the past two decades, scholars have carefully scrutinized the anti-tax revolts of the 
1970s and 1980s.  Often, historians have argued that this politically conservative, 
―neopopulist‖ rebellion drew its strength from millions of white suburban homeowners 
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and other members of Richard M. Nixon‘s ―Silent Majority.‖
26
  In many of these 
accounts, the state of California takes center stage as the birthplace of the anti-tax 
―backlash‖ that ultimately swept through the nation.  The history of the tax revolt in 
Michigan presents a more complicated narrative, however.  In 1978, Golden State voters 
passed Proposition 13, a controversial law that cut property taxes by 57 percent.  That 
same year, conservative activists in Michigan placed three separate tax limitation 
proposals on the statewide ballot.  Voters decisively rejected two of the three measures, 
though, including the ―Tisch Amendment,‖ a plan similar to Proposition 13.  
Michiganders did endorse Proposal E, the ―Headlee Amendment,‖ by a slim margin, but 
this law was significantly less severe than the tax rollbacks enacted in California and 
other states.  The Headlee legislation established a strict cap on state taxes and required 
local governments to obtain voter approval for new levies.  Yet it also forbade state 
officials from cutting outlays to local governments below 1978 levels.
27
   
With near unanimity, anti-tax protesters in Michigan viewed the 1978 election as 
a defeat.  In 1980, Republican activists mounted a second campaign for tax reform by 
placing Proposal D, another version of Tisch, on the ballot.  Once again, though, voters 
easily blocked the initiative.  Undeterred by these setbacks, conservatives continued to 
fight for California-style tax relief during the last two decades of the century.  Yet voters 
resoundingly rejected these proposals in virtually every instance.  Between 1970 and 
1992, Michigan citizens rejected eight of the nine anti-tax propositions that appeared on 
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the statewide ballot.  In 1994, anti-tax crusaders won an important victory with the 
passage of Proposal A, a plan that limited property assessments and increased the state 
sales tax.  Nevertheless, Proposal A, like Headlee, did not provide the sort of tax 
rollbacks that most conservative political activists endorsed.
28
   
 Evidence from Michigan suggests that historians have overstated the national 
significance of Proposition 13.  At the very least, it seems clear that the anti-tax 
movement in Michigan never gained the same traction that it did in California.  To be 
sure, thousands of white homeowners from the Flint area and elsewhere actively 
supported the statewide tax protests of the 1970s and 1980s.  In the weeks leading up to 
the second Tisch vote, members of We the People ACT (American Citizens Tribunal), an 
anti-tax group based in Pontiac, held several large meetings in Genesee County.  As 
many as three thousand area residents, many of them underemployed autoworkers, joined 
the group prior to the election.  However, these activists usually found themselves in the 
minority, even during the height of the rebellion.  Moreover, most Michiganders, even 
those who embraced the Tisch Amendment and Proposal A, viewed taxes with a 
profound degree of ambivalence.  Tens of thousands of white homeowners loathed 
paying taxes to fund government programs for African Americans and the poor and 
resented the bureaucracies they found at city halls and in Lansing.  Yet many more 
supported local taxes for schools, roads, sewers, and other infrastructure improvements.  
Consequently, the anti-tax coalitions of the 1970s and 1980s often disbanded within 
weeks of statewide elections as supporters with opposing local interests and viewpoints 
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went their separate ways.  Indeed, six months after the 1980 Tisch defeat, Flint Journal 
reporter Bob Sherefkin noted that ACT had waned in popularity and that the tax protest 
movement was ―losing steam‖ in the Flint area.
29
              
In Genesee County, the anti-tax rebellion drew support from thousands of 
politically moderate and Republican-leaning white homeowners.  However, General 
Motors was the undisputed head of the movement.  In fact, at the precise moment when 
grassroots tax protests were faltering throughout the state, the corporate revolt was 
gathering momentum.  In 1985, GM lawyers filed appeals against the company‘s 
property tax assessments in more than two dozen cities nationwide.  The challenge in 
Michigan, filed with the state tax tribunal, included a request for a $178 million reduction 
in property appraisals for the company‘s plants in Flint, Genesee Township, Grand Blanc, 
Burton, and Grand Blanc Township.  Just in the city of Flint, where the appeal cited 
grossly inflated assessments dating back to 1982, GM sought to have its property 
valuations reduced from $303 million to $170 million, a 46 percent cut.
30
  At stake was 
over $30 million in contested tax payments.  As with GM‘s abatement requests, the 
property tax appeal generated a hostile response from a wide array of civil rights 
activists, public officials, and trade unionists.  Even the editorial board of the Flint 
Journal, traditionally a staunch supporter of local manufacturers, publicly opposed the 
company‘s position.  Led by Michael Moore and local autoworker Mike Westfall, the 
campaign against GM‘s tax appeal gained support from consumer critic Ralph Nader, 
actor Edward Asner, and other prominent liberal activists across the country.  As well, 
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Mayor James Sharp, Flint‘s first popularly elected black chief executive, vowed to fight 
on behalf of the city, stating,  
General Motors is an important part of this City and Flint will do whatever 
necessary to help its facilities remain productive.  But like its corporate 
and residential neighbors, General Motors must pay its fair share of taxes.  
We are not going to balance GM‘s budget on the backs of our school 
children.
31
       
            
 Mayor Sharp‘s battle against GM proved to be a costly endeavor.  During the first 
year of the dispute, the city spent $1.5 million just to cover legal fees and property 
appraisal expenses.  As the costs mounted and the city sank deeper into economic crisis, 
municipal officials began a series of negotiations to resolve the imbroglio.  In May 1988, 
Flint City Attorney Richard Figura announced an agreement on GM‘s appeal for the 
Fisher Body 1 plant.  The settlement consisted of a tax refund of $426,667 to be 
shouldered by the city of Flint, Genesee County, the Flint Community Schools, the 
Genesee Intermediate School District, and Mott Community College.  Speaking to 
reluctant council members just prior to their vote on the proposal, Figura acknowledged 
that the payout would provoke bitterness among Flint‘s many unemployed workers.  
Nevertheless, he also pointed out that the city could not afford to maintain a sustained 
legal dispute with GM.  With the city‘s tax base already ravaged by home foreclosures, 
layoffs, and impending plant shutdowns, all but the most strident of GM‘s opponents 
supported the measure.  On May 25, 1988, city council members voted by a seven-to-two 
margin to approve the settlement.
32
  Although the resolution of the Fisher 1 dispute left 
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the appeals on GM‘s other facilities unresolved, the 1988 accord signaled the city‘s 
willingness to forego the courts in favor of negotiation. 
 After years of political fighting and the expenditure of nearly $10 million on legal 
and appraisal services, Flint officials reached an agreement with GM in 1992.  The final 
settlement called for the city to refund $34 million and provide the corporation with a 30 
percent reduction in property tax assessments.  For their part, company officials agreed to 
drop the tax appeal, forgive all interest on the city‘s debts, and coordinate a long-term 
payment plan.  With the city‘s treasury nearly bankrupt, Flint officials ultimately 
conceded defeat in what had become an unwinnable war of attrition.  ―GM wore us 
down,‖ state Senator Joe Conroy admitted.  ―They won with deep pockets.  We couldn‘t 
afford to fight them anymore.‖
33
   
The property tax dispute coincided with a period of great harshness for American 
autoworkers.  Roger Smith‘s 1980s restructuring campaign brought a new wave of plant 
closures to metropolitan Flint.  Locally, GM‘s divestment program reached a peak in 
1986 and 1987.  In December 1986, Flint‘s Chevrolet V-6 engine plant closed 
permanently.  Five months later, GM shut down one assembly line at the Chevrolet truck 
and bus facility on Van Slyke Road.  Near the end of 1987, the company shuttered the 
historic Fisher Body 1 plant, where the sit-down strikes had first erupted.
34
  Between 
1978 and 1987, the combined effects of factory closures and layoffs reduced the 
automaker‘s Genesee County workforce from seventy-eight thousand to forty-eight 
thousand.  With so few industrial facilities left in the city, members of the Manufacturers 
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Association of Flint voted to disband in 1987.  Throughout this period of retrenchment, 
the Vehicle City‘s unemployment rate routinely exceeded 25 percent.
35
   
Desperate to find work, nearly thirty thousand residents moved out of Flint 
between 1982 and 1987, many of them to Sunbelt cities such as Houston or Dallas.  Just 
between 1985 and 1990, the city‘s population dipped by 8.6 percent.
36
  As the migration 
unfolded, local bookstore owners began selling copies of the Houston Post, the Dallas 
News, and other southern newspapers with thick classified sections.  Citywide, 
booksellers sold over a thousand copies of Sunbelt newspapers every day during the 
1980s crisis.  ―The plain truth of the matter,‖ claimed unemployed Houston Post reader 
Marcus Cleveland, ―is that there‘s work down there and none up here.  Period.‖
37
  The 
mass migration from Flint to points southward created difficulties for employees of local 
moving companies, who could not keep their vans and trucks in the city.  ―All our 
equipment is down south,‖ complained U-Haul employee Jerry Clark.  ―I don‘t have a 
third of the equipment that I had a year ago.‖
38
   
The economic malaise of the 1970s and 1980s brought the city of Flint to the 
verge of bankruptcy.  Plant closures, layoffs, and the departure of thousands of white 
homeowners denuded the city‘s once massive tax base, leaving city officials with budget 
shortfalls that seemed to grow with each passing year.  That Mayor Rutherford had to cut 
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garbage collection services was only one indication of how dire the financial situation 
had become.  Throughout the city, whole neighborhoods looked as though they had been 
abandoned.  During a 1980 interview with a writer from the Detroit News, one 
unemployed worker explained why the city seemed so empty: ―Flint is folding up.  
There‘s nothing here, no opportunity.  I don‘t think there is going to be any.  No way.‖
39
  
Several years later, a young journalist named Alex Kotlowitz encountered even grimmer 
evidence that the city had fallen on hard times.  Tacked in front of one North End home 
he found a handmade sign that read, ―Night Crawlers $.60 a dozen.  Open 24 hours.‖
40
   
 
Flint‘s ―Great Leap Forward‖ 
Most of the residents who left the city during the 1970s and 1980s meltdowns never 
returned.  Their departures spawned widespread fears about the fate of the Vehicle City.  
In 1984, Michael Moore went so far as to write an obituary for the city in which he 
warned that Flint was on its way towards becoming a ―21st-century ghost town.‖
41
  For 
his part, Neal R. Peirce, a journalist from the Detroit News, referred to Flint as ―Plywood 
City,‖ a place where ―there are so few people about that you might think the neutron 
bomb had hit.‖
42
  Still, civic boosters and elected officials did not give up on their 
revitalization mission.  By the early 1980s, the Floral Park interchange and Interstate 475 
were complete.  The two projects, which had been the centerpieces in the city‘s earlier 
urban renewal campaign, helped to make Flint more accessible to commuters and other 
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non-residents.  Yet the city still lacked the consumer outlets and cultural attractions 
necessary to lure new visitors and investors.  Consequently, municipal leaders used the 
completion of the freeway to launch a second phase of urban development.  Unlike the 
first wave of revitalization, which entailed removing thousands of black residents from 
their neighborhoods, this next stage of urban renewal centered on a bold effort to bring 
new people to the city‘s depressed downtown core. 
 Flint‘s downtown renewal drive began quietly in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
According to popular legend, it originated in 1965, the year in which consumer critic 
Ralph Nader published Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-in Dangers of the American 
Automobile.  Nader‘s acerbic critique of the safety standards employed by automobile 
manufacturers ultimately led to the recall of the Chevrolet Corvair, a popular GM model 
designed to compete with smaller European and Japanese imports.
43
  Several years after 
Nader‘s best-selling account hit bookstores, his supporters in San Jose, California, 
symbolically buried a Chevrolet to protest the selfish priorities of automobile 
manufacturers.  In response to these attacks, Harding Mott, then the head of his father‘s 
foundation, allegedly proposed to build a national automotive hall of fame in downtown 
Flint to celebrate the motor vehicle‘s contributions to American life.  Although no 
evidence corroborates this claim, Flint‘s leading citizens began holding private 
discussions on the matter within a year of the San Jose incident.
44
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 In April 1970, twenty-nine of the city‘s leading executives, retailers, bankers, and 
developers met for a three-day conference to discuss Flint‘s future.  They assembled at a 
lodge owned by the Consumers Power Company near Tippy Dam and the Lake Michigan 
shorefront.  Harding Mott, the event‘s organizer, hoped that the meeting would generate 
new ideas on how private citizens could help to solve the city‘s problems.  In a letter to 
invited guests, all of whom were wealthy white males, he outlined the significance of the 
challenges that faced Flint in the new decade: ―The 1970s will undoubtedly be a decade 
of great importance for Flint.  Whether we ‗make it‘ as a city may well hang in the 
balance, and that balance could be tipped one way or the other by what the leaders of this 
community do at the outset of the decade. . . .‖  ―Flint, frankly is in a war of survival,‖ he 
warned, ―and if we are to win it is going to take all the determination and dedication we 
have.‖  Most of the city‘s leading executives responded to Mott‘s call and attended the 
Tippy Dam conference, where they discussed the idea for an automotive hall of fame, 
debated prospects for downtown renewal, and listened to a speech by Robert Pease, 
president of the Allegheny Conference, who had helped to orchestrate the city of 
Pittsburgh‘s well-known ―Golden Triangle‖ redevelopment project.  Although the 
meeting included discussions on a range of issues such as unemployment, health, culture, 
and civic leadership, downtown revitalization received top billing.
45
   
By all accounts, the spring conclave was a major success.  According to Flint 
Journal reporter Lawrence Gustin, ―By the time the meeting broke up, the twenty-nine 
men were in an enthusiastic mood to solve problems.‖  The mood was so euphoric that 
                                                 
45
 Gilman, ―Urban Redevelopment,‖ 208; H. Mott to Warner, n.d., Warner Papers, box 16, 95-1.1-373, 
Scharchburg Archives; H. Mott to Healy, March 11, 1970, Healy Papers, box 2, folder 37, GHCC; 
―Specific Problem Areas: Tippy Dam,‖ n.d., Warner Papers, box 16, 95-1.1-373; and Gustin, ―Big Plans on 
the Horizon for Central Flint,‖ Flint Journal, June 8, 1971.  See also, Flint Journal, February 17, 1970, 
February 2, 14, June 6, 1971.   
610 
 
Mott later described it as ―the spirit of Tippy Dam.‖  Upon their return to Flint, 
conference participants began holding weekly meetings to trade ideas for downtown 
redevelopment.  In October 1971, they formed the Flint Area Conference, Inc. (FACI), ―a 
nonprofit organization of civic and business leaders working with public officials in an 
effort to meet unfilled physical and economic needs of the community.‖  The group‘s 
board of directors included Harding Mott; J. L. Gillie, an executive from Consumers 
Power Company; Alfred W. Hewitt, a chief officer of the Michigan National Bank; Oz 
Kelly, the head of the Manufacturers Association of Flint; as well as each of GM‘s local 
plant managers.  By design, it seems, FACI‘s board members excluded representatives 
from labor and civil rights groups such as the UAW and the NAACP.  Gustin later 
explained the group‘s homogeneous composition, writing, ―Since FACI will not be 
primarily devoted to solving social problems, no effort is being made to include all 
segments of the community.‖
46
 
The leaders of FACI believed that a revitalized downtown business district would 
have a beneficial effect on the rest of the region.  They hoped that the rebirth of Saginaw 
Street would ―act as a catalyst for a physical and economic resurgence of the central area 
of Flint – new businesses, new buildings, a new life, a new look.‖  FACI member and AC 
Spark Plug official Joseph Anderson was convinced that a vibrant downtown would 
generate a ―renaissance of spirit, pride, and progress in the Genesee Metropolitan 
Area.‖
47
  To pursue those goals, the new group hired several planning firms to create 
Centric 80: A Revitalization Strategy for Flint.  Released in February 1972, the report 
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reflected the executives‘ desires to bring people back to downtown Flint.  The plan 
recommended a new downtown campus for the University of Michigan-Flint (UM-Flint), 
an automotive hall of fame near the Flint River, and other ―people generating‖ facilities 
and activities on the riverfront.
48
   
Harding Mott and other members of FACI‘s board of directors welcomed the 
report‘s proposals.  However, the economic recession of 1973-74 forced the group to 
shelve its downtown plans for several years.  FACI leaders continued to meet privately, 
though, where they added new developments to their wish list.  By the close of 1975, 
FACI, the Mott Foundation, and other civic groups had created a sweeping revitalization 
plan for the central business district that surpassed the modest recommendations included 
in Centric 80.  In December, representatives from the Mott Foundation and FACI 
publicly announced their support for AutoWorld, a downtown automotive museum and 
theme park; Riverfront Center, which included a high-rise hotel, shopping complex, and 
convention center; a Flint River flood control and beautification program; and the Doyle 
project, a mixed-income housing development just north of the central business district.  
To help launch the enterprising plan, the Mott Foundation offered $4.25 million in start-
up grants and a firm commitment to future fundraising.  Quickly, the mayor and city 
council members offered their full support.
49
     
The collaborative efforts of leaders from FACI and the Mott Foundation helped to 
galvanize the city‘s massive downtown renewal program.  Several months after the 
December announcement, the Flint Journal announced that Flint‘s ―Great Leap Forward‖ 
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was underway.  The first encouraging signs of downtown redevelopment surfaced in 
1977, when UM-Flint unveiled its first building just south of the Flint River.
50
  In 1979, 
Riverbank Park, the waterfront beautification project, opened adjacent to the new 
campus.
51
  At around the same time, the Windmill Place shopping center opened near 
downtown and the Mott Foundation purchased land just north of the river for AutoWorld.  
Shortly after that, the $30-million Hyatt Regency Hotel, also on the waterfront, 
welcomed its first customers.
52
  To persuade visitors and shoppers to patronize these new 
developments, FACI sponsored the ―Buy Local‖ and ―Flint Image Improvement‖ 
programs, both designed to publicize the pleasures of shopping downtown.  As well, the 
group supported the ―Flint Is Alive and Well‖ media campaign—which included 
billboards and other advertisements meant to polish Saginaw Street‘s tarnished 
reputation.
53
  Supporters of the downtown projects even created a rap music anthem, 
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―The Flint Booster,‖ to trumpet the new and improved central business district.  The 
lyrics to the song illustrate the optimism that accompanied Flint‘s Great Leap Forward: 
Auto World and Buick City 
Will help Flint gain vitality 
 
Mayor Rutherford is turning Flint around 
And things are happening downtown 
 
Flint is getting back in the race 
We have a nice new Windmill Place 
 
U of M Flint‘s downtown Campus 
Has really helped all of us 
 
We all can really have a lark 
At our splendiferous Riverbank Park 
 
The ripple effect from Hyatt Regency 
Is spreading to every community.
54
 
       
Throughout this period of frenetic development, over a half dozen major new 
attractions sprouted on or near the downtown waterfront, prompting Flint Journal 
reporter Lee Bergquist to remark, ―There‘s a whole lot of developin‘ goin‘ on in Flint.‖
55
  
Each of the projects was part of a broad strategy to lure new residents, shoppers, tourists, 
jobs, and investors back to the shrunken city.  The real showpieces of the downtown 
renewal campaign, however, were the Hyatt Regency Hotel, AutoWorld, and the Water 
Street Pavilion, a festival marketplace near UM-Flint designed by renowned developer 
James Rouse.
56
  Of the three major projects, AutoWorld was the lynchpin of the overall 
program.  After nearly two decades of planning, the $73-million park opened with great 
fanfare in July 1984.  The project, like most of the others downtown, drew financial 
support from a variety of public and private sources, including $31 million from the Mott 
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Foundation, $36.5 million in public funds, $4 million from local donors, and nearly $9 
million from Capital Income Properties, an east coast investment firm.  For their part, 
General Motors officials contributed $1 million to support the effort.  In the weeks 
leading up to the grand opening, civic boosters raved that AutoWorld was the largest 
enclosed amusement park in the world.  In truth, though, this development—operated by 
the Six Flags Corporation—was equal parts theme park, museum, and shopping center.  
Unlike the mall, though, it required an admission fee of $8.95.
57
   
Beneath AutoWorld‘s studded dome—which bore a striking resemblance to a 
stegosaur‘s back—were a variety of attractions including a carousel and ferris wheel, 
shops and restaurants, a giant automobile engine, a carnival ride through ―The Humorous 
History of Automobility,‖ an IMAX movie theater, and a mock assembly line operated 
by robots.  The park also contained a huge replica of downtown Flint, designed to 
resemble Saginaw Street as it looked in 1900 (minus the dust, streetcars, and horse 
manure).  This idealized version of the old downtown featured a flowing river, 
comfortable benches, soothing music, and $500,000 worth of tropical plants and trees.  
Hoping to use the city‘s depressed economic climate to their advantage, promoters from 
Six Flags marketed the facility as an escape from the drudgery of life in Flint.  ―Visit 
AutoWorld,‖ one advertisement urged, ―and leave the real world behind.‖  For many of 
the area‘s older residents, the downtown simulacrum was the highlight of the AutoWorld 
experience.  According to some visitors, it brought back memories of ―Old Flint,‖ the city 
that existed before the layoffs and plant closures (and perhaps desegregation).  Joanne 
Ladd, a Burton resident who toured the complex, commented on how AutoWorld made 
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her wistful for the Saginaw Street of her childhood: ―The old time ‗flavor‘ I remember of 
downtown Flint was there.  It could only be topped if there had been a Kresge‘s and that 
candy store where you could get a phosphate in a soda glass.‖  To some, though, 
AutoWorld only served as a reminder of how unattractive the real downtown had 
become.  ―Mostly,‖ another visitor claimed, ―I just remember thinking that being in ‗Old 





Figure 12.1.  Opening day parade at AutoWorld, July 1984.  Courtesy of 
www.toysaregoodfood.com.     
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Not everyone agreed that ―Old Flint‖ and AutoWorld were worth celebrating.  
Several weeks after the opening, a group of Asian Americans objected to a display at the 
park that derided Japanese-made automobiles.  The poster in question depicted ―a car 
with caricatured Oriental features – buck teeth and slits for eyes reminiscent of World 
War II propaganda art – dive-bombing an aircraft carrier labeled ‗Detroit‘ against a rising 
Sun background.‖  After receiving complaints from members of Citizens for Justice, an 
Asian-American activist group, Six Flags spokesperson Kathy Schoch defended the 
artwork, arguing that it was part of a ―satirical display that documents attitudes towards 
the automobile.‖  Surprisingly, she also suggested that tourists could construe plenty of 
other things in the complex as offensive.  To illustrate her point, Schoch pointed out 
another poster, this one featuring an image of ―a used-car salesman in a loud plaid coat 
with a large nose that might be taken as a Jew.‖  ―You‘ve got to view it in context,‖ she 
added.  ―The pictures poke fun at all kinds of people – rednecks, housewives, and 
Texans. . . . We haven‘t had any comments or complaints about it.‖  Despite Schoch‘s 




Many more, however, simply viewed the park as boring and overpriced.  Prior to 
the July ribbon cutting, Mott Foundation President William S. White, a major supporter 
of the project, commissioned several studies to determine how many people would visit.  
Most experts predicted that the development would draw around a million customers per 
year.  White was confident that this goal was attainable.  Indeed, he assumed that throngs 
of tourists and locals would enjoy the amusement park, eat a meal downtown, and then 
perhaps shop at the Water Street Pavilion, which opened nearby in 1985.  Some out-of-
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town guests, he and others imagined, would even stay overnight at the Hyatt Regency 
Hotel.
60
  These ideas turned out to be fanciful, though.  By the fall of 1984, the crowds at 
AutoWorld had already started to dwindle.  Although business often improved on 
weekends and around holidays, the park appeared empty on most days.  For employees, 
most of whom earned the minimum wage, work at the facility was often monotonous.  ―I 
worked at ‗The Humorous History of Automobility‘ and I still remember its inane theme 
song, which I had to hear 8 hours a day every day,‖ a former employee recalled.  ―I had 
to take the job because jobs were scarce and I wanted to save up enough money to get out 
of Flint.  I snorted a lot of ground-up No-Doz during those days, just because the 
repetitiveness of the job put me to sleep.‖  ―It is boring as hell,‖ UM-Flint professor Neil 
O. Leighton fumed.  ―Even my 16- and 12-year old sons found it boring, with the 
exception of the IMAX film.‖  According to one survey, 30 percent of the people who 
visited the facility indicated that they would not recommend it to their friends.
61
 
To remain profitable, AutoWorld required a million paying customers each year.  
When it became apparent that this would not happen, the park‘s financiers moved quickly 
to close it down.  In December 1984, just six months after the grand opening, officials 
from Six Flags announced that the park would be open only on weekends through the 
remainder of the winter.  A month later, investors closed the facility altogether.
62
  The 
building reopened for several brief periods over the next few years, but poor attendance 
and the state‘s depressed economy continued to frighten away tourists and investors.  In 
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1994, AutoWorld shut its doors permanently.  Following the closure, city leaders 
received several redevelopment proposals, including one advocating a new casino for the 
site.  Voters rejected that plan in November 1994, however.  Embarrassed by the failure, 
White and other representatives from the Mott Foundation demanded that the building be 
leveled to make way for new projects.  In 1997, White got his wish when a crew of 
workers from Best Wrecking in Detroit tore down the facility.  Hoping to assist with the 
marketing of the soon-to-be vacant land, WJRT broadcast part of the demolition on live 
television in an event dubbed, ―Boom for Growth.‖
63
               
 The AutoWorld fiasco severely undermined the city‘s entire downtown renewal 
effort.  By 1987, at least six of the stores in the new festival marketplace had gone out of 
business.  Although the managers of the Hyatt Regency ran an aggressive advertising 
campaign to lure conventioneers and other travelers, the luxury hotel remained virtually 
empty on most nights.  By century‘s end, the Hyatt, Water Street Pavilion, and Windmill 
Place had all fallen into bankruptcy.
64
  Significantly, the UM-Flint campus and a new 
office building owned by the state of Michigan survived the downtown‘s collapse.  
However, these two facilities failed to generate the customers needed to support 
downtown business owners.  Part of the difficulty stemmed from the fact that tourists, 
suburbanites, and thousands of Flint residents clung to the notion that the central business 
district was dangerous in spite of evidence suggesting that it was the safest area in the 
city.  Even among UM-Flint students, government workers, and others who frequented 
downtown, most preferred to do their shopping, dining, and partying elsewhere.  This 
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was in part a reflection of the university‘s housing policies and the architecture of the 
campus, which militated against trips to downtown stores.  Because the new school had 
no on-campus housing, virtually all students commuted to class by car, most from a 
distance of over six miles.  Once they arrived downtown, students and faculty members 
parked their vehicles in one of several garages attached to classroom buildings by 
enclosed, climate-controlled ―skyways.‖  Likewise, workers in the state‘s new office 
building could avoid the street by using aboveground walkways.  These overhead 
passages made it possible for students, faculty, campus visitors, and government workers 






Figure 12.2.  An elevated ―skyway‖ at the University of Michigan-Flint.  Photograph by 
Andrew R. Highsmith, 2005. 
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Like AutoWorld, Water Street, the Hyatt Regency, and Windmill Place, scores of 
downtown restaurants and shops closed during the prolonged economic crisis of the late 
twentieth century.  Even fast food establishments found it difficult to survive in Flint‘s 
depressed downtown core.  In a 1986 report, researcher Thomas R. Hammer noted that 
there were none of these franchises left in downtown Flint.  ―In central Flint,‖ he 
explained, ―you simply cannot buy a Big Mac, Whopper, or Double with Cheese.‖
66
  
Willing to try almost anything to turn things around, city workers and business owners 
attempted to mask the downtown‘s decline by painting faux storefronts onto abandoned 
buildings.  This act of desperation fooled very few people, though.  In 1986, as 
unemployment surged past 25 percent, Money magazine released its ―Best Places to Live 
in America‖ issue.  Much to the chagrin of civic boosters, Flint came in last place.
67
   
 
Michael Moore and the Rust Belt Synthesis 
The intense local battles over layoffs, plant closures, property taxes, and downtown 
development helped to spawn a new generation of activists in Flint during the 1970s and 
1980s.  One such individual was Fran Cleaves, who in 1982 helped to build a shantytown 
called ―unemployment city‖ in downtown Flint.  Complete with tents and a soup line, 
Cleaves‘s village attracted hundreds of visitors who joined her in calling for a national 
moratorium on plant closings.
68
  The most noteworthy of the city‘s new organizers was 
Michael Moore, however.  After losing his seat on the Davison school board, Moore 
moved to the Vehicle City, where he founded the Flint Voice, an alternative weekly 
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newspaper.  Later renamed the Michigan Voice, the newspaper attracted an 
extraordinarily talented pool of angry but funny young writers and activists including Ben 
―Rivethead‖ Hamper, a local autoworker and writer, and Kotlowitz, a journalist who 
went on to author several award-winning books on urban poverty and social inequality.
69
  
In ―I, Shop Rat,‖ a 1982 Voice column, Hamper described his experiences as an 
underemployed GM operative: 
Over the past two years I‘ve been bounced back and forth from the bread 
line to the rivet line to the benefit line to the axle line so many times, I feel 
like some experimental human ricochet that GM is testing out just how 
much they can dribble one‘s world before it drops right into the lost and 
found with a severe case of job lag.
70
   
 
Moore and his colleagues won a wide following for their muckraking essays on 
unemployment, urban renewal, police brutality, plant closures, and other local topics.  
During the campaign to defeat GM‘s tax appeal, Moore worked closely with Flint 
autoworker and UAW activist Mike Westfall, Ralph Nader, and Jim Musselman, an 
attorney with Nader‘s Center for the Study of Responsive Law.  It was during this period 
that Moore first considered a career in filmmaking.  In April 1985, Nader wrote a letter to 
Roger Smith asking him to visit Flint to explain why he authorized GM‘s tax appeal.  The 
following month, Musselman attended a meeting of corporate shareholders, where he 
offered a similar invitation to Smith.  To raise awareness about the situation, Westfall 
proposed making a documentary film about plant closures and layoffs in Flint with all 
profits earmarked for unemployed workers.  Moore and Musselman supported the idea, 
but Westfall could not raise the funds necessary to begin filming.  In 1987, Moore 
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revealed that he was going to begin work on his own film about Flint and General 
Motors, which he planned to title either ―Dance Band on the Titanic‖ or ―My 
Hometown.‖  Westfall and Musselman shared all of their research on GM and agreed to 
film interviews for the project.  At some point in 1988, however, Moore decided to 
change the theme of the film.  Instead of focusing on GM and its troubled hometown, the 
new version of the movie revolved around Moore‘s personal quest to convince Roger 
Smith to visit Flint.  Renamed Roger and Me, Moore‘s revamped, more egocentric film 
arrived in theaters in 1989.  Although Moore had clearly borrowed many ideas from 
Westfall, Nader, and Musselman, he failed to acknowledge them either in the film or 
after its release.  Much to the surprise of his former colleagues, the movie quickly 
became one of the highest grossing documentary films in American history.
71
   
 Roger and Me follows Moore (Me) across the country as he attempts to meet with 
Roger Smith (Roger).  Throughout the film, Moore hilariously stalks his elusive foe at 
shareholders‘ meetings, the Detroit Athletic Club, the GM corporate headquarters, a 
yacht club, and other locations in an attempt to convince the executive to witness the 
devastation caused by GM‘s plant closures in Flint.  Interwoven throughout these 
comedic situations, however, are scenes of abandoned homes, tenant evictions, and 
interviews with local residents who reflect upon Flint‘s declining fortunes and the fates of 
unemployed autoworkers.  Like other articulations of the Rust Belt Synthesis, the 
narrative of Roger and Me turns on a series of juxtapositions between scenes of poverty 
and wealth, hope and despair, past and present.  At several key moments in the film, 
Moore skillfully uses cutaway shots and other cinematographic techniques to contrast the 
Vehicle City‘s prosperity during the postwar era with the gloom of postindustrial Flint, a 
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city where the American Dream seems to be dying.  During a January 1990 interview 
with television host Phil Donahue, filmed on location in Flint, Moore elaborated on the 
film‘s commentary on the American Creed: ―Phil, you know, the American Dream used 
to be that if you worked hard, and the company prospered, you prospered.  Now it‘s you 
work hard, the company prospers, you lose your job.‖
72
  At the core of Roger and Me is a 
tragic story about the demise of the postwar American Dream. 
 Moore‘s film, perhaps the most iconic statement of the Rust Belt Synthesis yet 
produced, highlights the human implications of deindustrialization by focusing on the 
sense of alienation and abandonment felt by Flint‘s unemployed autoworkers.  For 
Moore, GM‘s rejection of Flint—signified by the corporation‘s decision to close local 
plants while opening new ones in the Sunbelt and Mexico—marked the end of a 
prosperous era.  Although the losses documented in the movie were very real, this theme 
of nostalgia is nonetheless deeply problematic in light of Flint‘s long and tangled history 
of racial division and metropolitan development.  The film‘s stark contrasts between past 
and present serve to obfuscate both the processes of deindustrialization and the myriad 
ways in which Flint residents experienced corporate divestment.  Roger and Me makes no 
mention of the postwar capital migrations that ultimately helped to impoverish the city.  
Nor does it address how racial exclusions shaped Flint‘s rigidly delimited opportunity 
structure during the postwar and civil rights eras.  Instead, Moore‘s account frames the 
1940s and 1950s as an epoch marked by growing prosperity, social opportunity, and 
GM‘s firm commitment to the city.  By neglecting to address racism and the social and 
economic implications of the postwar suburbanization of capital, Roger and Me presents 
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a skewed narrative of abandonment that acknowledges the experiences of only white 
workers.  In 1989, African-American historian Nell Irvin Painter reflected on this 
prevailing tendency among labor history scholars, left-leaning activists, and other 
proponents of the Rust Belt Synthesis.  ―The new labor history has a race problem,‖ she 
asserted.
73
  Like the labor histories that Painter criticized, Roger and Me also has a race 
problem.  For even in Flint, the place once known as the ―town of seven wonders,‖ there 
was never a golden era of equal opportunity.     
 Roger and Me cost less than $200,000 to produce.  Still, it attracted millions of 
viewers and won extraordinary acclaim from an international audience of film critics.  It 
won best documentary film honors from the New York Society of Film Critics, the 
National Society of Film Critics, the Los Angeles Society of Film Critics, and the 
National Board of Review.  Viewers in Flint greeted Roger and Me with a mixed 
response, however.  At the 1990 taping of the Phil Donahue show, Fran Cleaves‘s 
husband Herbert, also an activist, spoke out in support of the film:  
Phil, this town is not coming back on its feet.  The reality is, what he 
[Moore] did, he put Flint on the map for everybody in the world to see that 
disgraceful kinds of things that‘s happened to the people in this town.  He 
did it.  I‘m glad he did it.  We‘re going to support you.  And we are going 
to get 20/20 here.  We want Primetime, NBC, ABC—you‘ve got to bring 
them here!  Bring them to Flint!
74
   
 
Cleaves and many others embraced the publicity generated by the film and hoped that it 
would spur government officials to intervene on the city‘s behalf.  The films critics, 
though, feared that Moore had permanently sullied the city‘s reputation.  After viewing 
the controversial movie, Woodrow Stanley, the city‘s third black mayor, denounced 
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Moore as a ―pimp‖ and charged him with irrevocably damaging Flint‘s public image.
75
  If 
Flint‘s problems derived from negative beliefs, as many civic boosters maintained, then 
Roger and Me surely dealt the city a knockout blow.       
__________ 
 
Roger Smith and his colleagues met great resistance from Michael Moore and other Flint 
residents who opposed GM‘s restructuring efforts.  Yet even the company‘s staunchest 
critics could not sidestep the fact that decades of corporate divestment had left Flint‘s 
inner-city plants increasingly obsolete.  Late twentieth-century job losses in the Vehicle 
City derived from a combination of poor sales, outsourcing, automation, and the 
shuttering of outdated facilities.  In cities across the country, GM officials closed their 
oldest factories first.  During a 1987 congressional hearing, GM President F. James 
McDonald revealed the criteria that corporate officials used to determine shutdowns.  
According to McDonald, the top two factors executives considered were the age of the 
factory and the ―useful life‖ of the facility.  In addition, McDonald admitted that 
―landlocked‖ urban plants, especially those of the two- and three-story variety, would be 
among the first to close.
76
  With its dozens of older, multi-story industrial buildings, the 
island city of Flint could claim few state-of-the-art factories at century‘s end.     
The deindustrialization of Flint thus continued unabated during the 1990s.  In 
May 1990, GM representatives announced that they were going to close and demolish 
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Plant 2A, formerly Fisher Body 2, at the Chevy in the Hole complex.  Two years later, 
the company revealed plans to shut twenty-one factories nationwide including the 
Chevrolet V-8 engine facility on Van Slyke Road.
77
  The most serious blow to the local 
economy occurred in 1999, however, when General Motors shuttered Buick City, GM‘s 
largest industrial complex in North America.  During the mid-1980s, GM invested $475 
million to modernize and automate the factory.  By the early 1990s, the independent 
market research firm of J. D. Power and Associates had ranked the North End behemoth 
as the highest-quality automobile plant in North America.
78
  Nevertheless, rising 
demands for minivans, pickup trucks, and sport utility vehicles severely eroded Buick‘s 
share of the large vehicle market.  Between 1980 and 1999, the number of Buicks sold in 
the United States declined from 720,858 to 445,611.
79
  In their attempt to ―rightsize‖ 
production, GM executives closed Buick City and shifted its operations to newly 
constructed plants in the Michigan communities of Hamtramck and Orion Township.
80
  
Several years after the Buick City demolition, journalists from the Detroit Free Press 
adopted the phrase, ―The Fall of Flint,‖ to describe the city‘s long, hard decline.
81
 
For many local and national observers, GM‘s decision to close plants in Flint 
marked a major historical turning point between the end of Fordism and the rise of the 
Rust Belt.  In reality, however, the plant demolitions were the culmination of GM‘s long 
and circuitous departure from Flint.  Regardless, the shutdown at Buick City constituted 
one of the most devastating moments in the city‘s history.  Dating back to 1904, when the 
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founders of the Buick Motor Company chose Flint as their manufacturing headquarters, 
the Vehicle City had staked its future on the success of General Motors, the growth of the 
American automobile industry, and the permanence of Fordism.  During a 1953 ―Flint 
Community Salute to Buick,‖ Chamber of Commerce members reminded residents of the 
unbreakable ties that bound Buick and Flint: ―Buick and Flint . . . Flint and Buick.  These 
are inseparable.  They are linked traditionally in a strong kinship which has no parallel in 
America.  Wherever Buick is known, so is known the name of Flint.‖
82
  For the tens of 
thousands of citizens who grew up believing those words, the closure of Buick City 
created a grave identity crisis.  Pondering the psychological implications of the news, 
journalist Warren Cohen from U.S. News and World Report asked, ―How can a town 
nicknamed ‗Buick City‘ not make Buicks?‖
83
  Like chameleons, the ―Buick City‖ and its 
residents would have to find new identities—and new jobs, thousands of them—for the 
twenty-first century. 
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America Is a Thousand Flints 
 
 
GM‘s retreat from Flint devastated all but the most sanguine of the Vehicle City‘s 
boosters.  The Flint Area Conference quietly disbanded in 1988, its members disgraced 
by the failures of the Great Leap Forward.  Several years later, in an article on 
deindustrialization, New York Times reporter Don Terry concluded, ―The Vehicle City is 
running out of gas.‖
1
  For his part, Michael Moore reaffirmed his earlier prediction that 
the city would soon cease to exist.  ―My fear,‖ he admitted in 1999, ―is that Flint is going 




  At century‘s end, hope seemed to 
be in short supply in the Vehicle City.   
Even in the face of such pessimism, however, many civic leaders remained 
confident about the city‘s twenty-first century fate.  Many of those who believed that 
Flint‘s best days were ahead viewed GM‘s plant closures as a blessing of sorts—an 
opportunity for economic diversification and a chance to obtain a brighter postindustrial 
future for a city that had bound its future to America‘s ailing automobile industry for far 
too long.  ―Flint is like a Phoenix waiting to rise out of the ashes,‖ claimed Gary Ford of 
the Chamber of Commerce.  ―The only thing working against us is our name.‖  Ford and 
others vowed to fight on for a new and better Flint in spite of the gloomy prophecies that 
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proliferated at the end of the twentieth century.
3
  Flint‘s political leaders and civic 
boosters largely failed in their efforts to stem the outward flow of jobs, people, and 
resources, however.  Indeed, Flint recently celebrated its sesquicentennial and GM‘s 
hundredth anniversary amidst a deep, intractable, and seemingly permanent state of urban 
crisis.      
 
Beyond Abandonment 
Regardless of the city in question, most accounts of the Rust Belt‘s collapse revolve 
around the closely related themes of white flight and corporate abandonment.
4
  The 
prevailing wisdom regarding the ―Fall of Flint‖ fits neatly into these analogous 
declension narratives.  To Michael Moore and other cultural critics, the closing of Buick 
City represented GM‘s abandonment of Flint, the death of prosperity, and perhaps even 
the end of the city itself.  As economic conditions deteriorated during the 1990s, 
apocalyptic visions of the city‘s future circulated widely, manifesting themselves on t-
shirts, mugs, and caps reading, ―Flint: Last One Out, Turn Out the Lights.‖  In 2001, the 
Old 97‘s, a country music group, released ―Buick City Complex,‖ a song that grapples 
with the human implications of deindustrialization.  The song‘s chorus imagines a bipolar 
future of romantic inhibition and terrifying loneliness in a dying city with neither jobs nor 
people:  
They‘re tearing the Buick City Complex down.   
I think we‘re the only people left in town.   
Where are you gonna move, where are you gonna move?   
Do you wanna mess around?
5
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In a June 2007 column in the Uncommon Sense newspaper, local satirist ―Mad Mac‖ 
asked, ―When Flint finally closes next year, what will people in the future think about all 
the expressways, bridges, ramps, railroads, and the airport that all intersect here . . . 
where there isn‘t anything?‖
6
  Mad Mac and other locals turned to gallows humor as a 
form of cultural protest against white flight and corporate divestment.  
Journalists and academic researchers have adopted a similar approach to narrating 
Flint‘s descent into urban crisis.  In 1996, sociologist Steven P. Dandaneau published A 
Town Abandoned: Flint, Michigan, Confronts Deindustrialization, a book that focuses on 
boosters‘ futile efforts to reverse industrial decline.  Like most other chroniclers of the 
city‘s recent past, Dandaneau employs the metaphor of abandonment to explain plant 
closures, job losses, and the dismantling of Flint‘s urban empire.
7
  The causal framework 
of flight has generated many useful insights for understanding Flint‘s downward 
economic trajectory.  It is undeniable that tens of thousands of whites deserted Flint and 
other major cities when integration arrived in their communities.  Their departures 
reinforced the color line and severely impaired the city‘s economic health.  Likewise, it is 
impossible to dispute the claim that GM and other local employers shifted billions of 
dollars in capital and resources from the central city to the suburbs and the Sunbelt in the 
second half of the twentieth century.  The outmigrations of white taxpayers, capital, and 
jobs devastated urban neighborhoods and wreaked havoc at city hall, where elected 
officials struggled to balance budgets and deliver services to a municipality whose 
population seemed to be in perpetual decline.  By 2002, Flint‘s fiscal crisis had become 
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so severe that Governor John Engler appointed an emergency financial manager to run 
the bankrupt city‘s day-to-day operations.
8
          
Still, the concept of abandonment is highly problematic, not least because General 
Motors and tens of thousands of white residents did not completely pull out of Flint and 
may never.  Furthermore, civic boosters and neighborhood activists refused to relent in 
their struggles to revitalize the city.  Even during the era of mass layoffs and plant 
closures, city leaders sought to renew Flint and searched, though often in vain, to find 
reasons for optimism.
9
  Indeed, struggles over the fate of urban America continued to 
rage long after the majority of the nation‘s whites had moved from cities to suburbs.  In 
1997, just when the industrial nadir seemed to be at hand in Flint, a Mott Foundation 
researcher noted the hidden benefits of the city‘s awful reputation for crime, poverty, 
failing schools, and unemployment: ―Flint‘s image is so bad it‘s good, in that any positive 
developments are bound to attract attention.‖
10
  A decade later, Paul Wenstrom, a local 
Merrill Lynch executive, offered an even more hopeful assessment of the city‘s 
development potential: ―I think businesses will realize this is a community with a terrific 
infrastructure in place.  They might see this is an opportunity that‘s unmatched if you 
want a lot of land and a nice residence for not too much money.‖
11
     
 The most remarkable facet of Flint‘s postwar and recent pasts is not that white 
people, employers, and investors have turned their backs on the city, though many surely 
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have.  Rather, it is the ways in which government officials, civic leaders, and ordinary 
residents have recreated and fortified racial and economic inequalities in their attempts to 
revitalize the region.  The phrase ―Demolition Means Progress‖ was not just an empty 
slogan.  In fact, it expressed the operating ethos of the city‘s political and economic 
leadership during the bulk of the twentieth century.  In the shops, schools, and 
neighborhoods of Flint, civic leaders constantly tried to revitalize the city and its people 
by demolishing inefficient structures and institutions.  During the Great Depression, 
members of the board of education and the Mott Foundation hoped to renew the city by 
re-making public schools into segregated community centers.  In the 1940s and 1950s, 
federal housing administrators and local developers sought to reinvigorate the real estate 
market by sponsoring new, racially segregated subdivisions outside of the city limits.  
Their interventions helped to make Genesee County one of the most segregated 
metropolitan regions in the United States.  For their part, GM executives and city officials 
worked to revolutionize automobile production by demolishing old urban factories and 
rebuilding new automated ones in all-white suburbs.  When those efforts failed to create a 
renaissance, city leaders launched an ambitious plan to replace black neighborhoods with 
a freeway and new factories.  Yet urban renewal and freeway construction initiatives 
ultimately undermined the city‘s commercial and industrial economies and hardened the 
color line.  In the end, each one of these renewal efforts yielded an even more 
impoverished and racially divided city.  Flint was not empty, however. 
Despite Michael Moore‘s 1999 prediction, the city of Flint did not become a ghost 
town; and neither did other maligned cities such as Detroit, Baltimore, and Cleveland.  
Moreover, business owners and politicians did not surrender in their perennial quests to 
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bring homeowners, development, and jobs back to these shrinking metropolises.  In Flint, 
their efforts hinged on a sustained campaign to create a better perception of the city and 
its people.  Long before the release of Roger and Me, representatives of the Flint 
Chamber of Commerce, the Mott Foundation, and other civic groups argued that Flint‘s 
distressed economic climate stemmed directly from its poor public image.  After the 
film‘s debut, the movement to refurbish Flint‘s reputation reached new heights.  ―A big 
part of the economic development problem,‖ confirmed Mott Foundation researcher 
Thomas Hammer, ―is a need to undo adverse perceptions about Flint and its environs.‖
12
  
In their attempts to polish Flint‘s image and repopulate the city, Ford, Wenstrom, and 
other civic boosters stand in a much longer tradition of urban renewal dating back to the 
Depression and post-World War II eras.   
Like their postwar predecessors in the Sunbelt, Vehicle City boosters in the new 
millennium aggressively publicized Flint‘s pro-business economic climate.
13
  Local 
leaders sought to lure new investors by advertising the city‘s two-tier wage structure, 
surplus labor, low taxes, and severely weakened trade unions.  In 2004, editors from the 
Flint Journal trumpeted the fact that wages in the Vehicle City had fallen well below 
those in Detroit and other nearby cities.  The editors, hoping to use ―our well-known 
economic misfortune as an advantage,‖ urged everyone in the city to ―tell small 
manufacturers and other businesses how much this community has changed, that job-
seekers no longer consider high wages a birthright, and moving here won‘t price them out 
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  Along similar lines, municipal officials waged a successful turn-of-the-
century battle to have Genesee County included in ―Automation Alley,‖ a cooperative 
venture bringing local governments and corporations together to combat southeast 
Michigan‘s reputation for labor militancy and anti-growth economic policies.  Today, 
signs announcing that Genesee County is an Automation Alley community greet 
motorists traveling on Interstate 75 as they enter the Flint metropolitan area.
15
         
Civic leaders augmented their public relations blitz by waging a tireless campaign 
to retain jobs.  As part of that effort, the Flint City Council continued to offer tax 
abatements and other incentives to support new and existing factories and commercial 
enterprises.  The city‘s renewed commitment to GM culminated in the mid-1990s with 
the creation of the Billy Durant Automotive Commission.  In 1997, members of the 
commission presented a ―living agreement‖ to General Motors, a lengthy proposal 
designed to make Flint and Genesee County more appealing to corporate investors.  Led 
by Bill Donahue of the Genesee Area Focus Council, the group consisted of 
representatives from the Genesee County Board of Commissioners, the Flint Board of 
Education, the UAW‘s Region 1-C office, Consumers Energy Company, the Flint-
Genesee Economic Development Conference, the Flint Cultural Center Corporation, and 
the Mott Foundation.   
Included in the agreement were formal pledges to GM in the areas of labor, 
education, health, government, and culture.  On behalf of organized labor, Commissioner 
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Ruben Burks, a regional director from the UAW, promised that trade unionists would 
work to eliminate all unnecessary obstacles to productivity and profitability, support new 
automated technologies, and allow GM to negotiate local work rules on a plant-by-plant 
basis.  Members of the Flint Board of Education vowed to create better laborers by 
formulating ―school-to-work‖ partnerships, developing career training tracks at all local 
high schools, and designing a curriculum that ―puts all classroom learning in a workplace 
problem solving context.‖  Commissioners also agreed to inaugurate a countywide 
wellness campaign in order to reduce GM‘s rising health care costs.  Government 
officials assured executives that they would continue the tax abatement program, provide 
new water and sewer improvements to retain GM employment, and implement an 
aggressive road maintenance plan.  Spokespersons from Flint‘s Public Works Department 
sweetened the transportation deal by offering to repair or rebuild, with no questions 
asked, any ten roads in the city selected by GM plant managers.  To help the company 
lure new executives to the Vehicle City, Larry R. Thompson, president of the Flint 
Cultural Center Corporation, promised to provide GM recruits with free passes to all of 
the center‘s facilities.  The covenant concluded with a strong, open-ended commitment to 
assist the automaker as it adapted to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century:  
The competitive nature of the global automotive market place requires that 
automobile manufacturers adapt quickly to new challenges and 
opportunities.  The same holds true for the communities in which 
manufacturers operate.  The Greater Flint community stands ready to act 
as a full partner with General Motors by evolving institutions with the 
flexibility to respond to unanticipated trends and events, as well as 
articulated needs.
16
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This remarkable offer brought Flint‘s long, complex relationship with General 
Motors full circle.  In an undated postwar letter to Harding Mott, AC Spark Plug 
executive Joseph Anderson once suggested that city leaders needed to do more to 
demonstrate their affection for the company.  ―G.M. is our main employer and bread 
winner,‖ he wrote.  ―It pays ½ of our taxes.  Over the years, G.M. has been very good for 
Flint.  We need to constantly let G.M. know that we love and appreciate them.‖
17
  With 
its impressive package of pledges and incentives, the Durant commission‘s covenant was 
an expression of civic love that harked back to Mayor George Algoe‘s proclamations 
during the 1954 Golden Carnival.   
Ultimately, however, such promises have produced only mixed results.  In 2004, 
GM announced plans to open a new $300 million engine plant in the city and spend $148 
million to upgrade its existing truck and bus complex on Van Slyke Road.  Four years 
later, many civic leaders rejoiced when executives confirmed that they would build an 
additional engine factory in Flint—this one for the Chevrolet Volt, GM‘s highly 
anticipated ―plug-in‖ hybrid car.
18
  These new automated plants helped to fill the massive 
tax void left behind by the closures of Buick City, Chevy in the Hole, and other local 
facilities.  Yet they created few new jobs for city residents.  As expected, GM adhered to 
its existing agreement with the UAW and awarded virtually all new positions to 
unemployed autoworkers—most of whom lived in the suburbs—from Buick City and 
other shuttered facilities in the region.  Still, city council members and Mayor Donald J. 
Williamson offered millions of dollars in tax abatements and infrastructure improvements 
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to secure the new developments.  In an attempt to dispel false optimism about the new 
plants, Second Ward Councilman Ed Taylor warned, ―Nobody in Flint is going to get a 
new job. . . . Nobody [who works at the new factories] is going to buy a house [in Flint].  
They aren‘t going to shop here.‖
19
  Sadly, Taylor‘s prediction turned out to be true.                        
 GM‘s new plants did not stop the deindustrialization of Flint.  In fact, engineers 
unfurled the blueprints for the new factories at the same time that other, more labor-
intensive manufacturing facilities in the region were closing.  In the fall of 2004, a crew 
of workers from Detroit tore down Plant 4 from the mostly empty Chevy in the Hole 
complex on Flint‘s west side.  Plant 4 was the factory from which black autoworker 
Roscoe Van Zandt and his colleagues triumphantly marched following the conclusion of 
the Flint sit-down strikes.  Prior to the demolition, thieves stole the two historical markers 
honoring the sit-downers that stood in front of the building.  In response to the teardown 
and the loss of the signs, Sharon Huntley from UAW Local 659 remarked, ―You just 
want to cry.‖
20
  The following November, GM executives fended off bankruptcy by 
unveiling an aggressive plan to close plants and eliminate thirty thousand manufacturing 
jobs in the United States.  Among the factories slated for closure was the Flint Engine 
North facility, whose workers built V-6 engines near the demolished St. John Street 
neighborhood.
21
  In 2006, production ended at the historic AC Spark Plug plant on Dort 
Highway, by then operated by Delphi Automotive Systems, a GM spinoff company.  
After hearing the news, Dale Mark, a GM retiree living in suburban Genesee Township, 
expressed shock that the sprawling complex had closed: ―I never thought it would.  I 
                                                 
19
 See Flint Journal, October 21, December 1, 8, 16, 2004.  
20
 Flint Journal, November 20, 2004. 
21
 Rick Haglund and Seibt, ―GM Ax Falling on Local Plant,‖ Flint Journal, November 21, 2005. 
638 
 
thought they‘d always need the things we made.‖  Two years after the Delphi factory 
closed, it too met the wrecking ball.
22
         
Public relations campaigns, tax abatements, living agreements, and other 
perquisites offered to investors have generated only minor economic development in the 
city of Flint and its struggling inner-ring suburbs.  The county‘s southernmost 
communities—especially those bordering the booming high-tech corridor in Oakland 
County—benefited substantially from the Automation Alley program and a robust real 
estate market.  Yet Flint and economically depressed suburbs such as Beecher continued 
to hemorrhage jobs, residents, and capital in the new century.  By 2005, additional layoffs 
and plant closures had brought GM‘s local workforce down to approximately fifteen 
thousand.  With so few jobs available, Flint‘s population continued to plummet, sinking 
to 113,000 in 2006.  The city‘s housing vacancy rate that year approached 20 percent.  
Also that year, thousands of suburban homeowners—even those in southern Genesee 
County—began experiencing financial difficulties of their own when the housing and 
stock markets faltered and the nation‘s economy lurched toward recession.  The gathering 
economic storm in the suburbs paled in comparison to the crisis in Flint, however.
23
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Flint and the Fate of Urban America 
After experiencing four decades of uninterrupted deindustrialization, economic decline, 
and depopulation, Flint—like dozens of struggling cities nationwide—entered the new 
millennium in a severely weakened state.  This seemingly boom-proof city continued to 
bleed jobs and residents even during the 1990s heyday of the ―New Economy,‖ when it 
lost approximately 11 percent of its population.  The bad news only mounted in the new 
century.  Despite the city‘s aggressive demolition program for blighted properties, census 
takers counted 6,720 vacant homes in 2000—nearly half of them condemned—out of 
55,464 total housing units.  Things looked gloomy downtown as well.  Visitors to the city 
could not help but notice that the Saginaw Street business district—once the 
entertainment, commercial, and consumer capital of Genesee County—emptied at 5 p.m. 
each day as thousands of government workers, UM-Flint students, and other commuters 
left for their homes in surrounding suburbs.  Downtown lot owners provided free parking 
during off-peak hours to lure new customers, but most area residents continued to do 
their shopping and dining elsewhere, many of them at the Genesee Valley mall in Flint 
Township and the bustling strip plazas nearby on Miller Road.  Although several hundred 
UM-Flint students moved into new on-campus dormitories near the central business 
district in 2008—and though several coffee shops opened on Saginaw Street to serve 
them—there was still no viable consumer sphere downtown.  As 2008 ended, there were 
no movie theaters, grocery stores, or pharmacies located in the city center, and most 
restaurant owners and shopkeepers on Saginaw Street closed their doors after dark.
24
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The collapse of downtown Flint‘s consumer economy was a direct result of the 
decline of manufacturing and the exodus of federal funds, corporate capital, and private 
wealth from the central city.  In 2000, Genesee County‘s average property tax base of 
$47,919 per household was lower than in any other metropolitan region in the state.
25
  
This was primarily a reflection of the high unemployment rates in the city, which ranged 
between 13 and 18 percent.  More striking, however, is the fact that over 40 percent of 
Flint residents over the age of sixteen—37,436 individuals—bowed out of the labor force 
completely in the new millennium.  Per capita incomes in Flint, which stood at $15,733 
in 2000, were thus among the lowest in the nation.  In 2006, officials from the U.S. 
Census Bureau confirmed that Flint was the poorest major city in Michigan (and among 
the most impoverished in the United States), with one in three residents living below the 
federally established poverty level.
26
  The human implications of Flint‘s statistical 
impoverishment emerged most clearly in the early morning hours before trash pickups, 
when poor families arrived in neighborhoods to scour through waste bins in search of 
scrap metal, clothing, and furniture; or during the holiday season, when area food banks 
collected donations and distributed food to the needy.  In December 2004, William Kerr, 
the president and chief executive officer of the Food Bank of Eastern Michigan, issued a 
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plea for assistance—a harrowing reminder that Flint‘s economic crisis had not yet abated: 
―This is the greatest need we‘ve ever experienced. . . . We need the help.‖
27
   
Poverty has always been an equal opportunity condition in urban America.  In 
Flint, thousands of white residents earned wages at or beneath the federal poverty line at 
the turn of the century.  Nevertheless, impoverishment in Flint and virtually all other 
American cities disproportionately affects African Americans, women, and children.  In 
1999, black city dwellers in the Vehicle City earned an average per capita income of 
$13,670, while their white counterparts took home $18,930.  A 2003 report found that 
nearly 40 percent of the city‘s mothers with children less than five years old were 
indigent.  Moreover, 75 percent of Flint‘s public school children were eligible for free or 
reduced-price lunches.  In 2008, the city‘s schools were second only to Detroit‘s in 
statewide levels of racial and class segregation.  Startlingly, many of Flint‘s elementary 
and junior high schools were more segregated that year than they were on the eve of the 
Supreme Court‘s 1954 Brown decision.  Flint was not alone, however.  In fact, 
segregation and income stratification indices increased sharply in urban neighborhoods 
and school districts throughout the nation during the 1990s.  In the cities of Milwaukee 
and Phoenix, to cite just two examples, school segregation along racial lines increased by 
approximately 6 percent just between 1992 and 1997.
28
 
                                                 
27
 Flint Journal, December 1, 2004. 
28
 M. Orfield and Luce, Genesee County Metropatterns, 1-7; U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of Selected 
Economic Characteristics for Flint City, Michigan; U.S. Census Bureau, Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Summary File for County Subdivisions in Genesee County, Michigan (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 2003).  Also, see Keith Schneider, ―Address Segregation in Land Use Plans,‖ Detroit Free Press, 
April 14, 2003; and K. Schneider, ―Michigan Apartheid: Reforming Land Use Policy Can Help Most 
Segregated State,‖ April 17, 2003.  This article, published by the Michigan Land Use Institute, is available 
at http://www.mlui.org/growthmanagement/fullarticle.asp?fileid=16480.  On the nationwide spike in school 
segregation, see M. Orfield, American Metropolitics: The New Suburban Reality (Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2002), 49-64.            
642 
 
As they always have been, Jim Crow schools are in part a reflection of rigid 
housing segregation.  However, the Flint Board of Education continued to play a role in 
upholding racial boundaries at the turn of the century.  During the 1990s, the school 
system continued its drift toward almost complete segregation, freefalling enrollments, 
and financial collapse.  Critics of the magnet program responded to the crisis by arguing 
for a return to more cost effective neighborhood schools.  In 1991, white school board 
member Leo Macksood called for an end to the desegregation program and the limited 
forms of pupil busing that it required.  ―We need to get back to a sound neighborhood 
school program,‖ he claimed.  ―We‘re going to the poorhouse in a school bus.‖
29
  Later 
that year, he raised the issue again: ―There‘s no way to desegregate the school system any 
longer.  Why continue to pay millions maintaining a charade?‖
30
  In the post-
integrationist era, Macksood and other critics of desegregation nationwide advocated a 
return to the neighborhood schools first pioneered by the Mott Foundation in the 1930s.  
By the turn of the century, a growing number of African Americans had joined him.  In 
the grandest of ironies, the burgeoning neighborhood schools movement in Flint brought 
together white and black citizens who had stood on opposite sides of the desegregation 
question for over a generation.  With support for neighborhood schools stretching across 
the color line, Flint‘s voluntary desegregation program simply could not endure.
31
          
In the spring of 2006, under the leadership of a newly appointed African-
American superintendent, Walter Milton, Jr., the Flint Board of Education formally 
cancelled the magnet program and announced the reimplementation of neighborhood 
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  The decision garnered few headlines and spawned little controversy in a 
divided metropolis that had grown weary of integration.  Still, the 2006 policy shift 
marked the ultimate triumph of racial apartheid.  But this was not like the 1950s, when 
residents of the Vehicle City flocked to their community schools by the thousands to 
learn and play in a segregated public sphere.  This time, there was no square dancing in 
the streets to honor Jim Crow‘s victorious return. 
Declining white enrollments made racial integration all but impossible in the Flint 
Public Schools and other urban school districts.  Such was not the case in many of the 
city‘s neighborhoods, however.  Unlike Detroit, Gary, East St. Louis, and other virtually 
all-black cities of the Rust Belt, Flint was still home to a substantial number of whites in 
the new century.  The nearly fifty thousand whites who lived in the city, most of them 
poor or working class, represented approximately 40 percent of Flint‘s overall 
population.  Although this community continued to shrink at a steady clip, thousands of 
white homeowners who were anxious to leave remained trapped by mortgages worth 
more than the market value of their residences.  Many of these would-be sellers chose to 
remain in their neighborhoods rather than face the prospect of huge financial losses in the 
depressed real estate market.  In some instances, sagging property values helped to 
stabilize Flint‘s tenuous interracial balance.  Nevertheless, a plethora of homes remained 
for sale inside the city—many at reduced prices—especially in those neighborhoods 
experiencing racial transitions.  During the first eight years of the new century, thousands 
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Most homeowners who departed Flint relocated to suburban Genesee County.  
With few exceptions, these suburbs remained virtually all white.  In 2000, there were 
311,198 people living in the twenty-seven municipalities, villages, and townships 
surrounding the Vehicle City.  Nearly 90 percent of them were white while only 7 percent 
were African American.  Of the 22,283 African Americans living in suburban Genesee 
County in 2000, almost three-fourths of them resided in Flint Township, Beecher, or 
Mount Morris Township.  As well, two thousand blacks lived in the close-in suburbs of 
Grand Blanc Township, Burton, and Genesee Township.  By contrast, the remaining 
twenty-two communities in Genesee County, with a combined population of 169,522, 
housed fewer than two thousand black people.  In the south suburban city of Linden, 
home to approximately 2,800 people, there were two African Americans in the year 2000.  
Likewise, the northwestern suburb of Montrose contained two black people out of 1,619 
residents.  In the eastern suburb of Atlas Township, where 7,257 people lived, census 
takers found only twenty-four African Americans.  The racial geography was equally 
polarized in the exurban and rural fringes of the Flint metropolitan area.  In the Bavarian-
themed city of Frankenmuth, home to 4,838 mostly wealthy white people (and the 
world‘s largest Christmas store), government officials counted thirteen African 
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Americans.  Jim Crow remained an ever-present feature of the region‘s residential 
landscape in the twenty-first century.
34
      
Sill, evidence from Genesee County and the nation as a whole suggests that it is 
long past time for a more nuanced typology for America‘s increasingly diverse suburbs.  
Although the suburbs and exurbs of metropolitan Flint remained rigidly segregated along 
racial lines in the new century, their class demographies were much more complex.  In 
2000, the exurban hamlet of Owosso, once an all-white ―sundown town,‖ was home to 
only twenty-seven African Americans who comprised 0.2 percent of the population.  
However, most of the city‘s 15,244 whites were solidly working class.  The city‘s median 
household income of $32,576 was nearly $10,000 less than the national average.  Owosso 
was not at all unique, though.  In fact, for every Fenton Township—where median 
household incomes of $71,094 dwarfed national averages by $30,000—there were 
multiple suburbs such as Montrose, Beecher, and Swartz Creek, where residents earned 
salaries at or below national averages.  Between the extremes of Fenton Township and 
Flint, an increasing number of formerly middle-class suburbs were dotted with bank-
owned homes and boarded-up storefronts, all of them testaments to Michigan‘s deep 
industrial crisis.  Despite its pockets of extreme wealth and capital, Genesee County—
like most other metropolitan regions—began to experience the suburbanization of the 
urban crisis in the new century.  In fact, racial and class diversity increased dramatically 
in the waning years of the twentieth century in hundreds of suburban areas throughout the 
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nation, leading Myron Orfield and other policy experts to debunk the ―myth of the 
suburban monolith.‖
35
    
The Vehicle City celebrated its sesquicentennial in 2005 amidst another punishing 
round of plant closures.  Three years later, local citizens joined millions of Americans in 
honoring the hundredth anniversary of GM‘s founding.  Unlike 1954, though, when 
revelers at the Golden Carnival claimed that Flint was the envy of the world, these 
twenty-first century celebrations occurred under dark clouds of uncertainty.  Toward the 
end of 2008, the stock market crashed and the nation‘s economy sank into a deep 
recession.  By November of that year, stock prices had plunged and home and vehicle 
sales had all but halted nationwide.  In response, GM Chairman G. Richard Wagoner, Jr. 
and other American automobile executives declared that their companies were on the 
brink of collapse.  Hoping to avert a potentially devastating series of bankruptcies and job 
losses, Wagoner and his erstwhile rivals from Ford and Chrysler requested an emergency 
―bridge loan‖ from the United States Congress to help their troubled corporations stay 
afloat.  On December 10, members of the U.S. House of Representatives approved a $14 
billion bailout for American automakers.  The following day, however, senators rejected 
the bill, pushing GM another step closer to financial insolvency.  Although it is unclear 
whether federal officials will ultimately approve some sort of relief package—or, for that 
matter, whether General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler will survive the current economic 
crisis—it is almost certain that the future promises more job cuts and austerity for 
autoworkers and their communities.  From coast to coast, cities, suburbs, and rural areas 
as diverse as Indianapolis; Doraville, Georgia; Wilmington, Delaware; Shreveport, 
                                                 
35
 See M. Orfield and Luce, Genesee County Metropatterns, 3; and M. Orfield, American Metropolitics, 28.  
See also, Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven, passim; Wiese, Places of Their Own; and Kruse and Sugrue, eds., 
The New Suburban History.  
647 
 
Louisiana; Lorsdtown, Ohio; Los Angeles; Warren, Michigan; Spring Hill, Tennessee; 
and, of course, Flint and Detroit will experience significant job reductions as GM and 
other automobile manufacturers adjust to weak credit markets and falling demands for 
new cars and trucks.  Still, it is difficult to imagine that Flint and its people could suffer 
any more than they already have over the past two generations.
36
  
 In December of 2005, writers from the Detroit Free Press painted an extremely 
unflattering portrait of the city‘s rusted landscape: ―Parts of the city are eerily empty, 
with vast stretches of vacant land standing in silent testimony to the factories that were 
once there.‖
37
  On the city‘s North End, where St. John Street and Buick City once stood, 
visitors in 2008 could find unobstructed postindustrial vistas and waist-high prairie 
grasses that bore a striking resemblance to a concrete-dipped Kansas.  Today, the 235-
acre Buick City facility—which once employed 28,000 autoworkers in its sprawling 
complex of factories—is a vast postindustrial wasteland of concrete and razor wire.  The 
old AC Spark Plug plants on the city‘s north and east sides and the Chevy in the Hole 
complex in West Flint are also gone.  Without question, deindustrialization has hit Flint 
as hard as any other city in the United States.  In truth, though, postindustrial 
neighborhoods such as those in the North End are seemingly ubiquitous in cities and 
towns throughout the nation.  Yet neither the city of Flint nor its people have 
disappeared; nor have they vanished from Detroit, St. Louis, Gary, Indiana, and other 
predominantly black cities that once formed the backbone of America‘s industrial 
economy.   
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At present, Genesee County is a landscape of Dickensian extremes.  It is a region 
where unimaginable privilege and Gilded Age wealth coexist uneasily with Third World 
squalor and mind numbing hopelessness—a place where whites and blacks live and learn 
separately and unequally despite the poverty, despair, and want that know no color line.  
By nearly all accounts, and without a shred of hyperbole, Genesee County is one of the 
most racially segregated, economically polarized, and politically divided regions in the 
United States.  Perennially, however, Flint competes for this dubious distinction with 





Figure C.1.  Buick City.  Photograph by Andrew R. Highsmith, 2005.   
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Back in 1945, when Americans celebrated the conclusion of World War II and 
looked forward to a future of peace and prosperity, Buick historian Carl Crow claimed 
that the United States consisted of a thousand Flints.
39
  His words ring true today.  The 
America of 2008 is indeed a thousand Flints, but not in the way that Crow imagined.  
There are Flints in the economically depressed neighborhoods of Decatur, Illinois; East 
Palo Alto, California; Camden, New Jersey; Miami, Florida; and Erie, Pennsylvania.  
Flints can be found in big city ghettoes on Chicago‘s south side and in struggling suburbs 
such as East Cleveland, Ohio, and Yonkers, New York.  However, there are also 
thousands of Flints in the booming all-white subdivisions of Silicon Valley and the 
affluent suburbs of Boston, Seattle, Houston, and Charlotte.  There are Flints in the Rust 
Belt and in the Sunbelt, for the conditions of racial, spatial, and economic inequality that 
defined the Vehicle City in the old and new millennia know no regional boundaries.  
Because it took the full weight of government at all levels—along with the efforts of 
millions of ordinary Americans—to build the walls that surround these communities, it 
will require an equally concerted movement to tear them down.     
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